



Vladimir Gliborov

PEŠČANIK

**ZAŠTO SE ZEMLJE
RASPADAJU?
SLUČAJ JUGOSLAVIJA**

Vladimir Gligorov

Zašto se zemlje raspadaju
Slučaj Jugoslavija

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Napomena izdavača

Vladimir Gligorov je ovu knjigu napisao na engleskom, pre 20 godina, na severu Evrope, pretpostavljamo dosta usamljen u starom univerzitetskom gradu Upsala, u Švedskoj. Te davne 1994. knjige su se još uvek slovoslagale, a ratovi devedesetih su bili u punom jeku: ratu u Bosni se nije video kraj, a rat na Kosovu je još uvek pripadao dalekoj budućnosti. Kao jedna od prvih studija o raspadu Jugoslavije, knjiga *Zašto se zemlje raspadaju – Slučaj Jugoslavija* je imala ogroman uticaj na zapadne autore koji su se bavili ovom temom. Pred vama je prvo elektronsko izdanje ove knjige na engleskom i njen prvi prevod na naš jezik.

Rezime

Ova knjiga se bavi nasilnim i nedovršenim raspadom Jugoslavije. Autor se oslanja na pristup racionalnog političkog izbora u konstrukciji objašnjenja da je, uzimajući u obzir (1) prioritet koji su bivši jugoslovenski narodi davali etničkoj pravdi nad individualnim slobodama i pravima, i (2) uticaj dugoročnih etničkih strategija i rivaliteta, te (3) nasleđe četrdesetogodišnje komunističke vladavine i složenost postsocijalističkog procesa transformacije - raspad zajedničke zemlje jugoslovenskim narodima bio neophodan, kako bi pokušali da ostvare svoje političke prioritete.

U prvom poglavlju razmatra se proces „balkanizacije“. Prvo, izlaže se kritika teorije ustavnog izbora. Pokazuje se da se (direktne i prečutne) pretpostavke na kojima počiva ova teorija, međusobno isključuju. Drugo, obrazlaže se da je usled toga ideja samoopredeljenja neizvodiva i samodestruktivna. Jugoslavija je bila utemeljena na principu samoopredeljenja te se i raspada po istom principu. Treće, opisuje se i analizira nejasna ideja individualnog i etničkog identiteta, „sopstva“, na Balkanu. Četvrto, razmatraju se implikacije nemogućnosti da se, u Jugoslaviji, bilo kakva ustavna ideja prihvati kao legitimna.

U drugom poglavlju opisuje se otkrivanje liberalizma za vreme komunističke vladavine i objašnjavaju razlozi za njegov neuspех. Pokazalo se da su sve klasične liberalne ideje u konfliktu sa socijalističkim principima; one nisu uspele da odigraju ključnu ulogu u preobražaju zemlje, jer nisu poticale iz same ideje jugoslovenske države.

U trećem poglavlju daje se „neposredno objašnjenje“ raspada Jugoslavije. Dokazuje se da se država nije raspala iz ekonomskih razloga (kao način da se izade iz socijalizma), već iz sledeća dva razloga: (1) nezavisna etnička država jeste dugoročna strategija Srba i Hrvata (dva dominantna jugoslovenska naroda), i (2) u procesu transformacije politički prioriteti dominirali su nad ekonomskim. Uzimajući u obzir ciljeve, strategije i datu etničku konfiguraciju, raspad Jugoslavije bio je neizbežan i neizbežno nedovršiv.

U četvrtom poglavlju razmatra se doprinos komunističkog nasleđa i daje se pregled stanja individualnih i kolektivnih prava u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Pokazuje se da ni u jednoj novonastaloj državi nije postignut značajan porast ovih prava te da su ove države daleko od idealne liberalne države.

U zaključku se odbacuje ideja da je „Balkan nešto drugo“ i dokazuje se da nepoštovanje principa građanskih prava i međunarodnog poretku uvek nužno vodi istim ishodima. U tome leži važnost jugoslovenskog slučaja.

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„Jasno je, dakle, da država nastaje po prirodi i da je važnija nego pojedinac. Ako pojedinac izdvojen (iz celine) nije sam sebi dovoljan, odnosiće se prema celini kao i drugi njeni delovi. A onaj ko ne može da živi u zajednici ili kome ništa nije potrebno jer je sam sebi dovoljan, nije deo države, te je ili zver ili bog. U svim ljudima, dakle, postoji prirodna težnja za takvom zajednicom i onaj ko ju je prvi osnovao začetnik je najvećeg dobra. I kao što je čovek, kada dostigne svoj puni razvoj, najbolje od svih živih bića, tako je bez zakona i pravde najgore od svih – jer naoružana nepravda je nešto najstrašnije. Čovek se, međutim, rađa naoružan razumom i vrlinom koje može da upotrebi u prvom redu protiv onoga što je tome suprotno. Stoga je čovek bez vrline najizopaćenije i najdivljije biće i najgore od svih u zadovoljavanju polnog nagona i gladi. Pravednost je, međutim, potreba države, jer pravda čini poredak državne zajednice, a ona se sastoji u tome da se odluči šta je pravo.“¹

Aristotel

¹ Aristotel, Politika, BIGZ 2003, prevod Ljiljana Crepajac.

Predgovor

Ova knjižica predstavlja zbirku tekstova koje sam objavio na temu raspada Jugoslavije. Razmatrao sam razloge, dinamiku i posledice. Budući da sam proces pratio iz neposredne blizine, nije me zanimalo da ono što se dešavalo i što se još uvek dešava na teritoriji nekadašnje Jugoslavije prikažem iz istorijskog ili sociološkog ugla. Ono što me zanima jeste da (1) objasnim zašto se država raspala, i da (2) pokažem da standardna liberalna misao nije u stanju da ovaj proces razume. U tom smislu, želim da razmotrim razloge zbog kojih je došlo do raspada zemlje, te da pojasnim specifičnost jugoslovenskog slučaja.

Proces raspada, koji je predmet moje analize, još uvek nije završen. Iako na nekim mestima u knjizi teoretski razmatram posledice, ne želim da ostavim utisak da znam šta će se ubuduće dešavati na balkanskim prostorima. No, čini mi se da je na početku prikladno da razjasnim jednu stvar. Mnogi su dešavanjima u bivšoj Jugoslaviji pristupili kao tipično balkanskom fenomenu. U prvom poglavljvu razmatram proces balkanizacije koji se tamo odvija. Ali, iako je raspad Jugoslavije proizveo neke tipično balkanske posledice, on se ipak ne može proglašiti tipično balkanskom krizom. Jedan od načina da ovo pojasnimo jeste da utvrđimo kako rat koji se tamo odvijao poslednjih nekoliko godina nije bio balkanski rat (kako nagoveštava podnaslov inače izvanredne knjige Miše Glenija Pad Jugoslavije – Treći balkanski rat). Ne radi se, dakle, o neraščišćenim problemima iz dva prethodna *balkanska* rata, već o neizmirenim računima iz dva *svetska* rata. Sukob će se možda proširiti u balkanski rat. To je nemoguće predvideti.

Temi sam pristupio kao ekonomista, ali je suštinski doživljavam kao političku. Jugoslavija se nije raspala zbog loših ekonomskih aranžmana, već zato što je to bio jedini način da se razreše nagomilani politički problemi. I to, kako ću pokazati, po bilo koju cenu. Da bih bio u mogućnosti da analiziram ovaj politički proces, razvio sam neke jednostavne modele *borbe za prostor* (space competition) i teorije igara, ali moj glavni dokaz oslanja se na razumevanje politike

u Aristotelovom smislu. Primarni politički motiv, u Jugoslaviji i na Balkanu, bio je sveobuhvatni osećaj nepravde koji se pojavio usled nesigurnosti koju su ljudi osećali u vezi sa svojim kolektivnim i individualnim identitetom, svojim pravima, svojim očekivanjima u odnosu na nastupajuće političke i socijalne promene. Ne želim da kažem da je njihovo ponašanje bilo iracionalno. Naprotiv, sve što sam napisao u ovoj knjizi oslanja se na pretpostavku da se ljudi ponašaju racionalno, to jest da se ponašaju na takav način da je razumno očekivati da će ostvariti svoje političke ciljeve. Upravo je zbog činjenice da politička racionalnost može da dovede do katastrofalnih posledica proučavanje jugoslovenskog slučaja važno.

Upsala, 1994.

Uvod

Jugoslavija je već dugo u žiji svetskog interesovanja. Ova zemlja, koja je igrala važnu ulogu u evropskoj i svetskoj politici u dugom posleratnom periodu hladnog rata, raspala se u roku od nekoliko godina na prilično spektakularan način. O tom događaju već postoji obimna literatura. Razni eksperti i novinari koji su izveštavali iz ovog regiona napisali su mnoštvo knjiga i članaka. Danas se sve češće objavljuju prikazi insajdera i direktnih učesnika. Veći deo napisanog, ukoliko nema direktne političke motive, bavi se razlozima koji su izazvali toliko strašno nasilje i razaranje, koje je pratilo raspad ove zemlje, kao i utiskom koje je takvo moralno i političko iskustvo ostavilo na građane. Nema sumnje da će ova tema pokrenuti još mnoga naučna istraživanja i lična preispitivanja.

U knjizi sam ovoj temi pristupio iz malo drugačijeg ugla. Za neke beogradske intelektualce, kojima i sâm pripadam, razvoj situacije u postsocijalističkoj i postkomunističkoj Jugoslaviji predstavljao je razočarenje. Očekivalo se da će sa okončanjem „istorijskog materijalizma“ nastupiti vreme za normalniji, generalno liberalniji sistem vrednosti. Sve što je dolazilo iz Zagreba i Beograda imalo je sličnu aromu: bilo je života čak i pod komunistima, za razliku od ovoga što se događa danas. I tu, najčešće, počinje prebacivanje krivice. Moj cilj je da bez emocija, pristrasnosti, političkih motiva ili obazrivosti pokušam da objasnim zašto se ta zemlja raspala. Da bi mi to i uspelo, prepostaviću da su ljudi koji su ovde živeli upravo to i želevi. To će biti lajtmotiv ove knjige.

Da bih objasnio raspad Jugoslavije kao posledicu racionalnog političkog izbora, moram uzeti u obzir neke liberalne ideje na kojima se temelji većina dominantnih socioloških teorija. Tako ću razmatrati političku filozofiju Džona Roulsa, kritikovati društveno-ugovorne teorije ekonomije i politike, i pokazaću da se evolutivna (vigovska) teorija razvitka slobodnog društva ne može primeniti na ovaj slučaj. Želim da naglasim da nije u pitanju različitost Balkana, već da se radi o pogrešnom pristupu problemu.



Ovako bi izgledao pomalo shematisovan prikaz liberalnog pristupa. U društvu u kome su moral, religija, politički i kulturni obrasci krajnje protivrečni, što inače daje određene političke i ekonomske prednosti, racionalni ljudi će izabrati da žive po pravilima koja odgovaraju najmanjem zajedničkom imenitelju njihovih interesa. To će se desiti ukoliko sukobljene strane zanemare svoje razlike – ili smišljeno, ili uz prihvatanje procedure donošenja odluka, ili uz spremnost da učestvuju u racionalnoj raspravi. Zašto bi to učinili? Ako bi sledili svoje lične interese, to ne bi bilo neophodno. Ako bi sledili svoje oprečne ideale, sigurno ne bi razrešili spor na taj način. Kao što, uostalom, dobro ilustruje i slučaj Jugoslavije.

Poznato je da je miris slobode opojan. Kada ljudi jednom otkriju da imaju prava, kao i da ta prava mogu upotrebiti kako bi se otarasili neefikasnih institucija koje ih ugnjetavaju, proces spoznaje će se automatizovati i neće se zaustaviti sve dok se ne otkriju i najsitniji detalji „ustrojstva slobode“. Međutim, ovaj proces ne zahteva puku sposobnost da se nepravda tek individualizuje, već i da se postave opšti principi pravičnosti. Ne postoje garancije da će se ovaj drugi deo procesa razviti onoliko koliko je potrebno. Generalizacija se može zaustaviti u tački koja obuhvata sve one za koje smatramo da su nam jednaki po jednom ili drugom kriterijumu – kao što svedoči svemoćni etnički kriterijum koji je primenjen u slučaju Jugoslavije.

Smena integracije i dezintegracije obično se objašnjava argumentima teorije društvenog ugovora, koji se bazira na pretpostavci da ljudi ulaze u države ili ih napuštaju kao da se radi o učlanjenju u neki klub ili iščlanjenju iz njega. Zavisno od mogućeg dobitka, doći će do integracije ili do razlaza. Sledstveno tome, političke obaveze su u osnovi iste kao pri potpisivanju pojedinačnog ugovora. Svi troškovi koji iz toga slede mogu se razumeti kao troškovi transakcije koja je već umanjena za očekivanu dobit. Ali, to je isuviše pojednostavljeno. Sigurno je da postoji i jedan nivo troškova koje očekivani dobitak ne može da opravda. Kada nekoga pozovete da se borи за državu ili naciju, razumno je očekivati da troškovi transakcije, koja zahteva polaganje svog života (ili života drugih), postaju na neki način previšoki. Tako, u slučaju nivoa razaranja koje se odigralo u Jugoslaviji, argument teorije društvenog ugovora u jednom času postaje pogrešan.

Takođe, tvrdi se da ljudi ulaze u konflikte kada u državi nije rasprostranjen osećaj za pravdu. Ako postoje prava koja su nekim građanima uskraćena, ili ako svi nemaju iste mogućnosti, logično je očekivati da će se pojaviti pokret koji će zahtevati jačanje i poštovanje individualnih i kolektivnih prava. Ovo je posebno svojstveno totalitarnim državama, u kojima je glavni cilj vlade da guši individualna prava umesto da ih jača. I zaista, vladavina prava bi trebalo da bude glavni podsticaj i karakteristika napuštanja socijalističkog sistema. Međutim, suprotstavljanje represivnim režimima može se zasnivati i na samom osećaju nepravde, a ne na nekom određenom idealu pravde. Ljudima nije potrebno da znaju šta je ispravno da bi shvatili da im je nanesena nepravda. Pojam pravde je uopšten, a osećaj nepravde individualan (ovo vezujem za Aristotelovu teoriju pravde, vidi Gligorov [1985]). Stoga, totalitarni režimi mogu biti kolektivno odbačeni zbog nepravde koju nanose svakom ponaosob, no to i dalje neće dovesti do neke zajedničke ideje o pravdi, a kamoli do ideje jednakih prava za sve. O tome najbolje svedoči nivo pravičnosti ili, bolje rečeno, nivo nepravde u državama koje su nastale nakon raspada Jugoslavije.

Kao što se može naslutiti, analizirajući slučaj Jugoslavije, u ovoj knjizi odbacujem upravo ovakav shematismovani prikaz liberalno-političkog razvoja. To činim u prva četiri poglavlja koja razmatraju posebne aspekte raspada Jugoslavije, kao i u dodatku u kojem pojašnjavam neke ideje i modele koje sam koristio u ostatku knjige. Sada ću izložiti kratki prikaz tih poglavlja.²

2 Prvo poglavljje pisano je za skup koji je organizovala Katedra za istočnoevropske studije univerziteta u Upsali, u Švedskoj. Drugo i četvrtog poglavlje ove knjige pisao sam za konferenciju bečkog Institut fur die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Jedan deo materijala pisan je tokom moje posete Center for the Study of Public Choice univerziteta George-Mason u Ferfaksu, Virdžiniji, SAD, 1991. i 1992. godine. Najveći deo rada nastao je na Katedri za istočnoevropske studije univerziteta u Upsali. Prethodne ili izmenjene verzije ovih poglavlja objavljene su (ili će biti objavljene) pod sledećim nazivima: "The Discovery of Liberalism in Yugoslavia", East European Politics and Societies 5 [1991]: 5-25. ("Otkrivanje liberalizma u Jugoslaviji", Istočnoevropska politika i društva 5); "Balkanization: A Theory of Constitutional Failure", East European Politics and Societies 6 [1992]: 283-302. ("Balkanizacija: teorija ustavnog sloma", Istočnoevropska politika i društva 6); "Is What is Left Right?" ("Da li je levo pravo?") u zborniku: J. M. Kovacs (urednik), *The Unofficial Legacy of Communism. The Ironies of the Transition*. (Nezvanični legat komunizma. Ironije tranzicije), New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1994.

U prvom poglavlju ču analizirati proces *balkanizacije*. Monteskjeovu ideju da je despotizam prikladan režim za narode koji nisu svesni svog identiteta, upoređujem sa trenutno dominantnom idejom savremene političke filozofije da će neuka i neinformisana individua izabrati liberalni demokratski poredak. Pokazaću da je Monteskje, u principu, bio u pravu. To ćemo videti u slučaju procesa balkanizacije. Nema kriterijuma koji nije upotrebljen za identifikaciju na Balkanu. Drugim rečima, to znači da većina ljudi na tim prostorima nije sigurna u svoj identitet. Oni po pravilu biraju autoritarni umesto demokratskog režima.

U drugom poglavlju analiziraću proces otkrivanja i krah liberalizma u Jugoslaviji. Tokom socijalizma, građani Jugoslavije, posebno intelektualci, otkrivali su sve poznate liberalne principe tako što su bili izloženi dugotrajnim i raznovrsnim iskustvima socijalističke nepravde. I zaista, za razliku od ostalih socijalističkih zemalja, Jugoslavija nije potpuno odbacivala liberalne ideje, posebno ideje pluralizma i tržišta. Takozvano samoupravljanje pokazalo se kao prilično nezgodno za kritiku, no čak i oni koji su ga branili sve više su se oslanjali na liberalnu argumentaciju. U jugoslovenskoj javnosti postajalo je sve teže dovoditi u pitanje individualizam, privatnu svojinu, vladavinu prava, građansko društvo, parlamentarnu demokratiju i politički pluralizam. Međutim, kada su se komunisti povukli, liberalne vrednosti kao da su odjednom nestale. Cela zemlja, svi njeni narodi, uglavnom predvođeni uglednim intelektualcima, uronili su u nacionalizam. Komunizam su nekada ismevali citiranjem čuvene rečenice iz Orvelove Životinjske farme da su „svi jednaki ali su neki jednakiji od drugih“, a sada su svi odjednom besramno počeli da se služe orvelovskim jezikom. Analogna tvrdnja sada je mogla da glasi ovako: „Svi su jednaki bez obzira na njihovo etničko poreklo, ali su oni koji su istog etničkog porekla kao ja – malo jednakiji od drugih“. Kao što možemo da primetimo, Orvelova tvrdnja je čak suptilnija od ove nacionalističke.

U trećem poglavlju nudim *direktno objašnjenje raspada Jugoslavije*. To je centralni deo knjige. Razmatram (1) stav da se Jugoslavija mogla reformisati, i (2) da su upravo uzroci zbog kojih je to bilo moguće isti

oni uzroci zbog kojih se i raspala. Sada je sve prisutnija saglasnost o tome da bi transformisana Jugoslavija omogućila svim svojim narodima da ostvare veću pravičnost, sigurnost i blagostanje nego što je to slučaj danas u okviru novonastalih država. Iz toga proizlazi da uzroke raspada Jugoslavije moramo potražiti u suprotstavljenim političkim strategijama zasnovanim na najbitnijim etničkim ciljevima. Destruktivni povod pronalazim u široko rasprostranjenom osećanju etničke nepravde te u osećanju da će se, uz neizbežne promene u strukturi vlasti u Jugoslaviji, ta nepravda samo uvećavati. Ovo, kao i poremećaj u promeni strukture vlasti, predstavlja polazište za moje objašnjenje raspada zemlje. Tvrdim da postoje mnogi razlozi zbog kojih države nastaju, po pravilu pružajući sigurnost, ali da se većinom raspadaju zbog jednog razloga – nedostatka pravde.

U poslednjem poglavlju sumiram osnove jugoslovenskih ustavnih dilema i razmatram način na koji novostvorene države tretiraju ljudska i ostala prava. Pokazaću da su rezultati, najblaže rečeno, razočaravajući. U ovom, kao i u drugom poglavlju, baviću se nasleđem komunizma i socijalizma. Komunistička Jugoslavija rasturila je politički prostor na način tipičan za totalitarne države, tako da je nakon sloma komunizma počela skoro neograničeno da se nagnje udesno. Zato režimi koji su iz takve države iznikli nisu baš mnogo marili za jednakost i ljudska prava. Ove države, slično nekadašnjim komunističkim državama, prošle su kroz sve cikluse „čišćenja“. Na kraju, ustavi ovih država liče na zbirku pravila o diskriminaciji. To su prava koja preostaju posle etničkih revolucija.

U poslednjem poglavlju, više nego u prethodnim, baviću se perspektivama koje imaju oblasti bivše Jugoslavije. Kako sada stvari stoje, neizbežna je permanentna nestabilnost. U zaključku ovog poglavlja, kao i u zaključcima nekih drugih poglavlja o Jugoslaviji, pišem sa manje-više političkog aspekta. To činim kako bih podvukao problem razumevanja koji ilustruje ovaj slučaj. Ne zagovaram nijednu određenu poziciju, niti sam vatreni pobornik bilo koje opcije. Samo se trudim da upozorim na ono što će se možda dogoditi. U Dodatku I razmatram i doprinos međunarodne zajednice ovakvom stanju nestabilnosti.



U ostalim dodacima bavim se različitim teoretskim i drugim shvatanjima koja mogu biti korisna za razumevanje moje glavne argumentacije. Prikazao sam takođe neke spekulativne podatke o troškovima raspada i pojedine komentare na literaturu. Dodatke sam pisao tako da se mogu upotrebiti nezavisno od glavnog teksta i obrnuto. Verujem da će neko poželeti da pročita samo ono što sam imao da kažem o uzrocima i posledicama raspada, te se neće zamarati teorijama na koje sam se oslanjao. Poneko će možda želeti da pročita više o nekim aspektima koje sam dotakao u ovoj knjizi, pa sam ih elaborirao u dodacima. Nadam se da sam izašao u susret i jednima i drugima.

PRVO POGLAVLJE

Balkanizacija, teorija ustavnog sloma

„Moglo bi se učiniti da ljudska priroda neprestano ustaje protiv despot-ske vladavine. Međutim, uprkos ljubavi koju ljudi gaje prema slobodi, uprkos njihovoj mržnji prema nasilju, većina naroda se pokorava nasi-lju. Da bi se stvorila umerena vladavina, valja složiti različite sile, srediti ih, ublažiti i staviti u dejstvo: jednu, da tako kažemo, učiniti okretnijom da bi bila u stanju da odoli drugoj; to je remek-delo zakonodavstva koje slučaju retko polazi za rukom, a razboritosti se retko daje prilika da ga izvede. Despotska vladavina, naprotiv, ako tako može da se kaže, bode oči: ona je posvuda jednoobrazna: kako su, da bi bila ustanovljena, dovoljne strasti, svi mogu podjednako dobro da obave taj zadatak.“³

Monteskje

Nacionalne države su često, a izgleda i sve više pravno utemeljene na principu samoopredeljenja. Međutim, nije uvek očigledno šta znači „samo“ i kako to treba biti „opredeljen“. U ovom poglavlju nameravam da razvijem jednostavnu teoriju o neuspehu samoopredeljenja. Za to ću koristiti pojam balkanizacije i osvrnuti se na pojedina iskustva onoga što se nekad zvalo Jugoslavija.

Ova država je izvorno bila utemeljena na novoproklamovanom principu samoopredeljenja.⁴ Njen raspad je značio ponovno oživljavanje tog principa. U vreme njenog osnivanja, 1918. godine,

3 Šarl Monteskje, *O duhu zakona*, preveo Aljoša Mimica, Gradac 2001.

4 Raspadi Jugoslavije i Čehoslovačke često se sagledavaju u svetlu nestanka Sovjetskog Saveza. Ovakvo gledište je pogrešno. Čak je i raspad Sovjetskog Saveza mnogo složeniji proces nego što to ponekad izgleda. Međutim, komunisti su se poslužili načelom samoopredeljenja da bi stvorili Sovjetski Savez, koji je trebalo da predstavlja korak ka stvaranju svetske socijalističke imperije, dok stečena nezavisnost Jugoslavije i nekih država centralne Evrope nije imala veze sa idejom komunizma i komunističkim tipom samoopredeljenja. Zato raspad Sovjetskog Saveza spada u procese neuspeha vlasti, dok slučaj Jugoslavije i nekih drugih zemalja spada u procese izazvane ustavnom krizom.



princip je bio uveden u nadi da će na neki način pomoći da se u regionu uspostave mir i stabilnost. Međutim, ispostavilo se da su sukobi izdržljiviji od ovog principa. I zaista, sadašnji haos možemo razumeti kao jednu vrstu političkog procesa karakterističnog za region, odakle i potiče pojam balkanizacije. Mislim da je interesantno i prikladno sagledati najnovije događaje u Jugoslaviji u svetlu procesa koji je povezan sa širom regijom.

Region, naravno, ima ulogu sličnu onoj koju bojno polje predstavlja u teoriji konflikta. A pravi sukob je u stvari sukob identiteta. Takođe je interesantno postaviti nekoliko uopštenih pitanja o tome da li smo sposobni da razumemo politička kretanja poput balkanizacije. Mislim da balkanizacija simbolizuje neuspeh uspostavljanja postojane političke vlasti ili pokretačke snage. Sledstveno tome, balkanizacija ima poseban filozofski, kao i politički značaj.

U ovom poglavlju, kao i u celoj knjizi, zanima me da ustanovim najosnovnije razloge za neuspeh liberalizma. U sledećem poglavlju detaljnije ću se baviti neuspehom liberalizma u postsocijalističkoj Jugoslaviji. U poslednja dva poglavlja podrobno ću opisati političke razloge tog neuspeha.

„Mi, Južni Sloveni“

U ovom poglavlju, razmatraču sličnost između ustavnih s jedne, i tržišnih i javnih promašaja s druge strane.⁵ U normativnoj teoriji, vlast se uvodi, u najosnovnijem smislu, putem procesa izbora igara. Iako se izbor može napraviti na različite načine, po ugovornoj tradiciji obično se smatra da u pogodnim okolnostima pojedinci ili države uvek usvajaju niz propisa kojima će se u svakodnevnom životu rukovoditi. Ovaj skup osnovnih

⁵ Analogija postoji čak i u ovom slučaju, mada bih ja voleo da dokažem suprotno, to jest da nije bilo tržišnih i vladinih neuspeha. Možda nije tačno da su tržišta neefikasna ili se ne uspostavljaju potpuno, a politička vlast ne ispunjava standarde političke efikasnosti ili čak to ni ne pokušava. Međutim, neuspeh u sastavljanju ustava još uvek stoji. Tako da sve o čemu u ovom tekstu govorim ne zavisi od teorija tržišnih i javnih neuspeha. Za opšti pregled koncepta „neuspeha i pravnih lekova“ vidi Štiglic (1989).

propisa doživljava se kao sadržalač zakonskih normi koje čine ustav. Preciznije, pod određenim pretpostavkama grupa ljudi se, formalno ili neformalno, sastaje i piše ustav. Uopšteno govoreći, u teoriji društvenog ugovora pretpostavlja se da je svaka država zasnovana na izričitom ili implicitnom opštem ugovoru, koji je proizvod formalne ili neformalne ustavne konvencije (dogovora). U stvari, ustav i konvencija su ista stvar.⁶

Ako bismo gledali još uopštenije, ne samo svaka država, već i svaka institucija izvedena je iz ustava (implicitno ili izričito) ili je u njega ugrađena. Ovakvo shvatanje u svakom pojedinačnom slučaju može se predstaviti kao hipotetička (pogodbena) obaveza u kojoj se tvrdi da je svaki postojeći institucionalni sporazum opravdan ukoliko položi hipotetički test da bi bio izabran ukoliko bi svi učesnici, ako bi na odgovarajući način bili upitani da li žele da poštuju takvu institucionalnu odredbu, odgovorili potvrđno; to jest, da li bi želeli da koriste baš tu institucionalnu obavezu ukoliko bi imali prilike da je izaberu, ili, što izlazi na isto, da li bi potpisali ugovor sa potpuno istim institucionalnim odredbama.

Ustavna naredba, stoga, tvrdi da je država izričito ili implicitno zasnovana na dokumentu koji smo „mi, narod“ doneli i potpisali. U slučaju Jugoslavije, države Južnih Slovena, ustavni ugovor su morali da potpišu „mi, južnoslovenski narodi“. To naravno menja smisao zamenice „mi“, kao i političko i svako drugo značenje „naroda“. Želim odmah da skrenem pažnju na to da se potpis „mi, južnoslovenski narodi“ oslanja na predugovorne karakteristike etničkog identiteta naroda. Ova razlika će odigrati ključnu ulogu u ostalim poglavljima ove knjige. U ovom pogлављu ču se, međutim, baviti „idealnim slučajem“ kada „narod“ nema dopunsku obavezu i kada se prema pretpostavljenoj ustavnoj naredbi odnosi direktno.

Nazvaću ovaj hipotetički imperativ, u smislu društvenog dogovora – ustavnim izborom.⁷ Ustav zato nudi neizbežno rešenje društvenih

6 Za dokaz ovakvog koncepta, vidi Miler (1991); za kritiku iz ugla društvenog izbora, vidi Gligorov (1992d).

7 Ovo je analogno pojmovima kao što su „lični izbor“, „racionalni izbor“, „društveni izbor“, ili „javni izbor“. I mada teorije o izboru mogu ali i ne moraju biti konzistentne, dokazaću da teorija o ustavnom izboru nije konzistentna.

procesa, ukoliko dođe do situacije u kojoj će institucije biti stavljenе na stvarnu ustavnu probu. Takođe možemo da kažemo da uvek postoji izričit ili implicitan društveni ugovor. Tako je teorija ustavnog neuspeha upravo izjava da je ova ustavna tvrdnja pogrešna.

Normativni argument u vidu hipotetičkog imperativa ne može se opovrgnuti empirijskom analizom bilo koje vrste, zbog same njene prirode. Kao rezultat imamo dve nezgodne posledice: prvo, svaki ustavni izbor biće tačan i istinit, i drugo, svaki ustav se može ustavno opravdati. Zbog ovoga, svaki ustavni iskaz mora se razmatrati u normativnom pogledu, a njegova konzistentnost se mora isprobati. Međutim, poželjno je da se ima u vidu određeni primer kako bi se teoretski dokazi bolje razumeli kada se, uz primenu na taj konkretan slučaj, obrazlažu ili, kao što će ovde biti slučaj, kritikuju.

Zbog toga ću u ovom poglavlju na primeru „balkanizacije“ raspravljati o teoretskom problemu ustavnog neuspeha, a teorijske zaključke do kojih sam došao ilustrovaću istorijskim i tekućim dešavanjima na Balkanu, posebno u onom njegovom delu koji se nekada zvao Jugoslavija.

Opis balkanizacije

Pod balkanizacijom se podrazumeva proces i moguć ciklus rascepa imperije, stvaranja malih država, lokalne nestabilnosti i dolaska nove (ili stare) imperije.⁸ Istoriski gledano, ona se odnosi na

⁸ Pod imperijom prvenstveno podrazumevam vlast koja se zasniva na moći, a koja je heteronomna vlast (u kantovskom smislu). Drugo, podrazumevam državnu vlast koja se zasniva na moći (na primer, despotizam u monteskejeovskom smislu). Treće, podrazumevam državu koja svojim građanima pruža zaštitu, ali im u svim slučajevima ne obezbeđuje i pravdu. Da bi mogla da im obezbedi i jedno i drugo, morala bi da se (i uglavnom je tako) decentralizuje do nivoa provincija. Četvrti, imperija nema jasne granice, zato što počiva na univerzalnom principu moći. Razlika između države i imperije je ta da, u krajnjem slučaju, država ima jasno definisane granice. Takođe, razlika može biti i u tome da je država sinonim za zakonitost, što znači da svojim građanima obezbeđuje i pravdu i zaštitu. No, poslednja tačka je prilično diskutabilna; za detaljniju raspravu o njoj vidi Jovanović (1990).

period nemira i ratova na Balkanu krajem devetnaestog i početkom dvadesetog veka.⁹ Turska imperija se povlačila iz regiona dok su na njeno mesto, uz otpor, dolazile Austrougarska imperija i Rusko carstvo. Međutim, proces balkanizacije posebno karakterišu pokušaji balkanskih naroda da stvore nezavisne državice, kao i ratovi koji su između njih izbijali. Proces je trebalo da se završi konačnim samoopredeljenjem balkanskih naroda. Ali gledajući unazad, može se reći da balkanizacija traje sve do danas, kada se odigrava još jedna runda kraha vlasti praćena građanskim i međudržavnim ratovima. Tako da se balkanizacija može sagledati kao proces koji do sada traje već skoro dva veka.

Do balkanizacije ne dolazi uvek kada se imperija smanji, i ona se ne može poistovetiti sa takvim događajem, ali se radi o simultanom procesu pada vlasti i pojave autonomnih vlasti, ili, bolje rečeno, o neuspehu formiranja vlasti. Kada imperija ostane bez vlasti, neki njeni delovi mogu se otцепити ili dobiti neku vrstu autonomije i bez građanskog rata ili sukoba sa susedima. Balkanizacija se javlja kada propast imperije ne može da iznedri stabilnu političku konfiguraciju usled političke nemoći koja se ogleda u činjenici da nije došlo do pojave autonomnih vlasti.

U stvari, ratovi ne predstavljaju suštinu procesa balkanizacije. Do njih neizbežno dolazi, ali njena glavna odlika nije mnoštvo konfliktnih političkih igrača već, ponekad, produžena politička praznina. Nju možemo opisati na različite načine, ali mene zanima nemogućnost stvaranja održive države. Mogu da kažem da se balkanizacija javlja kada se pojavi mogućnost za samoopredeljenje koja ne uspeva da se pretoči u realnost osnivanja autonomne javne vlasti.

Zamislite da postoji imperija čija se moć proteže preko nekoliko provincija i granica sa drugim imperijama i državama. I sada, ukoliko ta imperija počne da gubi vlast, provincije mogu da postanu kvazidržave ili potpuno suverene države. Mogu da zarate sa ostalim državama u cilju uspostavljanja međusobno priznatih

9 O teoriji međunarodne politike vidi Rajt (1977).

granica ili zbog odbrane od upada drugih imperija. Ali države u ratu jesu države. Sa druge strane, proces balkanizacije se javlja ukoliko zataji proces stvaranja države. Okupirane provincije, u prvom slučaju, mogu se nazvati protodržavama (ili predustavnim državama)¹⁰, dok u drugom slučaju mogu zauvek da ostanu provincije u potrazi za državom.

Ovo zaista otvara suštinski problem uspostavljanja vlasti ili uspostavljanja legitimiteata. Diskutabilno je da li će svako stanje *anarhije* dovesti do zakonite vlasti, iz jednog od poznatih političkih razloga (zaštita, dobit od saradnje, pravda, uzurpacija). Ako uzmemo da je proces raspada imperije istovetan procesu razvitka *anarhije*,¹¹ balkanizacija će predstavljati najopštiji slučaj legitimacije vlasti ili, bolje rečeno, njenog neuspeha. Balkanizacija je proces koji se javlja kada se do autonomne političke vlasti ne može doći kroz proces samoopredeljenja, a čak i ukoliko do njega dođe, ona se ne može zakonito održati.

Na narednim stranama upotrebiću termin balkanizacija kako bih uopšteno objasnio slučaj neuspeha političkog samoopredeljenja, odnosno neuspeha zakonite državne formacije (ili neuspeha zakonite vlasti), uz usputno bavljenje istorijom Balkana od početka devetnaestog do kraja dvadesetog veka. Koncentrisaće se na područje koje je pokrivala nekadašnja Jugoslavija.

10 Pored ustavne, države mogu biti „prirodne“ ili zasnovane na „drevnom ustavu“ koji predstavlja suprotnost „revolucionarnom ustavu“. Za dalja razmatranja na ovu temu u slučaju Jugoslavije vidi Gligorov (1991).

11 Anarhija se ovde shvata kao pojam koji se može pronaći i u starim i u modernim političkim filozofijama. Za Aristotela, kao i za Hobsa, anarhija je bila režim u koji se na kraju pretvaraju svi režimi. Sve što budem govorio može se primeniti, takođe, na Loko-vu ili Rusovu prirodnu državu kao i na savremene anarhije bez troškova transakcije. Vidi Gligorov (1992d).

Identitet i vlast

Ovo su minimalne prepostavke manje-više nepobitne teorije o ustavnom izboru:¹²

1. Određeni broj *individualnih predstavnika* (koji predstavljaju sebe, grupu pojedinaca, ili države). Lica koja oni predstavljaju možemo nazvati *stanovništvom* (broj predstavnika može da se poklopi sa brojem stanovnika).
2. Skup *strategija za predstavnike* (ne obavezno istih za sve). Možemo ih nazvati *politikama*.
3. Skup *ishoda* ili *posledica* (u opštem slučaju, radi se o izboru između različitih političkih režima). Ovo je zaista ustavna prepostavka.
4. *Procedura* donošenja odluka (u principu, no ne i neophodno, program glasanja).

Takođe, polazimo od toga da predstavnici neke ishode prepostavljaju drugim. Njihov zadatak je stvaranje multipersonalnog društvenog ugovora koji je u stvari državni ustav. Pošto je ugovor napisan, on podrobno određuje prava i obaveze svih koji pristupaju državi. Postoje dve vrste prava i obaveza: jedne koje građani imaju međusobno, druge koje imaju prema državi. Ove potonje su povezane sa državnim vlastima i mogu se takođe nazvati političkim pravima i obavezama. Baviću se jedino njima, ali neću ulaziti u detaljna objašnjenja.

O razlozima zbog kojih pojedinci formiraju države (a države će obrazovati konfederacije) raspravljano je do najsitnijih detalja u političkoj filozofiji i filozofiji prava. Pomenuće samo neke. *Prirodne razloge* analizirao je Aristotel; oni se, u suštini, odnose na korist od saradnje. *Političkim razlozima* bavio se Platon; oni se vezuju za pitanje pravičnosti. *Liberalne razloge* je, između ostalih, zastupao Hobs; oni se prvenstveno odnose na sigurnost i zaštitu. I na kraju, postoje razlozi koje možemo nazvati *realističnim*, po pobornicima takozvane *realpolitičke* škole; ona ustanovljuje poreklo svake javne vlasti do

¹² Za mene je teorija društvenog izbora jedini mogući pristup ustavnom donošenju odluka. U ovom tekstu ću razmatrati još opštije probleme ustavnog izbora. Za više detalja vidi Gligorov (1985).

njene usurpacije. Moje izlaganje je potpuno nezavisno od vrste političke filozofije. Možda će biti teže prihvati konstitucionalizam, a da se u isto vreme zastupa ideja da je „čovek po svojoj prirodi politička životinja“ (mada su Aristotel i neki drugi u tome uspeli).¹³ Dakako, dokle god je reč o problemima zakonitosti vlasti, moja argumentacija bi trebalo da drži vodu. U svakom slučaju, zbog ove rasprave, prepostaviću da (minimalna) država obezbeđuje svojim subjektima makar sigurnost i pravdu; ili, što je ista stvar u ustavnim okvirima, da je to politička roba koju zahtevaju oni koji prave ustavni izbor.¹⁴

Sada sledi veoma važna prepostavka. Smatra se da se proces građenja ustava uvek, izričito ili implicitno, odvija u *autarhiji*. Pod ovim podrazumevam uobičajenu prepostavku da predstavnici na ustavnom skupu najčešće nemaju pravo slobodnog pristupa ili napuštanja. Ovo se na neki način mora regulisati.¹⁵ Svako odlučuje da li će skupu prisustvovati ili ne. Ali kada jednom tu odluku doneše, nema povratka. Takođe, kad skup jednom počne, za posetioce spolja vrata ostaju zaključana, osim u slučajevima koji su jasno definisani skupom pravila.¹⁶ U tom smislu, kada se jednom započne sa pisanjem ustava, predstavnici se ponašaju kao da su u normativnoj autarhiji, odnosno kao da su potpuno samostalni. Ovo pravo im takođe, kao što će pokazati u daljem tekstu, omogućuje i prepostavka da su donosioci odluka na konvenciji predstavnici i to je jasno naznačeno u prepostavci o „velu neznanja“.¹⁷

Zbog toga ne mislim da se ovde radi o nezavisnoj prepostavci. U stvari, ona će biti zadovoljena čim se usvoji propis o načinu donošenja odluka. Ukoliko se nakon toga doneše propis o načinu

13 Zaista mislim da je Aristotel prvi formulisao teoriju ustavnog neuspeha. O ovom više u Gligorov (1992d).

14 Možda će želeti više, možda manje; izgleda da je nemoguće imati pravdu bez zaštite, dok za obrnut slučaj to ne važi. Smatram da je to suština Hobsovog izlaganja.

15 Nije jasno na koji način. Mogu se evocirati neke zamisli o optimalnoj veličini populacije, ili podrazumevati neke zamisli o pravdi (često implicitno). Ako se podrazumeva ili evocira ideja o prirodnim pravima, značenje celokupnog poduhvata ustavnog izbora radikalno se menja.

16 Za ovo vidi J. Buchanan (1975).

17 Za ovo u intergeneracijskom kontekstu vidi Arrow (1983).

glasanja, usvajanje takvog propisa odrediće veličinu ustavotvornog tela, jer glasačko pravilo govori o tome koliki je deo razlomka N (broja predstavnika) dovoljan za odluku.¹⁸ Pretpostavka autarhije obično nije eksplisitno izražena. Ona je obuhvaćena ili naslovljena definicijom ustavnog skupa, pravilima odlučivanja i naravno samim pojmom javne odluke, zato što se oslanja na pretpostavku o broju glasova pojedinaca.

Ipak, čak i ako autarhija nije eksplisitno pretpostavljena i ako se eksplisitno pretpostavi da je slobodan ulazak i izlazak omogućen za sve vreme trajanja, po dobro poznatim razlozima teorije socijalnog izbora, suštinski se ništa neće promeniti. Ja, međutim, tvrdim da problem nastaje onog trenutka kada uzmemo u obzir ustavne izbore. Nije bitan broj pojedinaca koji donosi odluku, ukoliko će ustav predstavljati vrhovnu vlast koja se ne može osporiti, to jest, ukoliko telo koje piše ustav ima suverenu vlast. Nakon što se ovo definiše, svi na koje se ustav odnosi (svi građani države) ne mogu se pozivati na neku drugu vlast ili ustav, kada i ukoliko požele da ostvare pravo koje im sadašnji ustav ne garantuje, ili ukoliko žele da izbegnu određenu obavezu koju imaju po svom ustavu. Zbog toga svaka ustavnost pretpostavlja neku vrstu normativne autarhije.¹⁹ Nažalost, ovo je u kontradikciji sa pretpostavkom normativne *anarhije* na kojoj se hipotetičke ustavne odredbe zasnivaju, ali ukoliko autarhija nije pretpostavljena, ostale pretpostavke će izgubiti svoj značaj i neće biti ustavnog izbora; ili će bar u tom smeru ići moja argumentacija.

Ustav neće nastati ukoliko neke od gore navedenih pretpostavki ne budu zadovoljene. Međutim, ja sam posebno usredsređen na pretpostavke koje se bave identitetom predstavnika na ustavnoj konvenciji i na odsustvo stanja autarhije. Na kraju ovog odeljka kratko ću se osvrnuti na problem primarnog političkog interesa, što predstavlja konzistenciju predstavničkih strategija. Ali predmet mog interesovanja u ovom poglavlju jeste prvenstveno normativni

18 Opširnije u Gligorov (1992d).

19 Platon je ovo, naravno, prvi uočio. Sledeći važan izvor u ovom kontekstu je Kant. Savremeniji autoritet u ovom polju je Veber. Različiti pristupi se, naravno, mogu naći u teorijama prirodnog prava.

aspekt, tako da će sada preko ovog poslednjeg pitanja samo ovlašćiti, a podrobnije se njime baviti u narednim poglavljima. Želim da pokažem da može doći do ustavnog promašaja upravo zato što su sve prepostavke zadovoljene.

Uobičajena prepostavka u ustavnoj teoriji jeste da će prisutni na ustavnom skupu delovati u skladu sa sopstvenim interesima samo indirektno, odnosno da će se ponašati kao predstavnici. Čak i da su svi lično prisutni na ustavnoj konvenciji, računalo bi se da svaki pojedinac predstavlja samoga sebe. Ova prepostavka može biti ispunjena na različite načine, na primer preko zahteva da se svi ponašaju kao moralne osobe ili putem uvođenja visokog nivoa sumnje u stvarni identitet svakog pojedinca, ili na neki drugi način. U savremenoj političkoj filozofiji ova prepostavka je obično predstavljena kroz metaforu vela. Pretpostavlja se da pojedinci razmatraju i odlučuju kao da su obavijeni velom neznanja o tome ko su oni zaista. Smatra se da u tom slučaju predstavnici ne samo da bi bili spremni da napišu ustav, već bi sam sadržaj dokumenta bio pouzdano predvidiv. Međutim, za našu diskusiju nije važno da li će u ustavu oko koga treba da se slože biti upotrebljene utilitarne, kantovske ili neke druge definicije prava i obaveza.

Sada će dokazati da je stav koji je upravo suprotan ovakvoj ustavnoj mogućnosti – istinit.

Stav 1: Ako u stanju *anarhije* (prirodno stanje, predustavno stanje) pojedinci ne znaju svoj identitet, pokušaji samoopredeljenja biće podložni i izloženi procesu balkanizacije.²⁰

Uzgred, želim da naglasim kako ustavni neuspeh o kome će govoriti nema nikakve veze niti sa Erouovom teoremom o nemogućnosti društvenog izbora niti sa neuspahom saradnje po ugledu na Zatvoreničku dilemu. Teškoća društvenog izbora je konceptualna

20 Ovo mogu da nazovem „antropološkom tvrdnjom“. Skoro svaka opštepoznata politička filozofija oslanja se na istu prepostavku o ljudskoj prirodi. Ne želim ovde da dodam ništa posebno novo. Pretpostavljam samo da svi pojedinci poseduju identitet. Ili, drugačije rečeno, nemoguće je prepostaviti individualizam bez prepostavke identiteta. Kada jednom prihvatišmo ovakav stav, teškoće koje nastaju sa državnim tvorevinama koje čine pojedinci bez identiteta ne bi trebalo da iznenaduju. Mislim da je Aristotel izložio slično mišljenje vezujući slobodu za ovlašćenja, odnosno nedostatak slobode sa nedostatkom ovlašćenja.

i konstruktivistička, i pokazuje da neostvarivo može potpuno racionalno biti smatrano za – poželjno. Zatvorenička dilema ilustruje teškoću da ono što je ostvarivo bude dovoljno ubedljivo kako bi postalo poželjno. Stoga se ova dva primera racionalnog i institucionalnog neuspeha bave karakteristikama promišljanja i saradnje.²¹

Takođe, tržišni kao i politički promašaji u osnovi su slični problemima poput Zatvoreničke dileme. Ili se tržište neće pojaviti, ili javne vlasti neće uspeti da razreše neuspeh tržišta, ili će čak napraviti novi problem. Problem koji sagledavam je drugačiji. Da li je moguće da se javne vlasti ne pojave čak i ako nema racionalnih, institucionalnih ili koordinacionih neuspeha? Ako jeste, onda možemo identifikovati ustavni neuspeh.

A sada, kao uvod u glavni dokaz, razlog za pojavu ustavnog neuspeha može se otkriti analizom nepoverenja koje određene verzije teorije društvenog ugovora pokazuju prema informacionim prepostavkama nametnutim pojedincima koji usvajaju ustav. Neki smatraju da bi oni koji pišu i izglasavaju ustav, iz političkih i moralnih razloga, morali da budu zaogrnuti *velom neznanja*. Na ustavnom skupu predstavnici će odlučivati bez poimanja ko su. Isti efekat mogao bi se postići alternativnom prepostavkom. Možemo da prepostavimo da su ljudi koji donose odluke vođeni javnim interesom (ili javnim duhom), da prate isključivo puki ili stvarni interes (interes koji je liшен lične koristi, dijalektički rečeno), ili odlučuju u uslovima države oslobođene troškova transakcije. U bilo kojoj od ovih okolnosti, jedan od mogućih ishoda jeste ustav koji će svakome omogućiti da bude ono što jeste (šta god to značilo), jednom kada se veo neznanja podigne.²² Drugi mogući ishod je da se ustavno nametnu odredbe koje će usavršiti identitet pojedinca, u momentu kada posebne, predustavne informacione restrikcije nestanu. Postoji još i mogućnost da se odredbe oblikuju tako što će se preraspodeliti u korist onih koji su prošli lošije od ostalih, i to onog trenutka kada u skladu sa takvim odredbama počne da se živi. Konačno, oni koji odlučuju mogu da

21 Opširnije u Gligorov (1992d).

22 Mislim da je ovo Platonova ideja. Koliko ja znam, veo neznanja se prvi put pojavi u Platonovoj političkoj filozofiji.

se slože oko praktičnog ili nekog drugog poboljšanja kolektivnog identiteta ili društvene dobrobiti.²³ Koji god pristup prihvatali, prepostavka vela neznanja čini postojeće lične identitete usvojenom ustavnom funkcijom pre nego li obratno.²⁴

Ostali veruju da ovakav pristup ne pravi dovoljnu, ili čak nikakvu, razliku među pojedincima.²⁵ Zbog toga, čak i ako veo neznanja nije podignut, postoji prepostavka da neke suštinske razlike, u smislu političkih principa koje predstavnici na skupu mogu zastupati kada je ustav zaista napisan, mogu postojati ukoliko su svi jednako neupućeni. To znači da je moguće postojanje konfliktnih ustavnih principa čak i ako se predstavnici na ustavnoj konvenciji ne ponašaju u svom interesu o kome nisu informisani, kao što je moguće postojanje suštinskih razlika među profesorima ustavnog prava ili političkim filozofima. Međutim, dokle god je veo neznanja spušten, izbor između suprotstavljenih ustavnih principa biće podložan procesu razmatranja za koji se prepostavlja da je isti za svakoga (na primer, može se zahtevati da izbor bude racionalan, ma šta to značilo).²⁶ Ako se, sa druge strane, veo neznanja podigne, razlike će postati stvarne i neće biti procedure koja će ove nesuglasice moći da reši, osim na način koji će nekome doneti neželjeni krajnji ishod. Baš iz razloga da se ovakav krajnji ishod ne bi pojavio, koristi se eksperiment sa velom neznanja.

No, da li će na taj način biti sprečena pojava ustavnog neuspeha? Ovom pitanju ću pristupiti u dva koraka. Prvo ću pokazati da, uopšteno, ne mora ni doći do stvaranja ustava. I drugo, dokazaću da, načelno, iz toga mogu proizaći samo političke države.²⁷

23 Za ugovornu interpretaciju utilitarizma vidi Binmore (1989).

24 Ovo je eksplicitno uvideo Rawles (1971). Mada ja tumačim Aristotelovu kritiku Platonovog konstruktivizma na identičan način. Za opštu kritiku Platona u okviru političke filozofije vidi Gligorova (1992).

25 Vidi Rawles (1971). Gauthier (1974) je za istu pogrešku prigovarao Rawlesu. U svom kasnijem radu Rawles je čak radikalizovao svoj stav, vidi Rawles (1985) i (1987).

26 Ovo nije bazazlena prepostavka. Može se tvrditi da individualizam prepostavlja mogućnost da svaki pojedinac dode do drugaćijeg rešenja koristeći iste informacije. Ne iznosim ovakvu prepostavku da bih osporavao, suprotno uobičajenim mišljenjima, činjenicu da ustav može biti sačinjen samo ukoliko pojedinci poseduju upravo takvu vrstu identiteta.

27 Pravim razliku između ustavne i političke države na isti način na koji je to Hume implicitno činio. Vidi Hume (1953).

Zbog čega se može desiti da ustav ne bude napisan? Pre nego što odgovorim na ovo pitanje, podsetiće na svoju pretpostavku kako bi država zasnovana na ustavu morala da osigura makar dva javna dobra: bezbednost i pravdu.²⁸ Jedan od razloga zbog kojih može doći do neutanačenja ustava jeste činjenica da ne postoji načelo pravičnosti oko koga bi pojedinci, koji zaista ne znaju svoj identitet, mogli da se slože. Ne kažem da će svako načelo oko koga pojedinci mogu da se slože dok su pod velom neznanja postati neprihvatljivo istim individuama kada jednom neopozivo otkriju ko su. Želim da ukažem na to da ne postoji ideja pravičnosti koja je primenjiva na pojedince koji ne poseduju jasan identitet. Jedan od načina da ovo pojasnim jeste da pretpostavimo da su pojedinci lišeni svog identiteta tako što je od njih zahtevano da se ponašaju po načelima najvećeg altruizma i dobromernosti (može se upotrebiti i bilo koja druga ideja javnog interesa, državnog interesa, kolektivnog interesa ili uopšte dobra volja). Ukoliko bi svi prošli kroz ozbiljan proces samoodricanja shodno zahtevima ekstremnog altruizma, svi bi bili, kao članovi društva, određeni na isti način iz svakog normativnog aspekta. U ovakvom slučaju ne postoje principi komutativne ili distributivne pravde koji mogu da se izvedu iz ovakve pretpostavke.²⁹ Komutativna pravda zahteva da se zakonitima pruži nadoknada za nepravdu koja im je učinjena; ali ekstremnom altruištvu ne može biti učinjena nikakva nepravda, jer po samoj definiciji interesi drugih poništavaju njegove sopstvene interese. Distributivna pravda se oslanja na ideju maksimizacije dobrobiti pojedinca. Ekstremni altruijam se nikada ne može zasnovati na bilo kakvoj raspodeli dobrobiti pojedinca, zbog toga što svaka distribucija može biti poboljšana novom redistribucijom u korist drugih.³⁰

Do istog rezultata možemo da stignemo i na dugi način, ako pretpostavimo da su svi lišeni svojih karakteristika, osim imena koja

28 Ono što država minimalno osigurava jeste zaštita; ono što ustavna država minimalno osigurava jesu zaštita i pravda.

29 To je bilo Hjumovo shvatanje pravde i jednakosti. Vidi Gligorov (1992b).

30 Utilitaristi se nisu suočili sa ovim problemom, jer je njihova ideja o dobromernosti zasnovana na ličnom interesu. Ekstremni altruijam, za razliku od utilitirizma, pretpostavlja da je sve što pojedinac poseduje uvek vrednije od onog što ima neko drugi. Shodno tome, ne postoji ravnoteža distribucije altruizma.

će se upotrebiti samo za prozivanje. U tom slučaju principi pravde ne mogu da se primene ni na koga. Ukoliko ne postoje identiteti, ne može doći do povrede, ne može jedna distribucija biti ocenjena bolje od druge, te se zbog toga pravda ne dovodi u pitanje, čak i kada postoji čitav niz teorija političke filozofije koje se, svojom sadržinom, bave upravo ovakvom vrstom situacije.³¹

I zbog toga, ne postoji koncept pravde primenljiv na pojedince obavijene velom neznanja, pa tako nema ni ustava koji to može da otelotvori.³² Nijedan ustav se ne može pojaviti pod ovakvim prepostavkama.

Ako država i nastane, kakva će ona uopšte biti? Monteske tvrdi da ekstremne političke jednakosti i ekstremno individualno poricanje mogu samo dovesti do pojave despotije. Primenu ovakvog stava možemo prosuđivati samo u ekstremnim okolnostima i na izolovanim mestima. Ipak, ove prepostavke su potpuno opšte. U stvari, one su skoro identične sa prepostavkama koje savremena politička filozofija predstavlja putem hipoteze o velu neznanja. To opravdava uopštavanje čiji je ishod takav da će, u slučaju ekstremnih represija identiteta, nastati samo političke ali ne i ustavne države. Ovo znači da, u opisanom slučaju, pojedinci ne bi imali razlog da zloupotrebe pisanje niza načela kojih bi hteli da se pridržavaju ili, drugim rečima, oni ovakva načela ne bi držali za obavezujuća. U stvari, možda bi radije izabrali državu bezakonja. Mož-

31 Da samo kratko prokomentarišem jednu mogućnost: pretpostavimo da je veo neznanja toliko neproziran da svi zastupaju isti pojedinačni razumni zadatak. Prvo, došlo bi do toga da u stvari samo jedna osoba piše ustav, tako da ona uopšte ne bi morala da uzme u obzir pitanje komutativne pravde, budući da pisanje ustava nikome ne bi nanelo štetu. Drugo, ukoliko ta osoba razmišlja o željama lica sa stvarnim identitetom, ona je podigla veo neznanja da bi donela neku procenu koja se odnosi na distributivnu pravdu. Zbog toga, ukoliko nema identiteta, nema ni pravde.

32 Rouls je prepostavio veo neznanja, ali je takođe prepostavio i neprozirnost identiteta. Nije mi jasno kako neko ko ne zna što će postati može da se ponaša u svom interesu. Ako, na primer, neko razmišlja na sledeći način: „Ne znam ko sam, ali ako ću završiti kao siromah, želeo bih da uživam određene povlastice“, u tom slučaju imamo siromaha koji promišlja. Znači da smo podigli veo neznanja. Njegova teorija pravde funkcioniše u ovakvom kontradiktornom maniru. Harsanyi se, sa druge strane, uopšte ne bavi pravdom, već opravdanošću utilitarnih moralnih načela. Stoga njemu nisu potrebne ni ustavne ni ugovorne prepostavke, jer je moral neugovorna pojava. Za suprotna gledišta, vidi Binmore (1989).

da bi se ispostavilo da im država bez zakona nudi više mogućnosti od države koja je zasnovana na ustavu. Stoga, u navedenim okolnostima, pojedinci će izabratи jedan od političkih režima u rasponu od demokratije do tiranije, ali se nikad neće složiti da obrazuju ustavnu državu.³³

Ako sam, dakle, u pravu, onda je pretpostavka vela neznanja nespojiva sa opravdanošću ustavne države. Štaviše, neuspeh ustava će se pojaviti svaki put kada takav veo neznanja prekrije identitete pojedinaca koji koriste pravo na samoopredeljenje. Pojedinci će odabrati silu a ne prava; sukobljavaće se i i natezati oko moći, a ne oko ustavnih prava.

Do sada sam obrazlagao da će do neuspeha ustava doći ukoliko se donošenje odluka pojedinca liši njegovog sopstvenog identiteta. Sličan neuspeh se pojavljuje ukoliko se ukloni eksplicitna ili implicitna pretpostavka autarhije. Ukoliko se struktura vlasti uruši, neće biti očigledno kojoj ustavnoj konvenciji pojedinac treba da prisustvuje. Ovaj problem je najbolje analiziran u okviru teorije fiskalnog federalizma. Ukoliko postoji više državnih vlasti koje se takmiče, pojedinac može da prizna onu koja najviše odgovara njegovim potrebama. Odmah možemo da primetimo kako bi, u slučaju rešavanja sukoba suprotstavljenih državnih vlasti, pojedinci koji podležu jednoj vlasti morali da znaju svoj identitet. Morale bi biti ispunjene i druge pretpostavke.³⁴ Jedna od posebno važnih jeste da pojedinci moraju biti potpuno mobilni. Ako nisu, a neće biti ukoliko su svesni svojih identiteta, mogu završiti u državi u kojoj nisu ževeli da budu. Osim toga, ustav bi, makar u idealnim okolnostima, trebalo da bude usvojen jednoglasno i da bude opšteprihvaćen.³⁵ I zato bi,

33 Izgleda da je razlika između ustavne i političke države slična razlici između zakona i odluke. Ili slična razlici između legaliteta i suvereniteta; ili između pravila i slobode izbora. U svakom slučaju, aristotelovska klasifikacija političkih režima razlikuje režime po tome da li su, između ostalog, zasnovani na moći ili na pravu. U prvu grupu spadaju svi oni kod kojih je za donošenje zakona potrebna odluka određenog broja ljudi.

34 Jasno je šta sam želeo da kažem kada sam zamislio model fiskalnog federalizma (model takmičarskih država) u kome granice među državama nisu jasno povučene. Ukoliko će granice biti ishod takmičenja između političkih država, biće ili neodređene ili će pravo pojedinaca na slobodno kretanje po državama biti povredeno.

35 Ništa se ne menja ukoliko se zahteva manje od jednoglasne saglasnosti. Vidi Gligorov (1992).

kad se donese odluka da se ustav napiše, pre toga trebalo da bude poznato na koga će se on primenjivati, ko će se, da tako kažem, smatrati građaninom novonastale ustavne države. U tom smislu, svaki ustav je napisan kao da je napisan u stanju potpune normativne autarhije u odnosu na ostatak sveta. To ću sada i obrazložiti:

Stav 2: Ne postoji garancija da će ustav biti usvojen ako oni koji o tome odlučuju nisu u stanju autarhije (što ne znači da će biti usvojen čak i ako postoji autarhija).

Ukoliko pretpostavka autarhije nije zadovoljena, nikad ne može doći do nastanka ustava. Razlog za to je jednostavan. Ukoliko ne postoji autarhija, ako svako može da napušta proces donošenja ustava u bilo kom trenutku, ustav nikad neće biti sveobuhvatan i potpun.³⁶ Da bi se ovo razumelo, pretpostavite da se pisanjem ustava bavi cela jedna generacija koja na kraju umre. Sledеća generacija neće moći ponovo da pregovara o ustavu sa prethodnom generacijom, jer neće biti nikoga sa kim bi mogli da pregovaraju. Isti slučaj je sa secesijom. Pretpostavimo da stanovnici napišu ustav, priključe se novi stanovnici, a prvobitna populacija se otcepi. Šta se dešava sa ustavom? Da li je o njemu potrebno pregovarati sa onima koji su napustili zemlju ili ne? Ako nije, država koja nastaje izgledaće kao bilo koja druga politička tvorevina koja se može ili ne mora zasnivati na zakonitosti (može koristiti zakone, ali oni ne moraju biti obavezujući, bar ne u ustavnom smislu), a ne samo na političkoj vlasti.

Ovom problemu se može pristupiti putem metafore vela neznanja. Ukoliko su pisci ustava zaogrnuti velom neznanja, onda će, prvo, svako ko pristupi morati da bude pokriven istim velom, i drugo, svako ko odlazi svoju odluku će morati da donese u potpunom neznanju. Međutim, konkurenca jest procedura procesuiranja informacija i kao takva u suprotnosti je sa pretpostavkom vela neznanja. Dosledna je utilitarnom merilu, no i takav kriterijum pretpostavlja normativnu autarhiju, jer se u bilo kojoj mogućoj varijanti mora

³⁶ Da biste ovo razumeli, zamislite da se o ustavu pregovara svaki put kad neko reši da napusti ili pristupi pisanju (ponovno pregovaranje može da bude neophodno čak i ako su sve odluke donesene jednoglasno, jer može doći do distributivnog efekta). Tvrđna proizlazi iz činjenice da to u ishodu neće dati kooperaciju i ravnotežu.

osloniti na određeni broj pojedinaca na koji utilitarna računica treba da se primeni. Kako god bilo, utilitarizam nije ustavna niti ugovorna politička filozofija te se njime ovde neću baviti.

Ako je ovo što sam utvrdio ispravno, znači da mora već postojati neka vrsta države da bi došlo do usvajanja ustava. Zbog toga je prepostavka autarhije toliko presudna i kontraproduktivna. Ako se ona prepostavi (a kao što sam naznačio, implicirano je putem propisa o donošenju odluke ili uz pomoć prepostavke vela neznanja, da je to jedan od načina kojim se prepostavka predstavljanja može usvojiti), prepostavice se i predustavna država; ako se, međutim, ne prepostavi, nikad neće doći do stvaranja ustavne države. Drugačije rečeno, proces stvaranja ustava nije ekvivalentan procesu stvaranja države. Neuspех u donošenju ustava ne znači da neće doći do stvaranja države već samo da, uopšteno rečeno, ustavni proces donošenja odluka nije isto što i proces stvaranja države. Čak i ukoliko država može ustavno da se oformi, ne znači da je to dovoljan ili neophodan uslov za nastanak države, njenu stabilnost i njen opstanak.

I zbog toga, da uopšteno zaključim, *nedostatak pojedinačnog identiteta i autarhije doveće do ustavnog neuspeha*.

Međutim, uklanjanje ovih prepreka ne obezbeđuje automatski donošenje ustava. U stvari, sledeći stavovi će biti predmet rasprave u većem delu knjige:

Stav 3: Ljudi koji odlučuju u međunarodnom okruženju, svesni svojih socijalnih, političkih i individualnih identiteta, ukoliko budu sposobni da obrazuju bilo kakvu vlast, po pravilu će uspostaviti političku, a ne ustavnu vlast.

Kada pojedinci jednom postanu svesni svojih identiteta i kada propisi o državljanstvu budu jasno određeni, svi će imati interes da glasaju i ponašaju se strateški, što znači da ne postoje garancije da će doći do prihvatljivog i primenjivog ustavnog društvenog ugovora čak i ukoliko su bile zadovoljene sve ostale prepostavke. Kada pojedince jednom sagledamo ne kao predstavnike već ih prihvatimo kao „političke životinje po prirodi“, veoma je teško govoriti o ustavnom izboru u duhu ugovorne teorije. Moguće je da se tu neće pojaviti ustavna

politika (opšte uzevši, neće je ni biti). Ali predmet mog interesovanja u ovom poglavlju su samo dva prethodno razmatrana razloga, dok će se ovim poslednjim baviti naknadno.³⁷

Objašnjenje balkanizacije

Razmatrao sam pojam ustavnog neuspeha da bih mogao da ga primenim na aktuelni proces balkanizacije. Ovaj proces obuhvata sve tri vrste neuspeha koje sam prethodno opisao. Veo neznanja se konstantno pojačava putem osporavanja identiteta. I radi toga postoje normativne vlasti koje se takmiče, i pretpostavka autarhije nije zadovoljena. Surogati identiteta (nacije, jezici, kulture, političke utopije) rade na uništenju mogućnosti da se uspostavi normativna autarhija i podstiču pojedince da se osalone na moć, a ne na ustavna prava. Zbog toga mislim da je teorija ustavnog neuspeha koju ovde predstavljam korisna za razumevanje balkanizacije.

Suštinsku odliku balkanizacije verovatno predstavljaju osporavani identiteti. Svakom ko je proučavao Balkan jasno je da na tom području nisu osporavane samo teritorije, već su osporavani, što je mnogo važnije, i identiteti većine stanovnika koji žive тамо (pojedinaca i naroda). Pojedinac je, da bi preživeo, veoma često morao da se krije iza lažnog identiteta, potpuno zaboravivši svoj prvobitni, što je dovodilo do neprekidnog rađanja novih mitova o stvarnim identitetima naroda i država. U stvari, celokupni problem izražavanja pojedinačnog identiteta presudan je za Balkan na isti način na koji je presudan u političkoj filozofiji uopšte.³⁸

A šta, u stvari, podrazumevamo pod *identitetom*? Da ne zalazimo u političku antropologiju, uobičajena definicija koju možemo da

37 Za opšta razmatranja problema implementacije vidi Dasgupta, Hammond i Maskin (1979).

38 Uz malo mašte, možemo da tvrdimo da je Balkan u potrazi za onim što je Rouls nazvao preklapajućim konsenzusom, imajući u vidu „balkanizaciju“ kroz koju je Evropa prošla tokom perioda religijskih ratova. Vidi Rawles (1985) i (1987).

primenimo i u ovom kontekstu glasila bi da je *identitet jedna vrsta spoja osobina koje mogu da se zaštite ispravom (dokumentom), koja te osobine pripisuje određenom broju stanovnika*. To znači da sve osobine koje pojedinac može pripisati sebi mogu biti opšte, tako da se u principu mogu vezati za bilo koga ko pod takvu generalizaciju potпадa. Ovo možemo iskazati i tako što ćemo se pozvati na princip jednakosti u zakonskom smislu, da su „svi jednaki bez obzira na pojedinačne razlike...“, pri čemu će naznačene razlike konstituisati pojedinačne ili grupne identitete. Ukoliko ne može da se obavi ova, da tako kažemo, operacija legalne generalizacije, onda postoje neki kriterijumi razlikovanja koji se ne mogu generalizovati. Drugačije rečeno, dolazi do osporenih identiteta.

Do sada sam tvrdio da ustavni i ugovorni pristup političkoj filozofiji poseduje ozbiljnu manjkavost jer ne postoji konzistentna ideja države uopštena tako da se može primeniti na slučaj osporenih identiteta, kao i da ne postoji konzistentna ideja ustavne države ukoliko je generalizacija postignuta potpunim oduzimanjem pojedinačnih identiteta (tako da konflikt nema po definiciji). Ovakva situacija se pojavljuje u slučajevima gde su identiteti toliko žestoko osporeni da ne postoji javno priznanje ko su takve osobe, koje u tom slučaju imaju i ličnu dilemu u vezi svog identiteta. Tada dolazi do procesa balkanizacije, u onom smislu u kojem ga ja ovde koristim.

Pokušaću primerima da ukažem na šta mislim. Može se reći da je ime neosporan pokazatelj ličnog identiteta. Iz toga sledi da je prirodno da pojedinac ima pravo na izbor sopstvenog imena. Međutim, na Balkanu su čak i lična imena predmet osporavanja. Ime se bira da bi se prenela informacija o opštem identitetu pojedinca (ma šta to značilo). Sa druge strane, drugi pokušavaju da utiču na izbor imena iz istog razloga. Na Balkanu, vlasti se često mešaju u proces izbora imena, uglavnom pokušavajući da ostvare kulturnu i političku asimilaciju. Tako postoje čitavi nivoi osporavanja u vezi sa time koje je ime odgovarajuće u određenoj sredini. Štaviše, postoje zakonski i ostali represivni mehanizmi koji su smišljeni ne samo da bi uticali na izbor ličnog imena, već predstavljaju i agitaciju za promenu imena. Ime je označavalo više nego bi, po prirodi stvari, trebalo da označava.



Prezimena su još češća meta napada, jer prenose više informacija o identitetu od ličnog imena.

Kakva je to informacija? Sporenja oko imena su toliko žestoka jer postoji mnogo spornih oblasti koje su na neki način koncentrisane oko ličnih identiteta. Možemo reći da je svaka vrednost predmet krajnje konfliktnih tvrdnji. Takođe i da sve što bi moglo biti faktor ujedinjenja, u stvari razjedinjuje. Dobar primer za to jeste jezik. Na Balkanu većina ljudi govori istim jezikom.³⁹ Ali to doprinosi manjem, a ne većem razumevanju. Naravno da nije neophodno da onaj koji govori engleski bude Englez, niti je neophodno da Amerikanci govore američkim jezikom da bi bili Amerikanci. Međutim, na Balkanu se nacionalni identiteti obično identifikuju sa jezikom, čak i kada lingvističke razlike zapravo ne postoje. I zato Hrvati moraju da imaju svoj hrvatski jezik, na isti način na koji Srbi moraju imati srpski.⁴⁰ Ovo zbujuje i više nego što bi trebalo, jer na Balkanu zaista postoje nacionalnosti koje su prvenstveno određene svojim jezikom (Slovenci, na primer).

Veroispovest je još jedan takav primer. Ona je bila kako izgovor da se ospori identitet drugih, tako i razlog za proklamovanje različitosti svog identiteta. Dakle, bila je razlog za asimilaciju kao i razlog za zahtevanje posebnog identiteta. I, kao i svugde, bila je primarni pokretač asimilacije, nasilnog uključivanja, kao i političkog konformizma, konverzije identiteta i svakakvih drugih metamorfoza. Ona je potencirala kulturne razlike do poistovećivanja etniciteta sa verskom pripadnošću. Međutim, identifikovanje kulture, a posebno etniciteta sa veroispovešću teško je izvodivo. Kulture se samo delimično zasnivaju na veroispovesti, a etnicitet teško da se može poistovetiti sa veroispovešću, jer postoji ograničen broj religija a puno veći broj nacija. Ono što je istinito za kulturu i veroispovest može se primeniti na svaki drugi atribut

39 Nije, naravno, lako odrediti koji su jezici isti. Ako upotrebimo kriterijum razumevanja, srpski i hrvatski su, na primer, jedan jezik. Međutim, Srbin neće moći da piše na hrvatskom bez dodatnih instrukcija, i obrnuto. Slično je sa srpskim i makedonskim, te sa makedonskim i bugarskim jezikom.

40 U jednom momentu je bilo pokušaja da se stvori bosanski jezik, što je posebno interesantno, jer se ne bi radilo o nacionalnom, već o regionalnom jeziku.

koji se odabere u cilju određivanja bilo kog aspekta individualnog i kolektivnog identiteta na Balkanu.⁴¹

Ovi kriterijumi ne funkcionišu ništa bolje ni u bilo kojoj drugoj sredini. I zbog toga se ne radi o nedoslednosti identifikacionih kriterijuma, već se na Balkanu, do krajnjih granica, iskorišćava ne samo njihova raznovrsnost već i činjenica da su podložni osporavanju. Baviću se logikom osporavanja da bih ovo razjasnio.

Nivo osporavanja ne zavisi od toga da li kriterijuma za osporavanje ima mnogo ili malo. Čak i „savršeni identitet“ (šta god to značilo) nije dovoljna garancija da neće doći do sukoba. Podstrek za diferencijaciju se može nalaziti baš tu, jer ne postoje razlike u identitetu koje su obuhvaćene uobičajenim kriterijumom. Sa druge strane, povećanje broja kriterijuma povećava broj potencijalnih tačaka rascepa. Zbog toga pojedinac ne može biti potpuno definisan putem malog broja kriterijuma, a može biti previše definisan velikim brojem kriterijuma.

Sukob je rezultat individualizacije isto koliko i generalizacije. Odbrana identiteta se može posmatrati kao secesionistički pokret, što u većini slučajeva i jeste.⁴² Međutim, veoma su uobičajeni i pokušaji samoodricanja. Oni funkcionišu putem generalizacije. Teško da na Balkanu postoji kolektivni kriterijum koji nije upotrebljen kao osnov za stvaranje novog identiteta. Jedan od takvih kriterijuma je i nacionalizam, koji je ekstremno razoran. Od ostalih oprobanih kriterijuma, najviše je obećavao jugoslovenski identitet, ali je istovremeno i najviše razočarao. U stvari, rađanje nacionalizma koje je trebalo da razreši problem nejasnih identiteta, pretvorilo se u smetnju daljoj generalizaciji kojom se došlo do jugoslovenskog identiteta, čak i u slučajevima kada je jugoslovenski identitet poslužio kao motor nacionalne emancipacije.⁴³ Principi federalizma i konfederalizma su takođe često korišćeni na Balkanu, ali federacija,

41 Nacionalni identitet, karakterologija, etnogeneza i politička istorija tradicionalno su važni sadržaji na Balkanu. Neki od autora za koje sam smatrao da mi mogu pomoći u razumevanju problema bili su Slobodan Jovanović, Stjepan Radić, Ivan Cankar, Krste Misirkov i Dimitrije Bogdanović. Za korisno razmatranje o nacionalnom pitanju vidi Banac (1984). Za kratak pregled vidi Cvijić (1991).

42 Pretpostavljam da je ovakav pristup političkim identitetima imao Mil.

43 Više o ovome u Četvrtom poglavlju.



kao i ostali tipovi udruživanja, nije uspela da se održi ni da obezbedi stabilnost.

Pravila uključivanja i isključivanja mnogobrojna su i preklapaju se sa nedostatkom konsenzusa. Jedan od razloga jeste taj što, usled lošeg određenja i osporavanja identiteta, istorijski kriterijum igra važnu ulogu. Međutim, uloga istorije i dalje je na nivou mističnih predanja, tako da svaka generacija ponovo izmišlja svoje kolektivno sećanje. Zbog toga je predmet osporavanja ne samo trenutni, već i istorijski identitet. Iste rasprave o imenu, poreklu, kriterijumu definisanja, teritoriji, kulturi, udelu veroispovesti i nasleđa vode se kako u istorijskom tako i u savremenom kontekstu. Smatra se da je prvenstveni zadatak istorije pružanje opravdanja trenutnim nacionalnim i političkim interesima.

Zbog toga ništa što pojedinač čini ili što mu pripada nije bezbedno pred reinterpretacijom koja ga može lišiti svih njegovih osnovnih ličnih prava, a o imovini i da ne govorimo. To uzrokuje pojavu ekstremne nesigurnosti. U tom smislu, pretpostavka vela neznanja zadovoljena je do te mere da ne postoji znanje ili sporazum na koji pojedinač može da se osloni sa bilo kakvom izvesnošću. Ovo, naravno, ne izaziva ponašanje kakvo bi pretpostavila teorija racionalnog očekivanja, ali predstavlja dodatni podstrek za oslanjanje na moć i pozive na upotrebu sile.

U filozofskom smislu, balkanizacija se objašnjava činjenicom da su nastanak i postojanost svakog *ja* i *mi* uvek snažno osporavani. Nivo netolerancije je taj koji balkanizuje. Ukoliko sagledamo krivudave puteve prepoznavanja identiteta naroda i pojedinca tokom istorije Balkana, postaće očigledno da je svaka vrednost vezana za lojalnost stavljena pod ogroman pritisak, a da je iskušenje odričanja od sopstvenih uverenja radi prostog preživljavanja uvek bilo veoma intenzivno. Pojedinac je mogao da se sakrije pretvarajući se da je neko drugi, ili da je niko, ili da postane ono što nije, ili čak da je ono što jeste. Onaj koji ne zna ko je i ne razume šta je, nema svoje mesto u svetu. U svetu Balkana.

DRUGO POGLAVLJE

Otkriće i neuspeh liberalizma u Jugoslaviji

„Kada dva čoveka putuju drumom, jedan ka istoku, drugi ka zapadu, lako mogu da se mimođu ukoliko je put dovoljno širok, ali dva čoveka koji vode raspravu o suprotstavljenim religijskim principima ne mogu se lako i bez potresa mimoći, mada se može prepostaviti da se i u njihovom slučaju radi o dovoljno širokom putu na kome svako može neometano da nastavi kuda je naumio. Ali priroda ljudskog uma je takva da uvek želi da dodirne svaki um koji mu se približi, i koliko jednodušnost mišljenja divno spaja, toliko svaka suprotnost izaziva šok i nemir. Otud revnost koju većina otkriva u sporenju, i otud njihova netrepeljivost prema suprotstavljanju, čak i kada se radi o najspekulativnijim i najmanje važnim uverenjima.“

Hjam

Država bez svojstava

Liberalna misao se pojavila u komunističkoj Jugoslaviji kao i u većini zemalja centralne Evrope, ali uz jednu značajnu razliku.⁴⁴ Dok su neke istočnoevropske države doživele ponovno javljanje liberalizma, u Jugoslaviji je on trebalo da bude otkriven prvi put. I to ne zato što u Jugoslaviji nikad nije bilo intelektualaca koji su zastupali liberalnu misao ili čak liberalnih partija.⁴⁵ Ovo važi za neke delove

44 Za rane procene srednjoevropskih socijalističkih zemalja vidi Scruton (1988).

45 Ne postoji dobra sveobuhvatna istorija političkih partija nastalih u različitim delovima Jugoslavije. Liberalizam je imao jako uporište u srpskim intelektualnim krugovima pri kraju devetnaestog veka (vidi Prodanović (1947)), ali je bio potisnut partijama koje su bile radikalnije i nacionalističke (za neke od ideja o jugoslovenskim političkim programima u trenutku stvaranja jugoslovenske države vidi Banac (1984)). U međuratnom periodu postojale su demokratske, republikanske i seljačke partie sa manje-više liberalnim programima, ali njihov uticaj nije bio preterano jak. Posle Drugog svetskog rata, jedno vreme su postojale neke liberalne partie, ali nisu mogle



Jugoslavije, jer neki od njenih naroda nemaju nikakvu značajniju liberalnu tradiciju.⁴⁶ Ali kod Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, tri ključna naroda u Jugoslaviji, liberalizam zaista ima određenu istoriju, i u nekom smislu, ona nikada nije bila prekinuta. Mada, bilo je potrebno ponovo otkriti liberalizam, jer se ispostavilo da nije bilo moguće održati kontinuitet. Ne radi se o tome da je bilo potrebno otkriti neke nove principe liberalizma, već je bilo potrebno ustanoviti kako dobro poznate vrednosti liberalizma mogu biti ostvarene u Jugoslaviji. Proces otkrića je bio uspešan, ali je pokušaj primene liberalizma u Jugoslaviji pretrpeo neuspех.

Upotrebiću analogiju da razjasnim značenje ideje otkrića koju ovde koristim. Tokvil⁴⁷ je pružio objašnjenje koje možemo nazvati liberalnom odbranom francuske revolucije od napada liberala Burka, koji je tvrdio da nije neophodna revolucija da bi se otkrili, razumeli i primenili liberalni principi. Burk je smatrao da su liberalni principi prisutni u drevnim ustavima svih država. Kant je, kao još jedan kritičar revolucionarnog principa, liberalne principe pronalazio u racionalnim idejama prava. Tokvil je, međutim, zadržao mišljenje da su se u Francuskoj ta dva izvora liberalizma podudarila. Stari francuski ustav bio je liberalan, u smislu da je pružao jednak prava svim Francuzima. Tako da je univerzalnost prirodnih prava bila sadržana u prvobitnom ustavu Francuske. Revolucija je samo ponovo otkrila prirodna prava i ponovo potvrdila drevni ustav francuskog naroda suprostavljujući ga izopačenom „ancien régime“.

Poenta je u tome da ideja francuske države podrazumeva kako postojanje univerzalnih prirodnih prava, tako i slobodnu vlast; jednom rečju, liberalnu državu. Ovo podudaranje racionalnog principa sa drevnim poreklom te države bilo je presudno za stvaranje liberalne Francuske kroz proces ponovnog otkrivanja (ili revoluciju). Morao je postajati makar mit o drevnoj slobodnoj državi, da bi mu se moglo vratiti. U Engleskoj, gde država verovatno nikada nije mnogo

da se organizuju, da bi na kraju bile eliminisane. Pošto se neću baviti političkom istorijom Jugoslavije pre uvodenja socijalizma, pozivajuću se samo na radove Čavoškog i Košturnice koji se odnose na posleratni period (vidi Čavoški, Košturnica (1983)).

46 Teško je pronaći liberalnu tradiciju u Makedoniji ili među Muslimanima.

47 Tocqueville (1967).

skrenula sa liberalnog kursa, reforme su bile dovoljne. U Sjedinjenim Državama ništa sem liberalnih principa nije moglo da državu bez istorije održi na okupu.⁴⁸ Tamo je nacija zasnovana na ideji jednakosti; u Francuskoj, jednakaka prava su obuhvaćena idejom nacije.

Dakle, ili je ideja o jednakosti kohezioni faktor države,⁴⁹ ili je potrebno postojanje ideje o istorijskoj državi; ili država mora da se otkrije, ili nacija mora ponovo da se uspostavi. U Jugoslaviji nije bilo moguće ništa od toga. Da bi ovo bilo jasno, predlažem drugačiju analogiju. Jugoslaviju možemo doživljavati kao tipično balkansku državu, ali to nije sasvim tačno. Istorija Balkana ne nudi ništa što bi obuhvatalo Jugoslaviju kao političku mogućnost, a kamoli nužnost. Ispravnije je Jugoslaviju sagledati kao srednjoevropsku državu. Ukoliko pročitamo roman Roberta Muzila „Čovek bez svojstava“, možemo analogijom doći do ideje Jugoslavije. Država postoji, ali ne postoji temelj te države. Možemo tražiti osnove takve države, ali ta potraga kao i država ne mogu biti naučni ili zakonski projekat. Da bi takva država opstala, morali bi da se uspostave liberalni principi bez oslanjanja na drevna prirodna prava ili na neku zakonsku i racionalnu ideju o univerzalnoj jednakosti ljudi. Teško je reći kako je i da li je ovo uopšte moguće. Kao tipična srednjoevropska tvorevina, Jugoslavija je najverovatnije moralna da se raspadne.⁵⁰

48 Poznata rasprava Burka i Pejna može se razumeti na ovaj način: u zemlji kao što su Sjedinjene Države, moguće je podržati princip da svaka generacija odlučuje za sebe, jer ne postoji ustavna istorija na koju se može pozivati. Sjedinjene Države su morale da gledaju unapred, dok Engleska nije mogla da garantuje pravo na revoluciju, jer bi to povredilo njen drevni ustav.

49 Što je Tokvilova poenta u „Demokratiji u Americi“. U Jugoslaviji postoji sukob istorije i politike, jer su istorijski ciljevi većine jugoslovenskih naroda prilično različiti. Političko stvaranje Jugoslavije većini Srba je izgledalo kao političko rešenje njihovih istorijskih problema; Hrvatima i Slovincima je to bilo istorijsko rešenje njihovih političkih problema. Svi su želeli da reše svoja nacionalna pitanja i to rešenje je nađeno u stvaranju ili ponovnom uspostavljanju nacionalne (etničke) države. Liberalno rešenje je u sukobu sa nacionalnim, pa je tako ideja o liberalnoj Jugoslaviji morala da bude otkrivena; ona nije mogla da se pojavi prirodno (kao ideja o naciji – u Francuskoj, ili kao ideja o državi – u SAD).

50 Spontani proces rasta koji opisuje Hayek (1960) teško se može pripisati političkoj inventivnosti. Hayek uopštava britansko iskustvo, koje je naravno jedinstveno. Kriviti revolucionare za raspad Austrougarske znači izbegavati odgovor; isto važi i za Jugoslaviju.

U nastavku ovog poglavlja opisaću proces otkrića liberalnih vrednosti u Jugoslaviji i razloge zbog kojih one nisu uspele da izvrše bilo kakav ozbiljniji politički uticaj. Proces je bio sličan u svim delovima zemlje, bez obzira na činjenicu da su neki imali tradiciju liberalne misli, a drugi ne. Dakle, proučavaču proces, a ne posebne liberalne mislioce ili grupe.

Levica i desnica u socijalističkoj državi

U parlamentarnoj demokratiji, politički i ideološki prostor može se podeliti na levu i desnu sferu. Ovakva podela se zasniva na činjenici da su ideologije uglavnom stvorene u dijalogu sa drugim ideologijama, kao i da odluke moraju da se donose putem određene procedure većinom glasova (vidi Duverger (1954) radi detaljnog obrazloženja). U socijalističkoj državi ne postoji ideološko nadmetanje, odluke se donose autokratski. Revolucionari su tradicionalno na levoj strani, dok su oni koji se opiru režimu na suprotnoj, desnoj. Komunisti, mada na vlasti, uvek zastupaju promene i to ih stavlja na levu stranu ideološkog spektra. Sa druge strane su oni koji predstavljaju okoštavanje društvenog poretku, pa bi se u političkom smislu nalazili na desnici, da njihovi neistomišljenici već ne zauzimaju desnu stranu. Ali najvažnija činjenica jeste da se u socijalističkim zemljama komunisti uvek nalaze na levici i svojevoljno predstavljaju manjinu, dok je desnica uvek rezervisana za većinu.

Desnicu karakteriše ideologija okrenuta prošlosti, mada ona zagovara politiku koja traga za promenama postojećeg socijalističkog poretku. Ukoliko se drevni ustav zemlje može tumačiti u liberalnom smislu, liberalizam može da se pojavi kao cilj antikomunističke politike. Ali najčešće će tu biti uključen i skup nekih konzervativnih vrednosti koje će dominirati desnim krilom političkog spektra u socijalističkoj državi.

Na levici obično postoje dve frakcije. Jedna je staljinistička, druga reformistička, koja se u socijalističkoj državi nalazi u najčudnijoj mogućoj poziciji. Reformisti ne mogu da računaju na podršku desnice, jer ne dele njihovu ideologiju, iako njihove politike promena mogu biti slične. Tako da moraju da dele ideologiju sa staljinistima. Sa druge strane, glavni neprijatelj reformističke frakcije komunista jesu ti isti staljinisti, koji se protive bilo kakvim promenama socijalističkih institucija. Reformiste napadaju kao liberali, dok opozicija s desna ne pravi veliku razliku između njih i staljinista. Ni jedno ni drugo nije istinito, ali se na taj način reformisti suočavaju sa nedostatkom bilo kakvog ideološkog i političkog identiteta, što je u neparlamentarnim i nedelotvornim političkim zajednicama fatalni nedostatak.

Uopšteno govoreći, ukoliko bi komunisti bili uklonjeni, ili ukoliko bi usvojili konzervativne vrednosti, socijalistička država bi ostala bez levice. Država počinje da živi svoju prošlost i samo su liberali sposobni da govore u ime budućnosti. Ali budućnost je ideološki vezana za levicu, koju su do tada monopolisali komunisti, što liberali ostavlja u limbu. U zemlji koja ima liberalnu prošlost, naravno, ne sledi ovakva konsekvenca. Takođe, proevropska ili zapadna zemlja moći će da primeni liberalne principe kao sopstvene. Ali ako, kao u slučaju Jugoslavije, ne postoji jugoslovenska prošlost, a pogotovo ne liberalna, i ako se Evropa doživljava kao delimično odgovorna za njen stvaranje, liberali će se naći u potpunom vakuumu. Da bi liberali mogli da zaigraju određenu političku ulogu u Jugoslaviji, bilo je potrebno izmisliti jedan kompletno novi politički prostor.

Ovim ne želim da kažem da u Jugoslaviji nisu otkrivene liberalne vrednosti i principi. Upravo suprotno, kao što ću pokazati u nastavku teksta, svakodnevni život gurao je ljude ka saznanju da je vladajući socijalistički poredak potrebno zameniti liberalnim principima.

Tržišni socijalizam

Glavni saveznik liberalizma u socijalističkoj državi jeste neefikasnost njene ekonomije. Zbog toga su neke liberalne ideje u početku otkrili reformisti ili pragmatisti unutar komunističke partije.

U Jugoslaviji su se određene liberalne ideje pojavile pri pokušajima socijalističkih reformi. Vremenom je reformistička frakcija komunističke partije zadobila vlast, jer ortodoksna frakcija nije mogla da ponudi bilo kakvo rešenje za ekonomske probleme socijalizma.⁵¹ U svojim pokušajima da socijalizam učini efikasnijim, reformistička frakcija je obično bila okretнутa liberalnim ekonomskim rešenjima. Prvo je bila isturena ideja o nekoj vrsti „optimalnog socijalizma“.⁵² Kada se ispostavilo da je ona nedelotvorna, ustanovljeno je da je uzrok neefikasnosti „birokratija“, pod kojom se podrazumevala rigidnija frakcija komunista. Ali postoje dva moguća kontrolna mehanizma vladajuće komunističke birokratije: politička opozicija i tržište. Prvi je bio nedostupan reformistima vladajuće komunističke partije (ili bilo kome drugom), a tržište je shvatano kao indirektni odgovor političkom monopolu. Zbog toga je prva liberalna ideja koja se pojavila u okviru komunističke partije bila ideja o tržišnoj ekonomiji, i to obično pod nazivom tržišni socijalizam.⁵³

51 Sada su ekonomski problemi socijalizma dobro poznati. Za najbolje tumačenje vidi Kornai (1989).

52 Reč je o ideji „optimalnog plana“ (Lange i Kantorovich). U Jugoslaviji je glavni zastupnik „optimalnog plana“ kao centralizovanog planskog sistema i „samoupravne ekonomije“ bio B. Horvat (vidi 1984). Drugi važni zagovornici jugoslovenske rasprave o „pravim socijalističkim ekonomskim ustanovama“ mogu se naći kod Milenkovića (1971). Skorašnje ponovno razmatranje može se videti u Cerne (1989).

53 Za analizu prve socijalističke reforme, takozvanog NEP-a (Nove ekonomske politike) u Sovjetskom Savezu vidi Gligorov (1984). Nikada nije prihvaćeno da ideja tržišnog socijalizma predstavlja gledište komunističke partije. Veoma mali broj ekonomista je zastupao takav sistem. Dogma da laissez-faire ekonomska politika ne može da se opravda široko je rasprostranjena, i nigde se više ne napada. Postojale su dve dominantne ideje u jugoslovenskoj ekonomiji: jedna je priznavala tržišni mehanizam kao instrument planiranja ili kao instrument kejnzijske ekonomske politike (Horvat); drugi su zagovarali kompletan tržišni sistem u okviru samoupravne ekonomije (vidi Bajt 1989).

Ideja tržišnog socijalizma ili „(liberalnog) socijalizma slobodne razmene“ nije održiva iz dva razloga⁵⁴: prvi – nemoguće je izbeći problem političkog pluralizma, i drugi – nije moguće uvesti tržišnu ekonomiju bez temeljne legalizacije privatne svojine.⁵⁵ Druga prepreka je smetnja svim reformskim pokretima u okviru komunističke partije, dok se o prvoj i ne raspravlja. Naravno, liberalni komunisti idu u pravcu zagovaranja demokratizacije društva, zahtevaju vladavinu prava i čak zastupaju slobodu štampe, ali ih sve to u totalitarnoj državi ne čini liberalima, već ih jedino diskredituje kao komuniste.

Važno je razumeti da se ideja o manje ili više ograničenoj slobodnoj trgovini obično rađa unutar vladajuće komunističke partije,⁵⁶ i to kao reakcija na neefikasnost socijalističkog sistema. Ali moguće je da laissez-faire socijalizam nikad ne stekne legitimitet, ni unutar komunističke partije, niti u javnosti (nezavisno od činjenice da nije ni izvodiv, niti održiv).⁵⁷ On se doživljava kao politika suprotna komunističkoj ideologiji, pa ga čak i javnost smatra fundamentalno licemernim i nepravednim. Tek kada socijalistički sistem doživi krah, vlada postaje spremna da prihvati radikalniju liberalizaciju socijalizma. Ali tada je za komuniste kasno da urade bilo šta.

54 Izraz „održiv“ upotrebljavam u istom kontekstu kao Brus (vidi Brus 1987). Tačno je da su mnogi komunisti reformisti postalii liberali, ali ne tako što su napravili frakciju (neki su obrazovali liberalne partie u pojedinim delovima Jugoslavije nakon raspada). Politički, komunisti reformisti, bar u Jugoslaviji, imali su tendenciju da postanu socijalisti, ali prilično je teško prepoznati socijalističku alternativu u postsocijalističkim društvima.

55 Interesantno je primetiti da je ovo bilo jasno već 1921. u efektnom izlaganju N. D. Kondratijeva.

56 U Jugoslaviji je liberalizacija započeta rano (pri kraju 1949) i razvijala se ujednačeno (mada ne bez povremenih zastoja). Nikada nije uspela da obuhvati tržišta pravnog kapitala i rada.

57 O ovome vidi raspravu između Brusa i Novea (Brus (1987), Nove (1987)).

Civilno društvo

Autonomija je sledeći korak u razvitku liberalne misli. Totalitarna društva stvaraju sistem potpune zavisnosti;⁵⁸ cilj njihovog sistema je da uništi svaki oblik autonomije. Pojedinac zavisi od države koja mu obezbeđuje rad, zaradu, hranu, krov nad glavom, kao i zaštitu i društveni status. I zaista, totalitarna država se iz petnih žila trudi da misli u ime svojih građana. Nije samo sloboda ugušena ovim tiranskim, autoritarnim sistemom; on gradi institucije koje treba da zamene sve vidove slobode, odnosno sve vidove autonomije.⁵⁹

U socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji su na početku raskida sa Staljinom neki oblici autonomije bili zastupani i prihvaćeni.⁶⁰ Nekih četrdeset godina kasnije, zahtevi su sakupljeni i obuhvaćeni potpuno razvijenom idejom građanskih prava.⁶¹ Važno je razumeti kako su se ti zahtevi pojavili. Jednostavan zahtev grupe liberala za jednakim pravima ili autonomijom građanskog društva ne bi imao nikakvog efekta. Da bi se takvi zahtevi ozbiljno shvatili treba otkloniti nepravdu socijalističkog sistema. Ovo se obično ne dešava na ideoškoj ravni, nego kada dođe do sukoba nekih konkretnih interesa sa postojećim institucijama. Dakle, zastupanje liberalnih interesa ne ugrožava socijalističku vladavinu, već potiskivanje konkretnih interesa stvara konfliktnu situaciju koja rađa svest ljudi o postojećem konfliktu i dovodi do shvatanja značaja liberalnih načela. Kada se pojavi interes a ne može da se ostvari jer je u sukobu sa dominantnim socijalističkim institucijama, nepravda socijalizma postaje transparentna, a svi ugroženi počinju potragu za alternativnim načelima. Jedno od takvih načела je liberalno.

Nepravda socijalizma ne mora da bude predstavljena samo kroz ekonomsku ili neku drugu neefikasnost. Kada neko ostane bez posla, prirodno je da potraži alternativni način da obezbedi sebe i svoju

58 Vidi Gligorov (1990).

59 Ovaj kontrast je najjače istakao Hayek (1944).

60 U Jugoslaviji su takvi zahtevi kulminirali studentskim demonstracijama 1968. Njima su se pridružili zahtevi za nacionalnom autonomijom u većini sastavnih delova Jugoslavije. Ova dva pokreta su uglavnom bila u sukobu, i zbog toga ih je komunistička partija relativno lako ugušila.

61 U Jugoslaviji se ovo odigralo nedavno. Izraslo je iz omladinskog pokreta u Sloveniji i uskoro se raširilo po celoj Jugoslaviji.

porodicu. Ali budući da je privatni biznis zabranjen ili strogo ograničen, baš tada pojedinac oseća nepravdu socijalizma. Ukoliko mora da potraži posao na crnom tržištu, trajno će živeti sa ovim nepravdama.

Isto se dešava sa intelektualcem koji želi da predstavi svoje viđenje o pitanjima koja ga se tiču. Ukoliko se sukobi sa državnim cenzorom ili sa vladajućom ideologijom, istog trenutka postaje svestan teške nepravde na kojoj su zasnovane socijalističke institucije,⁶² a to važi i za sve slične slučajeve.

Na primer, gušenje nacionalnih interesa je obično veoma rasprostranjeno u socijalističkim državama, jer su komunisti skloni da definišu gradanski identitet putem klasnih odrednica. Kaže se da je važnije kojoj klasi neko pripada nego koje je nacionalnosti. Ovo je rezultat marksističke ideologije koja je internacionalistička. Kao posledicu imamo da se sadašnjost i svetla budućnost smatraju važnijima od prošlosti, ka kojoj radnici imaju tek privremenu sklonost: radnicima navodno ništa nije važnije od sadašnjeg ekonomskog položaja i rastuće nade o budućem blagostanju. Tvrđilo se da radnici nemaju nacionalnih osećanja, jer im prošlost ništa ne znači. Budući da je ovo bilo u suprotnosti sa osećanjima većine ljudi bez obzira na njihovu klasnu pripadnost, nacionalni interesi su morali da dođu u sukob sa postojećom ideologijom i institucijama, pa se ponovo pojavio dodatni razlog da vlast poštuje prava pojedinaca.⁶³

Liberalizam se javio kroz pojedinačne i kolektivne sukobe sa socijalističkim sistemom. Razumljivo je da pojedinac mora da zahteva poštovanje svojih prava kada se suoči sa činjenicom da uopšte nema nikakva prava. Do liberalnog principa da „svi ljudi imaju ista prava bez obzira na svoje etničko, rasno, političko, ideoško, seksualno, socijalno, klasno poreklo i razlike u prihodu i u imovini“, došlo se kroz sukobe sa institucijama socijalizma koje su bile napravljene sa ciljem da eliminišu bilo kakvu ideju o političkoj jednakosti u svim

62 Najpoznatiji primer u Jugoslaviji je grupa filozofa praksisovaca. Način na koji su neki od njih prihvatali neke elemente liberalnog načina mišljenja je tipičan (kao i način na koji to nije uspelo da utiče na njihovo političko ponašanje). Ovaj slučaj je prepričan u Popov (1989).

63 Intenzivna rasprava o klasnom i nacionalnom identitetu vodila se u Jugoslaviji tokom kriznih perioda s kraja šezdesetih i početkom sedamdesetih.



tim domenima. Dakle, prvo dođe do osećanja nepravde; zatim do zahtevanja prava i na kraju se javlja ideja o jednakim pravima.

To je trenutak u kojem ideja civilnog društva stiče šire odobravanje. Bilo bi prirodno da se ideja personalne autonomije razvija prva. Ali u kolektivističkim društvima prvo se pokreće ideja o autonomiji društvenih ustanova. Zahteva se autonomija profesionalnih interesa; sledi zahtev za autonomijom univerziteta; prepoznaje se šira uloga dobrovoljne razmene i tržišta; prihvata se potreba za osnivanjem autonomnih udruženja; odobrava se šira nacionalna i regionalna nezavisnost; polako, na prstima, prikrada se liberalizacija. Na kraju, ideja građanske kulture postaje prominentna (suprotno zvaničnom idealu kulture proletarijata). Konačno, proglašava se kraj klasne borbe i priznaje pojava građanskog društva. Taj period se u nekim komunističkim državama nazivao „socijalističko građansko društvo“. U Jugoslaviji je ideja o „samoupravnom građanskom društvu“ u kratkom periodu zamenila ideju građanskog društva, sve dok ideja o samupravljanju nije bila napuštena a počeo da dominira jednostavni koncept građanskog društva.

Napredak počinje sa ljudima koji zahtevaju određena prava, narasta pravdanjem nastanka autonomnih društvenih ustanova i prenošenjem vlasti na niže teritorijalne organe i završava se implicitnim ili čak eksplicitnim pravdanjem građanskog društva.

Vladavina prava

Socijalistička država u skladu sa svojim totalitarnim karakterom koristi zakon, ali ga se ne pridržava. Za to se u prvo vreme okrivljuje „birokratija“. Postoji ogroman broj zabrana, višak administracije i formulara, previše kriterijuma koje treba ispuniti. Levičarska kritika „real-socijalizma“ otišla je toliko daleko da je govorila da je reč o birokratskoj kontrarevoluciji. Suština ove kritike bila je u tome da se, putem ukazivanja na široki jaz između proklamovanih idea i

postojeće političke realnosti, komunistička partija natera da promeni neke delove svoje politike.⁶⁴

Tako je početno nezadovoljstvo zakonitošću socijalizma bilo izraženo kroz kritiku birokratizacije vlasti vladajuće komunističke partije, da bi se tek kasnije otkrila prava priroda socijalističke države. I ponovo se do takvog otkrića došlo putem sukoba. Ukoliko bi intelektualac ili bilo ko drugi došao u konflikt sa vladajućom ideologijom, mogao je da bude izložen svakakvim vrstama šikaniranja, od mogućeg gubitka posla do odlaska u zatvor. Kada bi potražio zaštitu, shvatio bi da mu je zakon ne obezbeđuje, da može biti zaštićen samo u slučaju da partija tako odluči. I tada pojedinac shvata da se ono što je smatrao birokratskom državom, u stvarnom životu pretvorilo u partijsku ili policijsku državu.

Zakoni nisu služili da zaštite već su bili instrument moći. Socijalistička država predstavlja mrežu potpune zavisnosti ljudi od moći, odnosno partije i njene unutrašnje oligarhije. Kada se ovo jednom uvidi, antibirokratski stav polako zamenuje ideja o zakonom zaštićenim ljudskim slobodama. Tek tada zahtevi za vladavinom prava postaju zaista snažni.⁶⁵

Iako je ovaj zahtev moralno veoma moćan, on nije samo u sukobu sa postojećim institucijama, već je u sukobu i sa postojećom raspodelom interesa. Jednom uspostavljena socijalistička država stiče izvesnu, iako neefikasnu i nepravednu stabilnost. Sistem socijalističke autokratije od naroda ne traži samo žrtve, već ih snabdeva svakojakim dobrima. I zato, da bi se uspostavio princip vladavine prava, nije bilo dovoljno zahtevati da partijsku zaštitu zameni sudska, već da se svi instrumenti koje je vladajuća partija koristila zamene novim institucionalnim sporazumima. U suprotnom, reformističke ideje bi mogle samo da doprinesu povećanju nesigurnosti, što bi kao rezultat povećalo stabilnost postojećeg socijalističkog poretkta. To je dovelo do shvatanja da je nužno uspostaviti određene legitimne političke procedure koje će imati uticaja.

64 Mislim da je ovo bila suština takozvanih praksisovaca.

65 Ovaj zahtev je istakao Beogradski komitet za ljudska prava.

Kada se to razumelo, postalo je očigledno da vladavina prava ne predstavlja samo zakonsku zaštitu, već i najvišu vlast zakonodavnih tela. Tako dolazi do pojave ideje o parlamentarnoj demokratiji. Socijalističke države nisu bile predstavnički režimi. One su imale ili zakonodavna tela sovjetskog tipa, kao u Sovjetskom Savezu i Jugoslaviji, ili nisu imale slobodne izbore. Jugoslavija je ukinula parlament, a zajedno s njim i neposredne izbore. Time je nedostatak principa zakonitosti bio potpuno institucionalizovan. Kada je jednom ta nepovoljnost shvaćena, zahtevi za nezavisnim sudstvom morali su da obuhvate i zahteve za pravnom državom koja bi bila zasnovana na parlamentarnoj demokratiji.⁶⁶

Tako postoji progresija koja ide od osećanja nesigurnosti, preko zahteva za zakonitošću do, na kraju, zahteva za parlamentarnom demokratijom.

Reforme odozdo

Budući da parlamentarna demokratija nije postojala, morala je da postoji politička volja koja će moći da je iznese. U jednopartijskoj Jugoslaviji zakonski nije bilo moguće formirati opozicionu partiju. Zbog toga se prvo morala razviti određena vrsta ideoološkog nadmetanja da bi ideja partijskog pluralizma eventualno postala prihvatljiva.⁶⁷ To je dovelo do evolutivnih promena u socijalističkim strukturama, koje će nazvati „reformama odozdo“.

U Jugoslaviji je pluralizam bio zvanično prihvaćen. Može se reći da je liberalizacija komunističke Jugoslavije počela prihvatanjem ideje o ograničenom pluralizmu. Prvo su prihvачene umetničke slobode, da bi se kasnije nauka oslobođila marksističke ortodoksije, i na trećem mestu je prihvaćena mogućnost postojanja pluralizma nekih drugih

⁶⁶ Ovo je naravno postao uobičajeni zahtev svih opozicionih grupa i partija širom Jugoslavije (nacionalista, socijalista, liberala, demokrata ili seljaka).

⁶⁷ Za „ideoološku kompeticiju“ vidi Gligorov (1982).

„posebnih“ interesa. Naravno, sve ovo je bilo daleko od bilo kakve liberalne politike i ideološkog pluralizma.⁶⁸

Uprkos svemu ovome, komunisti nisu u prvi mah prepoznali značaj pluralizma i insistirali su na „bratstvu i jedinstvu“ dugo nakon što su očigledno promenili mišljenje. Tek na samom kraju komunistička partija je bila spremna da prizna da je zagovaranje jedinstva proletarijata bila zabluda. Tako je došlo do uvođenja „pluralizma interesa“. Ali socijalizam i pravi pluralizam nisu mogli da koegzistiraju, i kada je izbila ne samo ekonomski već i politička kriza, vlada je izgubila i najmanji privid legitimite. Članovi komunističke partije koji su bili više naklonjeni reformama počeli su da nude „dijalog“ ljudima izvan partije, ljudima različitih društvenih slojeva, ali za takav dijalog nije postojala institucija, niti ju je bilo moguće stvoriti. Parlament nije postojao, tako da nije bilo moguće napraviti koalicionu vladu, a nije bilo ni jasnog načina za organizovanje „okruglog stola“ kao što je bio slučaj u Poljskoj.⁶⁹

Tehnički govoreći, Jugoslavija je bila prototip pluralističkog političkog poretka.⁷⁰ Postojali su svi mogući politički raskoli: socijalni, religijski, nacionalni (etnički) i kulturno-etički, i bilo je teško razumeti kako je klasični socijalistički sistem tu uopšte mogao da funkcioniše. Sistem je napravljen tako da zanemari političke razlike, pa ne iznenađuje da je bio neefikasan čak i u modifikovanom jugoslovenskom obliku. Takođe, budući da je samo komunistima priznavao pravo da se politički organizuju i vrše uticaj, uglavnom se smatrao nepravednim. Zato je prvi korak bio zahtev za priznavanjem postojećeg pluralizma. Nakon toga, došao je zahtev za političkim pravima, a to je naravno moglo da se okonča samo zahtevom za višepartijskim sistemom.⁷¹

68 Pluralizam je usvojen u Programu jugoslovenske komunističke partije 1958.

69 Opis nekih pokušaja komunističke partije da započne dijalog sa javnošću može se pronaći kod Čavoškog i Košutnice (1983). Određeni konkretni predlozi uključivali su transformaciju takozvanog Socijalističkog saveza (organizacije tipa Narodnog fronta kojom je dominirala komunistička partija, koja je imala određenog udela u prihvatanju „pluralizma interesa“). Neki od zagovarača takvog kursa kasnije su osnovali Udrženje demokratske inicijative u pokušaju da naprave takav forum, koji bi bio suprotstavljen oficijelnom Socijalističkom savezu.

70 Opisano, na primer, u Lijphart (1977).

71 Komunisti su na kraju čak prihvatali višepartijski sistem. Prvi višepartijski izbori održani su Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj u proleće 1990.

Liberali su se u Jugoslaviji suočili sa problemom nepostojanja načina da se određena „pluralistička demokratija“ uspostavi u celoj zemlji. Bilo je neophodno da se različite političke grupacije, uključujući i komuniste, dogovore o forumu koji bi funkcionišao kao neka vrsta prelaznog rešenja koje bi vodilo stvaranju parlamentarne demokratije. Ali za razliku od Poljske i Mađarske, podjelenost opozicije po etničkim šavovima bila je dominantnija od njihove spremnosti da se ujedine protiv komunista.⁷² Opozicione grupe i partije bile su spremnije da sarađuju sa komunistima svoje nacionalnosti nego sa opozicijom različite nacionalnosti.⁷³ Dakle, tokom dugog perioda krize socijalizma u Jugoslaviji, komunisti su bili ti koji su se međusobno prepirali pokušavajući da igraju ulogu kvazipredstavnika svojih nacionalnosti. Liberali su u Jugoslaviji bili prilično nemoćni da oforme nekakav savez, jer nisu bili sposobni da shvate da je jednom liberalu individualna sloboda značajnija od kolektivnog interesa njegove nacije.

Na taj način, suzbijanje pluralizma potpomoglo je pojavu ideje o višepartijskom sistemu. Ali jugoslovenski liberali nisu bili sposobni da koncept pojedinačnih prava stave iznad koncepta kolektivne (etničke) pravde. I tako se pokazalo da „reforme odozdo“ nisu sposobne da oforme liberalne ideje van granica etničkog principa.

72 Mada je početkom 1990. umalo došlo do koalicije između slovenačkih i hrvatskih opozicionih partija.

73 Ovo je slučaj sa svim opozicionim grupama i partijama, ali taj problem je bio posebno ozbiljan u Srbiji, gde dugo vremena nije osnovana jasna opoziciona partija iz straha da će ugroziti političke pozicije nacionalističko-komunističkog rukovodstva. Naravno da je opozicija nacional-komunistima počela da se uvećava kako su se približavali izbori.

Reforme odozgo

U Jugoslaviji se prilično jasno i veoma rano, već u vreme raskida se Staljinom (1948), uvidela neefikasnost socijalističke ekonomije. Teoretska i politička rešenja zahtevala su da se državna imovina transformiše u društveno vlasništvo (jedna vrsta decentralizovane državne imovine). Smatralo se da je to preduslov za uvođenje samoupravljanja, koje je zauzvrat trebalo da stimuliše zaposlene da budu produktivniji i tako uvećaju efikasnost jugoslovenske ekonomije („kolektivno preduzetništvo“ samoupravnog sistema trebalo je da bude produktivnije čak i od individualnog preduzetništva liberalnog kapitalizma).

Ideja „samoupravnog socijalizma“ bila je toliko privlačna da je bilo teško pronaći i jednog ekonomista, sociologa ili bilo kog naučnika iz domena društvenih nauka koji bi joj se usprotivio. Ovo je bilo prilično čudno, jer je od početka bilo uočeno da ne samo da produktivnost ne raste, već i da se javljaju ozbiljni problemi prilikom raspodele prihoda, što proizvodi fatalne posledice u vidu nedostatka dobrovoljnih investicija. Pokazalo se da su radnici zainteresovani za povećanje svojih plata a da brigu o investicijama prepustaju državi. Država je to činila na dva načina: putem prinudne štednje i stranih zajmova. Ali budući da nije bilo odgovornosti prema preuzetim obavezama, investicije su se toliko slabo raspoređivale da je ekonomija povremeno zapadala u krizu.

Prva reakcija na prvu ozbiljnu krizu u šezdesetim godinama bila je pojava kritike da ekonomija nije dovoljno tržišno opredeljena, pa Jugoslavija napušta centralno planiranje i čak uvodi komercijalni bankarski sistem (1965). Ali pošto je samoupravljanje bilo toliko popularno među socijalističkim intelektualcima i političarima, kako unutar komunističke partije tako i u opoziciji, bilo je potrebno da prođe dosta vremena da bi se shvatilo da glavni problem leži u tome da tržišna ekonomija ne može postojati bez sveobuhvatne liberalizacije tržišta, a posebno bez tržišta kapitala. To je značilo da društvena svojina mora da se privatizuje da bi postala predmet tržišnih transakcija. Tužno je da je liberalnim intelektualcima bilo potrebno

toliko vremena da ovo shvate, tako da je na kraju broj komunista koji je zastupao privatizaciju bio veći od broja liberala.

Razlog možemo pronaći u činjenici da je bilo više intelektualaca komunista nego intelektualaca liberala, kao i u tome da su se liberali nalazili među intelektualicima piscima, sociologima, filozofima, a ne među ekonomistima, a ovi potonji nisu u potpunosti razumeli o čemu se zaista radi u raspravama o privatizaciji i tržišnoj ekonomiji, pa su se mnogi od njih protivili „novoj ideološkoj levici“. Bez obzira na sve, ideja o privatizaciji je ubrzano sticala priznanje, mada je dosta vremena prošlo pre nego što je istaknuta kao ozbiljan projekat.⁷⁴

Četvrti stalež

I pre pojave ideje o privatizaciji uočen je problem preduzetništva. U samoupravnom sistemu Jugoslavije nije bilo preduzetništva niti preduzetnika. U stvari nije bilo menadžera, jer su se u samoupravljačkoj ekonomiji svi zaposleni ponašali kao menadžeri, bilo direktno ili putem zastupljenosti u radničkim savetima.

Samoupravljanje je u celini kolektivistička ideja. To je možda jedna od najradikalnijih ideja podruštvljavanja koja se mogla zamisliti.⁷⁵ Osećaj kolektivističke pravde koji je ona pothranjivala bio je veoma dubok, i zbog toga je bilo jako teško propovedati bilo kakvu vrstu ekonomskog individualizma. Ipak, konačno je postalo očigledno da je neefikasnost samoupravne ekonomije direktno povezana sa nepostojanjem menadžerskog stručnog autoriteta kao i preduzetničkog rizika, što je na kraju povezano sa likvidacijom privatne svojine. I kada je ideja o privatizaciji jednom isplivala, mogla je da se opravda već postojećim shvatanjem da nije moguće postići efikasnost bez preduzetništva.

74 Rani nagovještaji se mogu pronaći u Popoviću (1984). Slična ideja je istaknuta kod Gligorova (1986).

75 Radi se, u stvari, o ideji komunističke organizacije proizvodnje i raspodele kojoj po radikalizmu može parirati jedino Staljinova ideja o kolektivizaciji.

Ali individualizam je otkriven i na drugi način, i to kroz sukob sa ideološkim kolektivizmom. Dok u autoritarnim državama profesija pojedincu nudi neku vrstu skloništa, u totalitarnim državama takvo sklonište ne postoji. Uništava ga zvanična ideologija. I tako pojedinac mora da potraži neku drugu vrstu skloništa, a u Jugoslaviji se obično okretao svojoj naciji i svojoj kulturi kao kolektivnom skloništu od komunističke ideologije. Ali vrlo brzo se otkrilo da je moralno tkivo svih jugoslovenskih naroda uništio socijalizam, pa nije bilo vrednosti niti nacionalne solidarnosti na koje bi mogao da se osloni. Tek kada se ovo jednom shvatilo, mogle su se pojaviti liberalne ideje.

Ne postoji dovoljno razumevanja da nije lako spojiti liberalnu ideologiju i nacionalizam. Liberalizam je individualistička ideologija koja nacionalnost smatra jednom od karakteristika ličnog identiteta. Ali u totalitarnim državama nacionalizam se doživljava kao brana od socijalističkog internacionalizma, tako da je prva reakcija liberala bila odbrana individualizma unutar nacionalnih granica. Tek kasnije su neki uočili da je individualizam bitniji i da nacionalnost mora da se posmatra samo u okvirima individualizma.

Pojedinac otkriva prednosti individualizma kada je sam, a u Jugoslaviji, kao i u ostalim totalitarnim državama, pojedinac je sam jer su ga svi napustili. Imamo modernu verziju priče o Robinzonu Krusou. To se dešava intelektualcu kada izgubi naklonost komunističke partije, ili kad ga ista partija stigmatizuje iz bilo kog razloga. Bilo da se nađe na ulici, nezaposlen ili u zatvoru, socijalno iskustvo kroz koje prolazi prilično je slično. Pojedinac otkriva koliko su slabe bile veze solidarnosti unutar njegove porodice, prijatelja i među građanima iste nacionalnosti. Kada se nađe u takvoj nevolji, poimanje da je individualizam neizbežan nameće se samo. Ukoliko pojedinac istraže, otkriće da se društvene veze mogu uspostaviti i na individualnim osnovama. Prijateljstvo, solidarnost, dijalog, saradnja, biznis, sve se ovo može zasnovati na uzajamnim interesima, kao i na zajedničkom prepoznavanju sličnosti društvene pozicije u kojoj su se ljudi obreli. Možda će zvučati cinično, ali politički zatvor i sve druge vrste komunističke represije, koje uvek proizvode žestoku izolaciju,

rađaju individualizam koji na kraju prerasta u liberalizam.⁷⁶ Kada se neko jednom osami, postaje motivisan da shvati kako izgleda prirodno stanje, da razume značaj prirodnih prava. Potrebno je samo da naknadno generalizuje ta prava i tako omogući pojavu ideje o liberalnom političkom poretku.

Ovde se suočavamo sa paradoksom, kojeg je prvi opisao Mandeljštam, ali je od tada stalno ponovo uočavan. Nazvaću ga „pardoks četvrtog stalež“.⁷⁷ Kada zamišljamo odbačenog intelektualca u totalitarnoj državi, ukazuje nam se slika usamljenog pojedinca u očajnom položaju, jer toliko odudara od preovlađujućeg kolektivizma sa kojim je suočen. Ali u totalitarnoj državi svi žive u nekoj vrsti izolacije, pa vidimo da je intelektualac samo primer, jer su u socijalističkoj državi svi prepušteni sami sebi. Problem je u tome što udruživanje svih tih izolovanih pojedinaca ne donosi ništa posebno: oni ne čine ni moralnu ni političku snagu. Oni sačinjavaju „četvrti stalež“, koji je obično brojan, ali potpuno nemoćan. Taj stalež teško može obrazovati bilo kakvu ozbiljnju opoziciju moćnim komunistima, jer njegovi članovi moraju da traže svoje mesto unutar kolektivističkog sistema, da podržavaju kolektivne vrednosti i da negiraju svoj ontološki individualizam. Tek kada se socijalistički kolektivizam dezintegriše, individualizam stiče šansu da se politički afirmiše.

Moguće je da je to konačna faza u otkriću liberalizma, ali u procesu ponovnog otkrivanja to bi predstavljalo prvu fazu. U Jugoslaviji se liberalizam gradio ciglu po ciglu dok se nije stiglo do same osnove – do individualizma. Tada je došlo do suočavanja sa problemom integracije liberalnih vrednosti, koji se opet morao rešiti kroz suočavanje sa konkretnim političkim problemima. I tu je liberalizam u Jugoslaviji propao.

76 Ovo je na fascinantan način opisao Gotovac (1989).

77 Mandeljštam je pisao o „četvrtom staležu“, staležu kulture. Brodski je koristio istu ideju u *Less then one* (Brodski 1986): „Sloboda, jednakost, bratstvo; hoće li neko pomenuti kulturu“. Istu ideju je razvijao Mihnjik kao „snagu nemoćnih“, i Konrad kao „anti-politiku“.

Liberalni federalizam

Glavni jugoslovenski politički problem bio je njen osnovni ustavni aranžman. Jugoslavija je bila multinacionalna država koja nikada nije pronašla pravu ravnotežu između moći centra i federalizovanih nacija. Jedno od rešenja mogle su da budu federalne republike, ali njih je bilo teško napraviti, jer su socijalizam i federalizam nekompatibilni principi. Socijalizam je zasnovan na javnoj svojini (državnoj ili društvenoj), koja daje previše vlasti centru. S druge strane, ukoliko se državna svojina decentralizuje, lokalne države imaju tendenciju vođenja nacionalističke ekonomske politike, budući da socijalizam, zbog svog nepovoljnog odnosa prema tržištu, razvija protekcionizam. I tako se razvija neka vrsta nacionalističkog federalizma, koji je uglavnom nestabilan.

Čisti liberalizam je u sukobu i sa socijalizmom i sa nacionalizmom, ali u socijalističkoj državi ima veoma težak zadatak da se sa oba suparnika bori istovremeno. Potrebna je jaka vera u liberalne principe da bi se mogao zastupati liberalizam u situaciji velikih nacionalnih animoziteta. U socijalističkoj državi dominantno je političko opredeljenje koje je prirodno za okupirane zemlje: da bi pojedinac bio slobodan, njegov narod mora da bude slobodan. Pojedinac traži nacionalnu državu da bi ga ona zaštitala od socijalizma. Naravno da Jugoslavija nije morala da se poistovećuje sa socijalizmom, nije čak morala da se doživljava ni kao talac centralizma; mogla je da se zahteva liberalna federacija. Kada trezveno razmislimo, liberalna federacija je mogla da predstavlja rešenje za oba glavna jugoslovenska problema: socijalizam i federalizam. Takođe je mogla da posluži kao rešenje za to što Jugoslavija nije imala čvrste osnove u prirodnim ili političkim pravima i interesima. To je moglo da bude odgovarajuće prilagođavanje postojećim političkim činjenicama.

Ali šanse za to su bile slabe. Pojavila se jedna vrsta liberalne (zatvorenikove) dileme, koja je koordinirala i sukobljavala oba politička koncepta, nacionalistički i socijalistički. Ukoliko se zastupao liberalni federalizam, u preovlađujućoj konstelaciji moći, prihvatanje federalizma moglo je da se predstavi i kao sklonost ka socijalizmu.



To je jačalo nacionalističku opoziciju. Sa druge strane, liberalno stanovište moglo je da se iskoristi za jačanje nacionalističkih interesa, što je snažilo socijalističku opoziciju. Na taj način, nacionalisti i socijalisti su mogli da sarađuju čak i kada su bili suprotstavljeni, a liberalna alternativa nije mogla da se obrazuje kao održiva politička opcija.

Navedena liberalna dilema proizlazi iz neravnoteže između političkog sećanja i očekivanja. Ukoliko tražimo prirodna prava, moramo se zagledati unazad, u istoriju, a istorija jugoslovenskih naroda je puna neispunjениh očekivanja i obeležena nejednakostima. Neke nacije nikada nisu imale nezavisne države, tako da je to postalo njihov glavni politički ideal. Neke nacije su Jugoslaviju doživljavale kao konačno rešenje svog nacionalnog pitanja, a druge su je sagledavale samo kao političku nužnost. Tako da nije postojalo zajedničko sećanje, ukoliko zanemarimo zajedničko sećanje na animozitete, nasilje i nezadovoljstvo.

Imajući sve ovo u vidu, bilo je veoma teško doći do nekih zajedničkih očekivanja. Ideja o liberalnom političkom uređenju, koje poštuje sva prava i koristi federaciju kao određenu zaštitu od moćnih nacionalnih država, doživljena je kao prilično utopijska. Da je takvo uređenje ikada postojalo, makar i u nekakvom mitskom sećanju, moglo je biti ponovo otkriveno. Ali je izgledalo neverovatno da to bude ponuđeno kao politički cilj, jer je za njegovo ostvarenje bio potreban tip političke partije kakav nikada nije postajao u Jugoslaviji.

I tu se liberalna ideja našla u čorsokaku. Tačno je da su se liberalne ideje u Jugoslaviji razvijale veoma brzo i da su zadobijale uporišta u inače veoma različitim kulturama jugoslovenskih naroda, ali se nije pojavila jugoslovenska koalicija koja je mogla da se suprotstavi višestruko jačim snagama socijalista i nacionalista. Takva koalicija mogla je da bude stvorena oko ideje liberalne federacije, ali liberali su, kao uostalom i druge partije, smatrali da ona sadrži veoma nizak mobilizacioni potencijal. U poređenju sa idejom etničke države, liberalni federalizam je izgledao ne samo utopijski, već se doživljavao kao očigledno irelevantan.

Neuspeh liberalizma u Jugoslaviji

Pokušao sam da pokažem da se liberalizam u Jugoslaviji otkriva u putem posebnih procesa učenja na osnovu iskustava. Kako nije bilo ozbiljne i raširene liberalne tradicije o kojoj bi moglo da se govori, moralno se doći u sukob sa socijalizmom da bi se uvidele prirodne lepote liberalizma. Ideja individualnih prava se pojavila kada je proces individualizacije pokuljao iz doživljaja diskriminacije. Kada su prava uočena, razvio se osećaj nemoći. Na taj način je uvedena prirodna ideja o univerzalnosti, koja sa sobom nosi sve uobičajene liberalne ideje. Jednostavno rečeno, doživljaj isključenosti i represije produkuje zahteve za slobodom; univerzalizacija tada radi u smeru pronalaženja liberalnih principa.

Ali se proces univerzalizacije zaustavio ubrzo nakon otkrića liberalnog federalizma, jer Jugoslavija nije bila sačinjena na osnovama prirodnih političkih prava i nije se doživljavala kao prirodni politički skup. Ovo je uništilo kako liberalne ideje o političkoj jednakosti, tako i delotvornost liberalnih političkih organizacija.

Jedan od izlaza iz ove situacije bio je zahtev za pomoći iz inostranstva, što bi značilo integraciju Jugoslavije u evropsku zajednicu. I kako bi ova integracija značila neku vrstu pomaka u smeru liberalne federacije, moguće je da bi se u Jugoslaviji izgubio interes za unutrašnje svađe u slučaju priključenja široj zajednici, koja takođe nije postojala u evropskoj prošlosti, već je potpuno novi proizvod liberalne maštice. Ova ideja je zadobijala utemeljenje, ali proces otkrivanja koji sam gore opisao nekako ju je potisnuo u stranu. Izgleda da je bilo neophodno da se iskuse najgore posledice socijalizma i Jugoslavije, da bi se tek nakon toga moglo pojaviti novo, razboritije političko mišljenje koje bi moglo da pruži šansu liberalizmu. Takođe, izgleda da je bilo neophodno da se iskuse ograničenja nacionalizma da bi se razumela ideja liberalne federacije (nada da bi se ona mogla primeniti ubrzo je nestala). A morala su se doživeti i ograničenja socijalizma da bi došlo do odbacivanja čitave te ideje. Kolika je bila cena ovog procesa, u to vreme je bilo teško odgovoriti. Izgledalo je da se teško može krenuti u pravcu liberalnih reformi pre nego što se odbace neka

prastara autoritarna sredstva. Tek tada je bilo moguće da se liberalna ideja ekonomskih povlastica i političke slobode, koje su već bile prepoznate, udruži sa otkrićem liberalnog federalizma.

Kada se jednom na ovakav način opiše put ka liberalnom društvu, postaje očigledno da je liberalna ideja morala da pretrpi neuspeh. Upravo to se desilo u Jugoslaviji. Glavni politički cilj i dalje je bila etnička pravda, a ne individualna prava. Kada su se jednom pojavile, liberalne partije su prihvatile ulogu više ili manje dobrovoljnog koalicionog partnera ili komunista ili nacionalista. Što znači da su dovele u pitanje svoje buduće šanse u etničkim državama koje su nastajale na principima koji nisu bili liberalni. I to ih je gurnulo na potpunu marginu.

TREĆE POGLAVLJE

Zašto se zemlje raspadaju?

„Ko želi ciljeve, želi i sredstva.“

Ruso

U ovom poglavlju izložiću neposredno objašnjenje raspada Jugoslavije i razmotriti moguće ishode. Izgleda mi da se ne dobija mnogo stavljanjem onoga što se stvarno dogodilo u formalne modele, bar ne za potrebe neposrednog razumevanja.⁷⁸ Međutim, mislim da se time ne gubi nijedan nivo opštosti, te ću početi u stvari prilično uopštenim razmatranjem mogućih uzroka raspada država, opisaću neke strateške aspekte takvog procesa, a zatim ću identifikovati bitne probleme bivše jugoslovenske države, rastumačiti dinamiku raspada, i ukratko se osvrnuti na moguće ishode.

Dve prepostavke

Da bih teorijski zasnovao ovo poglavlje, jednostavno ću izneti dve prepostavke na koje se oslanjam, koje ću u ovom poglavlju pokušati da opravdam i dokažem, i na koje ću se osloniti u sledećem:

Prvo, *ljudi će dobiti ono što žele*. Drugim rečima, objašnjenje raspada države, pa i građanskog rata, mora biti u saglasnosti sa političkim prioritetima učesnika tog procesa. Raspad, građanski rat, njihova cena, sve je to stvar izbora.

78 Ipak, ukazaću na neke mogućnosti u prilogu III i IV.

To ne znači da se ti prioriteti posmatraju kao unapred dati. Naprotiv, oni se obrazuju kroz politički proces. Opis obrazovanja političkih prioriteta je važan deo argumentacije objašnjenja. To ne znači ni da je izbor datih alternativa unapred izvestan: izbor je jedna od mogućnosti, a neke od njih tek moraju biti otkrivene. Zbog toga, visina *ex post* plaćene cene može se pokazati daleko višom od one izračunate *ex ante*, pa se kasnije može razviti i preovlađujuće političko osećanje kajanja.

Svemu tome mogu doprineti i drugi razlozi. Donete političke odluke nisu nezavisne od procedure – ili odsustva jasne procedure – njihovog donošenja. Posledica je da cenu mogu platiti, potpuno ili delimično, oni koji su bili u opoziciji ili oni koji nisu imali nikakvog učešća u donošenju odluka. Zato može izgledati krajnje cinično tvrdnja da su ti ljudi dobili ono što su želeli. Međutim, ja samo kažem da raspad države nije prirodna katastrofa, spoljašnji, neočekivani šok; to je politički izbor, mada on može imati katastrofalne posledice, moralne i druge.

Ove osobenosti političkih prioriteta uvek treba imati na umu. Zato će tvrdnja da „ljudi dobijaju ono što žele“ postati jasna kada se jasnije definišu prioriteti, ishodi i politička zajednica (što će biti učinjeno u sledećem odeljku o nacionalizmu).

Drugo, *politički prioriteti dominiraju nad ekonomskim*. To znači da sukob koji vodi do raspada države ima prednost nad političkim dobrima (bezbednošću, pravdom, pravima, slobodom, jednakošću i sličnim dobrima).⁷⁹

To ne znači da su ekonomski prioriteti beznačajni i bez uticaja. Štaviše, činjenica da se predmet političkih prioriteta naziva „političkim dobrom“ znači da ti prioriteti obuhvataju i značajne ekonomske aspekte. Ipak, politički aspekti dominiraju, isto onako kako ciljevi dominiraju sredstvima. Ovo će opet postati jasno kada politički prioriteti budu preciznije definisani.

Držim se ovih dveju prepostavki jer ne verujem u objašnjenje koje se oslanja na specifičnost političke kulture ili kulture uopšte, niti u

⁷⁹ Za detaljniju analizu političkih prioriteta i političkih dobara vidi Gligorov (1985) i (1992d).

ono koje se poziva na neku vrstu istorijske neizbežnosti koja gleda na ljudе kao na aktere ili žrtve istorijskih, kulturnih ili verskih nužnosti. Takva objašnjenja kod političkih aktera smatram racionalizacijom (u smislu koji tom pojmu daje Vilfredo Pareto), a greškom kod onih koji proučavaju ovu temu.

Time ne osporavam važnost svih ovih činilaca za politiku ili ekonomiju. U izvesnom smislu, te činioce uzimam za uslove, a ne uzroke. I zato nazivam svoje objašnjenje *direktnim*. Njime se određuju uzroci ili razlozi akcije. Verujem da su ona druga objašnjenja, koja uslove proglašavaju uzrocima, pogrešna.

Ponekada se istorijska objašnjenja pozivaju na uzroke koji nisu čak ni uslovi. Jedan primer može biti koristan. Građanski rat u Jugoslaviji istoričari ponekad objašnjavaju činjenicom – ako je to uopšte činjenica – da jedna ista granica između Istoka i Zapada postoji preko hiljadu godina. Ali šta to objašnjava? Slična je stvar i sa pozivanjem na prethodni građanski rat, koji se vodio tokom Drugog svetskog rata. Ljudi koji danas ratuju nisu tada bili ni rođeni. Ni osvetom se ništa ne objašnjava, a užasna kolektivna sećanja trebalo bi da budu pre upozorenje nego ohrabrenje. Nijedno od tih objašnjenja ne smatram direktnim. Mislim da isto važi i za ekonomska objašnjenja kojima ću se baviti u sledećem odeljku ovog poglavlja. Moje objašnjenje će biti političko.

Problem legitimnosti

Ideja da je raspad jedne zemlje posledica procesa koji su vođeni individualnim prioritetima i izborima ukazuje na ekonomsko objašnjenje. U izvesnom smislu, ovo mora biti tačno. Međutim, bar u jugoslovenskom slučaju, ali mislim i u svakom drugom, specifična ekonomska objašnjenja bilo nastanka bilo raspada države pogrešna su. Opšti oblik ekonomskog objašnjenja jeste da postoji neki dobitak koji se može ostvariti secesijom. Naročito kroz:



Manje opterećenje javnog sektora;
promene uslova trgovanja;
pridruživanje novoj ekonomskoj ili političkoj uniji.⁸⁰

Ovi argumenti se upotrebljavaju da bi se objasnile kako prepreke daljim integracijama, tako i tendencije dezintegracije. Očigledno je da se granice neke zemlje ne moraju poklapati sa optimalnom carinskom i deviznom teritorijom, kao i da teret javnog sektora ne mora biti idealno raspoređen na razne regije države. Prema tome, promene u stepenu integracije ili dezintegracije mogu se načelno objasniti promenama u sklopu prilika koje se ukazuju u zemlji kao celini i njenim pojedinim regionima.

Ovim objašnjenjima mogu se staviti dva metodološka prigovora. Prvo, radi se o logičkoj grešci *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*. Svaka sadašnja ili buduća društvena promena imaće posledice na distribuciju: stvorice dobitke i gubitke (ako ih nema, znači da je dostignuto opšte stanje ravnoteže). Usled toga, objašnjenje koje ukazuje na koaliciju-radi-dobiti⁸¹ kao uzrok promene (popularni argument *qui bono*) ne može omanuti kada se promena dogodi. U tom smislu, uvek postoji ekonomsko objašnjenje za bilo šta. Greška je u tome što se posledica uzima za uzrok.

Dруго, ako vremenski horizont nije unapred određen, svaka promena politike pokazaće se kao ona prava. Radi se o samoispunjajućem proročanstvu. Na primer, ako neko ukaže na činjenicu da je secesija proizvela vrlo visoki trošak koji ne bi bio nužan da do secesija nije došlo, uvek mu se može odgovoriti da se radi o racionalnom trošku imajući u vidu očekivani budući dobitak, koji će dugoročno sigurno nastati.⁸² Ovo je način mišljenja koji zaslužuje Kejnzovu primedbu:

80 U slučaju Jugoslavije, kod novonastalih država ovi razlozi nisu postojali.

Teret javnog sektora je veći, naročito u oblasti troškova odbrane. Uslovi trgovanja su nepovoljno promenjeni. Sve ove države su udaljenije od integracije u Evropsku zajednicu nego što je to bila Jugoslavija.

81 Kao u slučaju „ekonomike klubova”, v. Buchanan (1965).

82 Na primer, ako neko bira da stigne iz tačke x u tačku y, izbor y mora biti moguće opravdati u trenutku odluke; u protivnom nema mesta kajanju kada se u tu tačku stigne; idealno je moguće i jedno i drugo, ali ne u nekoj neodređenoj budućnosti. Još važnije: budući da pojedinac kontroliše svoja očekivanja, ona se uvek mogu prilagoditi kako bi

„Dugoročno gledano, svi smo mrtvi”. Iz ovih razloga prema tom tipu objašnjenja treba biti veoma rezervisan.⁸³

Alternativni pristup, kome dajem prednost, politički je. Takav pristup objašnjenju raspada država može se pravdati na više načina. Jedan od njih je pozivanje na društveni izbor, ili na paradoxne kolektivne i individualne racionalnosti poznate iz teorije igara.⁸⁴ Na primer, u terminima teorije igara moguće je pozvati se na odsustvo kooperacije, koje se ilustruje primerom Zatvorenikove dileme ili igrom Kukavice. Štaviše, jugoslovenski konflikt, to jest sukob Srba i Hrvata, može se predstaviti kao proces Zatvorenikove dileme koji se pretvorio u igru Kukavice. Zapravo, daleko najbolji srpski pravni i politički filozof, Slobodan Jovanović, došao je do skoro istog takvog zaključka.⁸⁵ On je uvideo da su Hrvati i u Austrougarskoj i u Jugoslaviji koristili strategiju koja ih je vodila u situaciju Zatvorenikove dileme. Uvek su se služili pretnjom secesije, što je dovodilo do rešenja koja su bila gora od onih koje bi bili ostvarili kroz kooperaciju.⁸⁶ S druge strane, on opisuje strategiju Srbije u Jugoslaviji kao strategiju koja je uvek davala prednost konfrontaciji nad kompromisom, kao u igri Kukavice, tako da se može reći da je ishod sukoba između Srba i Hrvata bio određen nesposobnošću Hrvata za kooperaciju i sklonošću Srba da

bila u skladu sa troškovima koje povlače. To se čini, između ostalog, poređenjem pokreta iz tačke x u tačku y sa povratnim pokretom iz tačke y u tačku x, jer je pokret već izvršen. Onda se može desiti da troškovi prvobitnog pokreta budu ocenjeni kao manji od troškova povratnog pokreta (uključujući tu čak i kajanje). Ali naravno, troškovi povratnog pokreta neće se ni pojavitи ako pokret iz tačke x u tačku y nije ni učinjen.

83 Moraju se razmotriti još dva dopunska prigovora. Prvi je varijanta logičke greške o kojoj smo govorili. Na primer, ako je ciljana inflacija od 5%, onda 6% ili 5,5% ne predstavljaju uspeh. Inače, sve je uspeh, po logici da je „moglo biti i gore”. Drugi prigovor je suptilniji. On se odnosi na percepciju uzročnosti. Kada je jednom nešto učinjeno, to postaje jedan od uslova za sve što će se potom dogadati. To postaje deo opšte istorijske uzročnosti. Ovo se može razumeti kao „sve što je učinjeno bilo je nužno“. „Sve što je učinjeno“ dobija svoju eksplanatornu i svaku drugu vrednost iz postojećeg. Vidi Lucas (1975) za iscrpnu kritiku argumenta ekonomske politike.

84 Koristim vrlo jednostavan model neformalnog socijalnog izbora, vidi Gligorov (1992a).

85 Vidi Jovanović (1991a, izvorno 1964). Jovanović, naravno, nije koristio teoriju igara. O idejama teorije igara koje bi mogle biti upotrebljene u stvaranju modela jugoslovenskih sukoba raspravljam u prilogu III.

86 Ovo je blisko interpretaciji hrvatske nacionalne strategije koju daje njihov vodeći pisac Miroslav Krleža u mnogim svojim napisima, ali posebno u prva dva toma Zastava.

traže rešenje u „konačnom obračunu”. Zaista, oni nisu mogli da se dogovore čak ni o tome koju igru igraju, o zajedničkoj strategiji da i ne govorimo.

Ova kratka diskusija o jednom mogućem tumačenju načina na koji je Slobodan Jovanović razumeao osnovni jugoslovenski konflikt samo je još jedan primer mogućih objašnjenja raspada Jugoslavije u kontekstu teorije igara. Nema u tome ničeg lošeg. Opservacije, pa čak i objašnjenja do kojih se tim putem dolazi svakako vode nekim uvidima, koji se mogu ispostaviti i kao tačni. Ali oni se zasnivaju na neodređenoj eksplanatornoj moći oblika igre. Ako se na pitanje „zašto se u Jugoslaviji vodi građanski rat?“ ponudi odgovor „to je Zatvorenikova dilema koja je prešla u igru Kukavice“, tome se možda ne bi moglo ništa prigovoriti, ali to ipak nije ono što se traži. Teorija igara se, naravno, može upotrebiti za analizu pojma političke racionalnosti, što će ovde i učiniti.

Međutim, čak i kada se radi o objašnjajima, taj postupak nije potpuno prazan. U našem primeru, iz načina na koji Slobodan Jovanović prikazuje strategije učesnika sledi da su samo Srbi bili sposobni da razore zemlju, izborom vrste igre i načinom na koji su je igrali. Takođe, time se potvrđuje tvrdnja da su svi drugi koji su izabrali opciju izlaska to učinili jer nisu mogli da utiču na izbor igre i strategiju dominantnog igrača. U stvari, jedini problem leži u metaforičkoj prirodi objašnjenja zasnovanog na pojmu igre. Povremeno će se pozivati na ova objašnjenja (vidi Dodatak III za opis relevantnih igara).

Tražim drugačiji pristup. Po mome mišljenju, objašnjenje raspada Jugoslavije treba posmatrati u najtradicionalnijim političkim okvirima. Jugoslavija se raspala jer su narodi koji su je sačinjavali stupili u borbu za moć kojom bi za sebe ostvarili osnovna politička dobra: slobodu, prava, jednakost, pravdu. Ključna reč je: pravda. Ustav Jugoslavije nije bio pravedan.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Reč ustav se u ovoj glavi upotrebljava na tri načina. U ovom slučaju pod njom podrazumevam „temeljno uređenje“ zemlje pre nego pisani ustav, kojih je bilo mnogo. U izvesnom smislu ova dva značenja su oba primenjiva kada se govorи o pisanim ustavu donetom 1921. godine. Zbog toga je mnogo toga što se dogadalo kasnije

Jugoslavija nije predstavljala prepreku da se ta pravda uspostavi. Time hoću da kažem da njena osnovna struktura nije onemogućavala reformisanje. Pokušaću to da dokažem. Jugoslovenski narodi mogli su dostići neki politički sporazum, to jest ustavno rešenje koje bi zadovoljilo njihove dugoročne nacionalne interese, da se nije radilo o tako složenoj raspodeli moći, gde je svako smatrao da postoji samo izbor između potpunog potčinjanja i punog suvereniteta, ili, da to izrazimo terminima očekivanog dobitka, da svako nije smatrao da je, nezavisno od mogućeg ustavnog rešenja, „moguće dobiti još više“ (opet, ovo je slično igri Zatvorenikove dileme). Zato je Jugoslavija neprestano izgledala kao zemlja koja se može reformisati, ali čija priroda sputava, čime je potkopavan legitimitet te države.

Zato mislim da uverljivo objašnjenje raspada Jugoslavije mora da se osloni na dva glavna činioca: dugoročne nacionalne (etničke) strategije („narodne želje“) i strukturu moći („politička upotreba ekonomije“). Oba se pozivaju na osećanje pravde, ili radije nepravde (razlika je bitna; to će u daljem tekstu, kao i u Dodatku I, pokušati da dokažem). Naravno, ovo nejasno političko dobro mora se pažljivo definisati i detaljno analizirati (što ovde nije do kraja učinjeno)⁸⁸ da bi objašnjenje koje želim da dam bilo potpuno.

Razmotriću u daljem tekstu te činioce. Da rezimiram, želim da iznesem vrlo uopštenu tezu koja po mom mišljenju ilustruje slučaj Jugoslavije: države nastaju iz vrlo različitih razloga, ali nužno obezbeđuju sigurnost; raspadaju se zbog nedostatka pravde. Nivo političkog sukoba u Jugoslaviji bio je uvek vrlo visok, mada nikada u stanju koje bi se približavalo anarhiji, koja je inače karakteristična za

bilo određeno već tada. Najbolji izvor za taj ustav još uvek je Jovanović (1928). O ustavnom uređenju Jugoslavije iz istorijske perspektive vidi Banac (1984). Treće značenje „ustava“ je režim. Prema tome, postoji temeljno uređenje zemlje, pisani ustav i funkcionalni ustav (režim). U kom značenju upotrebljavam tu reč biće jasno iz konteksta; tamo gde nije, pokušaću da objasnim. Pravim ovo razlikovanje jer temeljno uređenje zemlje može biti nepravedno, dok i pisani ustav i režim, imajući u vidu ishode do kojih dovodi, to ne mora biti. Na primer, u Jugoslaviji na njenom kraju, pisani ustav se oslanjao na pravilo donošenja odluka konsenzusom; takođe, nikada nije dokazano da je raspodela političkih i ekonomskih prednosti bila nepravedna, mada su se svi žalili da njihovi interesi nisu poštovani kao interesi ostalih. Pa ipak, temeljno uređenje Jugoslavije je bilo nepravedno.

88 Elementi ovoga mogu se naći u Gligorov (1992b).

taj region. U tom smislu, Jugoslavija je uspevala da bude država (kao Čehoslovačka u početku, a još više posle Drugog svetskog rata), ali nikada legitimna država; bila je podnošljiva, ali ne i prihvatljiva. Ona nikada nije u svojim građanima razvila neophodno osećanje političke obaveze koja karakteriše legitimnu državu. Zato ona nije uspevala da obuzda unutrašnje konflikte prilikom nepovoljnih ili čak povoljnih spoljnih promena.⁸⁹

Postoje zemlje koje su iznutra prilično nestabilne, ali im nikada ne preti raspad. Veći deo vremena, Jugoslavija nije bila iznutra nestabilna (bar u poređenju sa onim što se pod političkom stabilnošću podrazumevalo u nizu evropskih država), ali ravnoteža koju je uživala je bila nesigurna, jer je bila potkopavana mnogostrukim fundamentalnim sporenjima o osećanju i stepenu (etničke) pravde koju obezbeđuju institucije države. Način na koji su ova sporenja obuzdavana i kako je njima manipulisano predstavlja okosnicu jugoslovenske političke istorije; izbijanje i pogoršavanje tih sukoba dovelo je do moralno užasavajućeg kraja te istorije, ali utoliko pre je važno da razumemo taj proces.

U čemu se sastojao problem pravde koji je delegitimisao jugoslovensku državu? Jedan način da se odgovori na ovo pitanje sastojao bi se u tome da se opiše pravedno rešenje i onda uporedi stvarno stanje sa idealnim. To ne bi bilo umesno u ovom slučaju. Nedostatak legitimite koji je obeležavao sukcesivne jugoslovenske ustave nije nastajao zbog toga što su oni bili nesaglasni sa nekim idealom pravde, već zbog toga što su neprestano izazivali osećanje nepravde. Čovek ne mora da zna šta je pravedno da bi osjetio da mu se nanosi nepravda. Osećanje nepravde drugačije politički motiviše od ideala pravde. U stvari, kada su načela pravde poznata ili legalizovana, pritužbe na nepravdu se pozivaju na njih. U suprotnom, one se pozivaju na ograničavanje interesa, individualnih ili kolektivnih, i rađaju političke konflikte. Jugoslovenski pisani ustavi izazivali su osećanje nepravde ne zato što nisu na odgovarajući način odražavali ovaj ili onaj ideal pravde oko kojeg bi se ljudi složili ili sporili, već

89 Do jedinog mogućeg izuzetka došlo je 1948, kada se Jugoslavija oduprla Staljinovom pritisku.

zato što nisu obezbeđivali sredstva za ispravljanje nepravdi koje su ljudi videli kao posledicu osnovnog ustrojstva države. Time se ne želi reći da nisu isprobavani razni ideali pravde. Činjenica je, kao što će pokazati, da su mnogi isprobavani, ali nijedan nije uspeo da potre osnovno osećanje nepravde, a često je služio i kao ilustracija te nepravde.

Kako funkcioniše osećanje političke nepravde? U Jugoslaviji su uglavnom iznošene žalbe na nacionalnu diskriminaciju. Stvaranje države je pravdano načelom nacionalnog samoopredeljenja, a glavni problem države je bio da udovolji zahtevima za etničkim samoopredeljenjem. Odgovor države je bila zamena demokratskih kriterijuma i kriterijuma zasluga kriterijumima etniciteta. S jedne strane, konsenzus se sve više tražio gotovo za sve (broj učesnika je takođe rastao, od početna tri do osam); s druge strane, srazmerna zastupljenost je formalno i neformalno poštovana i na kraju zamenjena jednakom etničkom i regionalnom zastupljenošću. Budući da je bilo nemoguće konzistentno obezbeđivati prihvatljivu ravnopravnost, sve veći napor države da pronade principe zadovoljenja etničke pravde vodili su samo sve češćim žalbama na nacionalnu diskriminaciju. Osnovni nedostatak jugoslovenskog ustava sastojaо se u njegovoj nemoći da formuliše sistem kolektivne distributivne pravde kome se ne bi moglo prigovoriti.

Da bi se video da nije postojala ideja pravde koja bi nužno bila narušena, izneću nekoliko primera koji će pokazati koliko je, u stvari, bila složena percepcija pravde. Savezni poreski sistem zasnivao se, na kraju, na doprinosima republika (nisu postojali savezni porezi na prihod).⁹⁰

Dakle, koliko bi republike trebalo da doprinose? Pravilo je bilo da svaka republika doprinosi u onom procentu koji je bio srazmeran njenom udelu u nacionalnom dohotku jugoslovenske ekonomije. To je značilo, na primer, da bi Slovenija trebalo da obezbeđuje oko 25% jugoslovenskog saveznog budžeta, iako je njen stanovništvo predstavljalo 8% ukupne jugoslovenske populacije. Šta je u tom

90 Ostali izvori saveznih prihoda bili su porez na promet i carinski prihodi; detaljno vidi u Dubravčić (1933).

slučaju pravedno? Spor je bio neizbežan, jer Slovenija je smatrala da bi očigledno bilo pravedno da njen doprinos bude oko 8%, a Srbija i neke druge republike da stopa od 25% nije dovoljno progresivna. S druge strane, Slovenija je smatrala da ne bi trebalo da bude zastupljena u saveznim organima vlasti u сразмери sa svojom populacijom, već jednako kao i drugi (što nije značilo samo istim brojem zastupnika, već i jednakom moći da utiče na odluke; to bi u stvari značilo da svako treba da ima jednak uticaj kao i svi drugi, to jest, da svako ima pravo veta na svaku odluku). Očigledno je da bi se morali ponuditi protivrečni razlozi kako bi se ova pozicija održala. Isti slučaj je bio i sa svima drugima, samo kod nekih u obratnom pravcu. Šta bi u ovom slučaju značilo načelo „nema oporezivanja bez predstavljanja“?

Daću još jedan, ne tako značajan ali karakterističan primer. Pri samom kraju komunističke vladavine buknula je žestoka debata o književnosti u nastavnom planu. Ideja komunističke partije bila je da svako dete u jugoslovenskim školama pročita „osnovna dela“ reprezentativnih autora svih nacionalnih književnosti. Pokazalo se nemogućim da se opravda potreba za takvim „osnovnim delima“ nasuprot nacionalnom pristupu, ili da se pronađe zastupljenost autora koja bi zadovoljila sve. Na kraju, svi su prigovarali da je učinjena nepravda njihovoj naciji, jer je relativna važnost nacionalnih autora u sopstvenim očima uvek bila veća nego u očima drugih. Tako je konačno odlučeno da se usvoje odvojeni nacionalni programi književnosti. Ovo se proširilo i na programe iz istorije, jezika, društvenih nauka itd. Krajnji smisao ove rasprave je bio u tome da je odbačena sama ideja kolektivnog shvatanja i sećanja na kojima se zasniva makar mitologija države, zajedno sa manje ambicioznom idejom multikulturalizma. Jugoslovenske nacije su se razilazile u svojim shvatanjima istorije i osnovnih kulturnih vrednosti gotovo od samog početka, a u kulturnoj toleranciji mnogo ranije nego u politici i ekonomiji. Ovo je važno naglasiti, jer je Jugoslavija počivala na ideji zajedničkog porekla multietničkog naroda, koji su razdvajale samo istorija, politika i različiti politički uticaji.⁹¹

91 Ovo je, naravno, uvek bio predmet sporenja, kao što svedoči klasična izjava Ivana Cankara i kao što je najjasnije isticano u Sloveniji u polemikama vođenim osamdesetih godina. Vidi Vodopivec (1992).

Osećanje nepravde funkcionisalo je na isti način skoro u svim drugim slučajevima, značajnim i bezznačajnim. Pritužbe na nepravdu nisu se zasnivale na tome da je izneveren neki ideal pravedne raspodele, već na tvrdnji da su skoro prema svima počinjene određene nepravde, kakav god sistem pravde bio predložen ili uveden. Važniji je primer spora o ekonomskoj koristi od Jugoslavije koji se vodio u obliku rasprave o tome „ko ovde koga eksplatiše“. Slovenija i Hrvatska su tvrdile da Srbija i druge manje razvijene republike, na više načina i ukupno gledajući, bolje prolaze. Pozivali su se, s jedne strane, na savezni fond za nerazvijene regije, na devizni kurs konvertibilnih valuta i rublje, a s druge strane na monetarnu politiku centralne banke i mnoge druge stvari (i uopšte na argument pomenutog javnog tereta). Srbija i druge republike su isticale da Slovenija i Hrvatska koriste prednosti zaštićenog jugoslovenskog tržišta da plasiraju svoje inače nekonkurentne proizvode po višim cenama, kao i mnoge druge prigovore (koristi i troškovi carinske unije uopšte).

Postoje dva načina da se odredi koji su od ovih prigovora bili opravdani. Jedan bi bio da se pogledaju brojke. Istraživanja koja su sprovedena ne dokazuju nijednu od ovih tvrdnji. Drugi bi bio da se razmotri politika koju se zagovarale pojedine republike. Načelno, trebalo je da Slovenija i Hrvatska podržavaju konvertibilnost jugoslovenskog dinara i autonomiju jugoslovenske centralne banke. One to uglavnom nisu činile. S druge strane, Srbija i druge manje razvijene republike trebalo je da podržavaju otvaranje jugoslovenskog tržišta prema inostranoj konkurenciji. One to takođe uglavnom nisu činile. U stvari, razne studije daju istu sliku: (1) većina republika bila je prilagođena svetskom tržištu i jugoslovenskom finansijskom sistemu na sličan način; (2) nije bilo nikakve razlike u ekonomskoj strukturi većine republika. Dakle, njihovi politički prigovori nemaju mnogo osnova.

Jedan način da se provere ovi zaključci o katastrofalnim posledicama tog osećanja nepravde bio bi da se uporede načela koja su bila smatrana pravednim u Jugoslaviji, sa onim koja danas primenjuju nove nezavisne države. Sa izuzetkom Bosne i Hercegovine, nigde se ustavno ne propisuje bilo konsenzus bilo proporcionalnost (da ne govorimo o jednakosti) etničkog zastupanja na način koji je



postojao u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, iako su sve nove nezavisne republike multinacionalne u manjoj ili većoj meri. U neuspješnoj novoformiranoj skraćenoj Saveznoj republici Jugoslaviji, to se čini neiskreno. Dakle, nije se radilo o tome da zagovarani principi pravednosti nisu bili primjenjeni, već je postojalo široko rasprostranjeno osećanje nepravde, između ostalog i zbog toga što se u proklamovane principe nije verovalo, a oni se i nisu mogli pravedno primeniti. Sve to je dugoročno radilo na razaranju legitimite jugoslovenske države.

Da rezimiram, upotrebiću jednostavnu Aristotelovu ideju pravde kako bih opisao ono o čemu govorim. Pravedna raspodela jeste ona koja tretira „jednake jednako a nejednake nejednako“. Međutim, pravedan državni ustav mora da počiva na nekoj osnovnoj jednakosti građana. Ako ovo shvatimo kao sistem unutar kojeg su pojedine grupe nejednake, on ne može i neće biti pravedan. Svi principi pravde se mogu isprobati, ali će biti neuspuni (ovo je priznavao i Aristotel koji je smatrao da je „pravda jedna vrsta srazmre“ koju je suštinski nemoguće pronaći; o Aristotelovoj ideji pravde vidi Gligorov (1985)). Takav će biti slučaj i sa multietničkom državom zasnovanoj na principu etniciteta. Budući da etnički princip načelno i u svemu diferencira građane, oni u multietničkoj državi moraju biti tretirani nejednako. U Jugoslaviji su oni bili katerigorisani i klasifikovani po etnicitetu u vrlo složenoj podeli (postojali su narodi, narodnosti, etničke grupe i etničke manjine). Ove nejednakosti je trebalo da se izravnaju komplikovanim principima predstavljanja i političkih obaveza (u suštini, smatralo se da je etnička lojalnost važnija od lojalnosti državi). Pokazalo se da je to nemoguć zadatak. Konačno, takva država ne može da stvori osećanje pravde kod svojih građana; ona štaviše neprestano pojačava osećanje nepravde i uskraćenosti, pa prema tome ne može biti shvaćena kao legitimna. To je bio osnovni problem Jugoslavije.

Da li je raspad bio neizbežan?

Da bih bolje istakao glavne zaključke ovog i sledećeg poglavlja i da bih eliminisao neka alternativna objašnjenja, pokušaću da dokažem da raspad Jugoslavije nije bio neizbežan. Štaviše, pokušaću da dokažem da se Jugoslavija mogla reformisati. Čak ću ići toliko daleko da ću pokušati da dokažem da se tokom svog sedamdesetogodišnjeg postojanja Jugoslavija kretala u pravcu sve pravednijih političkih rešenja svojih ustavnih problema (ovu tvrdnju ću razraditi u sledećem poglavlju). Međutim, na tom putu bilo je i nekih značajnih skretanja sa ovog osnovnog pravca – diktatura u periodu pred Drugi svetski rat, građanski rat tokom Drugog svetskog rata, nakon toga period komunizma i socijalizma – tako da država nikada nije dostigla zadovoljavajući stepen legitimiteta, sve do konačnog napuštanja tog pravca. Ali trebalo se prilično pomučiti da se ona razori i taj proces još uvek nije završen.

Država je loše počela. Bilo je tu i velikih nuda i prizemnih motiva. Nedostajali su međusobno razumevanje i osetljivost. Jugoslavija je stvorena kao odgovor na široko rasprostranjena očekivanja i povoljna osećanja, ali bez jasnog konsenzusa njenih građana, njenih naroda i njihovih predstavnika.⁹² Time je stvoren problem legitimite o kojem sam već govorio. Ne može se tvrditi da je Jugoslavija stvorena protiv želja njenih naroda, ali njen oblik nije zadovoljavao zahtev konsenzualnog sporazuma. Država je nastala kao Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca bez, na odgovarajući način izražene, izričite saglasnosti Hrvata i Slovenaca (da ne pominjemo ostale koji nisu bili priznati, ili makar ne u istom stepenu kao oni koji se eksplicitno pominju u samom imenu države).

Zbog nedostatka početnog političkog konsenzusa, Jugoslavija je prolazila kroz sukcesivne ustavne reforme kojima je na kraju uspostavljena politika konsenzusa u gotovo svim aspektima. U teoriji konsenzus ima jasne prednosti u izboru ustavnih rešenja, ali pokazuje i očigledne nedostatke u praksi.⁹³

92 O ovome vidi Jovanović (1928).

93 Vidi Buchanan i Tullock (1961). Gajim rezerve prema valjanosti njihovih argumenata, ali ovde se ne radi o tome.

Da stvar bude gora, nijedan od ustava zemlje nije dostigao tačku u kojoj bi predstavljao izraz konsenzusa.⁹⁴ To znači da se ustavna distribucija prava mogla smatrati nepravednom (što je i bio slučaj), a mogla se menjati samo konsenzusom. Očigledno je da je takav ustav, umesto da donese pravedna rešenja, samo obnavlja frustracije. Takvo ustavno ustrojstvo otkrivalo je nedostatak legitimite i podsticalo građane da zahtevaju mešanje nekog unutrašnjeg ili spoljnog autoriteta, koji bi razrešio stanje paralize, naročito zato što se ono odužilo i vremenom pojačavalo. Iz istog razloga, a u očekivanju mogućih autoritarnih rešenja, rasla je i želja za izlaskom iz zajednice, za secesijom.

Međutim, ovaj primer takođe pokazuje da jugoslovenska država jeste tražila put ka legitimitetu kroz ustavni razvoj. Isti je slučaj i sa sistemom predstavljanja po kvotama, koji sam već pomenuo. Sve češće se zahtevalo jednakost predstavljanje svih regionalnih i etniciteta u saveznim institucijama. To je imalo i jednu nepredviđenu posledicu – stvaranje iskusnih političkih elita raznih etniciteta, koje će se pokazati vrlo važnim u osvajanju nezavisnosti. Vojne, diplomatske, finansijske i administrativne veštine i veze stečene u jugoslovenskim saveznim institucijama pokazale su se neprocenjivima za novonastale države. U svakom slučaju, Jugoslavija se u tom smislu pokazala korisnom za nacionalnu emancipaciju i, kao što ću pokazati, ne samo u tom smislu.

Drugi primer pokazuje da je potreba za decentralizacijom zemlje ipak bila shvaćena. Rano se razumelo da ta država neće opstati bez federalizacije. Tačno je takođe da je nepromenjiva reakcija na skoro sve ozbiljne krize, ranije ili kasnije, bila dalja decentralizacija i federalizacija (kao što je bio slučaj sa diktaturom iz 1929. koja se završila prihvatanjem autonomije Hrvatske 1939). Ali država nikada nije potpuno odustala od ideje centralizma, a naročito ne od autoritarizma. Zato su sve debate o ustavnom uređenju Jugoslavije vođene u terminima decentralizacije (ili federalizacije) i centralizacije (koji su opet reflektovali fundamentalne hrvatske odnosno srpske političke interese). Na kraju su nominalno federalni (neki bi rekli konfederalni) elementi prevladali centralističke, ali politika potpunog

94 Najsporniji ustav iz 1974.

i principijenog federalizma nikada nije bila usvojena. Rezultat je bio nedostatak legitimite federalnih institucija. One su takođe neprestano gubile kredibilitet zbog svoje dokazane neefikasnosti. Moglo bi se dakle reći da je Jugoslavija na kraju bila nominalno federalizovana u najvećem stepenu, suštinski autoritarna, ali da je u stvarnosti imala poliarhičnu raspodelu moći, čime su delegitimizovane prethodne dve karakteristike režima.

U međunarodnoj politici Jugoslavija je činila dobre izbore, mada ne bez izuzetaka. Osim tokom kratkog perioda posle Drugog svetskog rata, ona se oslanjala na Zapad, jer je Zapad prema toj državi pokazivao veće simpatije nego centralna Evropa ili Istok, ali se ona nikada nije potpuno integrisala u njega. Ne mogu sada da ulazim u to pitanje, ali je istina da Jugoslavija ne bi potrajala bez podrške Zapada. Kada je taj oslonac izgubljen, unutrašnji problemi su se pokazali nerešivim.

Međutim, postojao je priličan stepen integracije Jugoslavije u Zapad. Država se oslanjala na Zapad zbog bezbednosti, a njen ekonomski razvoj i razvoj osnovnih institucija još više su zavisili od odnosa sa zapadnim svetom. Ona je bila članica-osnivač Međunarodnog monetarnog fonda i Svetske banke i gradila je sve tešnje veze sa Evropskom zajednicom (ponuđena joj je asocijacija kao prvi korak ka punom članstvu neposredno pre nego što se raspala; ponudu su odbili oni koji su se već bili odlučili za rat), a imala je i značajne kulturne, naučne i vojne veze sa Zapadom. Ključni trenutak, međutim, nastao je sa gotovo fundamentalističkim povratkom Istoku koji se dogodio u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori, o čemu ću govoriti kada stignem do teme nacionalizma.

Konačno, u pogledu priznavanja nacionalnih prava, Jugoslavija je na kraju postigla mnogo više od onoga što su do sada postigle novoformirane države (a ta postignuća su se svakako razlikovala i od onih u drugim zemljama Balkana i srednje Evrope, mada ne bez ozbiljnih, čak fundamentalnih nedostataka, da ne pominjemo one iz građanskog rata koji se vodio tokom Drugog svetskog rata). Jugoslavija je bila jedna od retkih država koja je služila kao sredstvo multinacionalne emancipacije, mada je taj proces bio bolan za skoro sve njegove učesnike. Neke nacije stekle su svoj identitet tek u

okviru Jugoslavije; neke su doživele kulturni razvoj bez presedana; neke su osvojile elemente političkog suvereniteta koje nikada ranije nisu uživale. Prema tome, Jugoslavija se nije beznadežno kretala ka sopstvenoj destrukciji. Ali se pokazala nesposobnom da pronađe pravo ustavno rešenje.

Tako da se nameću sledeća dva zanimljiva pitanja: Da li je to rešenje moglo biti nađeno? Da li je to uopšte pokušano? Pozabaviću se prvim pitanjem.

U suštini, pravo pitanje glasi: Da li se Jugoslavija mogla reformisati? A njime se pokreću još dva pitanja: Da li je Jugoslavija mogla da napusti socijalizam kroz reforme? Da li je mogla da dođe do pravednog ustava kroz reforme? Prvo ću se pozabaviti reformom socijalizma.

Za razliku od Sovjetskog Saveza, a slično drugim socijalističkim zemljama, Jugoslavija se mogla reformisati. Kako? Takav proces obično započinje pokušajem da se poboljša efikasnost socijalističkog sistema, reformom koja mora propasti.⁹⁵ Ali pri tome dolazi do nepovratnih promena. Posledično, taj neuspeh vodi uvođenju daljih reformi. Ako su sve upravljenje u istom pravcu, na kraju sistem mora da popusti (više o tome u Dodatku V).

Jugoslavija je prošla kroz nekoliko neuspelih reformi, koje su dovele do korenitih promena u njenim institucijama. Nisu sve ni propale. Ironično govoreći, uvođenje samoupravljanja bilo je uspeh (može se dodati – nažalost). Ono je dovelo do pada efikasnosti jugoslovenske ekonomije, ali je bilo čvrsto ugrađeno u zvaničnu, pa čak i u ne sasvim zvaničnu ideologiju.⁹⁶ Najgore je bilo to što je samoupravljanje neprestano urušavalo efikasnost sistema, koji je trebalo da bude i donekle jeste bio rezultat reformi. Uprkos tome, sve tržišno usmerene reforme destabilizovale su taj sistem, što je pogodovalo konačnoj prelomnoj reformi. Činjenica je da promene u srednjoevropskim socijalističkim zemljama pokazuju da je moguće da se kroz neuspeh reformi dođe do njihovog konačnog uspeha. U stvari, Jugoslavija

⁹⁵ Ovde se ne slažem sa analizama koje su izneli Murphy, Shleifer i Vishny (1992). Više o tome u Dodatku V.

⁹⁶ Najbolji izvor argumenata za neefikasnost, kao i poželjnost samoupravljanja je Bajt (1990).

je prva od socijalističkih zemalja pokušala sveobuhvatnu reformu krajem 1989. godine. I ona je bila uspešna na dvosmislen način na koji i upotrebljavam tu reč: slomila je sistem, što je i trebalo da se desi i što je možda bila i namera.⁹⁷ Problem je bio u tome što se usput slomila i država.

Zato mislim da sam u pravu kada kažem da je Jugoslavija mogla da se osloboди socijalizma kroz reforme. Ali da li je reformama mogla da dođe i do pravednog ustava? Odgovor glasi da to nije ni pokušala. Tokom osamdesetih u Jugoslaviji se javila potreba za ustavnom reformom, ali to je bilo nemoguće iz dva razloga. Prvo, reformatori su računali na spontane snage liberalizacije. Drugo, prodemokratske snage nisu ni pokušale da organizuju opštejugoslovensku opoziciju. Zbog toga su se reformisti u nedostatku prave baze svog autoriteta, oslanjali na kombinaciju liberalizacije tržišta, a ponekad i na savez sa vojskom. Prvo je uspelo da slomi sistem, a drugo da započne građanski rat.

Prema tome, nije se moralo izlaziti iz Jugoslavije da bi se napustio socijalizam. Po pitanju socijalističkih institucija Jugoslavija se mogla reformisati; bilo je moguće oslobođiti se socijalizma kroz sukcesivne reforme. Međutim, za razliku od drugih srednjoevropskih socijalističkih zemalja, razvoj građanskog društva nije doveo do opštejugoslovenske partije ili pokreta sa alternativnim ustavnim idejama. Opoziciju, a na kraju i vladajuću partiju, okupirали su nacionalisti. I zemlja se raspala.

Da li je bio moguć pravedan ustav? Opet se postavljaju dva pitanja: Da li je to zamislivo? Da li je to politički bilo dostižno?

Na prvo pitanje nije teško načelno odgovoriti. Jugoslavija je tipičan slučaj potrebe ustava zasnovanog na onome što Rols naziva preklapajućim konsenzusom.⁹⁸ Sukob je imao toliko mnogo dimenzija da je samo vrlo uopšten liberalni i (kon)federalni ustav potencijalno mogao da stvori državu koja garantuje bezbednost i zaštitu prava.

97 Za raspravu o strategiji reformi i reformama iz 1989. vidi Gligorov (1990).

98 Vidi npr. Rawls (1985) i (1987).

Međutim, dve u krajnjoj liniji nepomirljive ideje nisu uspele da obezbede konsenzus. Možda je poučno videti zašto. Ta dva protivrečna principa dobro ilustruju prvi i poslednji ustav. Prvi ustav, zasnovan na liberalnim principima, izglasala je na ustavotvornoj skupštini srpska većina. Taj ustav nije podržao federalizam. On nije smatran legitimnim među onima koji su ostali u manjinama.⁹⁹ Dakle, oni koji su se protivili federalizmu bili su za majorizaciju, dok su federalisti bili za konsenzus.

Prilikom pokušaja reforme poslednjeg ustava, srpski političari, i oni na vlasti i oni iz opozicije, zalagali su se za većinsko donošenje odluka, dok su se ostali zalagali za jednoglasnost. U stvari, oba pristupa su bila motivisana pre lošim iskustvima i romantičnim očekivanjima, nego stvarnošću distribucije moći. Oni koji su zagovarali majorizaciju nisu zapažali činjenicu da se stabilna većina više ne može postići. S druge strane, oni koji su se zalagali za jednoglasnost nisu uviđali da se do promena ne može doći tim putem, jer je bilo realno očekivati da će jedna strana u procesu stvaranja konsenzusa odlučiti da ostane beskompromisna. Tako su se srpski političari i intelektualci borili za majorizaciju koja je bila neprihvatljiva Hrvatima i Slovincima, mada Srbi nisu mogli da se nadaju većini na isti način na koji su to činili u trenutku stvaranja države. Hrvati i Slovinci (kao i Makedonci, Muslimani, Albanci, pa čak i Crnogorci) tražili su jednoglasnost, neprihvatljivu Srbima, mada bi imali većinu. Da su izabrali da se prvo demokratizuju, Srbi bi imali dobre izglede da iznude po sebe povoljan konsenzus.

Možda bi bilo korisno videti kako i zašto bi bilo tako (o tome više u Dodatku IV). Uzmimo prvo slučaj majorizacije. Pretpostavimo da je izabran parlament koji odražava nacionalnu konfiguraciju Jugoslavije. To bi značilo da Srbi, u najboljem slučaju, imaju 40% mesta (u popisu iz 1991. manje od 40% stanovnika Jugoslavije izjasnilo se kao Srbi). Da bi formirali većinu, morali bi da imaju saradnju bar još jedne etničke grupe. U tom slučaju, sve bi zavisilo od političkih prioriteta eventualnih budućih političkih partnera. Moglo bi se tvrditi da oni

⁹⁹ Zemlja se u to vreme nije zvala Jugoslavija, već Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca.

ne bi imali mnogo uticaja, jer bi svi bili potencijalni partneri (to u stvari nije slučaj, ali će tu činjenicu zanemariti budući da ona ide u prilog mojoj tezi). Međutim, to nije tako. Svako ozbiljno oglušivanje o političke interese manjinskog partnera stvorilo bi podsticaj za obrazovanje koalicije bez srpskih partija. Uglavnom bi koalicija Hrvata, Slovenaca, Albanaca i Muslimana predstavljala većinu. Dakle, srpske partije bi tu morale da traže potencijalne partnere. Izabrani partner bi to iskoristio da se pogađa sa Srbima za veći uticaj. Izbor bi se sveo na koaliciju srpskih partija sa partijama neke druge nacionalnosti, u kojoj bi manji partner imao moć veću od jednake, ili koaliciju „nemoćnih“, sa srpskim partijama u permanentnoj opoziciji. Prema tome, princip majorizacije ne bi nužno radio u korist najveće etničke grupe, kao što je to bio slučaj, iz raznih razloga, 1921. godine.

Pogledajmo sada princip jednoglasnosti. On je vrlo konzervativan, jer svima daje negativnu moć (veto) da onemoguće bilo koju odluku, ali nije koristan u vremenima političkih promena. Kako on funkcioniše za male i velike nacije u vremenima promena? Prvo, mnoga pitanja ostaju nerešena, to jest prepuštena rešavanju van političkih institucija. To uglavnom pogoduje većim nacijama. Drugo, to svaku političku odluku čini skupljom za zainteresovanu stranu (jer će za svoju poziciju biti primorana da obezbedi podršku svih), u poređenju sa alternativnim pravilom odlučivanja kojim se ta podrška može postići i na račun preostale manjine. Ako stoji prva posledica, onda druga čini princip jednoglasnosti skupljim za male nacije (transakcioni troškovi jednoglasnosti su obično veći od onih pri većinskom odlučivanju; želim samo da kažem da su ti troškovi više nego proporcionalno veći za slabijeg partnera).

Uzimajući sve ovo u obzir, proizlazi da je za Srbe kao najveću naciju, ako su želeli da sačuvaju Jugoslaviju, najbolja strategija bila da stanu na čelo pokreta za liberalizaciju i demokratizaciju. Ne vidim kako bi se toj strategiji uspešno suprotstavili separatisti, uzimajući u obzir složenu etničku konfiguraciju Jugoslavije, kao i izraženu međunarodnu spremnost da se podrži integritet zemlje i potreba fundamentalne ekonomske reforme. Iz toga zaključujem da se Jugoslavija mogla reformisati.

Zašto onda do toga nije došlo? Da li su svi bili iracionalni? Ne. Zapravo, postupci i ishodi otkrivaju konfiguraciju političkih prioriteta koja je u skladu sa raspodelom očekivane ustavne moći. Većina nacija je izšla ili izlazi iz Jugoslavije, dok su Srbi dobili ono što su odlučili da žele oslanjajući se na raspodelu stvarne moći, tj. na silu. Tako je opisana raspodela moći, imajući u vidu dugoročne nacionalne interese, proizvela predvidive rezultate. Dakle, ustav adekvatan za zemlju kao što je bila Jugoslavija je bio moguć, ali je on morao biti prepostavljen alternativnim ishodima i donet političkim dogovorom. Zapravo, moje je mišljenje da je njemu davana prednost u ekonomskom pogledu, ali ne i u političkom. A budući da ekonomski prioriteti nisu bili podržani političkim, nije ih podržavalo ništa (tako se i ovo može svesti na igru Zatvorenikove dileme).

Jedno drugo pitanje je ovde važnije: Da li je takvo ustavno rešenje bilo ostvarivo? Sada znamo da nije. Teško je rukovoditi se hipotetičkim rasuđivanjem da bi se komentarisalo nešto postojeće. Sada mi izgleda očigledno da jugoslovensko rešenje nije bilo moguće. Čovek bi u suprotnom morao da se služi argumentima koji ne odgovaraju činjenicama, ali čak i kada bi argumentacija bila ubedljiva, koga je sada briga za to? Međutim, postoji jedan kvazirealističan pristup ovim izgubljenim mogućnostima. Pogledajte Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Postoji li pravedan ustav za tu državu? Mada je Jugoslavija bila nešto drugo, centralni jugoslovenski sukob i bosanski problem su isti. Ono što je upadljivo za Bosnu i Hercegovinu jeste da je ona toliko kulturno, etnički i verski složena da je politički nedeljiva. Isti je slučaj i sa nekim delovima Hrvatske i Srbije. Zato je osnovni razlog za postojanje Jugoslavije bio taj da je politički nemoguće konstruisati etničke države. Etničke države ne mogu da garantuju jednak prava svojim građanima (multietničke to nisu u stanju čak ni za priznate etnicitete). Dakle, upravo zbog postojanja takve mešavine etničkih i drugih osobenosti, Jugoslavija je bila politički održiva.

U stvari, u slučaju Bosne, kao i u slučaju Hrvatske, u sporu onih koji su zagovarali majorizaciju i onih koji su bili za konsenzus, bilo je nečeg ironičnog. U slučaju Hrvata i Muslimana, oni koji su se zalagali za konsenzus u Jugoslaviji bili su za majorizaciju u Bosni i Hercegovini (i Hrvatskoj), dok su se Srbi zalagali za konsenzus u odlučivanju u

Bosni i Hercegovini (i Hrvatskoj), mada su ga odbacivali u samoj Jugoslaviji (isto tako, Hrvati su branili ideju konsenzusa za Albance u Srbiji, ali ne i za Srbe u Hrvatskoj, dok su Srbi tražili konsenzus u Hrvatskoj, ali odbijali da takva prava daju Albancima u Srbiji). U stvari, u Bosni i Hercegovini nema stabilne većine, mada je distribucija moći možda nešto jednostavnija nego što je bila u Jugoslaviji. Postoje samo tri sukobljene strane, od kojih su dve vrlo udaljene (Srbi predstavljaju 31% stanovništva, Hrvati 17%, Muslimani preko 40%; ove brojke se osporavaju kao i sve drugo). Međutim, dok je složenost ravnoteže snaga uništila Jugoslaviju, jednostavnost je zapečatila sudbinu Bosne i Hercegovine. Sve dok Srbi i Hrvati nisu u koaliciji, Muslimani su uvek u pobedničkoj koaliciji. Budući da su Hrvati najmalobrojniji od tri etniciteta, verovatni ishod majorizacije jeste koalicija Muslimana i Hrvata, sa Srbima u opoziciji. Distribucija moći je prostija nego u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, ali je rešenje nužno složenije. Dok je Jugoslavija mogla biti organizovana kao liberalna federacija uz majorizaciju, Bosnu i Hercegovinu je gotovo nemoguće federalizovati, teško ju je videti kao liberalnu državu, pa bi se njome moralno upravljati konsenzusom. Istovremeno, morala bi deliti suverenitet sa Srbijom i Hrvatskom, jer su one vitalno zainteresovane za ono što se događa u njoj. Sve ovo nije nezamislivo, ali je skoro neizvodivo. I mnogo jednostavnije i dostižnije rešenje za Jugoslaviju pokazalo se utopijskim.

Budući da su etničke države nemoguće, očekivalo bi se da to racionalnim ljudima bude dovoljno da predvide užase građanskog rata (koji je već jednom doživljen u Drugom svetskom ratu, a uspomene na njega održavane živim u sećanju svih učesnika), ako ne i dobiti od ekonomskе i ustavne reforme, da bi se postiglo političko rešenje kroz (kon)federalni sporazum kojim bi se garantovala i zaštita jednaka prava za sve etnicitete i pojedince. Suprotno se pokazalo tačnim, mada nije bilo neizbežno, što sam pokušao i da pokažem, koliko god ideja Jugoslavije sada izgleda neverovatno i koliko god sada raspad izgleda kao konačan. Zato je još važnije razumeti slučaj raspada Jugoslavije, kao primer neuspeha održavanja jedne korisne političke integracije. (O ekonomskim prednostima i troškovima detaljnije raspravljam u daljem tekstu, vidi Dodatke VI i VII).



Nacionalizam

„Srbi dobijaju u ratu, a gube u miru.“

Dobrica Čosić

Misljam da sam do sada pružio određenu argumentaciju za tvrdnju da politički razlozi preovlađuju nad ekonomskim u raspadu neke zemlje (vratiću se na to u poslednjem delu ovog poglavlja, kao i u sledećem poglavlju). Sada ću razmotriti razloge za drugu tvrdnju, tj. da ljudi dobijaju ono što žele. Ovo zahteva opis političkog procesa kojim se formiraju nacionalistički prioriteti (takođe vidi Dodatak II).

Kao što sam rekao, osnovni konflikt u Jugoslaviji bio je onaj između Srba i Hrvata. Problem je u tome što oni na nekim teritorijama žive međusobno izmešani, tako da teško mogu da obrazuju nezavisne države, a da druga strana ne oseća da su time iznevereni njeni vitalni nacionalni interesi, kao što ne mogu ni da obrazuju zajedničku državu a da obe strane to ne dožive kao osujećenje svojih nacionalnih prava. Razumno bi bilo očekivati da se ovakav konflikt može rešiti politički uzimajući u obzir iskustvo užasnog građanskog rata tokom Drugog svetskog rata, i očiglednu činjenicu da bi stvaranje hrvatske i srpske nacionalne države bilo nemoguće bez ponovljenog građanskog rata. Činjenica da su Jugoslaviju činile i druge nacionalnosti pomogla bi stvaranju složenije i uravnoteženije strukture moći, da u Jugoslaviji nije bilo i drugih oštrednih konflikata (razmatranja koje slede mogu se posmatrati u terminima igre Lanac prodavnica (Chain Store), vidi Dodatak III).

Konflikt koji je posebno teško uklopiti u sveobuhvatno jugoslovensko (to jest „južnoslovensko“) rešenje jeste konflikt između Srba i Albanaca. Ne ulazeći u pojedinosti, jasno je da Albanci nisu južni Sloveni i da ne mogu da ignoriraju činjenicu da više od jedne trećine Albanaca ne živi u Albaniji već u Jugoslaviji, pretežno u Srbiji. Štaviše, oni žive na kompaktnoj i povezanoj etničkoj teritoriji.

Kako pomiriti njihova prava sa pravima drugih jugoslovenskih nacija? Albanci su smatrali da bi trebalo da imaju jednaka politička prava sa drugima u jugoslovenskoj federaciji. Srbi su smatrali da takav zahtev ugrožava njihove nacionalne interese. Konflikt zadire u same temelje Jugoslavije: Da li je ona etnička država južnih Slovena ili federacija svih etniciteta koji u njoj žive? Zapravo, nesposobnost jugoslovenskih nacija da nedvosmisleno odgovore na ovo pitanje vodila je rađanju još fanatičnjeg srpskog nacionalizma. Kada je on zahvatio srpske političke, intelektualne i vojne elite, nije bilo načina da slovenačke i hrvatske komunističke vlasti, već oslabljene kolapsom socijalizma, pruže preveliki otpor svojim nacionalistima (tek nastajući liberali pokazali su se vrlo slabim). I to je bio početak kraja.

U diskusijama o raspadu Jugoslavije često se zaboravlja taj početak. Često se veruje da se problem sastojao u tome da su zapadni delovi zemlje težili secesiji kako bi se brže integrисали u zapadni svet. Međutim, secesionistički pokret započeo je na Kosovu i nije bio nadahnut isključivo oslobođilačkim nacionalizmom već i idealizacijom albanskog komunizma. Potrebno je mnogo prostora da se opiše šta se sve tamo događalo, tako da će se ograničiti na konstataciju da fundamentalna jugoslovenska kriza nije počela na razvijenijem zapadu zemlje – koji bi pošao putem separatizma u potrazi za ekonomskim dobiticima ili za liberalizmom i demokratijom – već na nerazvijenom jugu.

Kosovski konflikt je u prvi plan istakao jugoslovenski ustavni problem i pogodovao je pojavi srpskog nacionalizma i upotrebi sile (kao i kontinuiranom oslanjanju na nju). Dok s jedne strane postoje nenasilna, to jest liberalna politička rešenja centralnog jugoslovenskog konflikta (bar načelno), s druge strane u Jugoslaviji nigde nisu moguća nacionalistička rešenja bez upotrebe sile, a to se najjasnije može videti upravo na Kosovu. Sve što se kasnije događalo tokom raspada Jugoslavije bilo je samo primena politike i ciljeva koji su prvo isprobani i branjeni na Kosovu. Tamo je albanski otpor bio prigušen, jer su na drugim mestima izbili smrtonosni konflikti i jer je izgledalo politički korisnije pustiti južne Slovene da se bore i

istrebljuju među sobom, nego rizikovati sve u konfrontaciji sa mnogo jačim i vrlo razgnevljenim protivnikom. U tom smislu, i Srbi i Albanci su na Kosovu dobili ono što su želeli, privremeno.

Ovim ne tvrdim da su oni ostvarili svoje osnovne ciljeve. To može da zvuči neshvatljivo, pa će na primeru Kosova objasniti šta podrazumevam pod političkim prioritetima („željama naroda“). Slučaj Kosova je jednostavan, između ostalog i zato što je donekle groteskan (opet se radi o Zatvorenikovoj dilemi, kao što ćemo pokazati). Kosovski region¹⁰⁰ je od velike istorijske važnosti za Srbiju, a danas je nastanjen Albancima (blizu 90%) i Srbima i Crnogorcima (mada ima i Turaka, Roma i drugih manjina). Jugoslavija je pokušavala da smiri etničke tenzije na Kosovu dajući mu sve veću autonomiju, mada nikada i ustavnim izjednačavanjem sa drugim članicama federacije.

Nacionalistička srpska država ne može da sproveđe demokratsku vladavinu nad Kosovom, jer joj nije u interesu da Kosovu pruži autonomiju, budući da bi to značilo albansku samoupravu. S druge strane, sve što bi bilo manje od autonomije u protivrečnosti je sa postojećom etničkom konfiguracijom Kosova, a to bi bilo nemoguće ignorisati u državi zasnovanoj na etničkom principu. Prema tome, srpska etnička država mora da se osloboди Albanaca, ako ne fizički, onda politički; to jest, izbor je između etničkog čišćenja i policijske države.

S druge strane, Albanci ne mogu da se nadaju mirnoj secesiji zbog važnosti Kosova za srpske nacionalne interese, ali ne mogu da prihvate ni da odu sa Kosova ili da se zadugo pomire sa životom u policijskoj državi. Tako da postizanje krajnjih željenih ciljeva – srpsko Kosovo (koje zahteva etničko čišćenje velikih razmera) ili nezavisno Kosovo (koje zahteva građanski rat) – realno ne treba očekivati. Dakle, obe strane moraju biti spremne da slede svoje pragmatičnije političke prioritete, što u ovom slučaju znači nelagodnu kombinaciju policijske države i podzemne nezavisnosti.

Alternativa tome je rat. Možda je tačno da je postojeće rešenje privremeno i da samo znači odlaganje neizbežnog rata. U tom slučaju,

100 U stvari Kosovo i Metohija, ali ovde ćemo to zanemariti.

moji zaključci bi bili dodatno potvrđeni. Ako strane u sukobu ne promene svoje prioritete, na kraju će morati da zarate, a na sadašnji aranžman bi se moralо gledati kao na fazu priprema. Kako god se situacija bude razvijala, politički prioriteti će biti zadovoljeni. U tom smislu, obe strane će dobiti ono što žele i završiće sa onim što su poželetele (to bi bilo konačno ponavljanje Zatvorenikove dileme).

Primer Kosova ilustruje dve teorijski važne ideje – obrazovanje političkih prioriteta i ulogu nacionalizma u tome. Pretpostavimo da se dve strane pogađaju. Najviše što svaka strana može želeti je da dobije sve od onoga što je predmet pogađanja. To može izgledati nepravedno čak i onome koji želi takav ishod i zato se za ovakav cilj traži jako obrazloženje. Nacionalizam predstavlja takvo obrazloženje. Međutim, ako su obe strane nacionalističke, nije realno da bilo koja od njih očekuje da dobije ono što želi. Zbog toga, čak i politički prioriteti nacionalista mogu ponekad da budu pragmatični. Kada kažem da narodi dobijaju ono što žele, pod željama naroda podrazumevam neku kombinaciju ovih pragmatičnih prioriteta koji bi odražavali politički ostvarive ciljeve, sa onim ekstremnjim koji se oslanjaju na nacionalizam. Nadajmo se da će pragmatični prioriteti preovladati. Ali naravno, nacionalistička obrazloženja neće nestati, što može destabilizovati postignuta politička rešenja. U stvari, tako je propala Jugoslavija.

Drugo, politički prioriteti srpskih nacionalista oblikovani su i demonstrirani na Kosovu. Postalo je očigledno da se policijska država prepostavlja demokratiji, ako se time podgreva nada za dostizanje krajnjeg nacionalističkog cilja, makar fiktivno ako ne u stvarnosti (čime se, da se tako izrazim, produžava igra). Izbor takvog prioriteta još nije napušten, tako da je sav dalji razvoj političke situacije doveo samo do širenja policijske i ratne države.

Ovi politički prioriteti se zasnivaju i na jednoj ideji pravde, retributivne pravde, tačnije rečeno, ideji da oni koji žive u policijskoj državi upravo to i zaslužuju.¹⁰¹ Mislim da je to od suštinske važnosti za ono što se događalo. Istorijска važnost Kosova za srpski nacionalizam sama

101 Za argumentaciju da se fašizam, pa čak i nacizam, zasnivaju na ideji pravde vidi Hayek (1944).

po sebi ne opravdava policijsku državu, a da ne pominjemo etničko čišćenje. Potrebno je jače obrazloženje. U slučaju Kosova, Albanci su predstavljeni kao izvršioci politike genocida protiv srpskog naroda. Time se opravdavala politika „svih neophodnih mera“. U odnosu na zločin, kazna je odgovarajuća; u odnosu na počinjenu nepravdu, policijska država je pravedna. Isto obrazloženje je upotrebljeno u Hrvatskoj (na obe strane), kao i u Bosni i Hercegovini (od strane Srba u odnosu na Muslimane, ali sve više i od druge dve strane). Nacionalizam tu opet igra ulogu vrhovnog opravdanja. Posledice su katastrofalne. Kada se jednom upotrebe i opravdaju „krajnje mere“, moralna šteta naneta naciji je toliko velika da čitavo društvo postaje talac nacionalista. Karakter srpske države nije sada toliko određen nacionalizmom koliko nacionalističkim pravdanjem najdrastičnije politike. Opravdanje obavezuje, postaje razlog i onda se svi na njega pozivaju. Tako je ono što je prihvaćeno na Kosovu postalo prihvatljivo svuda, pa su onda svi postali krivi za najužasnije zločine i time zaslužili najgoru sudbinu.

Slučaj političkih prioriteta Hrvata i Muslimana je nešto jednostavniji. Hrvati su sa relativnom većinom izabrali svoju nacionalističku stranku na prvim višestranačkim izborima 1990. godine, mada je već tada bilo očigledno da ciljevi te stranke ne mogu biti ostvareni bez rata sa Srbima. Zatim su takođe svi glasali za svoje etničke stranke u Bosni i Hercegovini, i na razočarenje jugoslovenskih stranaka time zapečatili sudbinu Jugoslavije, birajući u stvari mogućnost građanskog rata (period priprema je trajao malo duže u Bosni i Hercegovini).

Ono što su Hrvati i Muslimani previđali je da nisu imali odgovor na činjenicu postojanja srpskog problema, na isti način na koji su i Srbi u početku previđali – a onda nisu imali drugog izbora nego da to ignorišu – da uvođenjem policijske države na Kosovu zanemaruju problem Jugoslavije. Posebno su Hrvati računali sa time da mogu da prenebregnu srpski problem diversifikacijom, a u stvari su time omogućili njegovu generalizaciju. S druge strane, Muslimani su izabrali nezavisnost Bosne i Hercegovine u nameri da izbegnu sudbinu Kosova koja bi ih bila stigla ako bi ostali sa Srbijom, prenebregavajući činjenicu da se ne mogu nadati da dobiju

saglasnost Srba za nezavisnost. Zapravo, pre odluke o nezavisnosti Bosne i Hercegovine Srbi iz te republike, kroz rezultate etničkog referendumu, dali su jasno na znanje da neće prihvati nikakvu nezavisnu Bosnu i Hercegovinu.

Na političke opcije Bosne i Hercegovine može se gledati i na drugi način. Prepostavimo da se radi o političkoj igri sa tri strategije: izlazak, glas i lojalnost.¹⁰² Položaj Bosne i Hercegovine je takav da kroz lojalnost može imati možda i odlučujući glas, ali bez opcije izlaska. Bosna je provincija u potrazi za državom. Ako nema države kojoj može biti lojalna i u kojoj bi se čuo njen glas, Bosna sama može izabrati da postane država. Ali to će druge zainteresovane države, to jest Srbija i Hrvatska, videti kao izbor izlaska iz zajednice, i njihov međusobni sukob oko Bosne i Hercegovine će osuditi taj izbor na propast. Narodi Bosne i Hercegovine nisu imali naročitog izbora, ali su ga načinili na prvom slobodnom glasanju i referendumu o nezavisnosti i to čini bosanski slučaj tragičnim.

Jedini koji su pokazali izvesnu neopredeljenost bili su Makedonci, kao poslednji koji su proglašili nezavisnost i pokazivali jasan otpor ka primeni bilo kakvog nasilja; jedini koji su uspeli, za sada, da izbegnu rat. U tom smislu, svi su dobili ono što su odlučili da žele. Albanci su se izvukli sa snažnom represijom, jer se nisu odlučili za ratne sukobe. Makedonci su ostali zaglavljeni u smešnoj raspravi sa susedima, Evropskom zajednicom i čak Sjedinjenim Državama o pravu na svoje etničko ime i ime države, te doživeli ekonomsku blokadu Grčke, ali nisu izabrali rat.

Slučaj Slovenije je različit i donekle izuzetan, ali mi se čini da su i oni uviđali da je neka vrsta vojnih sukoba neizbežna i da su se za to svakako pripremili. Međutim, sukob je bio koliko kratak i neodlučan, toliko i besciljan. Ne postoje nikakvi sukobljeni nacionalni interesi između Srba, ili bilo koga drugog u Jugoslaviji, i Slovenaca. Problem se u slučaju Slovenije svodio na tajming otcepljenja i interesa Jugoslovenske armije. Inače, otcepljenje Slovenije moglo bi predstavljati neki problem samo u odnosu na promene koje je

102 Oslanjam se, naravno, na klasičnu analizu izbora političkih strategija koju je izneo Hirschman (1970).

izazvalo u raspodeli ekonomske i političke moći (mada to ne treba shvatiti olako, jer su te promene prinudile druge da ili pokušaju da zadrže Sloveniju u Jugoslaviji ili da slede njen primer; u suprotnom bi se opisana konfiguracija moći odlučno preusmerila u korist najbrojnije nacije).

Koliko god bila neprivlačna takva tvrdnja, izgleda da se u Jugoslaviji sve događalo u skladu sa (otvorenim ili strateškim) političkim prioritetima zainteresovanih strana. Međutim, dinamika nije nevažna. Raspad je počeo u tački (Kosovo) gde je sukob bio najteže rešiv ustavnim putem, tj. generalizacijom prava. To je na odlučujući način opredelilo ideologiju srpskog nacionalizma. On je tradicionalno uglavnom bio zapadno orijentisan, dok je na Kosovu doveo do obnove jedne ideologije koja se čak može nazvati fundamentalističkom, u nekakvom istočnjačkom smislu. Ona se zasnivala na kombinaciji nacionalizma, komunizma i nade da će takva kombinacija pobediti i u Rusiji. Odabrana je politika koja se oslanjala na nadmoćnu silu, i ta politika je shvatana kao pretnja širom Jugoslavije, zbog moguće primene i na ostale sukobe. Pitanja pravde, ili bolje nepravde, koja ni inače nisu bila rešena, postala su akutna. Ako vi na Kosovu možete da upotrebite nacionalizam i vojnu silu bez našeg pristanka, zašto i mi (ko god mi bili) ne bismo mogli da učinimo to isto u srpskim oblastima u Hrvatskoj (Sloveniji, Bosni i Hercegovini)? Taj argument je primenjiv i obratno. Tako neuporedivo postaje isto. I nacionalizam postaje opšti.

Šta nacionalizam znači i kako se on uopštava? Uzmimo opet primer Kosova. Ako njime treba da se upravlja protiv volje najmanje 80% stanovnika, to se može postići samo policijskom državom. Ako se u celoj Srbiji i Jugoslaviji ne uvede takođe policijska država, trebalo bi da bude moguća trajna demokratija u Srbiji i Jugoslaviji paralelno sa trajnom policijskom državom na Kosovu. To politički nije verovatno. U to svakako nisu verovali drugi u Jugoslaviji. Tako da je alternativa bila: dati Kosovu ista ili slična ustavna prava koja su uživale druge jugoslovenske republike, ili svako treba da počne da traži način da izbegne sudbinu koja je zadesila Kosovo.

Ta dilema je prilično dugo trajala i uticala je na razvoj političkih događaja širom Jugoslavije i naročito u Srbiji. Ona je bila uopštena u dilemu između demokratije i autoritarizma. U ključnom trenutku, 1986. i 1987., u srpskoj političkoj strategiji došlo je do promene koja je bliska prihvatanju autoritarizma i separatizma (do tada, Srbija je zastupala liberalizaciju i demokratizaciju). Ako drugi ne mogu da podnesu srpsko rešenje za kosovski problem, moraće da podnesu nezavisnost Srbije. To bi, naravno, dovelo do promene unutrašnjih granica koje bi ugrožavale svakoga u Jugoslaviji. Budući da je nastala opasnost po vitalne interese svih, nacionalizam se svuda pojavio kao poželjna politička alternativa. Sve je to dobro poznato; jedina stvar koju treba istaći je srpski separatizam. To se obično ne shvata.

Ovaj proces treba posmatrati i sa drugih strana. Uzmimo dugoročni interes Hrvatske da postane nezavisna država. On je uvek bio prisutan i samo potisnut snažnom političkom intervencijom protiv hrvatskog nacionalizma 1971. Međutim, kada je ravnoteža snaga počela da se menja i Srbija silovito počela da ističe svoje interese, hrvatski nacionalni interesi opet su izbili u prvi plan. To je povratnom spregom dalje osnaživalo srpski nacionalistički pokret, dok su svi drugi gledali kako da umaknu. To je, sa svoje strane, još više snažilo srpski nacionalizam i istovremeno u Hrvatskoj dovelo nacionaliste na vlast. Svi su se oslonili na resurse relativne prednosti, neko na etničku političku mobilizaciju, drugi na vojnu moć. I nikle su razne vrste nacionalističkih država.

Sa istorijske tačke gledišta, interesantno je da za razliku od međuratnog perioda i krize tokom kasnih 60-ih godina, tokom poslednjih stadijuma raspada Jugoslavije ni Hrvatska ni Srbija već duže vreme nisu zagovarale separatizam. Prvi koji su istakli svoje interese bili su Albanci; sledili su ih Srbi. Zatim su došli Slovenci. Njihov slučaj je strateški zanimljiv. Ponekad se dokazuje da je Jugoslavija mogla da preživi otcepljenje Slovenije i Makedonije, ali ne i Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine. Politički je to više nego pogrešno. Sledеći nekakvu sličnu ideju o posebnom položaju Slovenije u Jugoslaviji, slovenački komunistički političari su se zalagali za nešto što su nazivali asimetričnom federacijom. To znači

da bi ono što se događa u Jugoslaviji bivalo primenjivano na Sloveniju samo uz njen pristanak. Ovo je bio skoro politički neodgovoran stav uzimajući u obzir važnost etničke pravde za jugoslovensku politiku. Pored toga, ako bi se Slovenija povukla, ravnoteža moći u ostatku Jugoslavije bi se dramatično poremetila u korist Srbije. Ovaj slučaj ilustruje karakter jugoslovenske političke ravnoteže. Svi su morali da ostanu u Jugoslaviji (uključujući i Albance) da se cela građevina ne bi srušila. Jednom kada su Slovenci odlučili da napuste Jugoslaviju, država je bila osuđena na propast.

Ovi procesi su tekli paralelno. U stvari, mislim da se nacionalizam manje-više na ovaj način širio Jugoslavijom. Jednom kada su ga svi prihvatili, nije postojalo drugo rešenje sem sukoba. Osnovno obeležje nacionalizma je da kolektivne interese stavlja iznad načela i prava pojedinaca. To zajedničku, multietničku državu čini praktično nemogućom i tada se može primeniti samo međunarodno pravo. Budući da se upravo ovo dogodilo, nasilna sukobljavanja su bila neizbežna i zemlja se raspala.

Nemogući zaključak

Mora se obratiti pažnja na Bosnu i Hercegovinu da bismo videli u čemu su trajne dileme i očekivani politički ishodi. Tu se radi o jednom nepotpunom raspadu, nepravednom ustavu, permanentnoj nestabilnosti i sve većem međunarodnom angažovanju. Isto važi za skoro celu bivšu Jugoslaviju.

Poređenje sa bivšom Jugoslavijom je dobar primer. Mada Jugoslavija nije bila pravedna država, ona jeste bila država. Obezbeđivala je sigurnost svojih građana. Različiti etniciteti u Jugoslaviji imali su oprečne ideje o tome kako bi njihova država trebalo da izgleda i na kraju nisu uspeli da postignu konsenzus. Ali etničke države nastale raspadom Jugoslavije u većini slučajeva čak i nisu države.

Srbija je država bez jasno definisanih granica. Ona se pruža preko svojih zvaničnih granica, ne samo na Saveznu Republiku Jugoslaviju (federaciju Srbije i Crne Gore), već i na teritorije koje drže Srbi u Bosni i Hercegovini i Hrvatskoj, ali se ne pruža (sem svojim vojnim i policijskim prisustvom) do svojih zvaničnih granica na Kosovu. Kosovski problem je teško rešiv bez trajnog međunarodnog učešća. Ali će na kraju postati jasno da je čak i srpski problem nerešiv bez permanentnog međunarodnog učešća. Srbija se razvila u jednu besciljnu silu. Teško je očekivati da će ona ikada zamisliti neki ostvarivi nacionalni interes oko kojeg bi organizovala svoju državu. Ako se ne nađe rešenje za Kosovo, nedostatak usmerenja će ostati stalan, čak i pod pretpostavkom da se svi ostali problemi nekako reše. Ali u čemu bi se to rešenje moglo sastojati?

Hrvatska je takođe država bez granica. Ona se pruža preko Bosne i Hercegovine, ali ne i preko srpskih oblasti u Hrvatskoj. U stvari, u donošenju nekih ključnih državnih odluka, ona mora i moraće i ubuduće da obezbedi pristanak Srba u Hrvatskoj i srpske vlade. Slučaj Hrvatske precizno ilustruje prevagu političkih interesa nad ekonomskim. Trošak secesije Hrvatske na planu bogatstva, dohotka, same mogućnosti komunikacija (to jest bezbednosti) veoma je visok i dugoročan. U pogledu ekonomskog suvereniteta, Hrvatska sada mora da pregovara sa čisto srpskom vladom u Beogradu (za razliku od ranije jugoslovenske) i sa vladom Srpske Krajine u Kninu. Njena pregovaračka pozicija je pogoršana, najblaže rečeno. Ona je morala da se osloni na međunarodnu podršku da bi postala suverena, a da bi opstala moraće permanentno da se oslanja na međunarodne faktore.

Bosna i Hercegovina će biti država samo nominalno, ili ni toliko. Tu vidimo isti problem suštinske nepravde, samo još pogoršan surovim građanskim ratom koji će još potrajati rađajući permanentnu nestabilnost. Država neće biti u stanju da zaštitи sopstvene građane bez trajnog međunarodnog učešća. A to znači ono isto što i na Bliskom istoku: uključivanje celog sveta. Rešenja koja će se donositi u Ženevi, Njujorku, Washingtonu, Moskvi ili na nekom drugom mestu, sada ili kasnije, nesrećna su rešenja, jer će u pokušaju da reše akutni problem građanskog rata stvoriti trajnu problematičnu oblast koja će prilično dugo uz nemiravati svetske sile.



Jedina država koja je nastala iz Jugoslavije je Slovenija. Na drugom polu je Makedonija koja nije potpuno priznata država, to jest ona je država bez imena. Na nju se u međunarodnoj zajednici gleda kao na privremeni aranžman. Biće joj takođe potrebno rastuće međunarodno angažovanje. Oslanjaće se na ravnotežu snaga i zahtevaće vrlo visok stepen političke pravde kako bi se izbegla dalja deljenja. Realistično je reći da je to teško postići bez aktivne podrške Evropske zajednice i Sjedinjenih Država.

Pri svemu tome, problem Kosova potpuno je gurnut u stranu. Budući da on neće nestati, to će biti unutrašnji destabilizujući činilac. Na delu će biti i spoljni interesi, svuda širom bivše Jugoslavije, koji će takođe sve vreme delovati kao faktor destabilizacije. Najviše čemu se možemo nadati jeste trajni prekid vatre na Balkanu, dok stabilnost ne treba očekivati.

Da rezimiramo, sa izuzetkom Slovenije, zemlje bivše Jugoslavije kreću se ka dugotrajnoj nestabilnosti. Ako se izvori nestabilnosti čvrsto institucionalizuju i međunarodno obezbede, kao što sada izgleda više nego verovatno, ovaj region će patiti od dugotrajnog ekonomskog zaostajanja i rađaće političke i druge nepravde kao što je to bio slučaj i tokom cele istorije Balkana.

ČETVRTO POGLAVLJE

Da li je levo postalo desno?

„Dobro je sve što vodi dobru.“

Makijaveli

Krajnji ishod jugoslovenske krize još uvek se ne nazire. Zemlja se dezintegrisala, a sve ostalo se raspalo u paramparčad. Trenutno (mart 1994) građanski rat još uvek traje, nastale su nove nezavisne i poluzavisne države i regije, hiljade ljudi je pobijeno i ranjeno, uništeni su gradovi i sela, plima izbeglica je sve veća, postoje lične i oficijelne privatne vojske i mafija, rastu nezaposlenost, opšta nesigurnost i galopirajuća inflacija i hiperinflacija.¹⁰³ Najveći problem je u tome što političko rešenje još nije na vidiku.

Pokušaću u ovom poglavlju da objašnjenja iz prethodnih poglavlja primenim na politički čorskokak u koji su upale Jugoslavija i postjugoslovenske države. Da bih to postigao, razradiću temu drugog poglavlja i opisaću osnovna svojstva raspada komunističkog političkog prostora; eksplicitnije nego u trećem poglavlju izneću političke osnove Jugoslavije; tumačiću sveobuhvatni razvoj njenih različitih regija i istraživaću karakteristike mogućeg ishoda krize.¹⁰⁴

103 Ovo se ne odnosi samo na jugoslovenski dinar, već i na novi slovenački tolar kao i na hrvatske i makedonske dinare (iako izgleda da slovenačka inflacija polako jenjava, a hrvatska i makedonska za sada nisu ni približno visoke kao jugoslovenska). Monetarna politika novostvorenih država biće zanimljiva za proučavanje. Vrlo je verovatno da će se slediti monetarna politika svih revolucionarnih vlada, što znači da će se uvesti nova valuta (u suštini, bar na početku, radi se o običnim kuponima), pa će se ona provući kroz hiperinflaciju da bi se izbrisale sve prethodne obaveze, i tek će se onda stabilizovati tako što će se uvesti još jedna nova valuta. Ovo možemo da nazovemo preuzimanjem monetarnog suverenitetata.

104 Za više podataka pogledaj drugo poglavlje.

Ovde će, dakle, razmatrati samo političke aspekte jugoslovenske krize, bez osvrta na istorijske i ekonomski činioce i tumačenja.¹⁰⁵ Dokazaću da je, sumirajući donekle ono što sam već obrazlagao, političko nasleđe komunizma doprinelo izbijanju krize (vidi drugo poglavlje), ali da se ona produbljivala i nastavljala, jer je ne samo kriza, već i građanski rat bio racionalni izbor političkih aktera, ako uzmem u obzir političke interese na koje su se obavezali (vidi treće poglavlje). Iako svi u Jugoslaviji za tekuće događaje krive prošlost ili neprijatelja, prosta je istina da je kriza predvidivi ishod političkih ciljeva koji su zadobili široki legitimitet. Tako da se kriza neće završiti dok ne dođe do promene političkih strategija najvažnijih naroda Jugoslavije.

Jedna od karakteristika građanskog rata na dobar način opisuje suštinu krize: u građanskom ratu obe (u ovom slučaju sve) strane bore se za pravednu stvar. U jugoslovenskom slučaju pravednu stvar predstavljaju nacionalni identiteti, interesi i prava. Zbog toga je rat tako nasilan, brutalan i destruktivan. U ratu koji se vodi među državama makar se poštuje princip prirodnih prava (kao i mnoge zakonske i druge konvencije). U građanskom ratu ne priznaju se nikakva prava. Obe (sve) zaraćene strane žele da potpuno unište legitimitet protivničke strane.¹⁰⁶ Znači da se u jugoslovenskoj krizi radi o pravima i moći, i raspodeli onoga što je ostalo.

105 Što ne znači da trenutni sukobi nemaju istorijske korene ili da su takozvani materijalni interesi nevažni. Samo ističem ono za šta smatram da je vodeća tema u inače veoma složenoj kompoziciji.

106 U građanskom ratu nema „nevinih žrtava“. Dok se u ratu bore vojske, u građanskom ratu nema podele na vojsku i civilno stanovništvo. U tom smislu je Karl Šmit bio u pravu kada je rekao da postoji samo jedno razlikovanje, a to je razlika između prijatelja i neprijatelja.

Centar nije izdržao

Preovlađujuća politička teorija opisuje totalitarizam kao potpuno kontrolisani društveni sistem, ili kao sistem u kojem ne postoji ideološka, politička ili ekonomski konkurenca. Mnogi su kritikovali ovakvo viđenje, ali alternativne interpretacije su uglavnom počivale na sociološkoj ideji o rastućim funkcionalnim razlikama. Sudeći po onome što je očigledno, antitotalisti su bili u pravu. Međutim, pokazalo se da totalitarni model ima veliki kapacitet predvidivosti, jer iziskuje da sistem ide ka kolapsu. Alternativni model predviđa blažu tranziciju. U svakom slučaju, i jednom i drugom modelu nedostaje teorija političke dinamike u tranzicionom periodu. Nisu uspeli da sagledaju specifičnosti političkog prostora kakav se razvijao putem političke kompeticije pod komunizmom. Sada ću prikazati veoma pojednostavljenu sliku komunističkog političkog prostora.¹⁰⁷

Totalitarna teorija komunistički sistem vidi kao jednu vertikalnu liniju vlasti (zbog centralizacije moći i vlasničkih prava i vladavine jedne partije). Revizionistička teorija tvrdi da postoje različite dimenzije vlasti i to prikazuje kroz više vertikalnih linija. Elementi konkurenčije se pojavljuju na horizontalnim nivoima između tih linija. Tipičan primer za to su ministri koji se bore za vlast i resurse.

Međutim, u ovim modelima nema prostora za opšti horizontalni nivo legitimacije političkog sistema. Konkurentne frakcije su opisane kao „reformisti“ i „tvrdi struji“, ili „liberali“ i „konzervativci“. Ponekad su se koristile i metafore za „levo“ i „desno“, uglavnom na način koji je uveo Staljin.¹⁰⁸ Verovalo se da zbog nelegitimnosti komunističkog sistema i jednopartijske vlasti nije potrebno uvoditi građane u politički model.

107 Detaljnija rasprava može da se pronađe u Gligorov (1979) i (1984).

108 Kriterijum je jednostavan: sve što je loše nalazi se na desnoj strani. Interesantno je primetiti da je Lenjin različito doživljavao politički prostor od Staljina. On je video opoziciju na obe strane (levi avanturisti su uglavnom bili njegovi partijski oponenti, dok se klasni neprijatelj nalazio na desnoj strani; izgleda da se on trudio da se pozicionira u centar političkog prostora). Staljin je video samo podelu na dva ekstrema, on na levoj strani, a svi ostali na desnoj. On je takođe začetnik ideje o „dve desnice“, jedne koja predstavlja desnu frakciju komunističke partije i druge koja predstavlja sve ostale.



Izuzetak je pravljen kada se govorilo o nacionalizmu, ali nikad nije bilo jasno kako taj faktor utiče na opštu sliku totalitarnog komunizma. Pokazalo se da je ovo ogromna mana takozvanog komunističkog učenja. Nije pružen nijedan ozbiljan odgovor na pitanje šta će se desiti kada se totalitarni sistem uruši a stanovništvo stekne uticaj, odnosno kada dođe do potrebe da se moć ponovno raspodeli. Pojedinci i narodi su postajali sastavni deo ovog modela jedino kao potrošači, odnosno kao ekonomski klijenti vlasti. Verovalo se da će sistem dospeti u teškoće kada ne uspe da zadovolji potrebe stanovništva, kada neefikasnost zahvati institucije i uruši se struktura vlasti. Međutim, niko nije uzeo u obzir eksplisitne političke potrebe.¹⁰⁹

U stvari, komunistički politički prostor je na neki način bio i jednostavniji i u isto vreme kompleksniji od ovih opisanih modela. Uzmememo li u obzir samo revizionističku ideju o postojanju više linija vlasti, može se očekivati da se oni neće takmičiti samo za uticaj na centralnu vlast, već će se takođe takmičiti i za podršku građana. Ukoliko je ovo tačno, onda će se pojavitи određeni broj frakcija u vladajućoj komunističkoj partiji, koje će se boriti za podršku raznorodnih segmenata stanovništva. I zbog toga, iako nema izbora u pravom smislu, stanovništvo „glasa“ na mnogo različitim načina, te se razvija kvazipluralistički politički prostor koji može da se uporedi (mada mu nije sličan) sa onim prostorom koji je karakterističan za demokratije. Njegova ravnotežna tačka je negde između centra i jednog od ekstremra. Ja bih, sledstveno Staljinu, stranu na kojoj su vladari nazvao levom, dok bih ostatak stanovništva smestio na desnu. Pitanje glasi: kako ponašanje političkih učesnika utiče na dinamiku ovakvog političkog prostora?

Ukoliko stanovništvo nije indiferentno prema politici, i ukoliko ta činjenica može da bude od koristi u borbi za vlast, pojaviće se makar dve frakcije u vladajućoj komunističkoj partiji, i jedna će naginjati više nadesno od druge. Ukoliko je masa stanovništva desno od vladajuće partije, politika desne frakcije komunističke partije biće popularnija. U stvari, što više stanovništvo skreće udesno, centar moći će biti u

109 Ekonomski model sa eksplisitnim horizontalnim odnosima u inače potpuno socijalističkom sistemu razvio je J. Kornai u seriji knjiga; na primer Kornai (1980).

prilici da se pomeri više ka centru. Sa druge strane, leva frakcija može da spreči ovakav razvoj stvari ukoliko se pomeri još više uлево. I tako se stvara ravnoteža kada se većina stanovništva pomera udesno, dok se vladajuća komunistička partija zajedno sa stvarnim centrima moći pomera uлево, a „desno krilo“ održava prostor u kvaziravnoteži tako što stvara centar koji se nalazi levo od onog centra u kome bi se moći smestila da je održano par krugova slobodnih izbora.¹¹⁰

Opisana komunistička ravnoteža nije stabilna. Ideološki posmatrano, politički prostor nikad nije dovoljno levo orijentisan. Sa druge strane, gledano očima većine, nikada nije dovoljno desno orijentisan. Zbog toga, on može da počiva samo na sili, strahu i korupciji. Na sili, zato što bi se inače pojavila suparnička partija koja bi predstavljala volju većine. Na strahu, jer kako bi se inače objasnila uobičajena saglasnost i saradnja sa vlastima. I na korupciji, jer nema tog stepena sile i straha koji može da racionalno opravda produžavanje kvazistabilnosti inače nepopularnog režima. Međutim, činjenica da centar komunističkog prostora divergira od tačke u kojoj bi bio da su održani slobodni izbori vremenom stvara veliki broj političkih, pa čak i moralnih problema. U nekim komunističkim državama moralno gnušanje postaje osnova političke nestabilnosti, dok u drugim moralna razmatranja uzrokuju političku iracionalnost.¹¹¹ Šta god da je u pitanju, centar ne može da se održi večno. I zaista, porcija sile, straha i korupcije mora konstantno da se obnavlja. Kada u jednom momentu jedno od njih ili svi odjednom presuše, neizbežno dolazi do perioda nestabilnosti.

Moguća su makar dva ishoda. Jedan je da se većina stanovništva pridruži vladajućoj partiji ili organizaciji koja je pod kontrolom vladajuće partije. Štaviše, razvijeni komunistički sistem je na ovaj ili onaj način angažovao skoro svakoga. Ako takvo stanje potraje neko vreme, totalitarni sistem može da se pretvorи u autoritarni, tako što će stanovništvo apsorbovati desnu frakciju vladajuće partije, a posebno birokratiju i državne činovnike, dok će centar moći ostati

110 Pokušavam da predstavim ovaku sliku: pretpostavimo da postoji demokratska raspodela moći, kakva bi se pojavila da je došlo do tri ili četiri regularna i zakonita izborna ciklusa. Tada bi, u odnosu na takav politički prostor, centar komunističkog prostora naginjao ka levom ekstremu (vidi Dodatak III).

111 O ovome više u Gligorov (1984).

izolovano, autokratsko telo koje će biti odbačeno čim se za to ukaže povoljna prilika. Ovo mogu da nazovem, pomalo ironično, liberalnim rešenjem.

Drugo rešenje je da se politički prostor uruši. Ukoliko vladajuća partija ostane pod kontrolom leve frakcije, stanovništvo će biti gurnuto ka najdesnjem ekstremu, a kad se to dogodi, iz bilo kog razloga, makar i politički neopravdanog, kompletan politički prostor će skoro nepodeljeno otici udesno. Ovo će nazvati populističkim rešenjem. Interesantna varijanta populističkog rešenja pojavljuje se kada „liberalna“ frakcija komunističke partije prigrabi vlast neposredno pre ili odmah nakon kolapsa političke ravnoteže. Takav pokušaj „liberalizacije“, ukoliko do njega dođe prekasno ili u već formiranom „populističkom“ političkom prostoru, doživeće neuspeh (što se u slučaju Jugoslavije i dogodilo). Poraz „liberalnih komunista“ može čak da gurne ceo politički prostor dublje u pravcu populizma, jer je to svakako bio pravac kretanja.

Kao što će pokazati, karakteristike koje sam opisao nisu jedine i presudne za određivanje pravca kretanja političkog prostora, već postoji i faktor koji će nazvati specifičnim političkim osnovnim principima. Dve mogućnosti promena koje sam gore predstavio odražavaju način na koji je politički prostor sačinjen.¹¹²

Osnovni principi

Sada ću opisati osnovne političke principe Jugoslavije, a pažnju ću uglavnom pokloniti centralnom sukobu, dok ću se ostalim sukobima baviti naknadno, kada budem razmatrao razvoj događaja u različitim regionima.

1. Jugoslavija je bila tvorevina, a ne „prirodna država“.

¹¹² Za ovaku tvrdnju potreban je minimalni segment političkog prostora. U realnosti, sve je mnogo komplikovanije.

Filozofski je ovo, naravno, diskutabilna tvrdnja, jer sve države možemo da tretiramo kao tvorevine.¹¹³ Međutim, države u Evropi imaju tendenciju da budu države-nacije i da u tom smislu imaju „prirodnu osnovu“. Jugoslavija je izgrađena bez takvog razloga, mada samo ime nagoveštava da su svi narodi koji u Jugoslaviji žive veoma bliski (Jugoslavija znači „država južnih Slovena“).¹¹⁴ U svakom slučaju, zbog načina na koji se politički prostor razvijao pod monarhijom pre Drugog svetskog rata, a posebno pod komunizmom, nije došlo do stvaranja kontinuirane horizontalne linije. Postojala je mogućnost da svaka regija izabere različit put za izlazak iz komunizma. I to se i dogodilo.

Ukoliko postoji jedna fundamentalna činjenica jugoslovenske istorije i politike onda je to ova: *nacionalni interesi su razlog kako za izgradnju tako i za uništenje Jugoslavije*. Država je stvorena kao odraz „prava na samoopredeljenje“ naroda koji su prethodno bili grupisani unutar Austrougarske ili nedavno oslobođeni iz zemalja koje su bile pod turskom okupacijom. Tako da je nacionalni interes uzet kao „prirodni osnov“ novostvorenih zemalja koje do tada nisu postojale. Međutim, uskoro je postalo očigledno da će stari nacionalni rivaliteti i sukobi u novoj državi biti samo pogoršani, a da će se pojavit i neki novi. U stvari, poimanje da su nacionalni interesi „prirodni“ čini tvorevinu kao što je Jugoslavija „neprirodnom“.¹¹⁵

2. *Jugoslavija je nekoliko puta rekonstruisana, ali nikada na zadovoljavajući način.*

Prvi Ustav Jugoslavije (1921) bio je demokratski (čak i socijal-demokratski u nekom smislu), ali nije bio federalni. Donele su ga nadmoćne srpske partije sa hrvatskim i slovenačkim partijama kao

113 U nekom smislu. Za kritiku ugovornog pristupa u političkoj filozofiji vidi Gligorov (1992d).

114 Naravno da se istorija može tumačiti i drugačije. Sa jedne strane, Jugoslavija je stvorena 1918. (u stvari, prvo kao Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca; tek 1929. je dobila ime Jugoslavija) po principu „samoopredeljenja“ naroda. Sa druge strane, jaka mitologija zajedničkih jezičkih i kulturnih korena razvila se u nekim intelektualnim i političkim krugovima u različitim delovima onoga što će postati Jugoslavija. Međutim, nijedna nacija nije bila spremna da se odrekne svog nacionalnog identiteta i da ga zameni zajedničkim.

115 Razmatraču podrobnije odnos između prirodnih i nacionalnih osnova države u odnosu prema „liberalnom ustavu“ u dodatku II.

opozicijom.¹¹⁶ Zato je glavni jugoslovenski politički problem do Drugog svetskog rata bilo takozvano hrvatsko pitanje.¹¹⁷ Konačno, 1939. Sporazum Cvetković-Maček je federalizovao Jugoslaviju na asimetričan način, stvorivši hrvatsku provinciju (državu), a da nije federalizovao celu Jugoslaviju. Ovakvo himerično rešenje najbolje simbolizuje osnovni politički konflikt u Jugoslaviji.¹¹⁸

Brojni ustavi druge Jugoslavije bili su federalni, ali nisu bili demokratski. Priznавали су kako neophodnost davanja autonomije svim nacijama u zemlji (princip samoopredeljenja bio je iznova potvrđivan u skoro svakom posleratnom ustavu), tako i potpuni federalizam (do nivoa konfederalizma). Međutim, federalizacija je bila nesavršena, jer je kopirala model Sovjetskog Saveza, a sistem je bio socijalistički. Federalizam i socijalizam rade jedan protiv drugog, što predstavlja test za razvoj socijalizma u inače demokratskoj državi, ali decentralizacija pogoršava svaki regionalni konflikt u socijalističkom sistemu.¹¹⁹ Jugoslavija je iskusila obe posledice. Federalizam je pravdao različite vrste decentralizacije i jugoslovenski totalitarni sistem je bio mnogo slobodniji i više tržišno orijentisan od ostalih istočnoevropskih zemalja. I pored toga, svi su se žalili da suparnička regija ili regioni imaju povlašćeniji položaj u socijalističkoj igri podele i raspodele dobara.¹²⁰

116 Za prvi jugoslovenski ustav vidi Jovanović (1928).

117 Ovo ne znači da nije bilo drugih nacionalnih sukoba. U stvari, slovenački, makedonski, albanski, muslimanski i svi ostali, sada već očigledni, problemi bili su tu od samog početka. Hrvatsko pitanje je samo prepoznato kao centralno.

118 Ovaj primer je toliko rečit da ču mu se naknadno vratiti. Za sada bi možda trebalo pomenuti da je etnički princip upotrebljen da bi se odredile granice hrvatske federalne jedinice. Te granice se razlikuju od onih koje su iscrtane nakon Drugog svetskog rata, ali ne toliko drastično kao što to izgleda kada se slušaju usijane rasprave o „nepravednim granicama“ nekadašnje federalne Jugoslavije.

119 O tome više Gligorov (1990c).

120 Doduše, ekonomski profesija ne podržava popularno shvatanje. Samo je manji broj ekonomista svake nacije verovao da je baš sopstvena nacija eksplorativana od suparničke strane. Njihov uticaj je rastao upravo kada se komunistički prostor urušio te su mogli da koriste autoritet nacionalističkih partija kojima su pristupili, ili uticaj važnih nacionalnih ustanova čiji su članovi postali (Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti sa svojim ozloglašenim Memorandumom dala je kredibilitet sumnji da su „Srbci eksplorativani od strane Slovenaca i Hrvata od nastanka Jugoslavije 1918“). Najsmešnije je što je veliki deo obrazloženja za dugotrajanu eksploraciju pojedinih regiona u Jugoslaviji voden marksističkim žargonom. Neki marksisti tvrdili su da je očigledno da razvijenije regije eksplorativu manje razvijene regije, dok su njihovi marksistički

3. U odnosu na većinu drugih država u okruženju, Jugoslavija drži rekord u nacionalnoj toleranciji.

Ukoliko uzmemo u obzir svih sedamdeset godina njenog postojanja, Jugoslavija nije bila preterano antinacionalistička, iako nije bila prava federacija, a kao demokratija je postojala samo nakratko. Ako taj jugoslovenski rekord uporedimo sa ostalim zemljama u regionu ili sa nacionalnim državama koje su stvorene tokom Drugog svetskog rata na jugoslovenskim teritorijama, kao i sa novostvorenim državama bivše Jugoslavije, jasno je da se Jugoslavija nije sistematski protivila nacionalnoj emancipaciji naroda koji su u njoj živeli. Tačno je da svaka emancipacija mora da se osvoji putem teške političke borbe, ali, kada se sve sabere, prava Hrvata, Slovenaca, Makedonaca, Muslimana, Albanaca i Mađara unutar Jugoslavije bila su priznata i stalno su se uvećavala. Teško bi bilo dokazati da su prava Srba i Crnogoraca bila osujećena.¹²¹ Međutim, kako ćemo odmah videti, sve to zavisi od toga kako

ponenti iz razvijenijih regija govorili da je više nego očigledno da samo manje razvijene regije mogu da eksplorisu razvijenije.

121 Postoje mnoga tumačenja procesa nacionalne emancipacije u Jugoslaviji. Neki osporavaju postojanje bilo koje druge nacije osim one kojoj pripadaju. Takođe su postojali snažni pokreti samoporicanja. Jugoslavija je zamišljena kao država utemeljena na etničkim sličnostima različitih naroda koji su tu živeli. Među uticajnim intelektualcima svih vodećih naroda u devetnaestom i dvadesetom veku bilo je široko rasprostranjeno uverenje da su Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci jedan narod koji se sastoji od tri plemena. Stoga je bilo potrebno da se upoznaju tako što će živeti u istoj zemlji. Pošto su imali gomilu pogrešnih ideja o tome ko su zaista Srbi, Hrvati, Slovenci, Makedonci, Muslimani i ostali, bili su prilično iznenadeni kada su ustanovili da su među njima razlike mnogo veće od sličnosti. Ako na dobromameran način posmatramo istoriju nacionalnog konflikta u Jugoslaviji, možemo ga videti kao traženje odgovora na večno pitanje o našem poreklu. Ako razlike definišemo kao kulturne, imajući u vidu njihovu veličinu, kao i veoma primitivno istorijsko znanje, a i razmere kulturnih predstava, možemo da kažemo da je nivo nacionalne tolerancije u Jugoslaviji bio prilično visok. Na primer, Srbi su se borili za oslobođenje svojih sunarodnika u Makedoniji da bi, na svoje zaprepašćenje, shvatili da Srbi već duže vreme tamo ne predstavljaju većinsko stanovništvo. Čak i obrazovani i liberalni intelektualci nisu mogli da se pomire sa idejom da centralni deo srednjovekovne kraljevine Srbije više nije nastanjen Srbima. I tako je tokom čitavog međuratnog perioda, uz hrvatski, postojao i makedonski problem. Nakon Drugog svetskog rata Makedoncima su priznata nacionalna prava. Tako su svi shvatili što je bila realnost. Naravno, nacionalisti u Makedoniji i izvan nje još uvek ne žele da prihvate da je njihova istorijska percepcija samo mit, ali mislim da se radi o normalnom procesu istorijskog učenja.



razumemo pravo, odnosno kojem smo nacionalnom interesu posvećeni.¹²²

4. Jugoslavija je izgrađena i rekonstruisana u skladu sa željama dominantnih političkih snaga.

Niti prva niti druga Jugoslavija nisu predstavljale grešku ili neku vrstu smicalice. Jugoslovenska istorija je puna teorija koje „konačno“ dokazuju da je „druga strana“ pri pogodbi prevarila „pravednu stranu“. Međutim, država je izgrađena u skladu sa interesima onih koji su tu živeli. Sada je lako uvideti da je dominantna ideja svih jugoslovenskih naroda bila da sačine centralističku, unitarnu državu.¹²³ Neki se narodi nisu nadali da bi ikada mogli da dominiraju Jugoslavijom, tako da su zastupali federalno ili konfederalno ustavno uređenje. Neki, sa druge strane, jesu dominirali te su pokušali da je centralizuju koliko god je to bilo moguće. Čak je i socijalizam prihvaćen kao način centralizacije, nezavisno od drugih, pretežno revolucionarnih i posleratnih razloga.

Međutim, ispostavilo se da nijedna građevina nije stabilna. Jedini način na koji je Jugoslavija mogla da očuva stabilnost bio je da bude zasnovana na liberalnom ustavu. Ali liberalne snage su u Jugoslaviji i na Balkanu uopšte bile uvek veoma slabe. I tako, iako su demokratija i federalizam neophodni sastojci prihvatljive jugoslovenske države, oni nisu bili dovoljni da bi takvoj državi obezbedili stabilnost. Jugoslavija je mogla da preživi samo sa liberalnim ustavom. Ali kao i u mnogim drugim zemljama, liberalni elementi su bili i još uvek jesu nacionalistički, a popularni elementi nisu bili liberalni. Zbog toga ta mogućnost nikada nije istražena.¹²⁴

5. Osnovni problem Jugoslavije bio je srpsko-hrvatski nacionalni sukob.¹²⁵

122 Značenje posvećenosti nacionalnom interesu predstavlja komplikovan teoretski problem u koji ovde ne mogu da ulazim. Uopšteno prihvatom karakterizaciju Lorda Aktona u njegovom eseju o „Nacionalnosti“ (vidi dodatak za pojedine citate).

123 Svi ustavi nezavisnih jugoslovenskih država određuju veoma centralizovane države (izuzetak su Bosna i Hercegovina koja dozvoljava formiranje regiona, i Srbija koja nominalno ima dve autonome pokrajine ali je inače centralizovana koliko god je to moguće).

124 U Dodatu II će objasniti šta podrazumevam pod liberalnim ustavom.

125 Pod nacionalnim sukobom podrazumevam sukob naroda u njegovom praktično neodređenom značenju: kao sukob između država i etniciteta.

Sve gore rečeno predstavlja neku vrstu informativne podloge i nagoveštava koje su bile osnovne političke činjenice Jugoslavije. Dva dominantna naroda, Srbi i Hrvati, bili su predani suprotstavljenim političkim strategijama ili nacionalnim interesima. Hrvati su želeli da žive u odvojenoj državi. Tvrđili su da se nikada nisu odrekli tog prava, iako tokom skoro cele svoje istorije nisu bili u stanju da stvore nezavisu i suverenu državnu naciju (nacionalnu državu).

Srbi su, sa druge strane, želeli da žive zajedno u jednoj državi. Na taj način su doživljavali svoj nacionalni interes već duže od jednog veka. Srpska država se širila kroz ratove i na druge načine, da bi završila kao dominantni činilac prve Jugoslavije (1918-1941). Nakon Drugog svetskog rata srpski nacionalni ciljevi bili su na neki način ometeni. Ali prevladalo je shvatanje da je čak i federalna Jugoslavija prihvatljiva, sve dok Srbi imaju osećaj da žive svi zajedno u istoj državi.

6. Rešavanjem „hrvatskog pitanja“ otvara se „srpski problem“.

Priroda srpsko-hrvatskog konflikta je prepoznata nakon potpisivanja Sporazuma Cvetković-Maček 1939. godine. Kada je Hrvatima jednom priznato pravo na državnu autonomiju, došlo je do promene načina gledanja na političke probleme u Jugoslaviji. Vodeći srpski političari i intelektualci postali su svesni da „rešenje hrvatskog problema“ uslovjava pojavu „srpskog problema“ makar na tri načina. Prvo, Hrvati su imali svoju autonomiju u Hrvatskoj, dok Srbi nisu imali takav državni entitet. Drugo, jugoslovenska vlast se direktno protezala na sve ostale krajeve države, osim na Hrvatsku. To znači da su Hrvati (kao i ostali) mogli da utiču na odluke centra, što znači i na ostale delove Jugoslavije, a Jugoslavija je, a tu se misli na sve ostale njene građane i narode, morala da poštuje hrvatsku autonomiju. Treće, kako svaka asimetrija teži da izazove zahteve za simetričnim postupkom, svi drugi narodi bili su prinuđeni da zahtevaju isti tretman kao Hrvati, te je dalja federalizacija bila politički skoro neizbežna. A to je naravno značilo dalju eroziju srpske moći, kao i dalje pogoršavanje nacionalnih i teritorijalnih problema. Osnovni problem je bio jednostavan: *Ukoliko se stvari Hrvatska i ukoliko svakom narodu bude priznato pravo na samoopredeljenje, gde će biti granice Srbije?*

Na to pitanje još nemamo odgovor.



7. Nacionalni interesi Srba i Hrvata su nepomirljivi.

Ako samo ovlaš pogledamo mapu Jugoslavije postaje nam potpuno jasno da, imajući u vidu etnički raspored stanovništva, ne postoji rešenje koje bi jednako zadovoljilo i Srbe i Hrvate. Da bi Hrvati imali odvojenu državu bilo bi potrebno da se Srbi odreknu onoga za šta smatraju da je njihov osnovni nacionalni interes. Takođe, da bi svi Srbi živeli u jednoj državi, bilo bi potrebno da se Hrvati odreknu onoga za šta veruju da je njihov hiljadugodišnji nacionalni interes. Jedini način za postizanje jednog od ovih ciljeva jeste da jedna strana prevlada drugu. Što podrazumeva rat.

I zato, kada su se Srbi i Hrvati jednom posvetili političkim strategijama koje su bile podudarne sa njihovim dugogodišnjim nacionalnim interesima, građanski rat u Jugoslaviji postao je neizbežan. A da bi se takve strategije usvojile, na vlast je morao da dođe populistički pokret, što se upravo dogodilo i u Srbiji i u Hrvatskoj. Komunistički politički prostor, kako sam to do sada pokušao da dokažem, omogućavao je upravo takav razvoj situacije. I tako su se sakupile sve kockice potrebne da proizvedu raspad Jugoslavije.

8. Svi ostali nacionalni konflikti mogli su se, u principu, izgладити unutar Jugoslavije ili putem secesije, ali nikako nije moglo доћи до стварања неке друге multunacionalне државне творевине.

Nezavisno od sukobljenih nacionalnih interesa Srba i Hrvata, nacionalni interesi ostalih naroda mogli su da budu ispunjeni unutar jugoslovenske federacije ili konfederacije, ili u nezavisnoj državi. Na primer, slovenački, makedonski, crnogorski, muslimanski, pa čak i albanski interesi mogli su biti ispunjeni unutar liberalne jugoslovenske federalne države koja bi poštovala jednak prava svih pojedinaca i naroda. Takođe, interesi svih tih naroda (sa izuzetkom Muslimana) mogli su da budu ispunjeni ukoliko bi hteli da stvore nezavisne države, ili u slučaju Albanaca, ukoliko bi hteli da se ujedine sa Albanijom, a da se srpski ili hrvatski interesi ne pogoršaju još više. Problem albanskog separatizma jeste težak politički problem, ali je teritorija na kojoj žive sada etnički veoma homogenizovana. Slovenci i Makedonci su se suočili sa veoma složenim problemima onog časa

kada su odlučili da stvore nezavisne države, ali time nisu bili ugroženi nacionalni interesi drugih naroda. Ovo važi i za Crnu Goru, iako je problem nacionalnog identiteta Crnogoraca veoma komplikovan. Oni su, osim u međuratnom jugoslovenskom periodu, imali svoju nezavisnu i autonomnu državu i teško je naći dobar razlog zbog kojeg bi sada ovu ideju napustili.

Problem Muslimana je, opet, drugačiji. Oni ne mogu da žive bez autonomije, ali teško da mogu da stvore nezavisnu državu. Regije u kojima su naseljeni, Bosna i Hercegovina i Sandžak, osuđene su da budu provincije u potrazi za državom. Najbolje čemu se mogu nadati jeste da žive u federalnoj ili konfederalnoj zajednici sa jugoslovenskom državom. Ali ukoliko takva država nestane, oni će biti ostavljeni na ledini. Oni, kao i drugi narodi u regionu, ne mogu postati deo različitih državnih tvorevina, kao što su „mala Jugoslavija“ kojom dominira Srbija, ili „velika Hrvatska“.

9. Nije bilo moguće rešiti jugoslovensku ili srpsko-hrvatsko-slovenačku krizu a da se ne stvori bosanska kriza.

Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine činili su Srbi (nešto malo više od 31%), Hrvati (oko 17%) i Muslimani (preko 40%).¹²⁶ Postojale su sve moguće mešavine. U nekim delovima preovladavala je jedna nacija, u drugima su Srbi živeli pomešani uglavnom sa Muslimanima, ili su Muslimani bili pomešani uglavnom sa Hrvatima; ali u najvećem delu tri naroda su bila pomešana na takav način da se od grada do grada, od sela do sela mogla odrediti samo relativna većina. Uglavnom je postojala samo relativna većina i mali broj etnički čistih regija.

Zbog toga su Hrvati teško mogli da žive u bosanskoj državi bez snažnih veza sa Hrvatskom, što važi i za Srbe i njihove veze sa Srbijom. Sa druge strane, Muslimani nisu mogli da prihvate rešenje koje bi Bosnu lišilo političke autonomije, jer bi to drastično ograničavalo njihov nacionalni interes. Sve dok je postojala jugoslovenska država, nacionalni problemi mogli su da

126 Ovo su podaci poslednjeg popisa (proleće 1991) koji nisu preterano pouzdani, jer je država već bila prilično dezorganizovana, neki su popis bojkotovali, propaganda je bila na visokom nivou, te je objektivnost popisnih komisija bila sumnjiva.



se reše u okviru individualnih i kolektivnih prava. Sa nestankom Jugoslavije, nacionalna prava morala su biti uzeta u obzir. A kako i da li su se ona ikada mogla pomiriti, teško je reći. Ne želim da kažem da politička rešenja nisu moguća, nego hoću da naglasim da je teško očekivati da će ona biti u skladu sa nacionalističkim predstavama.

10. Čak i ukoliko se pronađe rešenje za srpsko-hrvatsko-muslimanski problem, još uvek ostaje albansko pitanje.

Čak i da se reši glavni sukob između Srba i Hrvata, uz Muslimane koji su uhvaćeni između dve vatre, i dalje ostaje na snazi problem Albanaca. Imajući u vidu kako su se stvari razvijale u istočnoj Evropi, nije izgledno da će Albanci odustati od svog cilja da stvore nacionalnu državu. Izuzimajući Albaniju, Albanci žive na nacionalno homogenizovanim teritorijama na Kosovu (koje se nalazi u Srbiji), Makedoniji i Crnoj Gori. Sve te teritorije se graniče jedna sa drugom, ili sa Albanijom. Čak i da je Jugoslavija preživela, bilo bi skoro nemoguće razrešiti albansko pitanje. Prepostavlja se da više od jedne trećine Albanaca živi u Jugoslaviji i Makedoniji¹²⁷ i samo ih granice razdvajaju od Albanije. Zato je pitanje vremena i prilike kada će te dve (ili tri) albanske države ili regije učiniti pokušaj da se ujedine. Ovo će se desiti bez obzira na promene političkih režima u Srbiji, Makedoniji ili Jugoslaviji, pa u tom smislu i u Albaniji. Međutim, nedemokratski režim u Srbiji i demokratski režim u Albaniji samo još bolje podcrtavaju ovaj problem.

11. Bez obzira na sve ovo, postoje još mnogi centralnoevropski i balkanski problemi.

Na rubu svih ovih sukoba, postoje konflikti koji su povezani sa slovenačkim, mađarskim i makedonskim problemima. Najlakši je slučaj Slovenije, iako je jedno vreme podržavala Hrvatsku u svakom mogućem političkom trvjenju sa Srbijom. Međutim, Srbija i Slovenija nemaju sukobljene interese. Slovenija treba da se suoči sa određenim problemima centralne Evrope.

127 Albanci su bojkotovali poslednji popis, tako da su brojke kojima se operiše krajnje proizvoljne.

Mađarsko pitanje je mnogo teže, jer postoji značajna mađarska manjina u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj, koja je iskazala popriličnu bojazan pred novim nacionalističkim režimima, pogotovo srpskim (tu živi veći deo mađarske manjine). Doduše, kada se jednom završi sukob između Hrvata i Srba (što može da potraje), političko rešenje problema mađarske manjine ne bi trebalo da predstavlja teškoću, jer se odnosi na nacionalna i kulturna prava.

Suprotno tome, makedonski problem predstavlja samu suštinu svih sukoba na Balkanu. I budući da se makedonsko pitanje ne vezuje samo uz jugoslovensku krizu, neću se njime baviti. Međutim, ono neće biti zaboravljeni, jer će još dugo postojati.¹²⁸

12. Pravi problem je nacionalizam, a ne multinacionalnost.

Da sumiramo, Jugoslavija nije bila potpuni promašaj jer nije bila otvoreno nacionalistička ili antinacionalistička, premda tokom većeg dela svog postojanja nije bila ni demokratija, niti je ikada bila liberalna federacija. Nije se razvila u modernu liberalnu državu, jer je u veoma mračnom periodu svoje istorije izabrala socijalizam i izgradila politički prostor koji nije bio naklonjen liberalnom rešenju, bar ne na federalnom nivou. Ali je liberalno rešenje dobilo šansu, osujećenu obnovljenim populističkim pokretom koji je zaigrao na kartu dugotrajnih nacionalnih interesa najmoćnijih jugoslovenskih naroda.

I zato, generalno gledajući, samo postojanje različitih naroda ne predstavlja prepreku da multietnička država poput Jugoslavije održi stabilnost i egzistira na duže staze. Pravi problem predstavljaju nacionalistički politički interesи.¹²⁹ Oni su izraz zahteva za zaštitom i jednakim pravima za jednake, odnosno za pravdom. U tom smislu, nacionalni interesи jesu zahtev za povezivanjem ličnog i javnog identiteta ljudi. Međutim, oni sadrže potencijalnu diskriminaciju onih koji poseduju različite nacionalne identitete u pogledu pravde, zaštite, prava i politike.

128 Na njega ću se vratiti na kraju poglavlja kada budem razmatrao moguće ishode.

129 Vidi Dodatak II za više o ovoj temi. Lord Akton je verovao da je svaka država koja nije multinacionalna „nesavršena“ (vidi njegov već citirani tekst o „Nacionalnosti“). Takođe vidi F.v. Hayek (1948), poslednje poglavlje o federalizmu.



Asimetrične simetrije¹³⁰

Kako je došlo do toga da populističke partije osvoje Srbiju i Hrvatsku? Jednostavan odgovor bi glasio: jer je tako želela većina Srba i Hrvata. Odluke su bile zasnovane na racionalnoj proceni da će to doprineti ispunjenju njihovih nacionalnih interesa, što znači da su predvideli da će sukob koji sledi biti brutalan i da će u tom slučaju biti mobilisana sva sredstva koja se smatraju neophodnim za povoljan ishod.

Ovo se najbolje vidi ako uporedimo događaje u Sloveniji sa događajima u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj. Slovenija je prva uvidela mogućnosti koje su se u to vreme otvarale povodom već izvesnog sloma komunističkog sistema.¹³¹ Krenula je putem demokratije i veće nezavisnosti od ostatka Jugoslavije i na kraju uspela, oslanjajući se uglavnom na koaliciju liberalnije frakcije slovenačke komunističke partije i umerenih nacionalista. Tako se inače tipični komunistički politički prostor koji je bio stvoren u Sloveniji raspao u smeru onoga što nazivam „liberalnim rešenjem“.

Da bi postigla iste ciljeve, Hrvatska je izabrala „populizam“. „Liberalna koalicija“ je doživela težak poraz na izborima, a neobična koalicija tvrdokornih komunista i ultradesnih partija osnovana je skoro odmah nakon izbora.¹³² Ovo se objašnjavalo kao reakcija na nedavni preporod nacionalizma u Srbiji. Ali to je daleko od istine. Istina je da je hrvatski politički prostor bio snažno zakrivljen u pravcu

130 O neuspehu Jugoslavije da prihvati univerzalne principe, kao i za razloge, vidi drugo poglavlje.

131 Ovo se događa 1988. godine. Slovenija je, inače, bila potpuno socijalistička država, isto kao i bilo koja druga republika u Jugoslaviji. U stvari, moglo bi se reći da je Slovenija bila prototip socijalističke države, jer je za razliku od ostalih regija u Jugoslaviji imala skoro punu zaposlenost, viši nivo socijalnih službi i nešto malo opozicije. Rukovodstvo slovenačkih komunista bilo je zasigurno konzervativnije od srpskog tokom osamdesetih, pre nego što je Milošević došao na vlast. Ovo je važno jer je isto rukovodstvo, na ovaj ili onaj način, još uvek na vlasti u Sloveniji.

132 Komunistička partija je odmah nakon izbora podržala nacionaliste i njeni članovi su zadržali veoma visoke položaje u novoj vladi. Neko vreme je samo mala Socijaldemokratska stranka predstavljala opoziciju, da bi na kraju počela da saraduje sa nacionalističkim režimom pri stvaranju privremene vlade, čije se formiranje pravdalo stalnim pogoršanjem gradanskog rata u Hrvatskoj.

ortodoksnog komunizma, što je davalo velike šanse populističkom ishodu.¹³³ Ali osnovna istina leži u činjenici da su političke elite i izborno telo smatrali da se njihovi nacionalni ciljevi ne mogu ispuniti ukoliko vlast ne preuzme neka populistička stranka.¹³⁴ Da nije bilo tako, moglo se izabrati rešenje koje bi bilo sličnije slovenačkom.

U Srbiji skoro da je došlo do pokušaja obnove staljinizma. Desna frakcija komunističke partije bila je poražena mnogo pre nego što se i nazirao pad komunizma, i to zbog nedovoljne odlučnosti i žestine u odnosu na zahteve albanskih nacionalista. Leva frakcija srpske komunističke partije očekivala je da će takve zahteve rešiti primenom sile uz pomoć federalne partije i vojske. Međutim, pogrešno je procenila konstelaciju političkog prostora u ostalim jugoslovenskim regijama, kao i u samoj federalnoj državi. U isto vreme je skoro groteskno pogrešno protumačila razvoj događaja u istočnoevropskim komunističkim zemljama, kao i put kojim je krenula Rusija. I tako je na kraju morala da zauzme poziciju ekstremne desnice stavivši se na čelo populističkog pokreta, uz obećanje da može da upotrebi jugoslovensku armiju u cilju ispunjenja srpskih nacionalnih interesa. Izborno telo je prepoznalo poruku, ogromnom većinom u nju poverovalo i izglasalo poverenje Socijalističkoj partiji.¹³⁵

Tako se posle izbora u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj sa sigurnošću mogao predvideti rat. Štaviše, populističke partije u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj nisu ni krile da se za njega spremaju. Njihovi ciljevi su bili takvi da ništa osim rata nije moglo efikasno da ih ostvari. Ratna retorika je započela tokom dugotrajne kosovske krize. Albanci su tvrdili da predstavljaju većinu na Kosovu (što je sasvim tačno, jer ih ima oko 90%) i da će u njihovoj nezavisnoj državi Srbima biti zagarantovana sva manjinska prava. Srbi su na to odgovarali da Albanci predstavljaju manjinu

133 Ovo se dogodilo zbog načina na koji je razrešena politička kriza u Hrvatskoj 1971. Tada su komunisti u Hrvatskoj bili na ivici poraza i umalo da nacionalisti preuzmu vlast. Međutim, tada je predsednik Jugoslavije Josip Broz Tito, oslanjajući se na tvrdu struju u partiji kao i na Jugoslovensku armiju, izveo politički kontraudar i uveo tvrdokorni komunistički sistem. On se raspao nakon Titove smrti, ali je zbog unutarnjih trvajanja nacionalističkom pokretu bilo potrebno neko vreme da se ponovo mobiliše.

134 Više o ovome u Gligorov (1989).

135 Više o događajima u Srbiji: Gligorov (1990a) i (1990b).



u celokupnoj državi Srbiji (što je takođe istinito) i da će u takvoj državi dobiti sva manjinska prava. Ista argumentacija se ponavlja u Jugoslaviji uzduž i popreko. Kada su hrvatski nacionalisti došli na vlast, pokazali su spremnost da poštaju sva manjinska prava Srba koji su živeli u državi Hrvatskoj. Logičan odgovor je glasio:

Zašto da mi budemo manjina u vašoj državi, kada vi možete da budete manjina u našoj?

Ultimativna posledica ovakvog slogana je da uopšte ne dobijete državu. Pogledajmo situaciju u Bosni i Hercegovini, gde su Muslimani samo relativno u manjini. Zbog toga Bosna ne može da bude ni teokratska ni nacionalna država. Ona živi u nekoj vrsti sa-društvenog političkog prostora, koji nije ni demokratski ni liberalni, ali poseduje priličan stepen tolerancije. Ukoliko bude ostavljen na miru, ovaj region može da krene jedino u smeru neke vrste pluralne demokratije, uz moguću regionalnu autonomiju. Multinacionalni karakter Bosne i Hercegovine ne predstavlja nepremostivu prepreku. Ali je nacionalizam očigledno neizbežan. I Srbi i Hrvati su Muslimanima ponudili da budu poštovana manjina u njihovim, srpskim i hrvatskim državama, dok su neki muslimanski nacionalisti uveravali i Srbe i Hrvate koji su živeli u Bosni i Hercegovini da će njihova, srpska i hrvatska, manjinska prava biti u potpunosti zaštićena u njihovoј muslimanskoj državi.

Problem nije samo u tome što niko ne želi da bude manjina u tuđoj nacionalnoj državi, već u tome što sve nacije mogu jedna drugoj da ponude ista obećanja. U takvoj situaciji, ukoliko imamo na umu način na koji je konstituisan postojeći politički prostor i očekivanja od realizacije postojećih nacionalnih interesa, prvi put u istoriji svakog od jugoslovenskih naroda blizina ova dva faktora proizvela je uglavnom nasilan ishod, čak i u regijama koje nisu imale preterano jake razloge za takav razvoj situacije.

Situacija u Crnoj Gori i Makedoniji je na neki način različita i nešto složenija. Ove dve republike skoro da nimalo nisu doprinele raspadu Jugoslavije. One su u izvesnom smislu bile uvučene u sukob i gurnute u pravcu koji nije nužno predstavljao njihove optimalne interese. Međutim, kada je jednom buknuo sukob između Srba i Hrvata, i ostali su morali da se snalaze.

Makedonija je sporna teritorija na kojoj je stanovništvo nacionalistički orijentisano¹³⁶ kao i bilo gde drugde, ali gde niko ne očekuje da će silom doći do ostvarenja ciljeva. Zato u Makedoniji nije pobedila populistička opcija, mada nije ni liberalna. Pravi test će nastati onog trenutka kada i ako izbjije sukob između Srba i Albanaca. Ukoliko do toga dođe, niko ne zna šta može da se dogodi sa ovim regionom. I bez toga, Makedonija ima probleme sa svim svojim susedima. Na jugu im Grčka osporava ime naroda i ime države. Makedonci su Sloveni koji su uzeli ime regije u kojoj žive i koja se geografski ne podudara sa teritorijama antičke Makedonije. Zbog toga bi Grci hteli da Makedonci izaberu neko drugo ime. Međutim, izbor novog imena ne bi rešio probleme, jer je u pitanju osporavanje i identiteta i teritorije. Pošto je sukob o identitetu teško razrešiti na brzinu, osnovni problem je kako na pouzdan način prihvati postojće granice.

Štaviše, neke moguće izmene u imenu naroda i države mogu čak da pogoršaju teritorijalne probleme. Ukoliko se Makedonci izjasne kao Bugari, teritorijalne pretenzije za velikom Bugarskom mogu da postanu veoma snažne. Ovo je možda razlog zbog koga Bugarska ne priznaje postojanje makedonskog naroda. To, naravno, stvara nove probleme makedonskoj državi. Na kraju, stara srednjovekovna Srbija je pripojila Makedoniju, što je bio i razlog za ratove Srbije protiv Turske i Bugarske. U svakom slučaju, u kojem god pravcu da se razviju makedonski identitet i država, osporavanje njenih teritorija može samo da se poveća, jer će dolaziti od strane jačih država.

Najveći unutrašnji problem Makedonije jeste brojnost albanske manjine. Teško je očekivati da Albanci, koji žive na zbijenim nacionalnim teritorijama, neće težiti nacionalnoj državi koja bi obuhvatila Albaniju, Kosovo i zapadnu Makedoniju (možda čak i delove Crne Gore). U ovom trenutku (1994) nije moguće predvideti kako će Makedonija rešiti sve ove probleme. I zato, iako Makedonija danas nikome ne predstavlja pretnju, ona jeste jedna vrsta medijuma kroz koji se pretnje generišu i prenose.

136 Stanovništvo se sastoji od Makedonaca, Albanaca, Srba, Rumuna, Turaka i malog broja ostalih nacionalnosti. Albanci čine oko 25% stanovništva.

Glavni problem Crne Gore jeste pitanje koliko ona stvarno želi da bude srpska država. Ona ima još mnogo drugih političkih problema koji se uglavnom svode na modernizaciju društva. Ali budući da nisu eksplodirali kao ostatak Jugoslavije, Crnogorci bi svoje probleme trebalo da reše uglavnom političkim sredstvima. Ne postoji ozbiljno osporavanje državne teritorije (osim možda teritorije Sandžaka koja je podeljena između Srbije i Crne Gore i delom je naseljena muslimanskom većinom koja stremi nezavisnosti), iako je skoro 30% stanovništva ili muslimansko ili albansko.¹³⁷

Uopšteno govoreći, nije teško uvideti osnovni problem Jugoslavije. Nacionalna prava teško mogu da budu sveobuhvatna bez velikog broja nasilnih promena. Na primer, sveobuhvatna primena prava na samoopredeljenje dovela bi ne samo do drastičnih promena postojećih granica, već i do velikih migracija u svim mogućim pravcima. Sa druge strane, asimetrična rešenja nisu prihvatljiva onima koji ih smatraju nepravičnim, dok je većinskoj populaciji ostavljeno da odluči kako će ta prava raspodeliti.

Da bi se došlo do simetričnog rešenja, nacionalna prava bi trebalo tretirati kao izvedena a ne kao osnovna. Na nesreću, Jugoslavija nije bila država koja je pouzdano mogla da garantuje poštovanje jednakih prava svim svojim građanima bez obzira na njihovu nacionalnu pripadnost. Stoga je bilo rasprostranjeno osećanje da se individualna prava pouzdano mogu zaštititi jedino u okviru nacionalne države. Da bi se osećali zaštiticenim od nepravde, građani svih federalnih republika zahtevali su asimetrična prava, što je izazvalo slične protivzahteve i sve se pretvorilo u komplikovani problem klasifikacije po velikom broju kriterijuma koji je, čak i načelno, nemoguće razrešiti.

137 Međutim, tokom gradanskog rata sukob između Crne Gore i Hrvatske izbio je zbog Prevlake (zemljouza). Pojavljuju se i problemi u Ulcinju i nekim drugim oblastima Crne Gore u kojima Albanci i Muslimani predstavljaju većinu.

Preostala prava

Jugoslavija se raspala iako još uvek nije jasno u šta će se pretvoriti. Doduše, nove države i države koje se tek stvaraju su ili već napisale i prepravile svoje ustave, ili su objavile svoje političke namere. Na osnovu toga možemo da procenimo šta će se dešavati u celom regionu. Ukratko ću razmatrati nacionalna, ljudska, ekonomska, politička i osnovna građanska prava, i to upravo tim redom. Neću se rukovoditi onim što je zapisano u ustavima, već ću se baviti njihovim duhom (mada ne verujem da može postojati nešto u duhu što na neki način nije i zapisano).

1. Sve nove države su nacionalističke u smislu da od svojih građana očekuju da pridaju veću vrednost svojoj naciji nego svojim individualnim pravima, uključujući tu i pravo na život. Bez ovakve percepcije nacionalnih interesa građanski rat ne bi ni bio moguć. To znači da se ustavi svih novih država zasnivaju na nacionalnoj obavezi. Zbog toga, iako bi mogle da budu formalno demokratske, one predstavljaju ustavno autoritarne države, jer prava i obaveze države i građana proizlaze iz tumačenja nacionalnih interesa a ne iz ustavnih, zakonskih ili demokratskih procedura. To praktično znači da će politički prostor u državama koje su zadržale svoje nacionalističke ustave permanentno biti pomeren ka jednom od ekstrema. U nekim državama će se povratiti politički prostor koji je bio karakterističan za vladavinu komunista; u drugima će doći do autoritarnih restrikcija kolektivnih prava i sloboda političkog organizovanja. Osim ovih detalja, sve ostalo će biti „na svom mestu“.¹³⁸

2. Sve nove države imaju ustave u kojima se na direktni ili indirektni način vrši diskriminacija na osnovu nacionalne pripadnosti. Ustavi novostvorenih država definišu ove države kao etničke ili daju

138 Više o ovome vidi u radu koji je predstavljen na Bečkoj konferenciji o „Zaboravljenom nasledu“ u junu 1991 (Gligorov 1992a). Kako u Jugoslaviji za sve postoji i original i karikatura, ustavi novih srpskih država u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini predstavljaju takve ekstremne i hiperrealistične nacionalne slučajeve. Tu se mogu pronaći sve najgore nacionalističke ideje i prakse, zajedno sa ustavnim deklaracijama o poštovanju univerzalnih ljudskih prava. Elementi iste stvari se mogu naći i u Hrvatskoj i u Srbiji. Ali, mada u manjem obimu, i u ostalim republikama.



povlašćen tretman dominantnoj naciji i njenoj kulturi. Tako narodi koji su izgradili nove države, oslanjajući se na pravo na samoopredeljenje, negiraju to isto pravo drugom narodu. Hrvati su stvorili svoju nezavisnu državu na osnovu svog prava na samoopredeljenje, ali nisu odobrili to isto pravo Srbima koji žive u Hrvatskoj. A Srbi su se takođe protivili pravu Hrvata na samoopredeljenje, ali su u isto vreme opravdavali svoje akcije koje su se oslanjale na isti princip. Takvo pravo su takođe osporavali Albancima i Mađarima koji žive u Srbiji. Ovo se može primeniti na sve nove države.

Kada nacionalistički karakter države nije eksplicitno izražen u ustavu, on se može otkriti po odnosu prema kulturnim različitostima. O ovome najviše govori tretman jezika i pisma. Srbi i Hrvati govore isti jezik koji može da bude pisan i latiničnim i čiriličnim pismom. Međutim, oni ne samo da jeziku nadevaju svoja nacionalna imena, i ne samo da negiraju da se radi o istom jeziku, već i diskriminiju ono pismo za koje smatraju da nije njihovo nacionalno pismo. Srpski ustav daje prednost čiriličnom pismu, a hrvatski latiničnom. Naravno da nijedno od ova dva pisma nije ni srpsko ni hrvatsko, već se takvima smatraju zato što suprotna strana preferira ono drugo pismo.

Na osnovu ovakvih diskriminacija slede i druge koje se odnose na prava državljanstva, zaposlenja, unapređenja, obrazovanja i svega ostalog. U Srbiji, hiljade profesora albanske nacionalnosti dobilo je u jednom trenutku otkaz zbog toga što nisu prihvatili novi školski program zasnovan na novom ustavu (i hiljade radnika i profesionalaca albanske nacionalnosti izgubilo je posao iz političkih razloga). U Hrvatskoj je nova vlada uvela kvote da bi obezbedila povlašćen položaj Hrvatima u odnosu na Srbe. Sa sličnim problemima suočavaju se i druge manjine, kako u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj, tako i u ostalim republikama.

3. Nove države su pokazale sklonost da se oslove na nacionalističko tumačenje ekonomskih prava i na nacionalističku ekonomsku politiku. Sve privatizacione šeme imale su jak nacionalistički prizvuk, a ove države su već do sada iskusile sve vrste protekcionističke

politike. Svi su nacionalizovali ili su njavili namjeru da nacionalizuju svoje valute. Stvorili su ogromne javne korporacije i uveli poreske razlike po osnovu državne ili nacionalne pripadnosti.

4. Sve nove države instrumentalizovale su slobodu govora i čak je ograničile na više direktnih ili indirektnih načina. Teret propagande je nepodnošljiv, a na mnogim mestima cenzura je mnogo efikasnija nego u završnim godinama komunističkog režima. U svim novim državama nacionalizovani su glavni štampani mediji i televizijske stanice, pa vlade na taj način striktno kontrolišu javno mnjenje.

5. Na kraju, opšti nivo zaštite je veoma nizak, a o vladavini prava nema ni govora. Još uvek je na snazi mafijaški tip zaštite. Dok je socijalizam bio sistem u kome su svi zavisili od ljudi na vlasti, nove države su razvile sistem zavisnosti koji je karakterističan za autoritarne režime. I tu takođe postoje razlike po regijama. Dok u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj postoji puno elemenata tipičnih za policijsku državu, udruženih sa visokim stepenom bezakonja i delatnostima mafijaškog tipa, u ostalim državama situacija je slična, ali u manjem obimu (Bosna i Hercegovina nije država u tom smislu, tako da se ne može govoriti o vladavini prava ili o bezakonju). U nekim državama ovakvo stanje je očekivano i ono će se menjati putem normalne zakonske i demokratske evolucije uz eventualnu modernizaciju. Međutim u ključnim državama, Srbiji, Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini, demokratska transformacija biće moguća tek kada se nacionalistički karakter tih država promeni. A to se očigledno neće dogoditi uskoro. Što ne znači da u bliskoj budućnosti ne treba očekivati izvesne promene. Njih će verovatno doneti domaći razvoj i međunarodni uticaji, o kojima ću sada govoriti.



Stalna nestabilnost

Kakvi ishodi se mogu očekivati? Proces koji sam opisao tehnički se naziva balkanizacijom.¹³⁹ Karakteriše ga unutrašnja dezintegracija i stalno međunarodno mešanje. U ovom trenutku postoji čak pet srpskih država, autonomnih regija ili federacija.¹⁴⁰ Postoje još i republike Hrvatska, Slovenija, Makedonija, Bosna i Hercegovina i Kosovo. Sve su se vremenom otcepile. Secesija Slovenije je stvorila ogromne probleme, ali je na kraju prihvaćeno da nije ugrožen nijedan nacionalni interes ostalih, pošto bi se Jugoslavija ionako raspala. Makedonija se otcepila a da nije iniciran nijedan sukob, ali nije, međutim, uspela da dobije potpuno međunarodno priznanje, jer je Grčka stavila primedbu na njeno ime. Ovo je lažni konflikt, jer nisu ugroženi nikakvi stvarni nacionalni interesi. U principu, secesije Slovenije i Makedonije nisu u smislu nacionalnih interesa mnogo naudile ostatku Jugoslavije, kada je jednom Jugoslavija prestala da postoji.

Međutim, srpske države i regije imale su namjeru da stvore novu, manju Jugoslaviju, umanjenu za Sloveniju i delimično Hrvatsku, koja bi suštinski ukinula postojanje Bosne i Hercegovine i naterala Albance da odustanu od namere da stvore republiku Kosovo. A država Hrvatska bi mogla da postoji samo u mašti. Sa druge strane, Hrvatska, Bosna i Hercegovina i Kosovo teško da su mogli da ugroze srpske teritorije, regije i države.

Hrvatska ima strategiju da Srbima u Hrvatskoj odobri značajna autonomna prava. Ovo je teško ostvarivo, naročito posle građanskog rata, ali nije i neverovatno. U tom smislu, hrvatska država je u principu

139 Više o ovome u prvom poglavlju.

140 U jednom trenutku je bilo i više srpskih država: Srbija, Crna Gora, Krajina, Zapadna Slavonija, Istočna Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem, Bosanska Krajina – i još neke. Do sredine 1992. došlo je do proglašenja Republike Srpske Bosne i Hercegovine (koja se sastojala od svih „srpskih regiona“ u ovoj sada već međunarodno priznatoj državi); takođe je proglašena i Srpska republika Krajina (sastavljena od „srpskih regija“ u Hrvatskoj); i na kraju nova Federativna republika Jugoslavija, koja je proglašena u maju 1992. i sastojala se od Republike Srbije i Crne Gore (ova država nije bila međunarodno priznata, a u pojedinim međunarodnim telima je učestvovala pod nazivom Bivša Jugoslavija).

moguća, naročito ukoliko se pridruži Evropskoj zajednici (to doduše ne znači da će je Srbi koji u njoj žive prihvati kao zakonitu). Međutim, stvaranje održive države Bosne i Hercegovine teško je zamisliti. Najbolje čemu se taj region može nadati jeste da bude stavljen pod neku vrstu produženog međunarodnog protektorata. Ali u tom slučaju, srpski problem će ostati nerešen. Teško je zamisliti da će se Srbi svojevoljno odreći svojih teritorijalnih pretenzija, naročito zato što ih to ostavlja sa nerešenim kosovskim problemom. Istog trenutka, i na koji god način se razrešile jugoslovenska i bosanska kriza, doći će do eksplozije kosovskog problema (ovo se naravno može dogoditi i ranije).

Upravo zato Srbija predstavlja centralni problem. Ukoliko bi htela da dâ pozitivan doprinos, Srbija bi morala da se okrene zapadnoj Evropi. Negativni efekti dugotrajnog nacionalističkog režima Srbiju su okrenuli od Zapada. Izolovana i pod sankcijama, Srbija preživljava teška politička i ekonomска vremena.¹⁴¹ Sa liberalnom i demokratskom vladom Srbija bi mogla da se nada mnogo boljim rešenjima svojih nacionalnih interesa. Sa vladom ekstremnih nacionalista i socijalista, problemi se samo beznadežno pogoršavaju.

Bilo kako bilo, u ovom trenutku ovako izgledaju strategije država bivše Jugoslavije i međunarodne zajednice. Svi zvanično prihvataju činjenicu da stara Jugoslavija više ne postoji, a Slovenija, Hrvatska i Bosna i Hercegovina su priznate kao nezavisne države (Makedonija je takođe članica Ujedinjenih nacija pod privremenim imenom Bišva Jugoslovenska Republika Makedonija, ali još uvek ima problema sa susedima). Srpsko rukovodstvo je prvobitno imalo nameru da ponovo stvori skraćenu Jugoslaviju, koja bi sadržavala Srbiju, Crnu Goru, Bosnu i Hercegovinu (odnosno srpske teritorije), srpske teritorije u Hrvatskoj, i možda u Makedoniji. Za sada se zadovoljila mnogo manjom Jugoslavijom, načinjenom od Srbije i Crne Gore. Doduše, ime Jugoslavije predstavlja znak da dugoročni cilj još nije promenjen, iako je možda malo modifikovan. Tek kada budu

¹⁴¹ U maju 1992. Ujedinjene nacije su uvele sveobuhvatan paket sankcija protiv novostvorene države Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, proglašavajući je tako za nelegalnu državu.



obuhvaćene sve „srpske zemlje“, država će se umesto Jugoslavije nazvati Srbija.¹⁴²

Strategija međunarodne zajednice¹⁴³ bila je da prvo osigura nezavisnost Slovenije i Hrvatske, pa da onda počne da brine o ostalima. A to su bile teritorije kojima su dominirali Srbi sa nekoliko miliona Albanaca, Muslimana i Makedonaca i stotinama hiljada pripadnika drugih nacionalnih manjina. I tako je otvoren proces dalje balkanizacije. Kada je Makedonija proglašila nezavisnost, a jugoslovenska vojska je napustila, problem je ostao, jer se u oblastima pod srpskom dominacijom nalazio ogroman broj pripadnika albanske i muslimanske manjine. Zato će se proces balkanizacije odvijati u nedogled. Lično ne vidim način na koji bi ovaj region mogao da se stabilizuje, a o poštovanju ljudskih prava i demokratiji i da ne govorimo.

Čak i ako se Srbija okrene demokratiji, čak i ako ostale države priguše svoj nacionalizam, problem neće biti rešen. Teško je zamisliti stabilnost ovog regiona. Najviše čemu možemo da se nadamo jeste da sukobi prestanu i da započne dugotrajni proces političke emancipacije. Ali veći su izgledi da će rezultat stvaranja nacionalnih država i regiona u kome ne vladaju zakoni biti – stanje permanentne nestabilnosti.

Tu bi međunarodni uticaj mogao da bude od pomoći. Osnovni problem Jugoslavije (i Balkana uopšte) povezan je sa pravima i bezbednošću. I na kraju, postoji problem nacionalne emancipacije i političke modernizacije. Teško je poverovati da će novostvorene države biti u stanju da svojim građanima garantuju jednak prava, čak i ako jedna drugu priznaju i reše da žive u dobrom odnosima. Zbog toga će direktna i indirektna intervencija međunarodne zajednice, ukoliko bude izvedena na prikladan način, biti od velike pomoći.

142 Do izmene će možda doći i ranije, ukoliko se promeni vlast u Srbiji, ali politički cilj se neće promeniti.

143 Ovo je naravno zanimljiva slutnja, ali sada ne mogu da ulazim u njenu analizu. U slučaju Slovenije i Hrvatske Nemačka je stala na čelo „međunarodne zajednice“.

U pogledu prava, značajan pomak bi se dogodio ukoliko bi nove države prihvatile jurisdikciju nekog međunarodnog suda koji bi mogao da sudi u pojedinim oblastima ljudskih prava i međudržavnih konfliktata. Što se bezbednosti tiče, neke države i regije bi trebalo demilitarizovati, a neke, kao Bosnu i Hercegovinu, trebalo bi staviti pod određeni oblik protektorata. Dugoročno gledano, ove regije će morati da se integrišu u novonastali evropski poredak, ali do tada ih ne bi trebalo prepustiti njihovim lokalnim nacionalnim liderima koji će nastaviti da se bore za sporne teritorije.

Sve doduše zavisi od načina na koji će se međunarodna zajednica razvijati, kao i od unutrašnjih događanja. Međunarodna zajednica se nije odgovorno ponašala tokom celokupne jugoslovenske krize i izgleda da trenutno nije u stanju da definiše ni svoju unutrašnju strukturu ni svoje ciljeve. S druge strane, delimično zbog kontradiktornih poruka međunarodne zajednice, a uglavnom zbog davanja prioriteta svojim uskim nacionalističkim interesima, zemlje Balkana (ne samo zemlje bivše Jugoslavije) nastavljaju sa svojom destruktivnom politikom i u ovom trenutku se izgleda kreću u smeru produbljivanja procesa balkanizacije.

Dakle, budući da (1) nisu uspele da odlučnije utiču na demokratske procese u Jugoslaviji, (2) da su zanemarile opasnu politiku Beograda; (3) da su zakasnelo priznale secesionističke republike i (4) da su se različito odnosile prema njihovim zahtevima, i SAD i Evropska zajednica su ispoljile zabrinjavajuću nemoć da makar formulišu neke jasne principe „novog svetskog poretku“, a kamoli da se u skladu sa njima i ponašaju.

Stoga će izgleda jedino što preostaje od raspada Jugoslavije biti stalna nestabilnost. Strateški posmatrano, jugoslovenska kriza je u stvari kombinacija dva sukoba. Prvi je centralnoevropskog porekla i odnosi se na srpsko-hrvatsku separaciju. Drugi je balkanski konflikt, koji se odnosi na nezavršena pitanja iz balkanskih ratova. Za prvi sukob Jugoslavija je bila neophodna. On će trajati sve dok postoji i najmanja naznaka Jugoslavije. Za drugi sukob Jugoslavija nije neophodna. Jugoslavija je bila zemlja koja je oba ova problema rešavala tako što je



donosila bezbednost regionu. Čak je dala šansu da se problem etničke pravde reši u okviru liberalne federacije. Sa njenim nestankom, oba problema su mogla samo da se pogoršaju. Ostaje da se vidi kako će se bezbednost vratiti na područja bivše Jugoslavije i kako se i da li se dalja etnička trvanja na Balkanu mogu izbeći. U svemu tome pravda i žudnja za pravdom, koja se nalazi u korenu svih sukoba, ostaje daleko van domašaja aktera sukoba.

ZAKLJUČAK

Da li je Balkan poseban?

U ovoj knjizi sam pokušao da objasnim da je raspad Jugoslavije posledica racionalnog političkog izbora njenih građana. Kritikovao sam Roulsa a oslanjao sam se na Aristotela, i na taj način sam se usprotivio vladajućoj liberalnoj političkoj filozofiji. Ali uzeo sam u obzir Aristotelova objašnjenja, a ne preporuke. Štaviše, verujem da je njegova teorija pravde pesimistična u smislu koji se može posebno primeniti na Balkan: pravda je utopijski ideal, a iskustva i prihvatanje nejednakosti mnogo su dublji od prihvatanja jednakosti. U slučaju Jugoslavije, iskustvo etničke nepravde je najdominantnije i svi liberalni argumenti u korist takve države (u stvari, države uopšte) postaju uzaludni.

I pored toga, ne mislim da je Balkan posebno drugačiji. On oličava krhkost liberalnog motiva shvaćenog krajnje uopšteno. Naravno da postoje određene balkanske specifičnosti. Glavna specifičnost, koju ne razmatram u ovoj knjizi a koja toliko zbuњuje strane posmatrače i teoretičare, jeste preveliki značaj koji se poklanja istoriji, ponekad zaista veoma drevnoj istoriji. To mnoge navodi da pomisle ili tvrde da je jugoslovenski slučaj veoma složen, težak za razumevanje i uopšte atipičan. Naravno, tačno je da ga treba studirati veoma podrobno, ali ništa manje podrobno od bilo kog drugog naučnog ili političkog problema. Ali nije tačno da je on u osnovi čudan i iracionalan. Jedan od načina da se dokaže da je i na Balkan primenjiv pristup racionalnog izbora jeste da se uoči da su tamošnje sukobljene strane bile savršeno u stanju da iskoriste spremnost spoljašnjeg sveta da ih vidi kao drugačije, različite od ostalih. Vrlo su pronicljivo tretirali međunarodni faktor onakvim kakav on i jeste: nevoljan da uloži vreme i napor da pravilno razume problematiku, jer ako bi to uradio ne bi imao opravdanja da se ponaša onako kako se ponašao. I zaista, narodi na Balkanu ne veruju da bilo koga mogu da prevare tvrdnjama da su drugačiji od ostalih. Međutim, retorika o drugačijem Balkanu korisna je za sve – to je način za nastavak moralnog i političkog horor



scenarija, a bez razarajućeg osećanja političkog ili intelektualnog poraza iz kojeg bi zatim morale da proisteknu i neke obaveze. Otuda zainteresovanost da se Balkan prikaže toliko drugačijim od ostalih regionalnih.

Nespremnost da se političke obaveze ozbiljno shvate ima teške i dalekosežne posledice. Slučaj Jugoslavije i Balkana predstavlja test sposobnosti Zapada da uspostavi i uvede čvrste principe političkog ponašanja u područja koja prolaze kroz fundamentalne političke promene. Zapad je u stvari pokazao nesposobnost da pruži podršku zemlji u čijem je stvaranju, kao i održavanju u životu, aktivno učestvovao. Ravnodušnost sa kojom je dopustio da ova zemlja propadne bila je samo uvod u spremnost, pa čak i želju da se odstupi od svih proklamovanih principa. Tako da se može reći da Balkan nije poseban, a i da Zapad nije ništa drugačiji od ostalih.

Moja namera u ovoj knjizi je bila da iznesem neke temeljne tvrdnje o liberalnoj političkoj filozofiji, ali i neke direktnе tvrdnje o raspadu Jugoslavije. Međutim, nemam nikakvu nameru da spekulsem o tome kakav će biti uticaj balkanskih prilika na ostale evropske regije, posebno na centralnu ili istočnu Evropu. Oživljavanje fašizma, međuetnička netrpeljivost i surovost neslućenih razmera, međunarodni cinizam i ravnodušnost, sve su to zloslutni znaci. Sve što želim da kažem jeste da je nada da će se ove pojave ograničiti samo na čudnovati prostor po imenu Balkan, podjednako uzaludna koliko i nada da će liberalne vrednosti lako uhvatiti korena čim se komunisti povuku sa vlasti. Sve su to novi izazovi sa kojima će sloboda tek morati da se suoči.

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DODATAK I

Država na Balkanu

Pojam države koji se upotrebljava u ovoj knjizi je preuzet iz teorije javnog izbora.¹⁴⁴ Država obezbeđuje politička dobra (i druga dobra, ali to čemo ovde zanemariti). Posmatrano drugačije, to je institucionalno predstavljanje individualnih političkih zahteva. Ne ulazeći detaljno u teoriju javnog izbora, nabrojaću samo dobra koja se zahtevaju od države i njihovu važnost za zadovoljavanje određenih političkih kriterijuma.

Bezbednost je političko dobro koje država mora da obezbedi (ne nužno u potpunosti, tj. ekskluzivno), inače bi bila država samo po imenu. Šta ulazi u „funkciju proizvodnje“ bezbednosti – to je složeno pitanje.¹⁴⁵ Na jedan ili drugi način tu spadaju sva druga politička dobra, od kojih su međunarodna najistaknutija. Na primer, može se zamisliti da bi država bez snaga bezbednosti mogla obezbediti sigurnost svojih građana oslanjajući se samo na međunarodni balans snaga (Makedonija je takav primer). Ali to je izuzetak (takva država bila bi ili članica nekog bezbednosnog saveza, ili bi bila provincija ili protektorat). U svakom slučaju, teško je smatrati jednu političku zajednicu državom ako na neki način ne obezbeđuje neki osnovni nivo bezbednosti.¹⁴⁶

Pravda je sledeća na listi političkih dobara. U stvari, radi se više o idealu. Postoje mnogi aspekti ovog idealala. Neću ulaziti u složenost teorije pravde. Treba samo razlikovati tri stvari: osećanje nepravde, ideju komutativne pravde i ideal distributivne pravde. Način na koji se leči osećanje nepravde i postiže željeni tip i nivo pravde predstavlja „duh zakona“ jedne države. Samo još treba reći da se temelj državnog autoriteta oslanja na način kojim se obezbeđuje ovo dobro. Ako se

144 Za uvod u teoriju javnog izbora vidi Buchanan and Tullock (1961), vidi takođe Breton (1974) i (1989).

145 Smatram da Hobson Leviatan daje klasičan odgovor na to pitanje, dok Nozik (1974) predstavlja savremeni minimalistički pokušaj.

146 Ovo je hobsovsko viđenje države (bar u tradicionalnom tumačenju).

građani obrate državi tražeći pravdu, to znači da očekuju da je autoritet njenih zakona, institucija i sudova sposoban da obezbedi to dobro. Sve dok se žalbe na nepravdu rešavaju, na ovaj ili onaj način, pitanje idealja pravde može se bezbedno ostaviti po strani.

Najzad, država obezbeđuje *dobrobit*. Kao što država nije jedina koja obezbeđuje sigurnost, a još manje pravdu, tako nije ni jedina koja obezbeđuje dobrobit. I to je vrlo složeno dobro. S jedne strane, država ima monetarnu i fiskalnu moć i mnoge druge regulatorne moći. Od toga kako ih upotrebljava zavisi, direktno i indirektno, blagostanje njenih građana. S druge strane, ona preraspodeljuje dobra, utičući na blagostanje svih.

Bezbednost omogućava život, pravda ga čini legitimnim, a zajedno obezbeđuju održivost; blagostanje je sasvim druga kategorija. U ovom radu, polazim od hobsovskog stava da je neophodan uslov za postojanje države to da ona obezbeđuje sigurnost svojih građana.

To je bio stav koji je zauzela takozvana Badinterova komisija, koju je obrazovala Evropska zajednica da bi procenila održivost raznih država bivše Jugoslavije koje su tražile međunarodno priznanje. U tom smislu bivša Jugoslavija je bila država, a Bosna i Hercegovina ne. Postoje naravno i granični slučajevi kao što je Hrvatska, koja ne zadovoljava ovaj kriterijum u potpunosti (to je bila i ocena Badinterove komisije) i Makedonija, koja zadovoljava ovaj kriterijum u nedostatku dokaza o suprotnom.

Badinterova komisija razmatrala je i aspekt pravde ovih potencijalnih država i utvrdila da neke od njih taj kriterijum ne zadovoljavaju (Srbija i Hrvatska). Ipak, jasno je da je ovaj kriterijum smatrano važnim ali ne i nužnim, u smislu u kome je to bila sigurnost. Kriterijum dobrobiti nije razmatran na značajniji način, koliko mi je poznato. Vens-Ovenov plan za Bosnu i Hercegovinu uzima u obzir aspekt dobrobiti kada razgraničava autonomne regije, ali očigledno posmatra ovaj kriterijum kao sekundaran. Međutim, ovaj plan ne posmatra obezbeđivanje sigurnosti kao nužan uslov za postojanje države Bosne i Hercegovine, što svedoči o činjenici da su je posmatrali više kao provinciju ili protektorat, nego kao državu.



Postoje i druge države koje nalikuju političkim zajednicama u bivšoj Jugoslaviji: sama Jugoslavija, Srbija, Crna Gora, srpske države u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini i Kosovo u Srbiji. Ove zajednice ne zadovoljavaju nužne uslove za postojanje države, jer ne obezbeđuju sigurnost na celoj svojoj teritoriji ili nemaju jasne granice. Opet u hobsovskom duhu, postoji razlika između ratne države i prave države, pri čemu Jugoslavija i druge pomenute države (sa izuzetkom Kosova) zadovoljavaju avgustinovski kriterijum državnosti prema kome i banda ili ratnička grupa mogu biti država. U tom smislu na Jugoslaviju se može gledati kao na armiju u potrazi za državom; Kosovo je, s druge strane, nešto što se može nazvati nekakvom paralelnom državom, jer ona svojim građanima ilegalno obezbeđuje osnovna politička dobra.

Na drugom kraju spektra državnosti su Slovenija, koja jeste država kada se govori o sigurnosti, jer njena sigurnost nije ugrožena, i Makedonija, koja je država u nedostatku dokaza o suprotnom. Ako se Slovenija ne smatra balkanskom državom, već centralnoevropskom, onda izuzev (možda privremeno) Bugarske, Grčke, čija sigurnost zavisi od NATO-a, i Albanije, koja pokušava da postane država, Balkan predstavlja teritoriju bez država.

Razlog za ovakvo stanje stvari nalazim u procesu balkanizacije koji detaljno opisujem u knjizi. Ovde samo želim da potkrepim iznete tvrdnje pomoću jednog citata i nekih dodatnih razmatranja.

„Ako smatramo da uspostavljanje slobode radi realizacije moralnih obaveza predstavlja krajnji cilj građanskog društva, moramo zaključiti da su najsavršenije one države koje, kao Britansko i Austrijsko carstvo, obuhvataju razne nacionalnosti i ne tlače ih. One u kojima nije došlo do mešanja rasa su nesavršene; a one u kojima su se efekti mešanja izgubili su posustale. Država koja nije sposobna da zadovolji različite rase osudila je samu sebe; država koja se trudi da ih neutrališe, apsorbuje ili protera, uništava sopstvenu vitalnost; država koja ih ne integriše lišava se glavne osnove samouprave. Teorija nacionalnosti je zato retrogradni istorijski korak.“ Lord Acton, „Nacionalnost“.

Proces „balkanizacije“ o kojem govorim u prvom i četvrtom poglavlju može se rezimirati na sledeći način. Pretpostavimo da postoji Tajdbautov (Tiedbout) proces spontanog stvaranja države u kojem ljudi upotrebljavaju institucionalna ili nasilna sredstva da organizuju državu samo za one građane koji dele određene slične karakteristike. Pretpostavimo da se stabilno rešenje postiže raspodelom vlasti (kao funkcijom nivoa oporezivanja za koje se odlučuju razne proto-države koje žele nezavisnost).¹⁴⁷ U tom slučaju proces balkanizacije određuju dva svojstva:

- (1) svaka raspodela vlasti je lošija od neke druge za bar jednu proto-državu;
- (2) svaka decentralizacija državne vlasti otkriva novu poželjnu decentralizaciju ili centralizaciju državne vlasti.

To znači da je balkanizacija proces koji neprestano menja raspodelu vlasti, između ostalog zbog međunarodnog grupisanja i pregrupisavanja, i da taj proces nikada ne otkriva „prave“ prioritete zainteresovanih strana. U tom smislu, to je proces konstitutivne destrukcije.

Međutim, čak ni Tajdbautov proces ne daje potreban okvir za analiziranje procesa balkanizacije, jer se on temelji na pretpostavci jasno određene federalne i konfederalne jurisdikcije, tako da ljudi mogu „glasati nogama“. Ako s druge strane granice nisu jasno povučene, onda postoji stepen slobode koji uvećava izglede nastupanja dva pomenuta ishoda. Nema raspodele moći koja bi bila nezavisna od načina na koji su povučene granice, i nema države koja dovodi u ravnotežu nivo obezbeđenih javnih dobara, jer to zavisi od nacionalističkih prioriteta, to jest od procesa otkrivanja prioriteta u domenu državne vlasti. Oba procesa uključuju međunarodni faktor koji čini problem politike moći još složenijim.

¹⁴⁷ Za veličinu države kao funkciju njene poreske osnove vidi D.Friedman (1971).

DODATAK II

Nacionalni prioriteti

Pod liberalnim ustavom, koji suprotstavljam nacionalističkom u drugom poglavlju, podrazumevam institucionalno uređenje koje se zasniva na Povelji o pravima. Suštinska karakteristika liberalnog ustava ne sastoji se u činjenici da je on takav da bi se mogao jednoglasno prihvatići, već da se prava na kojima se zasniva mogu univerzalizovati. To znači da je ta država zasnovana na pojmu zaštite individualnih sloboda.

Liberalni ustav ne mora da se zasniva na ugovoru. Ali on se razlikuje od ustava etničke države po tome što se ovaj drugi temelji na posebnom neugovornom svojstvu etničkog porekla. Nacionalistička država se odlikuje time što:

- (1) obuhvata one koji su određenog porekla, bilo rođenjem ili izborom;
- (2) različito tretira one koji su različitog porekla;
- (3) sledi nacionalni interes.

Ovaj poslednji element je dobro opisao Lord Akton:

„Nacionalna teorija obeležava kraj revolucionarne doktrine i njen logični kraj. Proglašavajući supremaciju prava nacionalnosti, sistem demokratske jednakosti prevazilazi sopstvene krajnje granice i dolazi u protivrečnost sa samim sobom... Nacionalistički sistem je razvijeniji od socijalističkog po tome što je proizvoljniji... Nacionalizam nema za cilj ni slobodu ni prosperitet, koji su žrtvovani imperativnoj potrebi da se nacija pretoči u kalup i meru države. Taj put vodi u materijalnu i moralnu propast kroz pokušaj da taj novi pronalazak nadmaši delo gospodnje i interesu čovečanstva. Nema načela promene i zamislive faze političkog mišljenja koji bi bili obuhvatniji, subverzivniji ili proizvoljniji. Nacionalizam je poricanje demokratije, jer postavlja granice vršenju opšte volje, koju zamenjuje višim principom... Tako, kada podvrgne pojedinca

kolektivu, revolucionarni sistem čini kolektivnu volju podložnom uslovima od njega nezavisnim i odbija samu ideju zakona, ostajući samo pod vlašću slučaja.“

O nacionalnim pravima Lord Akton piše sledeće:

„Najveći neprijatelj prava nacionalnosti je moderna teorija nacionalnosti. Izjednačavajući u teoriji državu i naciju, ona sve druge nacionalnosti u državnim granicama svodi na uslove potčinjenosti. Ona ne može da im prizna jednakost sa vladajućom nacijom koja konstituiše državu, jer bi tada država prestala da bude nacionalna, što bi protivrečilo samom principu njenog postojanja. Prema tome, u zavisnosti od stepena humanosti i civilizovanosti tog vladajućeg korpusa koji zahteva za sebe sva prava u zajednici, inferiorne rase će biti istrebljene, ili porobljene, ili dovedene u položaj zavisnosti.“

Suštinski problem nacionalizma je vidljiv kada se on univerzalizuje. Ako bi svaka država bila nacionalna, nijedna ne bi imala manjine. Ne samo zato što su slobodna preseljenja nemoguća, već zato što mora doći do prisilnih preseljenja, kada neku teritoriju naseljavaju pomešane nacije. Građanski rat je način da se postignu ova prinudna preseljenja, a sve vrste diskriminacije su politički način da se kontrolišu neželjene ili podstaknu željene migracije.

Politika i ekonomija nacionalizma široka su tema. Ovde je potrebno izdvojiti samo jedan ili dva aspekta da bi se olakšalo razumevanje ove knjige.

Postoje ekonomske teorije nacionalizma koje ga posmatraju u okvirima teorije klubova. Ideja je da je nacionalizam način da se internalizuju neke od najvažnijih spoljašnjih okolnosti. Politička verzija te teorije jeste samoopredeljenje. Razumevanje nacionalizma u okviru teorije klubova, kao i nekih drugih ekonomskih teorija, počiva na benignim verzijama nacionalističkih prioriteta. One previđaju jednu osnovnu činjenicu: nacija nije dobrovoljna organizacija, niti klub. Čak i ako se država posmatra kao izraz društvenog ugovora ili kao vrsta kluba, nacija nije ugovorna institucija čak ni u tom smislu. Pristupanje ili istupanje iz nekog



etničkog stanja drugačiji su nego u slučaju kluba ili države. Zato internalizacija spoljašnjih okolnosti nije pogonska ekonomska sila nacionalizma, a da ne pominjemo političke motive.

Nacionalističke vrednosti pretvaraju etničku pripadnost u jednostranu obavezu, u smislu prihvatanja jedne bezoblične vlasti. Zato im je tako lako podleći i zato su one tako moćne i primamljive. U mnogim slučajevima, nacionalizam služi kao delotvorno sredstvo preko kojeg specijalni interesi zadobijaju status opšte sile. Takav je slučaj sa Srbijom i Hrvatskom (sve je ovo, naravno, preterano pojednostavljeno i ima za svrhu samo osnovnu informaciju).

Hrvatska nacija je, istorijski, teritorijalno i kulturno podeljena. Karakteristično etničko obeležje nije ni jezik, ni zajedničko etničko poreklo, već nacionalna ideja i u nekim slučajevima veroispovest. Međutim, vera odvaja Hrvate koji su katolici, od Srba koji su pravoslavni, i od Muslimana, ali ne i od Slovenaca, koji su takođe katolici, ili od Italijana. U ova dva poslednja slučaja kriterijumi razlikovanja su jezik i nacionalna ideja. Usled ove mešavine etničkih kriterijuma, najsnažniji hrvatski nacionalizam može se naći tamo gde su Hrvati izmešani sa Srbima, sa kojima dele jezik, a u priličnoj meri i istoriju i kulturu, ali gde ih razdvajaju vera i nacionalna ideja. To su uglavnom oblasti koje su ekonomski i na druge načine manje razvijene od ostatka zemlje. Međutim, u njima se ispoljava poseban zahtev za etničkom solidarnošću. Zato one dominiraju hrvatskim političkim prioritetima u vremenima nacionalne krize.

Srpski slučaj je mnogo komplikovaniji. Danas je njegovo razumevanje otežano politikom trenutne beogradske vlade. Međutim, taj slučaj zasluguje ozbiljno razmatranje. Srbi žive na celoj teritoriji bivše Jugoslavije, mada u manjem broju u Sloveniji i Makedoniji (što se u poslednjem slučaju ponekad osporava). Sama Srbija je etnički prilično homogena. Međutim, na Kosovu Srbi predstavljaju samo oko 10% populacije. U Vojvodini, drugoj autonomnoj pokrajini Srbije, oni predstavljaju nešto iznad 50%

populacije. U Hrvatskoj 12%, ali u nekim delovima Hrvatske kao što su Krajina, Lika, Kordun, Banija i delovima istočne Slavonije, oni predstavljaju apsolutnu ili relativnu većinu. U Bosni i Hercegovini predstavljaju oko jedne trećine populacije, a u većini su u delovima istočne Hercegovine i Bosanske Krajine. Zadržavam se na detaljima etničke disperzije Srba da bih ukazao na teške političke probleme sa kojima su suočeni.

Stvar postaje još složenija time što srpski identitet nije zasnovan ni na jeziku, ni na veri, već na prilično složenoj nacionalnoj ideji. Ali ostavljujući po strani pitanje srpskog etničkog identiteta, politički problem predstavlja činjenica da su srpski nacionalni interesi Srba iz uže Srbije s jedne strane, i svih drugih Srba sa ostalih srpskih teritorija ili teritorija bivše Jugoslavije s druge strane – različiti. Ponovo, kao i u slučaju Hrvatske, mnoge srpske zemlje po obodima srpske nacije nerazvijene su i potrebna im je etnička solidarnost. To je posebno slučaj na Kosovu, gde je i otpočela nedavna obnova srpskog nacionalizma.

Nacionalizam drugih etniciteta u Jugoslaviji je drugačiji. Slovenački nacionalizam je prvo bitno definisan u okviru posebnosti slovenačkog jezika. Razvio se do zahteva za nacionalno samoopredeljenje. Makedonski nacionalizam se razvio iz regionalizma. Slovenska populacija koja nastanjuje region stare Makedonije usvojila je ime tog regiona kao svoje nacionalno ime da bi izbegla identifikaciju sa Bugarskom i Srbijom i da bi se odbranila od potčinjanja. To se takođe pretvorilo u zahtev za samoopredeljenjem. Crnogorski nacionalizam ima poreklo u crnogorskoj državi koja je postojala do 1918. godine kada se pridružila prvo Srbiji, a odmah zatim i Jugoslaviji. Crnogorski nacionalizam nije usredsređen na pravo na samoopredeljenje, već na očuvanje crnogorske države.

Muslimanski nacionalizam je uglavnom negativan. Muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini su islamizovani Sloveni. Njihov nacionalizam je kombinacija zahteva za samoopredeljenjem, veštačkog proizvoda Jugoslavije legitimisanog na etničkim osnovama, i imitacije verskog nacionalizma Srba i Hrvata.



Albanski nacionalizam je u suštini separatistički. On je zaoštren činjenicom da Albanci nikada nisu bili prihvaćeni kao jednaki partneri u Jugoslaviji, već su tretirani kao nacionalna manjina. To je bilo teško objasniti Albancima, jer nijedan slovenski etnicitet bilo gde u Jugoslaviji nije smatran nacionalnom manjinom. Jugoslavija je imala komplikovanu klasifikaciju političkih prava različitih etniciteta. To je bio normativni izraz nepravedne osnovne strukture zemlje o kojoj govorim u knjizi. Jednaka zastupljenost bez političke jednakosti bila je albanskoj manjini nezadovoljavajuća, a srpskoj većini neprihvatljiva (ali slični problemi, samo suprotnog predznaka, postojali su u svim republikama, naročito u Hrvatskoj, Bosni i Hercegovini i Makedoniji).

Postoji još jedan dodatni, donekle paradoksalni aspekt po kojem se nacionalizam u postkomunističkim zemljama razlikuje od drugih nacionalizama. U posttotalitarnim društvima, opozicija se razvija u totalitarnom periodu. U većini slučajeva to znači da će ona biti konzervativna, tradicionalistička, liberalna i nacionalistička. U Jugoslaviji, to se razlikovalo od regionala do regionala. U Sloveniji, najjača opozicija bili su sami komunisti, koji su se predstavljali kao zaštitnici slovenačke nacionalne stvari od savezne vlade u Beogradu. Oni su došli na vlast i još uvek su na vlasti. U Hrvatskoj, nacionalizam se pojavio kao opozicija šezdesetih godina. Doživeli su represiju i, po logici postkomunističkog razvoja, kasnije su izronili kao snaga koja će preuzeti vlast. U Srbiji i Crnoj Gori slika je bila mnogo složenija. U Beogradu i delovima Vojvodine, opozicija je bila liberalna i liberalno-nacionalistička. U užoj Srbiji ona je bila mahom konzervativna. U Vojvodini u celini, kao i na Kosovu i u Crnoj Gori, najsnažnija je bila staljinistička opozicija (koja je bila surovo progonjena posle razlaza sa Sovjetskim savezom 1948) i skoro slovenofilska nacionalistička opozicija. Obe su se pomešale sa srpskim nacionalistima iz redova Srba koji su živeli u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini. Tome je doprinela činjenica da su se Srbi iz ovih delova Jugoslavije osećali najugroženijim, a dominirali su u vojsci i službama bezbednosti. Tako je liberalna opozicija izgubila bitku sa koalicijom staljinista i nacionalista (drugi put, jer su prvu bitku

izgubili sa konzervativnim komunistima ranih sedamdesetih). Paradoksalno ali istinito, u oba slučaja su izgubili bitku od istih snaga, s tom razlikom da su ove sebe prvi put nazivale titoistima, a drugom prilikom antititoistima. U oba slučaja, liberali su proglašeni izdajnicima, jednom višeg cilja, a drugi put nacionalne stvari. U Bosni i Hercegovini, slučaj Srba i Hrvata bio je gotovo isti, dok su Muslimani odabrali konzervativniju frakciju svoje nacionalističke stranke. U Makedoniji, nacionalizmu skloniji komunisti bili su jedina opozicija. Oni su došli na vlast i još uvek su na vlasti, pod imenom bilo demokratskih socijalista, bilo liberala. I tako, pošto su liberali svuda bili u manjini u antikomunističkoj opoziciji, oni nisu imali uspeha protiv nacionalista konzervativnije i radikalnije vrste.

Mada su ekonomski prioriteti sekundarni, oni su ipak prisutni. Koje su ekonomске vrednosti nacionalizma? U suštini, to su vrednosti preraspodele. Za vreme Jugoslavije, vaskrsavanje srpskog nacionalizma podržavala je ogromna propaganda o nepovoljnem ekonomskom položaju Srbije u Jugoslaviji. Nakon toga usledilo je odbijanje bilo kakvih ideja o slobodnoj trgovini, a završilo se unutrašnjim bojkotom slovenačke robe i nezakonitom uzurpacijom saveznih monetarnih ovlašćenja. Prema tome, ekonomija nacionalizma je: protekcionizam, diskriminatorna ekonomска politika, i neodgovorna monetarna politika. Takva praksa pojavila se, na jedan ili drugi način, u svim novoformiranim državama bivše Jugoslavije. I ona će dugo opstati.




DODATAK III

Borba za prostor i izbor igre

„Politika je samo geometrijska figura koja je prihvatile zakon džungle.“

Josif Brodski

1. Prostor predstavljen u drugom i četvrtom poglavlju može se predstaviti pravom linijom.



Tačka C predstavlja „pravi“ centar. Tu bi se smestila moć, ako bi se pošteni izbori redovno održavali. Tačka A predstavlja „idealni“ komunistički centar moći. Tačka B – „liberalni“ politički centar. U tačku D se smešta većina stanovništva kada je na vlasti „liberalna“ komunistička frakcija. Centar se pomera u tačku E u slučaju raspada političkog prostora.

Ako je država federacija, politički prostor može biti fragmentiran tako da opšta politička linija uopšte i ne postoji. U tom slučaju, moguće su sve kombinacije. U nekim slučajevima, politički prostor će se skupiti oko „pravog“ centra, u nekim drugim može otici uлево ili prema ekstremnoj desnoj strani. U stvari, to bi značilo da države više i nema.

Ovo bi se na drugi način moglo izraziti ako bi se pokazalo da u federaciji nacionalističkih država ne postoji jedinstvena poželjna tačka na prikazanoj liniji političkog prostora. U tom slučaju na snagu stupa teorema permanentne nestabilnosti sa dve posledice: prvo, ne postoje stabilne većine, i drugo, na svaku političku stabilnost gleda se

kao na nametnutu.¹⁴⁸ U slučaju da se politički prostor raspadne duž linije nacionalnih podela, nepostojanje jedinstvene poželjne tačke neće imati za rezultat samo odsustvo zajedničke horizontalne linije, već i slom same države.

2. Drugi, formalniji način da se posmatra osnovni jugoslovenski konflikt pruža teorija igara. Tri igre su korisne za razumevanje tog konflikta: Zatvorenikova dilema, igra Ko je kukavica, i Lanac prodavnica (vidi Skyrms [1990], Kreps [1990] i Selten [1978]). Pogledaćemo ukratko ove igre, a onda preći na glavno političko pitanje: kako se bira igra koja će se igrati?

1. *Zatvorenikova dilema*

Osnovni oblik ove igre određen je sledećom konfiguracijom koristi sa kojom su suočena dva igrača (prvo pogledajmo osnovnu korist):

		Igrač B	
		x	y
Igrač A	x	2,2	0,3
	y	3,0	1,1

Igrači A i B mogu da izaberu šta će učiniti, *x* ili *y*. Ako obojica izaberu *x*, dobijaju 2 poena neke vrednosti. Ako se obojica odluče za *y*, dobijaju po 1 poen. Ako se A odluči za *x*, a B za *y*, A dobija 0, a B dobija 3 poena, odnosno obrnuto ako donesu suprotne odluke. Racionalni izbor za oba igrača je da se odluče za *y* i dobiju po jedan poen, mada bi obojica mogli da se odluče za *x* i dobiju po 2 poena. To je usled toga što, ako se jedan od igrača odluči za *x*, drugi to može da iskoristi i dobije više birajući *y*. To važi za obojicu pa je za obojicu najsigurniji izbor *y*.

148 Za ovu teoremu vidi Schwartz (1981).



Igra se može tumačiti ovako: recimo da su igrači Srbi i Hrvati. Otcepljenje Hrvatske sa postojećim granicama najbolji je ishod za Hrvate, a najgori za Srbe (3 prema 0). Otcepljenje Hrvatske i Srbije po etničkoj liniji podele najgore je za Hrvatsku i najbolje za Srbiju (0 prema 3). Liberalna federalizacija donosi za oba igrača 2 poena. Autoritarni federalizam donosi po 1 poen obojici. Ako Srbi i Hrvati igraju ovu igru, ishod će biti autoritarni federalizam koji ne zadovoljava nijednog od njih.

2. Igra ko je kukavica

Igra je predstavljena ovakvom konfiguracijom koristi:

		Igrač B	
		x	y
Igrač A	x	0,0	0,1
	y	1,0	-1, -1

Ako igrači A i B odustanu, dobijaju 0 poena (obojica gube). Ako jedan nastavi a drugi odustane, onaj koji je nastavio dobija 1, a drugi igrač 0 poena (prvi dobija, drugi gubi). Ako su obojica tvrdoglavci, gube po 1 poen (ishod lošiji od gubitka).

Neka opet Srbi i Hrvati igraju ovu igru. Ako i jedan i drugi odustanu od sukoba, zadržava se *status quo*. Ako jedan ili drugi natera protivnika da odustane, on dobija a drugi gubi. Igra favorizuje nasilnika. Ako se igrač oseća jačim od protivnika, ovo je igra koju treba da izabere. Takva politika je vrlo jednostavna. Sve što igrač treba da učini jeste da ide dalje bez obzira na cenu. Cenu plaća onaj ko se otcepi, to jest kukavica.

Srbi, budući jači, puštaju Hrvatsku da se otcepi, ali pod njihovim uslovima. U ovoj igri Hrvati nemaju dobar izbor. Njihova jedina nada je promena odnosa snaga tako da mogu da se otcepe pod svojim

uslovima. Za to im je potrebna podrška spolja. Ako nje nema, oni moraju da prihvate pogubnu strategiju.

3. Lanac prodavnica

Igraču A preti potencijalna konkurenca nekoliko igrača B. Srbija je igrač A, Hrvatska, Slovenija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Makedonija, Kosovo, Crna Gora itd. su igrači B. Igru karakteriše sledeća struktura koristi:

		Igrač B	
		napolju	unutra
Igrač A	sarađuje	2,2	5,1
	agresivan	0,0	5,1

U uobičajenoj interpretaciji igre konkurent ulazi na tržište. Za našu svrhu, ja ću obrnuti interpretaciju. Igrač B želi da izade. Sve drugo je isto. Ako igrač B izabere da izade, a igrač A se tom potezu ne protivi, obojica dobijaju po 2 poena. Ako igrač B želi da ostane, a igrač A u tome sarađuje, B dobija 1, a A dobija 5 poena. A i B dobijaju istu nagradu ako B izabere da ostane, a A ne sarađuje u tome. Najzad, ako B odluči da izade, a A na to reaguje agresivno, niko ne dobija ništa.

Teorija igara označava ishod 2,2 kao racionalan. Tumačenje je jednostavno. Pretpostavimo da je Hrvatska poslednja koja se odlučuje za otcepljenje. Najbolji odgovor Srbije jeste da u tome sarađuje (2,2 nasuprot 0,0). Ali, onda isto rezonovanje mora važiti i za preposlednje otcepljenje i tako dalje. Otuda je racionalna strategija Srbije da sarađuje sa svakim otcepljenjem.

Međutim, ako zapreti prvom, recimo Kosovu, najbolje što protivnik može da učini jeste da ostane. Isto važi i za drugog, trećeg itd, recimo sve do poslednja dva sa kojima Srbija može da sarađuje. Pretpostavimo



da se Srbija usprotivi secesionističkim potezima Kosova, Bosne i Hercegovine, Hrvatske i Crne Gore, ali sarađuje sa Slovenijom i Makedonijom – prošla bi bolje nego da po pravilu sarađuje sa svima. Zato je sled secesionističkih poteza važan, kao i kredibilnost igrača. Ako je igrač A viđen kao agresivan, igrač B može odlučiti da se uopšte i ne otcepljuje. Ako je protivnik percipiran kao racionalno agresivan, da tako kažem, onda odabrani redosled secesionističkih poteza može da proizvede rezultat sličan aktuelnom (osim što se možda može uzeti da je potez Slovenije preuranjen, što delimično menja sled i uništava reputaciju Srbije čime je ona prinuđena da bude još agresivnija nego što bi to inače bilo neophodno da bi poslala kredibilni preteći signal ostalima).

4. Izbor igre

Igra Lanac prodavnica je poučna jer dozvoljava da se unutar nje modelira izbor drugih igara. Tako se ova igra može pretvoriti i u Zatvorenikovu dilemu i u igru Kukavica. U oba slučaja ona favorizuje agresivne poteze nadmoćnog igrača. Nadmoćni igrač ima izbor da igra igru Lanac prodavnica bilo kao Zatvorenikovu dilemu, bilo kao igru Kukavica. Ako izabere Zatvorenikovu dilemu, otcepljenje je nemoguće, ali opšta frustracija je neizbežna. Ako izabere igru Kukavica, moći će da izbaci svakog pod sopstvenim uslovima. Neke od ovih podela mogu izgledati kao kooperativni potezi (kao u slučaju Slovenije ili možda Makedonije), dok će druge morati da budu krajnje agresivne. Zbog toga nadmoćni igrač, a u slučaju Jugoslavije to je bila Srbija, određuje i izbor igre i krajnji ishod.

DODATAK IV

Struktura moći

1. U knjizi govorim o tri različita tipa stanja ravnoteže i neravnoteže u kojima se Jugoslavija nalazila. Prikazaću ih ovde shematski, a onda ću komentarisati strukturu moći koju ta stanja proizvode ili impliciraju.

	Stabilno stanje	Nestabilno stanje	Kriza
Ustavna moć	Liberalno	Regionalizam	Građanski rat
Politička moć	Autoritarno	Poliarhija	Raspad zemlje
Ekonomска moć	Tržište	Socijalizam	Kolaps

Stabilna ravnoteža zahteva liberalno ustavno ustrojstvo, snažnu centralnu vlast i tržišnu alokaciju sredstava. Nestabilno stanje zahteva poštovanje regionalizma, decentralizovanu raspodelu vlasti i visok nivo unutrašnjeg i spoljašnjeg protekcionizma. Stanje neravnoteže je stanje građanskog rata, raspada države i ekonomskog kolapsa. Zato je složen posao naći uravnoteženo rešenje koje bi istovremeno bilo i izvodivo i poželjno.

2. Promenljiva jugoslovenska struktura moći može se formalno analizirati pomoću Šaplijeve vrednosti ili neke njene varijante.¹⁴⁹ Ilustrovaću taj pristup, a onda ću preći na manje formalnu analizu oslanjajući se na gornju tabelu i neke stilizovane činjenice koje pominjem u daljem tekstu.

Prepostavimo da imamo osam igrača od kojih svaki ima jedan glas (toliko je bilo glasova u jugoslovenskoj federaciji posle donošenja

149 Vidi Aumann i Myerson (1988).

Ustava iz 1974. godine). Ako odlučuju jednoglasno, svaki od njih ima istu moć (1/8). Ako se odluke donose prostom većinom, oni koji se nađu u većinskoj koaliciji imaju istu moć (1/5), dok oni koji su isključeni nemaju nikakvu moć (mada, koalicioni potencijal svakog glasača je, u principu, isti). Ako sada pretpostavimo da je stvorena stabilna koalicija tri igraca (na primer, Srbija, Kosovo i Vojvodina), nju možemo nazvati „velikim igračem“. Ako se odluke donose jednoglasno, taj igrač ima 3/8 moći, dok svi drugi zadržavaju moć koju su i ranije imali (to jest 1/8). Međutim, ako se traži prosta većina, velikom igraču su potrebna dva glasa za pobedu. Ako se formira većina, veliki igrač ima 3/5 ukupne moći, dok dva koaliciona partnera imaju po 1/5 od ukupne moći (oni koji ostaju isključeni imaju 0 moći). To je ista moć koju bi imali i da nisu ulazili u koaliciju sa velikim igračem. Povrh svega, veliki igrač može da popravi svoju poziciju pozivom trećem spoljnog partneru da se pridruži koaliciji. U tom slučaju njemu ostaje ista količina moći dok ostala tri partnera dele preostalu moć (2/5) na tri dela, to jest, dobijaju po 2/15. Međutim, oni mogu da dobiju po 1/5 ako pristupe koaliciji koja isključuje velikog igarača. Zato će se takva koalicija i formirati.

Ovo funkcioniše još bolje ako veliki igrač ima 4 glasa (Srbija, Kosovo, Vojvodina i Crna Gora). Tada je potreban samo jedan dodatni član koalicije. Taj novi partner deli ukupnu moć sa velikim igračem na ravne delove (po 1/2). I dalje, ako se uključi još jedan partner, veliki igrač povećava svoju moć na 2/3, dok dva koaliciona partnera dobijaju po 1/6. S druge strane, imali bi 1/5 u koaliciji koja isključuje velikog igrača. I takva je stvarno koalicija koja će biti formirana.

U svakom slučaju, srpska potraga za glasovima kojima bi se dostigla većina bila je uzaludna. Pravilo odlučivanja prostom većinom davalo je Srbiji 0 moći, a jednoglasno odlučivanje bar 1/8. S druge strane, strahovanja drugih da će povećanje srpskih glasova Srbiji omogućiti odlučujući uticaj bilo je neosnovano. Naprotiv, time je uvećana njihova moć (individualna i kao koalicije).

3. Sada ću neformalno razmotriti četiri različita načina distribucije moći: etnički, državni (regionalni), demokratski i realni.

(1) *Etnički*

Upotrebiću grube cifre etničke distribucije u Jugoslaviji: Srbi 36%; Hrvati 20%; Muslimani 10%; Slovenci 8%; Albanci 8%; Makedonci 6%; Crnogorci 3% i ostali 9%. Pod pretpostavkom pravednog proporcionalnog predstavljanja, Srbi nemaju većinu. Po drugačijim pravilima glasanja mogli bi dobiti manje-više 40%, ali teško da mogu dobiti više od 50%. Njihovi najverovatniji koalicioni partneri mogli bi biti Slovenci i Makedonci. Kako su stvari stajale, moglo se ipak očekivati da će Slovenci biti na strani opozicije. Makedonci, s druge strane, nisu dovoljni kao koalicioni partneri. Zbog toga, vladajuće ideje bile bi one koje pripadaju nesrpskoj većini, bila ona na vlasti ili u opoziciji.

(2) *Savezni (regionalni)*

Posle ustavnih reformi iz sedamdesetih sistem se oslanjao na jednoglasnost šest republika (država) i dve autonomne pokrajine (Kosovo i Vojvodina, obe u Srbiji). Srpski političari pokušali su da isključe ove dve pokrajine iz odlučivanja i da promene pravilo jednoglasnosti u većinsko odlučivanje. U tome su naišli na otpor, mada se time ne bi značajno promenila struktura moći.

U situaciji osam predstavnika, Srbima je obezbeđeno između dva i četiri glasa (jedan iz Srbije, jedan iz Vojvodine, jedan iz Bosne i Hercegovine u svakom trećem turnusu, i jedan, ponekad, iz Hrvatske). Crnogorci su takođe imali jedan glas (mada bi kao koalicioni partneri bili beznačajni pri etničkom predstavljanju). Tako bi Srbija mogla u većini slučajeva da kontroliše polovinu od osam glasova, a ponekad čak i prostu većinu (naročito ako obezbedi glas Makedonaca). Kada bi se broj predstavnika smanjio na šest, ništa se ne bi promenilo (bez jednog glasa iz Vojvodine i jednog sa Kosova). Srbija bi time mogla doći čak u malo goru poziciju jer se tada ne bi moglo očekivati da Srbin predstavlja Hrvatsku. Ona bi ostala sa jednim sigurnim glasom, jednim verovatnim glasom, i ponekad sa još jednim dodatnim glasom. Dakle, u dve trećine slučajeva ona se ne bi mogla nadati da ima većinu, čak ni uz pomoć Makedonaca ili nekog drugog koalicionog partnera.



Zbog toga, kada su jednom preuzeli Kosovo i Vojvodinu, srpski političari su promenili svoje zahteve. Nisu više tražili smanjenje broja predstavnika, već samo većinsko odlučivanje. Tako su bili predstavljeni sa tri glasa, uz jedan crnogorski. Ipak, većina je zavisila od glasa Bosne i Hercegovine. U ključnom trenutku, tu republiku je predstavljao Srbin, ali on nije glasao sa Srbima u zimu 1991. kada se donosila ključna odluka o uvođenju vojne diktature.

Tako, kao što stalno ističem, srpska potraga za većinom u Jugoslaviji bila je u stvari bezizgledna. Otuda se insistiranje drugih jugoslovenskih republika na jednoglasnosti ne može objasniti strahom od srpske dominacije, bar ne one odlučujuće.

(3) Demokratski

Prepostavimo da treba da se održe višepartijski savezni izbori. Na osnovu sadašnjeg razvoja situacije moglo bi se poći od toga da bi se izvan Srbije, Crne Gore i Makedonije uglavnom formirale nacionalne stranke (što ne znači da bi nužno jedna stranka predstavljala jednu naciju). Zavisno od izbornog sistema, raspodela moći bi približno odgovarala etničkoj, ili bi bila još nepovoljnija po Srbe. Većinski sistem bi dao lošije rezultate po Srbe u Hrvatskoj, Makedoniji i na Kosovu, a verovatno i u Bosni i Hercegovini (zavisno od toga kako bi se formirali izborni okruzi). Razlog tome je što u Hrvatskoj većina Srba živi u gradovima u kojima predstavljaju manjinu. U Makedoniji žive u mešanim zajednicama i takođe bi bili manjina. Na Kosovu bi možda dobili u jednom ili dva okruga. U Bosni i Hercegovini su takođe na mnogim mestima manjina. S druge strane, albanska i mađarska manjina žive u Srbiji na kompaktnim teritorijama, pa bi većinski sistem njima pogodovao.

(4) Realni

Razmotriću dva interesantna slučaja; jedan se odnosi na rastuću *anarhiju*, a drugi na slobodnu trgovinu.

Prvo, slučaj rastuće *anarhije*. Ako država počne da se raspada, osnovna raspodela moći poprima vrhunsku važnost. To znači da kontrola nad armijom i snagama bezbednosti, kao i kontrola nad

količinom novca u opticaju, postaju odlučujuće. Raspodela stvarne moći (za razliku od političke moći koju smo prethodno analizirali) pogodovala je Srbima. Oni su daleko najveća jugoslovenska nacija. Kontrolisali su vojsku i organe bezbednosti i bili su u poziciji da preuzmu kontrolu nad monetarnim funkcijama moći. Zbog toga, ako je njihov nacionalni interes izdvajanje iz Jugoslavije, sila je za njih najefikasniji instrument.

Drugo, slobodna trgovina. Pretpostavimo da se u federaciji odluke moraju donositi jednoglasno. Nerešena pitanja moraju se ostaviti procesu koji se zove liberalizacija. Na primer, ako nema saglasnosti o monetarnoj politici, može se pokušati privatizacija te politike. Takođe, ako nema saglasnosti sa carinskom politikom, može se tražiti oslonac u liberalizaciji spoljne trgovine. Na taj način sva nerešena pitanja se takoreći ostavljaju tržištu. Kako bi u tom slučaju izgledala novonastala struktura moći? U Jugoslaviji se vodila vatreна rasprava o tome šta znači jugoslovensko tržište. Zvanična definicija je bila da je Jugoslavija jedinstveno tržište. Opozicija se zalagala za zajedničko tržište. Niko nije bio za slobodno tržište.

Zvanična verzija je zagovarala centralizaciju. Opozicija je njoj pretpostavljala porast unutrašnjeg protekcionizma. Slobodno tržište je odbacivano jer bi njegove posledice bile u celini nepredvidive, ali bi bile predvidivo loše za određene industrijske grane. Međutim, budući da je ekonomski struktura raznih regionala bila skoro ista i da je subvencionisanje raznih regionala bilo skoro jednak, kao i da promene u uslovima trgovanja u režimu slobodne trgovine ne bi favorizovale nijedan region posebno, najvećoj ekonomiji bi, dugoročno gledano, više pogodovala liberalizacija nego onim manjim. Tako, mada kratkoročne prednosti liberalizacije možda nisu bile očigledne, Srbija od nje nije morala strahovati.

U tom smislu, na izbor koji je Srbija napravila može se gledati kao na posledicu vremenske nekonistentnosti u preraspodeli moći. Kratkoročno gledano, prednost Srbije je očigledno bila u većoj vojnoj moći; dugoročno, politika liberalizacije dala bi za nju još bolje rezultate. Srbija se odlučila za kratkoročne prednosti.



DODATAK V

Izlazak iz zamke

Pojam reformskog procesa koji uspeva kroz poraz, koji upotrebljavam u trećem poglavlju, samo je jedno tumačenje evolutivnog razvoja kroz pokušaje i pogreške. On stoji nasuprot šumpeterovskoj teoriji prema kojoj svaki neuspeh vodi udaljavanju od liberalizma. Reformistički put iz socijalizma u stvari ima za pretpostavku da šumpeterovska zamka ne postoji.

Šumpeterovska zamka odnosi se na stalno pogoršavanje položaja neke ekonomije koje nastaje posle niza institucionalnih ili političkih neuspela. Recimo, neka industrija propada i država preuzme na sebe brigu za njene dugove i za njene zaposlene. Budući da je to teret za ekonomiju, dolazi do propasti drugih, koje država takođe preuzima. Ako država pokuša da reši rastući problem novom sveobuhvatnom regulacijom, to jest reformom, problemi će se umnožiti, izazivajući još veću državnu regulaciju. Što je veći neuspeh, to javnost zahteva više regulacije. Zbog toga, ekonomija neizbežno klizi u zamku i nema nikakvih podsticaja da se ikada iz nje izvuče.

Taj proces prepostavlja zatvorenu ekonomiju bez budžetskih ograničenja. U otvorenoj ekonomiji takav proces nije moguć, izuzev u smislu rastućeg protekcionizma. Međutim, čak i zatvorena ekonomija mora imati budžetska ograničenja. Kada ona jednom počnu da deluju, država će pokušati sa reformama koje bi uklonile neke terete. U početku, reforme moraju biti parcijalne: radi se o procesu otkrivanja. Moraju se tek pronaći ciljevi, kao i sam izlaz iz zamke. Treba ipak primetiti da jednom kada reforme, ma koliko beznačajne, postanu neophodne, njihov neuspeh može samo osnažiti razloge za drugi ambiciozniji pokušaj. I tako, što reforme postaju radikalnije, dodatne, još radikalnije, postaju sve nužnije. Na kraju, reforma koja znači definitivno odbacivanje postojećeg sistema postaje neizbežna. To je evolutivni put iz šumpeterovske zamke. Proces je još snažniji u federalnoj državi, jer će se budžetska ograničenja pojaviti ranije, kako

zbog većih zahteva, tako i zbog toga što će rivalitet država uticati na bržu liberalizaciju. Takav je bio slučaj u Jugoslaviji.

U stvari, Šumpeter je dvostruko grešio. Pokazuje se da je klizanje u socijalizam nemoguće – za socijalizam je neophodna revolucija. S druge strane, puzanje iz socijalizma izgleda neizbežno, budući da je revolucija verovatno neizvodljiva, kao i vrlo riskantna. Problem reformskog puta iz socijalizma je u onome što je Šumpeter identifikovao kao početni zahtev za socijalizmom. Ako dođe do neuspeha, ljudi se obraćaju državi kao krajnjem garantu. Međutim, kada država jednom više nije u stanju da preuzme nove obaveze ili mora da uskrati ispunjenje već preuzetih obaveza, nastaje problem legitimite. U multinacionalnoj državi to može biti snažan podsticaj za razvoj secesionističkih pokreta. Zbog toga mislim da je Šumpeter ispravno identifikovao osnovni uzrok teškoća reformskog procesa. On nije ekonomski, pošto socijalizam nije ni neizbežno ni upotrebljivo ekonomsko stanovište. On je politički i odnosi se na osećanje nepravde.

Jugoslavija je tipičan primer. Socijalistički ekonomski razvoj ima dve karakteristike: niz reformskih pokušaja, od kojih su svi manje-više mešavina oslobođanja tržišta i državne regulacije, i nizak stepen ekonomске efikasnosti. U poređenju sa drugim socijalističkim ekonomijama, Jugoslavija je bila jedinstvena potoměšeno nje oslanjala na centralno planiranje već na kombinaciju tržišne i decentralizovane državne kontrole (tako zvani sistem samoupravljanja). S druge strane, efikasnost samoupravne jugoslovenske ekonomije bila je upola manja od uporedivih južnoevropskih mešovitih ekonomija (kao što su grčka, turska, španska i portugalska).¹⁵⁰ Značajno je da se efikasnost pripisivala tržišnim uticajima i decentralizaciji, a njen nizak nivo ideološkim i političkim preprekama. Zato je, mada je svaki pokušaj reformi nailazio na čvrst otpor, svaki neuspeh reforme posmatran kao novi dokaz da tržište i preduzetništvo treba da budu oslobođeni mešanja države.

Snažan podsticaj takvoj percepciji reformi i njihovom opštem pravcu bilo je veliko oslanjanje Jugoslavije na spoljnu trgovinu, inostrani

150 Vidi Bajt (1990).

turizam i strane kredite i pomoć. U stvari, promene u međunarodnom ekonomskom položaju Jugoslavije prilično dobro objašnjavaju cikluse reformskih pokušaja. Prve reforme su uvedene posle raskida sa Sovjetskim Savezom (do raskida je došlo 1948. godine, reforme su otpočele 1949. godine). One su uglavnom dale dobre rezultate. Stopa rasta bila je prilično visoka, mada efikasnost investicija nije bila zadovoljavajuća. Drugi krug reformi uveden je nakon što je Jugoslavija bila suočena sa znatnim promenama u uslovima kreditiranja i svojim odnosima sa Zapadom. Reforme iz šezdesetih otvorile su problem socijalizma u Jugoslaviji, kao i problem Jugoslavije kao države. Promene koje su pogodovale jačanju tržišta donele su i neke nepovratne promene i u jugoslovenskim ekonomskim institucijama (uvodenje komercijalnog bankarskog sistema, liberalizacija spoljne trgovine, potpuno napuštanje centralnog planiranja, veća nezavisnost menadžera itd). To je bio jedini period kada je opšta efikasnost ekonomije doživela značajan porast. Međutim, pojavili su se i politički i nacionalni problemi, sa demonstracijama 1968. godine u Beogradu i nešto kasnije iste godine na Kosovu i sa nacionalističkim pokretima u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj. Ekonomski reformi morale su biti prekinute (mada institucionalne promene nisu ukinute), da bi se politički sukobi smirili. Najzad, do niza reformi osamdesetih godina došlo je posle kolapsa jugoslovenskog platnog bilansa. Ove reforme završile su se jednim ambicioznim pokušajem decembra 1989. da se pronađe reformski put iz socijalizma. Program je bio isti kao onaj koji je uveden nešto kasnije u Poljskoj. Stabilizacioni deo reforme bio je uspešan. Za tri meseca hiperinflacija od 100% mesečno svedena je na nulu. Dramatično su uvećane devizne rezerve, dok je proizvodnja doživela u početku manji, a kasnije i značajan pad. Do juna 1990. godine, sve je bilo gotovo, mada su pokušaji da se reforme održe u životu trajali sve do kraja godine.

Kakvi su bili učinci poslednjeg reformskog napora? Pored onih već pomenutih, učinci su bili sledeći:

- Postalo je očigledno da su reforme moguće.
- Shvaćeno je da je privatizacija neophodna.

- Postale su jasne i slabosti i snaga ekonomije i političkog sistema.
- Shvaćena je potreba za demokratskom legitimizacijom transformacije.

Konačno, sve što je još bilo potrebno bila je volja da se učini ono što je bilo moguće. Do nje se nikada nije stiglo. Jugoslovenske nacije su odlučile da upotrebe ekonomske mogućnosti i političke slobode kako bi ispunile svoje dugoročne nacionalne ciljeve: stvaranje sopstvenih etničkih država. Umesto da se izvuku iz socijalističke zamke, upali su u zamku građanskog rata. Iz ove perspektive, neuspesi ranih reformskih pokušaja bili su korisni, dok je uspeh poslednjih reformi bio nepovoljan, naročito u pogledu privlačenja značajnijih količina stranog novca, što je pomoglo strankama koje su pripremale građanski rat.



DODATAK VI

Ekonomija raspada

Ekonomsko pravdanje secesije može da poprimi različite oblike. Razmatraću samo sledeće:

1. *Argument ekonomske nezavisnosti.* Razlog je teorijski krivotvoren u malim otvorenim privredama. O monetarnoj nezavisnosti, šta god pod tim podrazumevali, ne vredi raspravljati, pošto danas teško da u Evropi postoji monetarno nezavisna država. Fiskalna nezavisnost se baš ne smatra preteranim blagoslovom, no u Jugoslaviji su države već bile poprilično fiskalno nezavisne. Nezavisnost ekonomske politike je važna stavka za privrede u transformaciji. Međutim, Jugoslavija se transformisala brže od većine novostvorenih nezavisnih država. Zbog toga mislim da ovaj argument nije zasnovan na stvarnim činjenicama.
2. *Argument državnog troška.* Ovaj argument se može upotrebiti samo u onom delu koji se odnosi na Sloveniju. Kako je Slovenija bila najrazvijenija država u Jugoslaviji, ona je imala veća izdvajanja za federalni budžet od ostalih republika. Sve ostale države su bile u različitim položajima. Doduše, iz federalnog budžeta finansirala se Jugoslovenska armija, sve ostalo je ostavljeno republikama. Postojaо je još i fond za razvoj, koji je novac razvijenijih država prebacivao manje razvijenim. Ukinut je u poslednjim stadijumima postojanja Jugoslavije. Tako se argument državnog troška svodi na trošak Jugoslovenske armije. Tek treba da se izračuna da li bi transformacija Jugoslavije u miroljubivu i demokratsku državu zahtevala veće troškove vezane za bezbednost, nego u slučaju sadašnjih nezavisnih država, uključujući i Sloveniju. Kada bi se uzele u obzir osnovne promene (kolaps komunizma, dugotrajna balkanska neprijateljstva) i kada bi se govorilo samo ekonomskim argumentima, pretpostavljam da bi državni trošak svih novostvorenih nezavisnih država, uključujući i Sloveniju, bio značajno veći od troška koji bi imala uspešno reformisana Jugoslavija. Ukoliko izuzmem Slovensku i Makedoniju, samo izdvajanja za vojsku u Hrvatskoj, Srbiji, Bosni i

Hercegovini i Crnoj Gori mnogo su veća nego što su bila, kojim god metodom ih izračunavali.

3. *Argument uslova razmene.* Često se čuje da su se zapadne jugoslovenske republike odlučile na secesiju jer su očekivale poboljšane uslove razmene sa Zapadom. Takva očekivanja su bila neosnovana. Sve bivše jugoslovenske republike pogoršale su uslove razmene. Izuzimajući Sloveniju koja je diskutabilan slučaj (mada je nesumnjivo da je pretrpela gubitke zbog promena uslova), sve ostale države su udarac osetile na najbolnjem mestu. Hrvatska u turizmu; Bosna i Hercegovina svuda; Srbija svuda, zahvaljujući ratnoj privredi i sankcijama; Makedonija svuda, zbog sankcija i ekonomске blokade od strane Grčke; Crna Gora u turizmu i industriji.

4. *Argument ekonomskih integracija.* Postojala je nada da će novostvorene nezavisne države brže pristupiti Evropskoj zajednici nego što bi to bio slučaj sa bivšom Jugoslavijom. Ovakav stav je pogrešan i kao činjenica i kao moguća motivacija. Jugoslaviji je bilo obećano članstvo u Zajednici, dok nijedna od novih nezavisnih republika nije ni blizu učlanjenja (i takođe, što je još važnije, Jugoslavija je bila na čelu bivših komunističkih zemalja, što sada nije slučaj čak ni sa Slovenijom). To je bilo poznato i moglo se predvideti, tako da suprotno ponašanje nije moglo biti politički motivisano.

U stvari, Slovenija je jedina država koja se približava sporazumu sa Evropskom zajednicom kakav je bivša Jugoslavija imala već dugi niz godina. Ostale države još nisu ni uzete u razmatranje.



DODATAK VII

Cena

Skoro da je nemoguće izračunati cenu raspada Jugoslavije zbog nedostatka kvantitativnih podataka. Zato ću prikazati samo grubu skicu.

Najrazvijenija država bivše Jugoslavije bila je Slovenija. Po pitanju proizvodnje i blagostanja, spustila se na nivo na kome je bila ranih sedamdesetih. Radi se o neuporedivo većem padu nego kod ostalih srednjoevropskih postkomunističkih privreda. A pošto nije bila značajno umešana u rat i, pošto nije bila u gorem položaju od Mađarske ili Poljske, pad mora većim delom da se pripiše raspadu Jugoslavije.

Hrvatska je u mnogo gorem položaju. Radi se o posebno dubokom padu, jer Hrvatska poseduje komparativne prednosti koje druge države nemaju. Njen turizam je tako snažno devastiran da će Hrvatskoj biti potrebno vreme da ga vrati na nivo na kome je bio u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Ali se hrvatska privreda u celini suočava sa teškim vremenima.

Srbija je unazađena za nekoliko dekada. O privredi Bosne i Hercegovine teško da možemo govoriti. Makedonija se našla na ivici ekonomskog kolapsa zbog sankcija koje su uvedene Srbiji, njenom tradicionalno najvećem trgovinskom partneru, kao i zbog spora sa Grčkom, njenim potencijalno najvažnijim ekonomskim partnerom.

Tako da se u smislu prihoda i bogatstava cena može odrediti.

Pre raspada Jugoslavije prosečna plata u Sloveniji bila je značajno veća nego što je sada (oko 600 nemačkih maraka). Nemam jasnu predstavu o vrednosti nekretnina i preduzeća.

Nije mi poznata prosečna plata u Hrvatskoj (govori se o sumi od oko 100 nemačkih maraka), ali su cene nekretnina dramatično opale. Cene zemlje i kuća u gradovima i na primorju bile su veoma visoke.

Kuće na dalmatinskoj obali koje su nekada vredele par miliona nemačkih maraka sada ne vrede ništa. Cela Hrvatska je suočena sa dugotrajnim procesom posleratne rekonstrukcije.

Isto važi za cene nekretnina na crnogorskoj obali.

Beograd je takođe u lošem stanju. Iako je bio izuzet iz ratnih dejstava, cene stanova i poslovnog prostora su dramatično pale. Preduzeća praktično nemaju nikakvu vrednost.

Zbog toga su efekti raspada Jugoslavije na bogatstvo i prihode u svim njenim delovima u osnovi negativni i veoma značajni.

Inflacija je značajno veća nego što je bila u Jugoslaviji, osim u periodu pre uvođenja reformi 1989, kada se radilo o hiperinflatornom nivou. Inflacija je u Sloveniji bila na oko 100% godišnje pre nego što je došlo do stabilizacije. Inflatorna stopa u Hrvatskoj često je dostizala nivo hiperinflacije. U Srbiji i Crnoj Gori je na kraju 1993. godine oboren svetski rekord u hiperinflaciji. U Makedoniji je uvedena nova valuta, ali je prethodna bila prilično inflatorna.

Stope nezaposlenosti takođe su uniformno visoke i kreću se od preko 13% u Sloveniji (koja je godinama imala prividnu punu zaposlenost) do 60% u Srbiji i čak većem procentu na Kosovu i Crnoj Gori. U Makedoniji situacija nije tako loša, ali se očekuje pogoršanje.

Postoji i veliki trošak zbog odliva mozgova. Slovenija je i ovde izuzetak. Mnogo mladih ljudi, kao i mnogo profesionalaca, napustilo je Hrvatsku zbog izbegavanja vojske, i iz političkih i ekonomskih razloga. Iz istih razloga i Srbiju je napustio veliki broj ljudi. Situacija u Bosni i Hercegovini je po ovom pitanju, kao i po svakom drugom, katastrofalna.

Kada se sve sabere, zaista se radi o visokoj ceni. Pri tom nismo uračunali troškove razaranja i demografske promene. Radi se o nasilnom i destruktivnom raspadu države i svakog njenog dela u punom smislu te reči. A kraj se još ne nazire.



DODATAK VIII

Bezvoljni pregovarači

Iz mog ugla, ekonomski razlozi za samoopredeljenje nisu održivi. Jugoslavija se raspala iz političkih razloga. Želim da se osvrnem na politiku ekonomskih sankcija koje su uvedene Srbiji i Crnoj Gori, kao i na međunarodno učešće uopšte.

1. U jednom nedavnom članku tvrdilo se da su selektivne sankcije efikasnije od opštih sankcija kakve su uvedene Srbiji. Tvrđnja se kretala u okvirima uobičajenog rasuđivanja političke ekonomije (Tinbergenovo pravilo kaže da bi za postizanje svakog cilja bilo potrebno da postoji makar jedan instrument, izuzimajući opšte ciljeve i instrumente). Ovo je po mom mišljenju pogrešno kad za cilj imamo poraz ratne ekonomije. U tom slučaju sankcije predstavljaju zamenu, trenutnu ili trajnu, za vojni sukob (kao u slučaju Kube). Dakle, politički ciljevi su takvi da ništa osim opštег režima sankcija ne bi obavilo posao. Cilj sankcija nije da određenu državu nauči lepom ponašanju. Krajnji cilj opštih sankcija jeste da trajno promene karakter države tako što će je što je moguće više isključiti iz međunarodne zajednice. U međuvremenu, postiže se i efekat zastrašivanja, kako se loš uticaj ne bi širio.

U slučaju Srbije teško je odrediti koliko su sankcije bile efikasne i da li će ubuduće biti. Međunarodna strategija Srbije se oslanjala na to da će se Rusija transformisati na takav način da podrži Srbiju kao strateški važnog činioca na Balkanu (upravo suprotno od uloge na koju je Jugoslavija smerala nakon razlaza sa Sovjetskim Savezom 1948). Trenutno, ruska podrška je prigušena jer ni Rusiji nije jasno šta želi. Ukoliko u Rusiji pobede nacionalisti, što je sasvim moguće, sankcije će imati nepovoljan politički efekat. Dugotrajni efekti ionako zavise od procesa modernizacije. Problem sa sankcijama koje se stalno zatežu je u tome što su one zamena za upotrebu sile, te mogu da donesu očekivane rezultate samo na duže staze, ali ne predstavljaju instrument brzog pozitivnog političkog uticaja.

2. Interesantno je u ovom kontekstu sagledati učešće međunarodne zajednice. Od samog početka je bilo katastrofalano vođeno. Nedostajalo je razumevanja, zainteresovanosti i principa. To je dovelo do nedostatka volje. Izostavljajući detalje, prokomentarisaču značenje Vens-Ovenovog plana i njegovih derivata.

Cilj mirovnog plana bio je da se on pretvori u sporazum. A pretvorio se u dodatno opravdanje za etničko čišćenje, kao i u neuspešni instrument kažnjavanja.

To se desilo zbog toga što je plan usvojio princip etničke podele zemlje u kojoj se tako nešto nije moglo sprovesti bez ogromnih demografskih podela. Ne samo da je u tom slučaju neophodna razmena stanovništva, već ne postoji rešenje za problem etnički mešovitih porodica, koje u Bosni i Hercegovini verovatno predstavljaju većinu. Muslimani nisu imali izbora osim da plan prihvate, dok je trebalo da Srbi i Hrvati budu zadovoljni jer su njihovi politički zahtevi bili ispunjeni (etničko razdvajanje). Doduše, u plan su bili uključeni i elementi kažnjavanja Srba, tako što im je bilo uskraćeno da imaju ono što su zaista želeli, a to je jedinstven srpski region u okviru Bosne i Hercegovine. Namera je bila da se Hrvati i Muslimani nagovore da potpišu plan i na taj način spreče Srbe u postizanju svojih strateških ciljeva.

Da je iza plana stajala pretnja vojnom silom, sve strane bi ga odmah potpisale. Da je do toga došlo, plan ne bi bio ni potreban, jer bi se moglo nametnuti bolje rešenje. A najgore je što je plan postao predmet pregovora. I tako su se borbe intenzivirale, jer su svi želeli da zauzmu što bolju pregovaračku poziciju. Srbi su dobili dodatni podstrek za ispunjenje svojih strateških ciljeva kada im je postalo jasno da su pretnje koje su im upućene običan blef. A kad je postalo verovatno da do ispunjenja plana neće doći, a da njegov glavni predlagач, takozvana međunarodna zajednica na to nema adekvatan odgovor, građanski rat se još žešće razbuktao uz učešće sve tri strane.

Ovaj slučaj ilustruje opšti problem. Međunarodnu zajednicu predstavljaju ustanove i zastupnici, ona čak sprovodi i politike (kao što su sankcije, na primer), dok pritom nije subjekat u uobičajenom političkom smislu. Posrednici poput Vensa i Lorda Ovена, kao i



trupe UN, bili su zastupnici bez nalogodavca. To ih je dovodilo u prilično nelagodan položaj. Kada je bilo potrebno poštovati prekid vatre, njihovo je bilo da pomognu i da nadgledaju, ali nisu smeli da se mešaju. No najneodređenija je pozicija mirovnih pregovarača. Da je njihovo zaduženje samo da pružaju pomoć zaraćenim stranama, radilo bi se o prilično jasnoj poziciji. Međutim oni su pokušali da nametnu principe i da zastupaju interes međunarodne zajednice, koja i jeste njihov nominalni nalogodavac, ali budući da principi i interesi nisu jasno određeni, nema političkih činilaca koji bi pregovarače podržali. Na taj način oni postaju podložni kritici svih strana i izazivaju opšte nezadovoljstvo. Zbog toga obično nisu od preterane pomoći, a njihove dobre namere ponekad proizvode veoma negativne efekte (kao u slučaju Vens-Ovenovog plana).

DODATAK IX

Izvori

U ovom trenutku veoma je teško koristiti izvore iz bivše Jugoslavije. Veliki deo kvantitativnih informacija je netransparentan, jer je jako teško doći do podataka. Široko korišćene brojke popisa iz 1991. delimično su nagadaњa (Albanci su bojkotovali popis, ali to nije jedini problem). Brojke koje se odnose na raseljena lica, kao i na druge promene, variraju zavisno od izvora. Izvori UN i srpski izvori barataju različitim procenama.

Najbolje kvantitativne procene i ostale informacije mogu se naći u dva beogradska nedeljnika, Vreme i Ekonomski politika. Pouzdanost ostalog dela štampe je promenljiva. Slovenija je izuzetak, jer je štampa tamo u principu informativna. Makedonske novine su takođe prilično pouzdane. Nedeljnik Ekonomski politika je jedino mesto na kojem se redovno mogu pronaći podaci o svim bivšim jugoslovenskim republikama.

Postoji određeni broj kvalitetnih teorijskih radova o jugoslovenskom sistemu samoupravljanja – vidi Lidal (1984) i (1989). Najbolji izvor je časopis Ekonomski analiza, koji izlazi u Beogradu. Najobuhvatniju odbranu sistema napisao je Bajt (1989). Malo drugačiju napisao je Horvat (1984). Najjezgrovitija kritika može se naći kod Pejovića (1992), a dobru analizu sistema koji je nastao sedamdesetih napisao je Tajson (1979).

Politički i istorijski radovi su na mnogo nižem nivou. Od istorijskih spisa na engleskom jeziku, Banac je generalno pouzdan i informativan. Od skraćenijih radova koje sam pročitao, koristan je Đilas (1991), a Cvijić (1991) pruža opštu informaciju, ali je pojednostavljen. Za prvo čitanje dobar je Šoflin (1992). Gard (1992) je, uprkos ambicioznoj namjeri i žestokom osporavanju u Beogradu, prilično informativan. Sa druge strane, Filkinkraut (1992) donosi lični doživljaj, ali nije pouzdan izvor.



Daleko najbolji pristup istoriji raspada Jugoslavije ima Gleni (1993). Pošto se njegova knjiga bavi periodom koji sam i sam pomno proučavao, mogu da potvrdim njen iznimno visoki kvalitet. Dobro je napisan i interesantan članak Banjca (1992). Magaš (1993) je veoma citiran. Vodopivec (1992) je napisao dobar tekst o istoriji slovenačke borbe za nezavisnost. Nistrom (1992) je autor korisnog članka o istoriji Makedonije. No, siguran sam da će o toj temi uskoro biti napisani tomovi radova i knjiga (vidi Hajdenovu (1992) skorašnju zanimljivu studiju).

Uvodna studija o slovenačkoj ekonomskoj politici nakon osamostaljenja može se pronaći kod Ćetkovića i Ćetkovića (1992) i Mencingera (1993). Temeljniju i svežiju studiju daje Cvirk (1993). Vizen (1993) je prvi pokušao da prouči ekonomiju Makedonije. Ništa slično ne postoji u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj, doduše vidi Madžara (1993). Ovo je velika šteta, s obzirom da ove države predstavljaju interesantne primere ratnih ekonomija. Najbolje mesto da se započne proučavanje ekonomije raspada Jugoslavije je nedavno izdanje *Komunističkih ekonomija i ekonomskih transformacija 5* (1993).

Broj izvora preko kojih možete da se obavestite o nedaćama Bosne i Hercegovine stalno raste ali, koliko ja znam, ne postoji sveobuhvatna studija. Rupnik (1993) može biti informativan.

Za osnovne informacije knjiga Rebeke Vest (1944) predstavlja nezaobilaznu literaturu. Jugoslovenska književnost predstavlja važan i bogat izvor informacija o tome kako su se doživljavali istorijski, etnički i politički problemi u jugoslovenskim krajevima. Najbolje je početi sa romanima. Mogu se konsultovati dela Andrića, Krleže, Crnjanskog, Selimovića, kao i Kiša, jer su prevedena na sve veće svetske jezike.

Kao što sam već naglasio na nekoliko mesta u knjizi, posebno se oslanjam na delo vodećeg srpskog intelektualca i teoretičara prava, Slobodana Jovanovića.



Vladimir Gliborov

PEŠČANIK

**WHY DO COUNTRIES
BREAK UP?
THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA**

Vladimir Gligorov

Why Do Countries Break Up?
The Case of Yugoslavia



Vladimir Gligorov

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Abstract

The book deals with the violent and inconclusive break up of Yugoslavia. The author relies on the rational political choice approach to construct an explanation that (i) given the preference of the ex-Yugoslav nations for ethnic justice over individual liberties and rights, and (ii) given the influences of the long terra ethnic strategies and rivalries, the legacy of the four decades of communist rule, and the complexities of the post-socialist transformation process, the break up of their common country was what it took the Yugoslav nations to try to realize their political preferences.

In Chapter 1 the process of “Balkanization” is discussed. First, the theory of constitutional choice is criticized. It is shown that the assumptions (stated and unstated) on which the theory is founded are not mutually consistent. Second, it is argued that that makes the idea of self-determination inoperable and self-destructive. Yugoslavia was founded on the principle of self-determination; it has been dissolving in accordance with the same principle. Third, the illusive idea of individual and ethnic identity, of the “self”, in the Balkans is described and analyzed. Fourth, the implications for the failure of any constitutional idea to be accepted as legitimate in Yugoslavia are drawn.

In Chapter 2 the process of the discovery of liberalism during the communist rule is discussed and the reasons for its failure given. All the classical liberal ideas were discovered in Yugoslavia in conflict with the socialist principles; they failed to play a key role in the transformation of the country because they did not arise from an idea of a Yugoslav state.

In Chapter 3 a “straightforward explanation” of the break up of Yugoslavia is given. It is argued that the state did not break up for economic reasons (as a way to get out of socialism), but for the following two reasons: (i) independent ethnic state is the long term strategy of Serbs and Croats (the two dominant Yugoslav nations); (ii) political preferences came to dominate the economic ones in the

process of transformation. Given the goals and the preferences and given the facts of the ethnic configuration, the break up of Yugoslavia was inevitable and it inevitably had to be inconclusive.

In Chapter 4 the contribution of the communist legacy is discussed and the record of individual and collective rights left in the ex-Yugoslav states is reviewed. It is shown that none of the newly established states has achieved a significant increase in those rights and is far from any ideal of a liberal state.

In the conclusion, the idea that “Balkans are different” is rejected and it is argued that the failure of the principles of civic rights and international order to be respected and implemented will invariably lead to the same set of outcome. In that the importance of the case of Yugoslavia lies.

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“The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficient; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and excellence, which he may use for the worst ends. That is why, if he has no excellence, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states; for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.”

Aristotle



Preface

This short book collects some of my publications on the dissolution of Yugoslavia. I treat the reasons, the dynamics, and the consequences. Though I have closely observed the process, my interest here is not to give a historical or sociological account of what was happening and is still going on in what used to be Yugoslavia. My interest is to (i) explain why the country broke up, and to (ii) show that the mainstream liberal thought is not well suited to understand that process. Thus, I want to discuss the reasons for the dissolution of a country and also to elucidate the specific case of Yugoslavia.

The process of dissolution that I analyze is far from over. Though I speculate on the outcomes here and there in this book, I do not want to leave an impression that I know what is about to happen in the Balkans in the future. It might be, however, appropriate to make one thing clear at the very beginning. Many approach the happenings in the former Yugoslavia as a typical Balkan affair. In the first chapter I discuss the process of Balkanization that is going on there. But as of now, the dissolution of Yugoslavia has produced some typical Balkan consequences, but it still is not a typical Balkan crisis. One way to make this clear is to say that the war that has been going on there for the last couple of years is not a Balkan war (as implied by the sub-title to an otherwise outstanding book by Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia. The Third Balkan War*). It is not about the unfinished business of the two previous Balkan wars but about the unsettled accounts from the two world wars. It may eventually spread into a Balkan war. That is something that one cannot know now.

I approach the subject as an economist, but I see the problem as essentially a political one. Yugoslavia broke up not because it was an inferior economic arrangement, but because that was the only way to settle its accumulated political accounts. Even, as I show, no matter the costs. To be able to analyze this political process I develop some simple space competition and game-theoretic models, but my

main argument relies on the understanding of politics that is as old as Aristotle's. The primary political motive there (in Yugoslavia, in the Balkans) was the pervasive sense of injustice that sprang from the insecurity the people involved felt about their collective and individual identities, about their rights, and about what they can expect in the time of far-reaching political and social changes. This is not to say that their behavior was irrational. On the contrary, whatever I say in this book relies on the assumption of people acting rationally, that is, acting in such a way that they can rationally expect that they will achieve their political goals. It is the fact that political rationality can bring about such disastrous consequences that makes the study of the Yugoslav case important.

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Some of the material was written when I was visiting the *Center for the Study of Public Choice* at George-Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia, USA in 1991 and 1992. Most of the material was written at the *Department of East European Studies* at Uppsala University.

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“Is What is Left Right?” in J. M. Kovacs (ed.), *The Unofficial Legacy of Communism. The Ironies of the Transition*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, coming out in 1994.

Introduction

Yugoslavia has been at the center of much of world's attention for quite some time now. That was a country that played an important role in the European and world affairs in the long period of the cold war that followed the World War II, and it disintegrated in a couple of years in a most spectacular way. The case has produced an already large literature. Books and papers are being written both by every kind of expert and by journalists reporting from the area. Increasingly, accounts from the insiders and the participants are coming out. Most of what is being written, when it is not directly politically motivated, deals with the reasons for the level of violence and destruction that the break-up of the country produced as well as with the moral and political experience those impressed on its citizens. There is no doubt that the subject will motivate even more scientific and soul searching.

In this book I approach the subject from a somewhat different angle. For some intellectuals living in Belgrade, as I was, the post-socialist and post-communist developments in Yugoslavia were a disappointment. There was an expectation that with the end of "historical materialism" the time for more normal, generally liberal, values will come. Much of what comes out from both Belgrade and Zagreb has the same general flavor: there was life even under communism after all, unlike now. Then, often, the blame pinning starts. My aim is to put emotional, partisan and political interests and considerations aside. I will try to explain why the country broke up. To do that, I will assume that that was what the people living there wanted. That is the recurring theme in this book.

As I explain the break-up of Yugoslavia as an outcome of the rational political choice, I have to take care of some liberal ideas that underlie much of the mainstream social science. Therefore, the political philosophy of John Rawls is discussed, the contractarian arguments that economics and politics are founded on are criticized, and the evolutionary (or Whig) theory of development of free society is shown



not to be applicable to this case. The point I make is that it is not the Balkans that are different but that it is the approach that is wrong.

The somewhat schematic version of the liberal approach would go as follows. In a society with highly conflicting moral, religious, political and cultural ideals, that offers certain political and economic advantages, rational people will choose to live under an arrangement that will represent their overlapping consensus. However, that will happen if the conflicting parties were to put their differences aside, either deliberately, or by accepting a decision-making procedure, or by being ready to engage in a rational argument. Why would they do that? If they were to follow their individual interests, they would not necessarily do that. If they were to follow some conflicting over-riding ideals, they would certainly not do that. As the case of Yugoslavia illustrates.

It is also argued that the taste of freedom is addictive. Once people start discovering that they have rights and that they can use these rights to get rid of oppressive and inefficient institutions, the discovery process will be self-sustaining and will not stop until the finest details of the “constitution of liberty” are discovered. However, this process does not require the ability to individualize the injustices only, but to generalize the principles of justice too. There is no guarantee that the latter process will go on as far as it should. The generalization may stop at the point where it includes all those that one considers to be one's equals according to some criterion or other. As the case with the all-powerful ethnic criterion adhered to in Yugoslavia testifies.

Shifting integrations and disintegrations are usually explained by contractarian arguments that supposedly work on the assumption that people join or leave states the way they join or leave clubs. If there is gain to be acquired that way, integration or a break-up will occur. Thus, political obligations are essentially the same as those one undertakes when one signs a contract. All the costs that ensue can be understood as transaction costs that had already been discounted when the expected gain was calculated. But, that is to explain too much. Surely there must be some level of costs that cannot be justified

by the expected gains. When one is called to fight for one's country or nation, there must be some sense in saying that the transaction cost that requires giving up one's life (or the lives of others) is somewhat too high. And as the case of the level of destruction that the break-up of Yugoslavia required shows, there is a point where the contractarian argument seems obviously misplaced.

It is also asserted that people conflict when their state does not reflect the prevalent sense of justice. If there are rights that are denied to some citizens, or there are opportunities that are denied to everybody, it seems reasonable to expect that there will be a movement demanding the enlargement and the respect of individual and collective rights. This seems especially appropriate for a totalitarian state, where the main task of the government is to violate individual rights, not to enforce them. Indeed, exit from socialism should be motivated and characterized by the respect for the rule of law. However, the opposition to an oppressive regime may be based on the feeling of injustice, not on any definite ideal of justice. People do not have to know what is just to feel that an injustice has been done to them. The idea of justice is general, the feeling of injustice is individual (this point I connect with Aristotle's theory of justice, see Gligorov [1985] for more). Therefore, totalitarian regimes may be universally rejected for the pervasive injustice they inflict on everybody, but that may not lead to any shared idea of justice, not to mention the idea of equal rights. As the examples of the level of justice or rather injustice in the newly created states of the former Yugoslavia testify.

The above schematic presentation of liberal political development is the one that I reject in this book relying on the analyses of the Yugoslav case, as the sparse comments above indicate. I do that in the four chapters that deal with particular aspects of the Yugoslav break-up, and in the appendices where I explain and amplify some of the ideas and models that I use in the body of the book. I will now give a short preview of what is to follow.

In the first chapter I analyze the process of "Balkanization". I contrast Montesquieu's idea that despotism is the appropriate regime for the



people that do not know their identities with the mainstream idea to be found in the contemporary political philosophy that the individuals put under a veil of ignorance will choose a liberal democratic constitution. I show that, in general, Montesquieu was right. The process of Balkanization is the case in point. There is no criterion that could not be used for identification purposes in the Balkans. That is the same as saying that most people there are uncertain as to their identities. And they invariably choose authoritarian as opposed to democratic regimes.

In the second chapter I analyze the process of discovery of liberalism and its failure in Yugoslavia. During the socialist period, citizens of Yugoslavia, and especially its intellectuals, discovered all the well known liberal principles through the prolonged and varied experience of socialist injustices. Indeed, Yugoslavia was not altogether inimical to liberal ideas, especially to those of pluralism and the market, in the way the other socialist states were. There was the specific problem of the so-called self-management that proved to be somewhat more difficult to subject to criticism, but even those who defended it relied increasingly on liberal arguments. In the Yugoslav public, it was increasingly difficult to argue against individualism, private property, the rule of law, civil society, parliamentary democracy, and political pluralism. However, once communists gave up, the liberal values all but disappeared. The whole country, all of its nations, led very often by their most respected intellectuals, went nationalist. While one used to make fun of the communists by citing the famous *dictum* from Orwell's "Animal Farm" that "everybody is equal, only some are more equal than the others", now, all of a sudden, everybody started to speak the Orwellian language unashamedly. The analogous *dictum* that says it all could go like this: "everybody is equal regardless of their ethnic origin, only those of my ethnic origin are more equal than the others". As one can see, Orwell's *dictum* is even more subtle than that of the nationalists.

In the third chapter I give a "straightforward explanation" of the break-up of Yugoslavia. That is the central part of the book. I argue (i) that

Yugoslavia was reformable, and (ii) that the very reasons that made it reformable worked for its dissolution. There is by now a growing consensus that transformed Yugoslavia would have enabled all its nations to achieve much greater justice, security and welfare than the newly independent states were able to secure. From that it follows that the reasons that led to the break-up of Yugoslavia have to be found in the conflicting political strategies justified by the all-important ethnic goals. The destructive cause I identify with the widespread feeling of ethnic injustice and the increasing and widespread expectation that with the inevitable change in the Yugoslav power structure it would grow. From there and from the imbalances in the changing power structure I develop an explanation of the process of state's dissolution. I argue that states come into being for many reasons, but invariably supply security - they dissolve for the lack of justice.

In the final chapter, I retell the fundamentals of the Yugoslav constitutional dilemmas and discuss the way that the newly created states treat human and other rights. I show that their record is disappointing to say the least. In this as well as in the second chapter, I discuss the legacy of communism and socialism. Communist Yugoslavia distorted the political space in the way typical for the totalitarian states, so that after the collapse of communism it started falling to the right side almost indefinitely. Thus, regimes sprang up that were not very keen on equal rights considerations. These states, much like the communist states previously, go through cycles of all kinds of "cleansing". In the end, the constitutions of these states look like a collection of rules of discrimination. Those are the rights left after an ethnic revolution.

In the last chapter more than in the others I discuss the prospects for the former Yugoslav areas. The way it looks now, permanent instability seems inevitable. In the conclusion to this chapter as well as in conclusions to some of the other chapters I write on Yugoslavia in more or less political terms. I do so to stress the problem of understanding that this case illustrates. I do not advocate any particular position or a partisan case. I only try to warn of what is



perhaps yet to come. In an appendix I discuss the contribution of the international community to this state of instability.

In the other appendices I discuss different theoretical and other matters useful for the understanding of my main argument. I also give some speculative information on the costs of the break-up and some comments on the literature. I have written the appendices in such a way that they can be used independently of the main text and *vice versa*. I believe that some will like to just read what I have to say about the causes and the consequences of the break-up and will not bother with the theory that I rely on to make that stick. Some might want to read more on some of the aspects that I touch on in the book, but elaborate in the appendices. I have hoped to accommodate both interests.

CHAPTER 1

Balkanization, a theory of constitutional failure

“One would imagine that human nature should perpetually oppose a despotic government. But notwithstanding the love of liberty, so natural to mankind, notwithstanding their innate detestation of force and violence, most nations are subject to this very government. This is easily accounted for. In order to form a moderate government, it is necessary to combine the several powers, to rule to temper, and set them in motion, to give, as it were, ballast to one in order to enable it to resist another. This is a master-piece of legislation, rarely produced by hazard, and seldom attained by prudence. On the contrary, a despotic government offers itself, as it were, at first sight; it is uniform throughout; and as passions only are requisite to establish it, this is what every capacity may reach.”

Montesquieu

National states are often and perhaps increasingly justified by the principle of self-determination. However, it is not always obvious what the “self stands for and how is it to be “determined”. In this chapter, I aim to develop a simple theory of self-determination failure. I will use the term “Balkanization” to refer to it and look at some of the experiences of what used to be Yugoslavia.

That country was originally justified on the newly proclaimed principle of self-determination.¹ It dissolved in accordance with the resurgence

1 The dissolutions of Yugoslavia and possibly Czechoslovakia are often understood in light of the breakdown of The Soviet Union. This is wrong. Even the breakdown of The Soviet Union is a much more complex process than it is sometimes taken to be. However, communists used the principle of self-determination to create The Soviet Union as a step towards a world socialist empire, while Yugoslavia and some other countries in Central Europe gained independence with no connection either to the communist idea or with a communist type of self-determination. So, the dissolution of The Soviet Union is a process of power failure, while in the case of Yugoslavia and possibly some other countries it is a constitutional failure.



of the same principle. At the time of its founding in 1918, the principle was introduced with the hope that it will help some sort of peace and stability to be established in the region. However, the conflicts proved to be more durable than the principle. Indeed, the current turmoil can be seen as a form of a political process characteristic of the region, whence the term “Balkanization” comes. It is interesting and I think not inappropriate to see the most recent developments in Yugoslavia in the light of a process that is connected to a wider region.

The regional aspect, of course, has a role similar to that of a battle-ground in the theory of conflicts. It is the clash of identities that the real conflict is about. It is also interesting to pose some more general questions about our ability to understand political developments such as Balkanization. I think that Balkanization can be taken to typify a general failure of stable political authority or agency to emerge. Therefore, Balkanization has a distinct philosophical as well as political and historical significance.

As in the whole of this book, in this chapter I am interested in understanding the most fundamental grounds for the failure of liberalism. In the next, I will look more specifically into the failure of liberalism in post-socialist Yugoslavia. In the last two chapters I will detail the political reasons for these failures.

“We, the South Slav people”

In this chapter, I discuss a constitutional analogue to market and public failures.² In normative theory, authority is introduced in the most fundamental sense through the process of rules of the game choice. Though the choice can be thought to be made in many different ways, in the contractarian tradition it is often argued that, given favorable circumstances, individuals or states will come up with a set of rules that they would want to abide by in their everyday lives. This set of fundamental rules is seen as containing legal norms which form a constitution. More precisely, under certain assumptions, a group of people is seen as formally or informally convening to write a constitution. In general, in the contractarian tradition, it is assumed that every state is founded on an explicit or implicit universal contract that is a product of formal or informal constitutional convention. As a matter of fact, the constitution and the convention are one and the same thing.³

In an even more general way, not only every state but every institution can be seen as being derived from a constitution (implicit or explicit) or as fitting into a constitution. That understanding, in every possible case, can be introduced through a hypothetical imperative (a conditional) stating that every existing institutional arrangement is justified if it passes a hypothetical test that it would have been chosen had everybody been asked in an appropriate way whether they would have wanted to respect that institutional provision; that is, whether they would have wanted to take on precisely those institutional obligations had they had a chance to choose the institution in

2 The analogue stands even if it is the case, as I would like to argue otherwise, that there are no market and government failures. It might not be true that markets are inefficient or fail to emerge altogether and it might not be the case that political authorities fail to meet the standards of political efficiency or that they even try. It would still be true, however, that a failure of a constitution to be constructed makes sense. So, nothing that I say in this paper depends on the theories of market and public failures.

For a quite general review of the “failures and remedies” concepts see Stiglitz [1989].

3 For an argument to that effect see Mueller [1991]; for criticism from a social choice perspective see Gligorov [1992d].



question or, which is the same thing, whether they would have signed a contract with precisely those institutional provisions.

The constitutional imperative thus asserts that a state is explicitly or implicitly founded on a document that is introduced and signed by “We, the people”. In case of Yugoslavia, the country of the South Slavs, the constitutional contract had to be signed with “We, the South Slav people”. That, of course, changes the referent of the pronoun “We” and the political and every other meaning of the “people”. The one aspect that I want to point to immediately is that the “We, the South Slav people” signature relies on the pre-contractarian character of the ethnic identity of the people. Indeed, this difference will play a crucial role in the other chapters of this book. In this chapter, however, I will deal with the “ideal type” case when “the people” are not under that added obligation and look at the constitutional hypothetical imperative directly.

I will call this hypothetical imperative, when used in a contractarian sense, a constitutional choice.⁴ Therefore, if the opportunity arises for institutions to be put to an actual constitutional test, a constitution is invariably the outcome of that social deliberation process. The other way to put this is to say that there is always an explicit or implicit social contract. So, a theory of constitutional failure is precisely the statement that this constitutional assertion is false.

A normative argument in form of a hypothetical imperative cannot be contradicted by empirical analysis of any kind, because of its counterfactual character. This has two unfortunate consequences: first, every constitutional choice statement will be true and, second, every institution can be constitutionally justified. For these reasons, the constitutional claim has to be discussed in normative terms and tested for consistency. However, it is helpful to have a specific example in mind, so that the theoretical argument could be both better understood and it could be used to understand the case one is in fact interested in explaining with the help of the theory

⁴ It is analogous to notions like “individual choice”, “rational choice”, “social choice”, or “public choice”. Again, though the theory of choice may or may not be consistent, I will argue that the theory of constitutional choice is not consistent.

developed or, as it will be the case here, through a criticism of such theory.

Therefore, in this chapter, I take the example of “Balkanization”, discuss the theoretical problems of constitution failure, and come back to illustrate the theoretical conclusions reached with a discussion of the historical and current developments in the Balkans, and particularly in what used to be Yugoslavia.

Balkanization described

By “Balkanization” a process and possibly a cycle of empire disruption, small countries creation, local instability, and a new (or old) empire moving in is meant.⁵ Historically, it refers to the period of unrest and wars in the Balkans in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century.⁶ The Turkish Empire was moving out and being pushed away from the area, while Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires were moving in and were being resisted. However, the Balkanization process was characterized particularly by the attempts of the Balkan nations at autonomous states creation and by wars erupting between them. The process was supposed to have been finished with the final self-determination of the Balkan nations. However, in retrospect, it could be argued that Balkanization has lasted all the way to the

5 By an empire I mean, first, an authority based on power, that is a heteronomous authority (in Kant’s sense). Second, I mean state authority based on power (for instance, a despotism in Montesquieu’s sense). Third, I mean a state that provides its citizens with security, but not necessarily with justice. To be able to supply either or both, however, it might be (and usually is) decentralized to provinces. Forth, an empire has no clear borders, because it rests on the universal principle of power. The difference between a state and an empire is, at least, that a state has clearly defined borders. The difference might also be that a state is almost synonymous with legality, that is it provides its citizens with justice as well as with security. But the last point is more debatable; for a thorough and basically indecisive discussion of this point see Jovanovic [1990].

6 On the theory of international politics see Wight [1977].



present time, when another round of power collapse followed by civil and inter-state wars is being played. So, Balkanization can be thought of as a process extending over almost two centuries now.

Balkanization does not occur every time an empire shrinks and it is not really identical with that development, but it is a simultaneous process of a dominant power decline and an autonomous authority emergence, or rather a failure of one to emerge. If an empire loses power, some parts can secede or get some kind of autonomy, without engaging in civil war or in wars with their neighbors. A Balkanization occurs if with the collapse of an empire, a stable political configuration cannot emerge because of political impotence expressed by the fact that no autonomous authority emerges.

In fact, wars are not essential to the Balkanization process. There will invariably be wars, but the main characteristic is not the multiplicity of conflicting political actors, but the sometimes prolonged political emptiness. It may be characterized in many ways, but I will be interested in the impossibility of a viable state creation. I might say that Balkanization occurs when an opportunity for self-determination presents itself and it fails to be translated into an establishment of autonomous public authority.

To illustrate, assume that there is an empire that extends over a number of provinces and borders on other empires and states. Now, if the empire starts losing power, the provinces may become quasi-states or outright sovereign states. They may engage in a war with other states with the aim of establishing the mutually acceptable borders or for reasons of keeping the other empires from moving in. But, states at war are states.

On the other hand, a process of Balkanization occurs if the process of state creation fails. The occupied provinces, in the first case, could be called proto-states (or pre-constitutional states),⁷ while, in the second case, they might end up forever being provinces in search of a state.

⁷ A pre-constitutional state may be a “natural state” or the one based on an “ancient constitution” as opposed to a “revolutionary constitution”. For further thoughts on that in the Yugoslav setting, see Gligorov [1991].

This, really, opens up the fundamental problem of authority emergence, or of legitimacy. One might want to argue that any state of *anarchy* will bring about a legitimate authority, for one or the other of the well known political reasons (protection, gains from cooperation, justice, and usurpation). If we take the empire decline process as the one that is the same as the process of growing *anarchy*,⁸ Balkanization will represent the most general case of authority legitimization, or rather of its failure.

Balkanization is a process that occurs when an autonomous political authority cannot come about through a process of self-determination, and even if it did, it could not be legitimately sustained.

In what follows, I will take Balkanization to refer to this general case of political self-determination failure, that is of the legitimate state formation failure (or of authority legitimization failure), and I will refer somewhat vaguely to the history of the Balkans from early nineteenth century to the late twentieth century. I will primarily have in mind the Yugoslav areas.

Identity and power

The more or less axiomatic theory of constitutional choice⁹ assumes at least the following.

1. A number of *representative individuals* (representing themselves, groups of individuals, or states). Those they represent we may call a *population* (the number of representatives and that of the members of the population may be the same).

⁸ Anarchy is here meant in the sense to be found both in ancient and modern political philosophy. For Aristotle as well as for Hobbes, anarchy was a regime that all regimes dissolved into. However, everything that I am going to say is applicable also to a Lockean or Rousseauian natural state as well as to contemporary transaction costs free anarchies. On this see Gligorov [1992d].

⁹ I take social choice theory to be the axiomatic approach to constitutional decision making. However, in this paper, I discuss the even more general problem of constitutional choice. For more details see Gligorov [1985].



2. A set of *strategies* for the representatives (not necessarily the same ones for everybody). We may call them *policies*.
3. A set of *outcomes* (in the general case, the choice is between different types of political regimes). This is really the constitutional assumption.
4. A decision-making *procedure* (in principle, but not necessarily, a voting scheme).

It is also assumed that the representatives have *preferences* over outcomes. They are supposed to be engaged in contracting, a multi-person social contract being exactly a state constitution. A contract being written, it details the rights and obligations of all those joining the state. The rights and obligations are of two kinds: those that citizens owe each other and those they claim against or owe the state. The latter are those connected with the public authority and can also be called political rights and obligations. I will deal solely with the latter and do not intend to go into details.

The reasons that individuals will form states (and states will form confederations) have been discussed in great detail in political philosophy and philosophy of law. I will just mention some of them. *Natural reasons* are those analyzed by Aristotle; they have to do, in essence, with the gains from cooperation. *Political reasons* are those discussed by Plato; they are connected with the question of justice. *Liberal reasons* are those advocated, among others, by Hobbes; they deal primarily with security and protection. Finally, there is what may be called *realistic reasons*, in reference to the followers of the so-called school of *realpolitik*; they trace every public authority to usurpation. Nothing that I will say will depend on what type of political philosophy one accepts. It might be more difficult to accept constitutionalism and rely on some idea of “man being by nature political animal” at the same time (though Aristotle and others succeeded in doing that).¹⁰ However, as long as the problems of legitimacy of authority are assumed to appear, the argument I am making should go through.

¹⁰ I indeed think that Aristotle was the first to formulate a theory of constitution failure. More on this in V. Gligorov [1992d].

In any case, for my purposes, I will only assume that a (minimal) state supplies its subjects with at least security and hopefully with justice; or, which is to say the same thing in the constitutional setting, that these are the political goods demanded by those making the constitutional choice.¹¹

Now, a very important assumption. The constitution building process is often implicitly or explicitly assumed to take place in *autarky*. By this I mean that it is often assumed that representatives at a constitutional convention do not have free entry and exit rights. These are somehow regulated.¹² One may decide whether to attend a convention or not. But, once the decision had been made, there is no turning back. Also, once a convention starts, the doors are closed to the outsiders, except under clearly denned set of rules. In that sense, once the constitution starts being written down, the representatives act as if they were in normative *autarky* that is as if they were completely autonomous.¹³ This is also, as I will point out below, entailed by the assumption of decision makers at the convention being representatives and it is quite clearly implied in the assumption of the veil of ignorance.¹⁴

I do not think, therefore, that this is an independent assumption. In fact, it will be satisfied as soon as a decision making rule is adopted. If a voting rule is followed, the adoption of the voting rule will determine the size of the constitution making body, because every voting rule says that some fraction of N (a number of representatives) is decisive.¹⁵ Usually, the *autarky* assumption is not even explicitly made. It is subsumed or entailed in the definition of a constitutional convention, in the decision making rules, and indeed in the very notion of a public decision, because it relies on an assumption that an individual's voice counts.

11 They might want more, and possibly even less; i. e., it seems impossible in general to have justice without protection, while the contrary is not true. I take it that this is the main point Hobbes was making.

12 It is not obvious how. Some idea of optimal population size might be evoked, or some idea of justice may be assumed (often implicitly). If an idea of natural rights is evoked or implied, then, of course, the meaning of the whole constitutional choice enterprize is radically altered.

13 See on this J. Buchanan [1975].

14 On this in inter-generational context see Arrow [1983].

15 For more on this see Gligorov [1992d].



Still, even if *autarky* is not explicitly assumed and even if it is explicitly assumed that there is free entry and exit all the time, nothing essential will be changed, for reasons that are well known from social choice theory. But I will claim that the problem is there as soon as we are considering constitutional choices. The number of individuals deciding is irrelevant, if the constitution is to be the supreme authority that cannot be abrogated; that is, if the body writing the constitution has a sovereign power. This being the case by definition, all those subject to the constitution (all of the state's subjects) could not call upon another power or constitution if and when they wanted to exercise a right that the actual constitution did not guarantee or if they wanted to avoid a specific obligation that they had under their constitution. Therefore, every constitutionalism assumes some kind of normative *autarky*.¹⁶ Unfortunately, this is in contradiction with the assumption of normative *anarchy* on which constitutional hypothetical imperative relies, but if *autarky* is not assumed, other assumptions will lose their meaning and there will be no constitutional choice, or at least that is what I am going to argue here.

The constitution will fail to arise if some of the assumptions listed above are not satisfied. However, the assumptions that I will be specifically looking into are those that deal with the identity of the representatives at the constitutional convention and with the state of *autarky* being absent. At the end of this section I will briefly discuss the problem of primary political interest, which is that of the consistency of representatives' strategies. But my concern in this chapter is primarily normative, so this last aspect will only be touched upon here and dealt with more extensively in the next chapters. I want to show that in general there can be a constitution failure precisely because all the assumptions are fulfilled.

Now, the usual assumption in constitutional theory is that those attending the constitutional convention will act in their own interest only indirectly, that is they will act as representatives. Even if every-

16 Plato was, of course, the first to recognize that. Another important source in this context is Kant. A more contemporary authority on these matters is Weber. Of course, a different approach is to be found in natural law theories.

body is present at the constitutional convention in person, every individual will be taken to be a representative of himself. This can be satisfied in different ways, for instance by requiring everybody to act as a moral person or by introducing a high enough level of uncertainty about the real identity of every particular person or in other ways. In contemporary political philosophy this assumption is usually introduced by a metaphor of the veil. The individuals are assumed to be deliberating and deciding as if they were under a veil of ignorance in a sense of not knowing who they really are. It is argued that if that were the case, the representatives would not only be prepared to write down a constitution but the actual content of the document could be safely predicted. However, it is irrelevant for the discussion here whether the constitution they were to agree on would use the rights and obligations definitions that are utilitarian in character, Kantian or any other.

I will now argue that a proposition stating precisely the opposite of this constitution possibility contention is true.

Proposition 1. If in the state of *anarchy* (state of nature, pre-constitutional state) individuals are ignorant of their identities, the self-determination attempt will be subjected to a process of Balkanization.¹⁷

As an aside, I want to state that the constitution failure that I will be talking about has nothing to do with either the Arrow impossibility of social choice result or with the Prisoner's Dilemma type of cooperation failure. The social choice difficulty is one of conceptual and constructivist type, it shows that the infeasible can rationally be deemed to be desirable. The Prisoner's Dilemma illustrates the difficulty of the feasible to be convincing enough to be desirable. Therefore, these two examples of failure of rationality

17 This I might call an “anthropological claim”. Almost every well-known political philosophy rests on some assumption about human nature. I am not assuming anything specific here. All I assume is that individuals have identities. Or, the other way around, that it is impossible to assume individualism without assuming identities. Once this is accepted, the difficulties with state creations by individuals without identities should come as no surprise. I take it that Aristotle was making a similar point connecting freedom with authority, that is lack of freedom with lack of authority.



and institutional failure deal with characteristics of deliberation and cooperation.¹⁸

Also, market failures and the political failures are basically similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma type of problems. Either the markets will fail to emerge or public authorities will fail to solve a market failure or will even create a new one. The problem I am looking at is different. Is it possible that a public authority will fail to arise even if there are no traces of those other rationality, coordination and institutional failures present? If it is, then a constitution failure will be identified.

Now, as an introduction to the main argument, one reason that a constitution failure may occur can be seen by reviewing the misgivings that certain versions of contractarian political philosophy have about the information assumptions put on the individuals who are to accept a constitution. Some believe that those writing down a constitution and voting it in should be put under a *veil of ignorance*, for moral or political reasons. The representatives at the constitutional convention are to decide without knowing who they are. The same kind of an effect can be achieved by alternative assumptions. The deliberator may be assumed to be guided by the public interest (or by public spirit), to be following their sheer or real self-interest (the interest of the self cleansed from self-interest, to put it dialectically), or they may be said to be deciding in a transaction costs free state. In any of these settings, one possible outcome is a constitution that will enable everybody to be exactly what he is (whatever that might mean), once the veil is lifted.¹⁹ Another is to impose constitutionally those institutions that will improve upon one's identity, once the special pre-constitutional information restrictions are lifted. Still another possibility is to model the institutions so that they will redistribute in favor of those that end up being worse off than the others once they have to live in accordance with these institutions. Finally, those deciding may agree on a utilitarian or some other criterion of

18 For more on that see Gligorov [1992d].

19 This, I think, was Plato's idea. As far as I am aware, the veil of ignorance first appeal's in Plato's political philosophy.

improvement of the collective identity or social well-being.²⁰ Whatever approach one takes, the veil of ignorance assumption makes actual individual identities a function of the constitution adopted rather than the other way around.²¹

Others believe that this type of an approach does not distinguish among individuals enough or not at all.²² Therefore, even if the veil is not lifted, it is assumed that some fundamental differences in terms of political principles that could be advocated by the representatives at the convention when the constitution is actually written could exist with everybody being equally ignorant. That is, there could be conflicting constitutional principles even if the representatives at the constitutional convention are not acting in their unenlightened self-interest, much the same as there are fundamental differences among scholars of constitutional law or among political philosophers. However, as long as the veil is kept on, the constitutional choice, the choice between conflicting constitutional principles, will be a function of a deliberation process that is assumed to be the same for everyone (for instance, the choice might be required to be rational, whatever that means).²³ If, on the other hand, the veil is lifted, the differences will be real and there will be no procedure to settle these disagreements except in such a manner that some will end up with an outcome they would rather it had not been reached. It is precisely for this kind of outcome not to arise that the veil of ignorance thought experiment is used.

But, will it prevent the constitution failure from occurring? I will approach this question in two steps. First, I will show that, in general,

20 For a contractarian interpretation of utilitarianism see Binmore [1989].

21 This is explicitly recognized by Rawls in [1971]. However, I interpret Aristotle's criticism of Plato's constructivism in exactly that way. For a general criticism of Platoism in political philosophy see Gligorov [1992d].

22 On that see Rawls [1971]. Rawls himself was reproached for the same mistake by Gauthier in his [1974]. In his later work, Rawls has even radicalized his position. See Rawls [1985] and [1987].

23 This is not an innocuous assumption. It may be argued that individualism requires that every individual can come up with a different solution even using the same information. I am not assuming this here because I would argue that, contrary to the usual assumption, a constitution can be drawn only if individuals have precisely that kind of an identity.



no constitution has to emerge. Second, I will argue that, in general, only political states will come about.²⁴

Why is it that the constitution might not be written? Before answering this question, I will just recall that I am assuming that a constitutional state should ensure the supply of at least two public goods: security and justice.²⁵ Now, one of the reasons that a constitution might not be agreed upon is that there is no principle of justice that individuals that do not know who they really are can agree on. I am not simply saying that every principle that individuals might agree upon under the veil of ignorance will fail to be acceptable to the same individuals once they discover who they are. What I am suggesting is that there is no idea of justice that is applicable to the case of individuals without clear identities. One way to see what I am saying is to assume that individuals have been stripped of their identities by requiring them to follow the morality of the most sever altruism or benevolence (every other idea of public interest, state interest, collectivist interest or general will would do). If everybody has gone through a severe process of self-denial that extreme altruism requires, everybody will be defined as just another member of a community from every possible normative point of view. By the very description, there are no principles of either commutative or distributive justice that could be derived from that assumption.²⁶ Commutative justice requires that those injured will be compensated for the harm done to them; but no harm can ever be done to an extreme altruist, because by the very definition the interests of the others override his own. Distributive justice relies on some idea of maximization of individual well-being. Extreme altruism can never settle down to any distribution of individual well-being because every distribution can be improved upon by a new redistribution in favor of the others.²⁷

24 I distinguish between constitutional and political states in the way that Hume implicitly does. See Hume [1953].

25 A minimal state supplies security; a minimal constitutional state supplies security and justice.

26 That was Hume's point on justice and equality. See Gligorov [1992b] for more on that.

27 This problem is not faced by utilitarianism because its idea of benevolence is based on self-interest. Extreme altruism, unlike utilitarianism, assumes that everything one has is always worth more as something belonging to somebody else. Therefore, there is no equilibrium distribution of altruism.

Another way to arrive at the same result is to assume that everybody has been stripped of all their individual characteristics except for their names that are to be used only for designation or roll-call purposes. Then, there is nobody to apply the judgments of justice to. If there are no identities, no harm can ever be done, no distribution can ever be judged better than any other, therefore, there is no question of justice to settle, even if there did exist a whole set of theories of political philosophy that purport to deal with precisely such type of a situation.²⁸

Therefore, there is no idea of justice applicable to individuals under a veil of ignorance, so there can be no constitution embodying it.²⁹ Under these assumptions, no constitution will ever emerge.

If a state emerges at all, what kind of a state would that be? Montesquieu argued that in a case of extreme political equality and extreme individuality denial only despotism can emerge. This may be judged to be applicable only under extreme circumstances and in far-away places. However, the assumptions are perfectly general. As a matter of fact, they are almost identical with those that the current political philosophy introduces through the veil of ignorance hypothetical. That justifies a generalization to the effect that in the case of extreme identities repression only political and not constitutional states will emerge. By this I mean that, in the case described, individuals will have no reason to take advantage of writing down a set of principles

28 To comment briefly on one possibility only: assume that the veil of ignorance is so thick that everybody represents the same individual rationality function. First, there will be, in fact, only one person writing a constitution, therefore he or she does not have to consider the question of commutative justice at all, because a constitution can be written in which no harm is ever done. Second, if he or she deliberates upon the wishes of a person with a real identity, he or she has thereby lifted the veil in order to arrive at some judgement about distributive justice. Therefore, no identities, no justice.

29 Rawls assumes the veil of ignorance, but he also assumes non-tuism. I fail to see how anyone who does not know who he is going to be can act on the principle of self-interest. If, for instance, one thinks in the following way: "I do not know who I am, but if I were to end up being poor, I would like to be given preferential treatment", then we have a poor man deliberating. That is, we have lifted the veil of ignorance. His theory of justice is worked out in this contradictory manner. Harsanyi, on the other hand, does not deal with justice at all, but with a justification of utilitarian morality. Because of that, he does not need either constitutional or contractarian assumptions, because morals are a non-contractarian phenomenon. For an opposite view, see Binmore [1989].



they would be willing to abide by or, which is to say the same thing, they will not regard these principles as binding. In fact, they might rather prefer to take their chances with the lawless state. They may find that a lawless state can offer them more opportunities than the one with a constitution. Therefore, in the circumstances described, individuals would choose one of the political regimes ranging from democracy to tyranny, but they would never agree to form a constitutional state.³⁰

If I am right in what I have been saying, then the assumption of the veil of ignorance is incompatible with the justification of a constitutional state. Furthermore and in general, a constitution failure will occur whenever such a veil is put over the identities of the individuals implementing the right to self-determination. Individuals will take their chances with might, not with right; they will conflict and bargain over power, not over constitutional rights.

I have argued so far that a constitution failure will occur if individuals deciding are stripped of their identities. A related type of failure occurs if the explicit or implicit assumption of *autarky* is removed. If an authority structure breaks down, it might not be obvious which constitutional convention one should attend. This problem is best analyzed in terms of the theory of fiscal federalism. If there are competing public authorities, one might acknowledge the one that is best suited to satisfy his wants. It should be noted immediately that for the competitive solution of public authority conflict to work, individuals subjected to that authority should know their identities. However, many other assumptions have to be satisfied too.³¹ One particularly important assumption is that

30 The difference between a constitutional state and the political state may be seen as that between law and decision. Another way is to allude to the distinction between legality and sovereignty; another still between rules and discretion. In any case, the Aristotelian classification of political regimes distinguishes regimes by, among other things, whether they are based on might or on right. In the first class are all those that take a decision of a specified number of people to be law-making.

31 One can see what I am saying by imagining a model of fiscal federalism (competing states model) without clear boundaries between states being drawn. If boundaries are to be the outcome of the competition between political authorities, they will either be indeterminate or the free mobility of individuals across states assumption will have to be violated.

individuals have to be perfectly mobile. If they are not, and they will not be if they are aware of their identities, they may very well end up in a state they do not want to be in. Beyond that, the constitution, at least in ideal-typical circumstances, should be accepted unanimously and should have general applicability.³² Therefore, when the decision to write a constitution is taken, it should be known beforehand who should the constitution apply to, who, so to speak, will be considered to be the subjects of the emerging constitutional state. In that sense, every constitution is written as if in a state of complete normative *autarky* from the rest of the world. In fact, I will argue that:

Proposition 2. There is no guarantee that a constitution will be adopted, if those deciding are not in a state of *autarky* (which does not mean that it will be even if there is *autarky*).

Once the *autarky* assumption is not satisfied, no constitution might ever emerge. The reason is simple. If there is no *autarky*, if everyone can get in and out of the constitutional decision making process at any time, the constitution will never be comprehensive and complete.³³ To see this, assume, for instance, that a generation writes a constitution and dies off. Now, the next generation will not be able to renegotiate the constitution with the previous generation, because there is nobody to negotiate with. The same is the case with secession. Assume that a population writes a constitution, a new one joins, and the original population secedes. What about the constitution? Does it have to be renegotiated with those who had left the country or not? If not, the state emerging will look just like any other political state that might or might not rely on legality (it might use laws but it will not feel bound by them, at least not in a constitutional sense) and not simply on political authority.

32 Nothing changes if less than unanimous agreement is required. See Gligorov [1992d].

33 To see this, assume that the constitution is renegotiated every time someone decides to join or to leave (in the latter case renegotiation may be necessary even if all the decisions had been taken unanimously, because there may be distributional effects). Then, the proposition follows from the fact that there will not exist any cooperative equilibrium outcome.



The problem can again be approached in terms of the veil of ignorance metaphor. If those writing a constitution are under a veil of ignorance, then, first, everybody entering should be supposed to be veiled in ignorance and, second, everybody exiting should be making that choice in complete ignorance. However, competition is an information processing procedure and thus conflicts with the veil of ignorance assumption. It is consistent with a utilitarian criterion, though, but even that criterion assumes normative *autarky* because in every possible version it has to rely on the number of individuals that the utilitarian calculus is supposed to apply to. Anyhow, utilitarianism is not a constitutionalist and contractarian political philosophy and I leave it out here.

If what I said is correct, that means that for a constitution to be adopted, some kind of a state must have already existed. That is why the *autarky* assumption is so crucial and self-defeating. If it is assumed (and as I said, it is implied either by the decision-making rule or by the veil of ignorance assumption, that is one way to capture the assumption of representation), a pre-constitutional state will be assumed; if it is not, no constitutional state will ever emerge. Put differently, a constitution building process is not equivalent to the state building process. The failure of a constitution to emerge does not mean that there will be no state, but that, in general, constitutional decision making process is not a state creation process. Even if states could be created constitutionally, that does not mean that this is either a sufficient or a necessary condition for a state to emerge, stabilize and persist.

Therefore, and in general, *lack of individual identity and autarky will end up in a constitution failure.*

However, the removal of these obstacles does not ensure that a constitution will emerge. As a matter of fact, the following proposition will be discussed in most of the rest of this book:

Proposition 3. People conscious of their social, political, and individual identity, deciding in an international setting will invariably put up political, not constitutional, authorities, if they prove capable of putting up any authority at all.

Once individuals are conscious of their identities and the rules of citizenship are clearly determined, everybody will have an interest in voting and acting strategically, which means that there is no guarantee that there would be any acceptable and implementable constitutional social contract even if all the other assumptions were satisfied. Once individuals are not seen as representatives but are understood to be “by nature political animals”, it becomes very difficult to talk about constitutional choice in a contractarian spirit. There may be no constitutional politics (and in general there will not be one). But, in this chapter, I am interested only in the two previously discussed reasons leaving the discussion of the last for later.³⁴

Notes

Balkanization explained

I discussed the idea of constitution failure to be able to apply it to the actual process of Balkanization. The process I have in mind involves all three types of failures that I described above. The veil of ignorance is being constantly reinforced through identity contests. Because of that, there are competing normative authorities and the *autarky* assumption is not satisfied. The surrogate identities (nations, languages, cultures, political Utopias) work to destroy the possibility of normative *autarky* being established and stimulate individuals to rely on power rather than on constitutional rights. Therefore, I think that the theory of constitution failure that I am developing is useful to understanding Balkanization.

Probably the basic feature of Balkanization is that of contested identities. Whoever has studied the Balkans knows that not only territories but most importantly the identities of most of the people there (individuals and nations) have been highly contested. Very

34 For a general discussion of problems of implementation, see Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin [1979].



often, to be able to survive, one had to hide behind a false identity often to the point of losing the memory of the original identity, which leads to constant creation of new myths about people's and state's true identity. In fact, the whole problem of individual identity expression is crucial for the Balkans in the way political philosophy assumes it must be in the general case also.³⁵

Now, what does one mean by an “identity”? Without going into political anthropology, a common-sense definition, in the terms that are applicable to this context, might be that *an identity is some conjunction of attributes that could be secured by a document that generalizes on these attributes over a designated population.* That means that all those attributes that one might attach to him or herself could be generalized in a sense that they could in principle apply to anybody that falls under that generalization. One way to say the same thing is to invoke the principle of equality in the legal sense that “everybody is equal regardless of individual differences in where the differences specified would constitute individual or aggregate identities. If this, let me call it “legal generalization operation”, cannot be performed, there are some criteria of differentiation that are not generalizable. Put differently, there are contested identities.

What I have been saying until now is that constitutional and contractarian approach to political philosophy has a serious problem because there is no consistent idea of a state if it is generalized to apply to the case of contested identities and moreover there is no consistent idea of a constitutional state if the generalization is accomplished by removing personal identities altogether (so that there are no conflicts by definition). The last situation might be seen as arising in cases where identities are so severely contested that there is no public recognition of who the individuals in a particular state are and also there are personal dilemmas for that very reason. If that is the case, there is a Balkanization process going on in the sense I am using this term here.

35 By a little stretch of the imagination, one could claim that the Balkans are searching for what Rawls' has called “overlapping consensus” having in mind the “Balkanization” that Europe went through during the period of the religious wars. See Rawls [1985] and [1987].

I will now run through some examples to show what I have in mind. One might say that a name is an indisputable sign of personal identity. So, it seems natural to have a right to choose one's name. However, in the Balkans, even personal names are contestable. One picks a name to transmit information about one's more general identity (whatever that means). On the other hand, others try to influence the choice of a name for the same reason. In the Balkans, authorities often get involved in the name choosing process, usually trying to achieve cultural and political assimilation. So, there are cycles of contests over what is a proper name in a certain community. Moreover, there are legal and other repressive mechanisms that are devised not only to influence the choice of personal names, but there are campaigns of name changing. A name is used to designate more than it can ever possibly do. Family names are an even more common object of attack. This is because they transmit even more identity information than the first name does.

What information is that? The contests over the names are as severe as they are because there are many other contesting areas that somehow concentrate on personal identities. One way to put this is to say that everything valuable is subject to extremely conflicting claims. Therefore, everything that might unite in fact disunites. Language is a good example. Many in the Balkans speak the same language.³⁶ But that makes for less not for more understanding. It is of course not necessary for someone who speaks English to be English and it is not necessary for Americans to have an American language to be Americans. However, in the Balkans, national identities are often identified with languages, even if there are no linguistic differences. Therefore, Croats must have a Croatian language, the way Serbs must have a Serbian language.³⁷ This is even more confusing than it would have otherwise been because there indeed are nationalities

36 It is, of course, not easy to say which languages are the same. If understanding is taken as a criterion, Croatian and Serbian, for instance, are one language. However, a Serb will not be able to write in Croatian without some instruction and vice versa. It is similar with Serbian and Macedonian and with Macedonian and Bulgarian.

37 At one point there was an attempt to create a Bosnian language, which is interesting because it would not have been a national but a regional language.



in the Balkans that are primarily identified by their language (e. g., Slovenian).

Religion is another example. The shared religion has both been an excuse to deny the identity of the others and a reason to proclaim their separate identity. So, it has been a reason to assimilate as well as to assert one's distinct identity. And, as everywhere, it has been the primary vehicle of assimilation, forceful inclusion and of political conformism, identity conversion and all kinds of other metamorphosis. It has also been the springboard of cultural differences to the point of identification of one's ethnicity with religious affiliation. However, the identification of culture with religion and especially ethnicity with religion can hardly work. Cultures are only partly based on religion and ethnicity can hardly be identified with religion because there are only so many religions and a much greater number of nations. What is true of culture and religion carries over to every other attribute one cares to choose to determine any aspect of individual and collective identities in the Balkans.³⁸

Now, these criteria do not work better in any other setting. Therefore, it is not simply the inconsistency of the identification criteria and it is not only their multiplicity but it is their contestability that has been exploited in the Balkans to the limit. I will go into the logic of contestability to elucidate this.

The level of contestability does not depend on whether the contestable criteria are plentiful or scarce. Even a “perfect identity” (whatever that might mean) is not enough of a guarantee that no conflict will arise. The incentives for differentiation may be there precisely because there are identity differences that are covered over by the common criterion. On the other hand, the increase of the number of criteria increases the potential cleavage points. Therefore, one cannot be completely defined by a small number of criteria and can be over-defined by a large number of them.

38 National identity, characterology, ethnogenesis, and political history are traditionally important subjects in the Balkans. Some authors that I have found useful when trying to understand some of the problems discussed here include Slobodan Jovanovic, Stjepan Radic, Ivan Cankar, Krste Misirkov and Dimitrije Bogdanovic. For a useful discussion of the national question see Banac [1984]. For a quick overview see Cvijic [1991].

Conflicts arise both through individualization and through generalization. Identity assertion can be seen as a secessionist move, which in general it is.³⁹ However, attempts at self-denial are very common also. They work through generalizations. In the Balkans, there is hardly a collective criterion that has not been used as a foundation for new identity creation. Nationalism is one such criterion that is extremely damaging. But other criteria have also been tried, Yugoslav identity being one of the most promising and at the same time the most disappointing. As a matter of fact, the birth of nationalism that was supposed to solve the problem of fuzzy identities has in turn been an obstacle to further generalizations, one of which is the Yugoslav, even in cases where the Yugoslav identity has served as a vehicle of national emancipation.⁴⁰ Also, federalism and confederalism have often been invoked in the Balkans, but federations as well as other types of alliances have failed to endure or bring stability.

The rules of inclusion and exclusion are plentiful and overlapping with no consensus emerging. One of the reasons is that, identities being ill defined and contested, historical criterion plays an important role. However, history is still on the level of mythical storytelling, so that every generation reinvents its collective memory. Therefore, not only current but also historical identities are a contested territory. The same arguments over the names, origins, defining criteria, territories, cultures, religious contributions and heritage are exchanged in historical as well as contemporary terms. History is perceived as primarily supplying the required justifications for the current national and political interests.

So, nothing one does or has deserved can be safe from a reinterpretation that will remove away all his most fundamental personal rights, not to mention his earthly property. Therewith, the extreme uncertainty arises. In that sense, the veil of ignorance assumption is satisfied to the level that there is no knowledge or understanding that one can rely on with any predictability. That, however, does not induce a behavior in terms of rational expectation theory but is an added incentive to rely on power and invites the use of force.

39 I take that to be Mill's approach to political identities.

40 More on this see in ch. 4.



In philosophical terms, Balkanization is explained by the fact that the emergence and persistence of every I and We is always violently contested. It is that level of intolerance that “Balkanizes”. If one looks through the meandering ways in which peoples and individuals have identified themselves throughout Balkan history it will become apparent that every value one might have owed one’s loyalty to have been put under an extreme pressure and the temptations to give up one’s beliefs to simply survive have always been very intense. One could hide by being somebody else, by being nobody, or by being what one is not, and even by being what one is. He who does not know who he is and is not perceived for what he is cannot find his place in the world. That world is the Balkans.

CHAPTER 2

The discovery and failure of liberalism in Yugoslavia

“Two men traveling on the highway – the one east, the other west – can easily pass each other if the way be broad enough; but two men reasoning upon opposite principles of religion cannot so easily pass without shocking, though one should think that the way were also in that case sufficiently broad and that each might proceed without interruption in his own course. But such is the nature of the human mind that it always lays hold on every mind that approaches it, and as it is wonderfully fortified by unanimity of sentiments, so it is shocked and disturbed by any contrariety. Hence the eagerness which most of the people discover in a dispute, and hence their impatience of opposition even in the most speculative and indifferent opinions.”

Hume

The state without qualities

Liberal thought was emerging in communist Yugoslavia, as in most of Central Europe, though there was a difference.⁴¹ While in some East European countries liberalism was being rediscovered, in Yugoslavia it had to be found. This was not because there never were liberal intellectuals or even liberal parties in Yugoslavia.⁴² In some

41 For an early assessment of Central European socialist countries see Scruton [1988].

42 There is no good overall history of political parties in different parts of Yugoslavia.

Liberalism was strong in Serbian intellectual circles by the end of the nineteenth century (see Prodanovic [1947]), but it was superseded by more radical and nationalist parties (for some ideas on Yugoslav political programs at the moment of the creation of Yugoslav state, see Banac [1984]). In the interwar period, there existed democratic, republican, and peasant parties with more or less liberal programs, but their influence was not strong. After the World War II, for a while some more-or-less liberal parties existed, but were unable to organize, and were finally eliminated. As I am not dealing with Yugoslav political history



parts of Yugoslavia this is true, for some of its nations do not have any significant liberal tradition.⁴³ But, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians, as the three key nations in Yugoslavia, did have a certain history of liberalism and, in some respects, it has never been broken. Still, liberalism had to be discovered anew, because continuity proved to be impossible to maintain. It is not that some new liberal principles had to be found, but what had to be discovered was how the well-known liberal values could be implemented in Yugoslavia. The discovery process was a success, but the attempt to apply liberalism to Yugoslavia failed.

I will use an analogy to clarify the meaning of the idea of discovery that is used here. Tocqueville⁴⁴ gave what can be called a liberal defense of the French revolution against the attacks of the liberal Burke who argued that no revolution is necessary for liberal principles to be found, understood, and implemented. Burke thought that liberal principles are present in the ancient constitution of every country. Kant, to mention another critic of revolutionary policies, found them in the rational idea of rights. Tocqueville, however, maintained that, in France, these two springs of liberalism coincided. The ancient French constitution was liberal, in the sense of equal rights for all Frenchmen. So, the universality of natural rights was implied in the original constitution of France. All that the revolution did was to rediscover these natural rights and to reassert the ancient constitution of the French nation against the distorted “ancien régime” that had developed.

The point is that the idea of France implied both the existence of universal natural rights and of a free government; in one word, a liberal state. This coincidence of rational principles with the ancient origin of that particular state was crucial for the creation of liberal France through a process of rediscovery (or revolution). There has to be at least a myth of an ancient free state to fall back to, to revolve to.

before the introduction of socialism I will refer only to the work of Cavoski and Kostunica on the postwar period (see Cavoski, Kostunica [1983]).

43 It is hard to find any liberal tradition in Macedonia or among the Muslims.

44 In Tocqueville [1967].

In England, where, perhaps, the state has never deviated too much from the liberal course, reforms were enough. In the United States, nothing but liberal principles can hold together the country without a history.⁴⁵ There, the nation is based on the idea of equality; in France, equal rights are implied in the idea of the nation.

So, either the idea of equality keeps a country together,⁴⁶ or there has to exist an idea of a historical state; either a country has to be discovered or a nation rediscovered. In Yugoslavia, neither was possible. To understand this, another analogy is suggested. One may think of Yugoslavia as a typical Balkan state, but this is not quite correct. There is nothing in Balkan history that contains Yugoslavia as a political possibility, let alone necessity. It is more correct to see Yugoslavia as a Central European state. If one looked into R. Musil's novel "Man without Qualities", one could by analogy get the idea of Yugoslavia. There is a state, but there is no foundation. One can search for the basis of such a state, but the search as well as the state cannot be either a scientific or a legal project. If such a state, once established, was to survive, liberal principles would have to be discovered without recourse to either ancient natural rights or to some legal and rational idea of universal equality of man. How is this to be done is hard to see, and it is doubtful whether it could be done at all. As a typical Central European creation, Yugoslavia most probably had to disintegrate.⁴⁷

45 The well-known dispute between Burke and Paine can be understood thus: in a country like the United States, the principle that every generation should decide for itself can be supported, because there is no constitutional history to look back to. The States have to look forward, while England can not grant the right to revolution because that would violate its ancient constitution.

46 Which is Tocqueville's point in "Democracy in America". There is a conflict between history and politics in Yugoslavia, for the historical aims of most Yugoslav nations are rather diverse. When the political creation of Yugoslavia came about, for the Serbs it had seemed as a political solution to their historical problems; for the Croats and the Slovenians it was a historical solution to their political problems. All wanted to solve their national problems. The solution is defined as a creation or a reestablishment of a national (ethnic) state. The liberal solution is at variance with the nationalist, and so the idea of liberal Yugoslavia had to be discovered; it could not emerge naturally (either as an idea of a nation, as in France, or as idea of a state, as in the United States).

47 The spontaneous process of growth that is described in Hayek [1960] can hardly be applied to a political invention. Hayek generalizes on the British experience, which of course is unique. To blame on revolutionaries the breakdown of the Austrian Empire is really to beg the question, and the same is true of Yugoslavia.



In what follows in this chapter, I will describe the process of the discovery of liberal values in Yugoslavia and the reasons for their failure to exert any serious political influence. The process was much the same in all parts of the country, regardless of whether some parts had had a tradition of liberal thought, and some others had not. So, I will survey the process, not the specific liberal thinkers or groups.

Left and Right in a socialist state

In a parliamentary democracy, the political and ideological space can be approximately divided into the Left and the Right dimensions. The division follows the fact that ideologies are often created in dialogue with other ideologies, and also the fact that the decisions have to be taken by some procedure of majority voting (see Duverger [1954] for a detailed discussion). In a socialist state, there is no ideological competition, and decisions are autocratic. The revolutionaries are traditionally on the Left, while those who are resisting the regime are by contrast on the Right. Communists, though in power, are always advocating change, which puts them on the Left of the ideological space. On the other hand, as they are for the ossification of the socialist order, they would be on the Right in political terms, if the Right were not already ideologically occupied by all those who disagree with them. But, even more important is the fact that, communists being on the Left and being willfully in the minority, the Right is always in the majority in socialist countries.

The Right is characterized by an ideology that resides in the past, though it advocates a policy that looks for the change of the existing socialist order. If the ancient constitution of the country can be interpreted in liberal terms, liberalism can be discovered as the goal of the anti-communist policy. But, more often than not, it will include some set of conservative values that will dominate the Right of the political spectrum in a socialist country.

On the Left, there are usually two factions. One is Stalinist, the other reformist, and the reformists are in the most peculiar position in a socialist state. They cannot count on the support of the Right, because they do not share its ideology, though their policy of change may be similar. So, they have to share the ideology of the Stalinists. On the other hand, the main enemies of the reformist faction of the communist party are the Stalinists, who are opposed to any kind of change in the socialist institutions. The reformists are attacked as liberals, while the opposition on the Right perceives them as indistinguishable from the Stalinists. Neither is in fact true, but then the reformists come across as lacking any ideological and political identity, which in a non-parliamentary and non-pragmatic political community is a fatal shortcoming.

In general, if the communists are either moved away or they adopt conservative values, the socialist state loses the Left side. The state starts to live in its past, and only liberals can speak for the future. Being ideologically associated with the Left that was monopolized by the communists, liberals find themselves in a void. If the country has had a liberal past, then of course this consequence does not follow. Also, if the country is pro-European or pro-Western, that will enable it to apply liberal principles as if they were its own. But, if, as in Yugoslavia, there is no Yugoslav past, especially a liberal one, and if Europe is seen to be partly responsible for its creation, liberals will find themselves in a complete void. For liberals to have had a political role in Yugoslavia, a whole new political space would have to have been invented.

This is not to say that liberal values and principles were not discovered in Yugoslavia. Quite to the contrary, as I will show in what follows, the everyday life pushed people towards learning that liberal principles were those that should substitute for the ruling socialist ones.



Market socialism

The main ally of liberalism in a socialist country is the inefficiency of its economy. Thus, some liberal ideas are initially discovered by the reformists or the pragmatists inside the Communist Party.

Certain liberal ideas emerged in Yugoslavia out of attempts to come up with a socialist reform. The reformist faction of the Communist Party at times gained power because the orthodox faction could not offer any solution to the economic problems of socialism⁴⁸. While trying to make socialism more efficient, the reformist faction is usually driven towards liberal economic solutions. At first, an idea of some kind of “optimal socialism” is put forward.⁴⁹ And, when it proves to be unworkable, it is diagnosed that the cause of the inefficiency is the “bureaucracy”, by which implicitly the more rigid communist faction is meant. But, there are two possible controlling mechanisms of the governing communist bureaucracy: political opposition and the market. The first being inaccessible to the reformists of the ruling Communist Party (or to anybody else for that matter), the market is perceived as the indirect answer to political monopoly. That is why the first liberal idea to emerge inside a Communist Party is the idea of market economy usually under the name of market socialism.⁵⁰

48 The economic problems of socialism are by now well known. For the best interpretation see Kornai [1980].

49 Such are the ideas of an “optimal plan” of Lange and Kantorovich. In Yugoslavia, the main advocate of “optimal socialism”, both as a centrally planned system and as a “self-managed economy” was B. Horvat (see for instance [1984]). Other main proponents of the Yugoslav debate on the “right socialist economic institutions” are discussed in Milenkovich [1971]. A more recent reconsideration can be found in Ceme [1989].

50 For an analysis of the first socialist reform, the so-called NEP (New Economic Policy) in The Soviet Union see Gligorov [1984]. The idea of “market socialism” was never really accepted as representing the views of the Communist Party. There were very few economists who advocated such a system. There is a widely accepted dogma that “laissez-faire economic policy” cannot be defended and that it is not pursued anywhere any more. There were two dominant reformist ideas in Yugoslav economic thought: the one accepted the market mechanism as an instrument either of planning or of a Keynesian economic policy (Horvat); the other argued for a complete market system inside a self-managed economy (see Bajt [1989]).

The idea of “market socialism”, or “free trade (liberal) socialism” is not viable for two reasons:⁵¹ first, it is impossible to avoid the problem of political pluralism, and second, there is no way to introduce market economy without a wider legalization of private property.⁵² The second obstacle is the one that saps any reformist movement inside the Communist Party, while the first is not really on the agenda of this faction. Of course, liberal communists move towards advocating the democratization of society, ask for the rule of law, and eventually support freedom of the press, but in a totalitarian state, that only discredits them as communists, while not making liberals out of them.

It is important to understand that the idea of more or less restricted free trade is usually born inside the ruling Communist Party,⁵³ and that it is a reaction to the inefficiencies of the socialist system. But, “*laissez-faire* socialism” can never achieve legitimacy, either inside the Communist Party or in the public (apart from the fact that it is not feasible and not viable).⁵⁴ It is seen as a policy that is contradictory to the communist ideology and even the public perceives it as fundamentally hypocritical and unjust. Only when the socialist system experiences an economic breakdown the government becomes ready to accept a more radical liberalization of socialism. But by that time, nothing the communists could do is enough.

51 I take the term “viable” as used in the same context by Brus (see Brus [1987]). Indeed, many reformist communists became liberals, but not as a faction (some did organize liberal parties in different parts of Yugoslavia after the country disintegrated). Politically, reformist communists, at least in Yugoslavia, tend to turn to socialists, but the question of the identification of the socialist alternative in post-socialist societies is a difficult one.

52 It is interesting to note that this was already clear in 1921, and was forcefully put by N. D. Kondratiev.

53 In Yugoslavia, liberalization started early (by the end of 1949) and developed steadily (though not without temporary setbacks). It failed to ever include legalized capital and labor markets.

54 See the exchange between Brus and Nove on that (Brus [1987] and Nove [1987]).



The civil society

The next step in the development of liberal ideas is that of autonomy. The totalitarian society creates a system of complete dependence,⁵⁵ it aims at destroying all forms of autonomy. One depends on the state to provide him with work, income, food, and shelter, as well as with protection and social status. Indeed, the totalitarian state tries as hard as it possibly can to think for its citizens. It is not simply that liberty is suppressed by this oppressive, authoritarian system; it puts up institutions which are to substitute all forms of freedom, that is, all forms of autonomy.⁵⁶

Thus, in socialist Yugoslavia, at the beginning because of the break up with Stalin, some forms of autonomy were advocated and granted.⁵⁷ At the end, some forty years later, the demands were universalized into a fully developed idea of civil rights⁵⁸. It is important to understand the way that these demands were emerging. If a liberal group simply calls for equal rights or for the autonomy of civil society that will come to no effect. For these demands to be taken seriously, the injustice of the socialist system has to be disposed of. This usually happens not on the ideological level, but when some concrete interests are constituted and they clash with the existing institutions. So, it is not the advocacy of liberal principles that threatens the socialist governments; it is the suppression of concrete interests that creates a conflict situation, the understanding of which brings people to see the importance of the liberal principles. When an interest emerges, and it cannot be realized because it conflicts with the dominant socialist institutions, the injustice of socialism becomes transparent, and all those affected start looking for alternative principles. One of these is the liberal principle.

55 For more on that see Gligorov [1990].

56 The contrast is most forcefully drawn in Hayek [1944].

57 Such demands in Yugoslavia culminated with the student demonstrations in 1968. They were preceded and followed by demands for national autonomy in most parts of Yugoslavia. These two movements were mostly in conflict, which explains the fact that the Communist Party succeeded in crushing both movements rather easily.

58 In Yugoslavia, this was a recent development. At first, it grew out of the youth movement in Slovenia, but it soon spread all over Yugoslavia.

The injustice of socialism does not have to be seen only because it lacks economic or other efficiency. When somebody goes out of work, he naturally looks for an alternative way to provide for himself and his family. But, private business being prohibited or strictly limited, he feels the injustice of socialism right there. If he has to go to the black market, he has to live permanently with these injustices.

The same is true of an intellectual who wants to present his views on a subject of his interest. If he conflicts with the state censor or with the official ideology, he is immediately aware of the grave injustices that underlie socialist institutions,⁵⁹ and that applies to all similar types of cases.

For instance, suppression of national interests is usually pervasive in socialist countries. This is because communists tend to define the identity of the citizens in class terms. It is said that it is more important what class one belongs to than what is one's nationality. That is an outcome of Marxist ideology which is internationalist. The consequence is that the present and the glorious future are considered much more important than the past, indeed, that was supposed to have been the temporal structure of workers' preferences: nothing but the present economic predicament and the ever rising expectations of future welfare are supposedly important for the workers. A worker, it was argued, has no national feelings, because the past means nothing to him. This being in contrast with what most people of all classes feel, national interests had to conflict with the existing ideology and institutions, and again there was an added reason to demand that one's rights be honored by the government.⁶⁰

Liberalism emerges through individual and collective conflicts with socialism. One understands that one has to ask for respect of one's rights when one is confronted with the fact that he has no rights. The

59 In Yugoslavia, the best-known example is that of a group of so-called "Praxis" philosophers. The way some of them grew to accept some elements of liberal thinking is typical (the way that failed to influence their political behavior is also typical). This case is recounted in Popov [1989].

60 The class vs. national identity was intensely discussed in Yugoslavia during the crisis at the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies.



liberal principle that “all men have equal rights regardless of ethnic, racial, political, ideological, sexual, social, class and differences in income and in wealth” is discovered through conflicts with socialist institutions that are constructed with the aim to eliminate any idea of political equality along all those lines. Thus, first the injustices are felt; then, rights are demanded; finally, the idea of equal rights emerges.

At that point, the idea of civil society gains wider acceptance. It would be natural for the idea of personal autonomy to have developed first. But, in a collectivist society, it is the notion of autonomous social institutions that is at first put forward. The autonomy of the professional interests is demanded; the demand for the autonomy of the university follows; the wider role of voluntary trade, of the market, is recognized; the need for autonomous associations is accepted; the greater national or regional independence is granted; and the creeping liberalization sets in. In the end, it is the idea of civic culture that becomes prominent (as opposed to the official ideal of proletarian culture). Finally, the end of the class war is proclaimed and the emergence of civil society is recognized. For a while, in some communist countries, it was called “socialist civil society”. In Yugoslavia, it was the idea of the “self-managed civil society” that for a short while substituted the idea of civil society, until the idea of self-management was abandoned and the simple idea of civil society started to dominate.

The progression begins with people demanding specific rights, it develops into the justification of autonomous social institutions and territorial devolution, and it is completed with the implicit and eventually explicit justification of civil society.

The rule of law

The socialist state, being totalitarian, uses law, but does not abide by law. At first, “bureaucracy” is blamed for the consequences. There is too much red tape, too large an administration, too many forms to fill, and too many criteria to fulfill. The left-wing criticism of “really-existing socialism” went as far as to suggest that a wholesale “bureaucratic counter-revolution” had taken place. The point of that criticism was to get the Communist Party to change some of its policies by reminding it that there is a widening discrepancy between the ideals proclaimed and the existing political reality.⁶¹

Thus, early dissatisfaction with the legality of socialism was expressed as criticism of the bureaucratization of the authority of the ruling Communist Party, and only later was the real nature of the socialist state uncovered. Again, the discovery comes through conflict. If an intellectual or anybody else comes into conflict with the official ideology, he can be subjected to all kinds of harassment, one of which is a possibility that he will lose his job or he might even go to jail. Now, if one looks for protection, one will soon learn that the law provides him with none, for one can be protected only if the party decides so. Thus, one discovers that what he thought was a bureaucratic state, in reality turned out to be a party or a police state.

The laws were not used for protection, but as an instrument of power. The socialist state is a network of complete dependence of the people on the powerful, that is, on the party and its inner oligarchy. Once this is understood, the anti-bureaucratic sentiment subsides and the idea of law protecting human liberties emerges. Only then the demand for the rule of law becomes really strong.⁶²

Though this demand was morally very powerful, it conflicted not only with the existing institutions, but with the existing distribution

61 This I think was the main point of the so-called “Praxis” humanist Marxism.

62 This demand was put forward by the Belgrade “Committee for the Protection of Human Rights” in 1986.



of interests too. Once a socialist state has existed for some time, it achieves some sort of stability, though an inefficient and unjust one. The system of socialist autocracy does not demand sacrifices from the people only, it provides them with all kinds of goods. So, for the rule of law to be established, it was not enough to demand that party protection should be replaced with judicial protection; whatever the ruling party was used for had to be replaced by other institutional arrangements. Otherwise, reformist ideas could only bring about an increase in uncertainty, the expectation of which even works for the stability of the existing socialist order. This, in turn, led to an understanding that some legitimate political procedure of influence had to be established.

When that was recognized, it became obvious that the rule of law could not mean legal protection only, but also the supreme authority of the legislative bodies. With that, the idea of parliamentary democracy was discovered. Socialist states were not representative regimes. They either had Soviet-type legislative bodies, as in The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, or they had no free elections. Yugoslavia abolished parliaments and even direct elections altogether. So, the lack of the rule of law was completely institutionalized. Once the disadvantages of that were recognized, the demand for an independent judiciary had to generalize into a demand for a legal state founded on parliamentary democracy.⁶³

Thus, what we have is a progression from the feeling of insecurity, toward the demand for legality, and finally for parliamentary democracy.

63 That of course became the common demand of all opposition groups and parties all over Yugoslavia (nationalist, socialist, liberal, democratic or peasant).

Reform from below

As parliamentary democracy did not exist, there had to exist a political will to bring it about. In one-party state of Yugoslavia it was legally impossible to organize an opposition party. Thus, at first, some kind of ideological competition had to emerge for the idea of party pluralism to become acceptable eventually.⁶⁴ That brought evolutionary changes in the socialist structure, which I will call “reform from below”.

In Yugoslavia, pluralism was officially accepted. One could say that liberalization of communist Yugoslavia started with the acceptance of the idea of limited pluralism. First, artistic freedom was accepted; second, sciences were freed of Marxist orthodoxy; and, third, it was accepted that there could exist some pluralism of other “particular” interests. Of course, all this is a far cry from any kind of liberal political and ideological pluralism.⁶⁵

With all that, communists did not, originally, recognize the importance of pluralism, and insisted on “unity and brotherhood” even well after they apparently changed their mind. Only towards the very end the Communist Party was ready to accept that proletarian unity was a delusion, and “pluralism of interests” was introduced. But socialism cannot coexist with real pluralism, and when not only an economic but also a political crisis broke out, the government lost any semblance of legitimacy. The more reformist members of the Communist Party started offering “a dialogue” to the non-party members, and to the different social strata, but no institution for such dialogue existed and it was impossible to create one. There was no parliament so no coalition government could be established and there was no obvious way of a Polish style of “round table” to be organized.⁶⁶

64 On “ideological competition” see Gligorov [1982].

65 Pluralism was accepted in the Yugoslav Communist Party program passed in 1958.

66 A description of some attempts within the Communist Party to start a dialogue with the public can be found in Cavoski and Kostunica [1983]. Certain concrete proposals involved the transformation of the so-called Socialist Alliance (a Communist Party dominated People’s Front type of an organization that had some responsibility for



Technically speaking, Yugoslavia was a model type of “pluralized polity”.⁶⁷ All possible political cleavages existed: social, religious, national (ethnic), and cultural, and it is hard to see how any kind of a classical socialist system could have worked there. The system being such as to disregard political differences, it was no surprise that it was inefficient even in the modified Yugoslav form. Also, as it acknowledged only the right of the communists to political organization and influence, it was generally seen as unjust. Thus the first step was to demand recognition of the existing pluralism. After that, political rights were demanded, and that could of course end in nothing else but a demand for a multi-party system.⁶⁸

The problem that liberals faced in Yugoslavia was that there was no way that some kind of “pluralized democracy” could be established in the country as a whole. It would have been necessary for the different political groups, including communists, to have agreed on a forum that would have worked for some kind of transitory solution towards a parliamentary democracy. But, unlike Poland or Hungary, the opposition was more split along ethnic lines than it was ready to stand united against the communists.⁶⁹ The opposition groups and parties were more ready to cooperate with the communists of their own nationality than with the opposition of another nationality.⁷⁰ Therefore, for the long period of the crisis of socialism in Yugoslavia, it was the communists who were arguing among themselves trying to play the role of quasi-representatives of their respective nationalities. The liberals in Yugoslavia were quite unable to form any kind of alliance, because they proved to be incapable to understand that

coordinating the accepted “pluralism of interests”). Some of those who advocated such a course later founded the “Association for Democratic Initiative”, which was trying to create such a forum, outside and in competition with the official Socialist Alliance.

67 Described, for instance, in Lijphart [1977].

68 Even the communists in the end accepted the multi-party system. The first multi-party elections were held in Slovenia and Croatia in Spring 1990.

69 Though, the coalition between Slovenian and Croatian opposition parties was close to be formed somewhere in early 1990.

70 This was the case with all the opposition groups and parties, but it was especially a serious problem in Serbia where no clear opposition party had formed for a long time in fear that this might endanger the political position of the nationalist communist leadership. Of course, the opposition to the national communists was eventually to start to mount as election time was approaching.

individual freedom was more important to a liberal than the collective interest of his nationality.

Thus, the experience of repressed pluralism helped the idea of multi-party system to be discovered. But, Yugoslav liberals were at no point able to put individual rights above collective (ethnic) justice. This being the case, the “reform from below” proved to be incapable of generalizing the liberal ideas beyond ethnic limits.

Reform from above

The inefficiency of the socialist economy was seen quite clearly and quite early on in Yugoslavia, already at the time of the break-up with Stalin (1948). The theoretical and political solution that was found required state property to be transformed into social property (a type of a decentralized state property). It was thought that this was a prerequisite to the introduction of self-management, which, in turn, was to stimulate the employees to be more productive and thus lift the efficiency of the Yugoslav economy (the “collective entrepreneurship” of self-management was supposed to be even more productive than the individual entrepreneurship of liberal capitalism).

The idea of “self-management socialism” was so appealing that it was hard to find any economist, sociologist, or any other social scientist who would have disagreed. This was all the more amazing because early on it was perceived that not only was productivity not rising, but a serious problem of distribution of income emerged, which had a fatal consequence in the lack of voluntary investments. Workers proved to be interested in raising their salaries and in letting the state worry about investments. The state did this in two ways: through forced savings and through foreign loans. But, not being responsible for the obligations thus created, investments were so poorly allocated that the economy tended to periodically fall into crisis.



The first reaction to the first serious crisis in the sixties was an emergence of the criticism that the economy was not sufficiently market oriented and Yugoslavia gave up on central planning and even introduced a commercial banking system (in 1965). But self-management being so popular among the socialist intellectuals and politicians, both inside the Communist Party and in the opposition, it took quite some time to see that the main problem was that there can be no market economy without the comprehensive liberalization of markets, and especially without a capital market. That meant that social property had to be privatized in order to become subject to market transactions. It is a sad fact that it took too much time for liberal intellectuals to understand this, so that at the end one could find more communists advocating privatization than liberals.

This was partly because there were more communist intellectuals than liberal intellectuals. But it was also an outcome of the fact that the liberals were mostly to be found among literary intellectuals, sociologists, and philosophers and not among economists, and the former did not altogether understand what indeed was at stake in the disputes over privatization and market economy, and many were opposed mainly on the “new left” type of ideological grounds. Still, the idea of privatization was rapidly gaining ground though it was only very late in the development that the idea was put forward as a serious project.⁷¹

71 An early suggestion can be found in Popovic [1984]. A similar idea was put forward in Gligorov [1986].

The fourth estate

Even before the idea of privatization was discovered, the problem of entrepreneurship was recognized. In the “self-management” system of Yugoslavia there were no enterprises and no entrepreneurs. As a matter of fact, there were no managers, because in a self-management economy all those employed were acting as managers, either directly or represented by their workers’ councils.

Self-management is a completely collectivist idea. It is perhaps one of the most radical ideas of socialization that could be invented.⁷² The feeling of collectivist justice that it was breeding was very deep, and that made it very difficult to profess any kind of economic individualism. Still, it eventually became obvious that the inefficiency of self-management economy was directly connected to the non-existence of managerial authority and entrepreneurial risk that was eventually connected with the liquidation of private property. Thus once the idea of privatization emerged it could be justified with the already existing understanding that without entrepreneurship it was impossible to achieve efficiency.

But individualism was discovered in another way also, through a conflict with ideological collectivism. In authoritarian states, one can find shelter in his profession, but in totalitarian states this shelter does not exist. The official ideology destroys it. So, one has to find another type of shelter, and in Yugoslavia it was usual to look to one’s nation and its culture as a collective shelter from the communist ideology. But it was soon to be found that the moral being of every Yugoslav nation was destroyed in socialism, and there were no values and no national solidarity to fall back on. Once this was understood, liberal ideas of individualism could emerge.

It is not always well understood that liberal ideology and nationalism are not easily combined. Liberalism is an individualist ideology that takes nationality as one of the characteristics of personal identity.

72 As a matter of fact, it is an idea of communist organization of production and distribution which is as a radical idea second only to Stalin’s collectivization.



But in totalitarian states nationalism is seen as a shield from socialist internationalism, so that the first liberal response was to defend individualism inside national borders. Only later was it seen by some that individualism was more fundamental and that nationality had to be considered within limits of individualism alone.

One finds the virtues of individualism when one is left alone, and in Yugoslavia, as in other totalitarian states, one could be alone because everyone had deserted him. It is a modern version of the Robinson Crusoe story. This happened to intellectuals who had fallen out of grace with the Communist Party, or were stigmatized by it for some other reason. Whether one found himself on the street, unemployed, or in jail, the social experience was much the same. One discovered how weak were the links of solidarity inside one's own family, among one's friends, and between the citizens of the same nationality. When one finds oneself in such a predicament, there is no escaping the understanding that individualism is unavoidable. If one perseveres, he will discover that social ties can be established on individual bases. Friendship, solidarity, dialogue, cooperation, business, all that can be based on mutual interests, as well as on mutual recognition of the similarity of social positions that people have found themselves in. Though this may seem cynical, it is the political prisons and all the other communist types of repression, which always involve some kind of severe isolation, that breed individualism, and ultimately liberalism.⁷³ Once someone is left alone, one is driven to understand what it means to be put into a state of nature, and one understands the meaning of natural rights. All that is needed afterwards is a generalization of these rights and the idea of liberal polity can emerge.

But here we face a paradox, which I think was first described by Mandelstam, but has been rediscovered ever since. I will call it “the paradox of the fourth estate”⁷⁴. If one thinks of a condemned intellectual in a totalitarian state, one is driven by a picture of an

73 This was described in a fascinating way in Gotovac [1989].

74 Mandelstam wrote on the “fourth estate”, the estate of culture. Brodsky alludes to the same idea in *Less Than One* (see Brodsky [1986]): “liberté, égalité, fraternité; will anyone say culture”. The same idea is developed by Michnik as “power of the powerless”, and by Konrad as “anti-politics”.

isolated individual, and the universalization of his position seems desperate, because his position seems so unique in contrast with the prevailing collectivism he is facing. But once one recognizes that everybody is in some kind of isolation in a totalitarian state, one can see that the intellectual is only an example, for everyone is left to himself in a socialist state. The problem is that all these isolated individuals put together do not amount to much: they do not constitute either moral or political power. They constitute “the fourth estate”, which is the most numerous, but is completely powerless. It can hardly create any kind of a serious opposition to the powerful communists, thus its members have to look for their place inside the collectivist system, to support the collectivist values, and to negate their ontological individualism. Only when socialist collectivism disintegrated, individualism had a chance to politically assert itself.

That, perhaps, was the final stage of the discovery of liberalism, but in a process of rediscovery, it would have been the first stage. In Yugoslavia liberalism was put together piece by piece until the very basis of liberalism – individualism – was touched. Then the problem of integration of liberal values had to be faced, and this problem had, again, to be solved through an attempt to face some concrete political problems. At that point, liberalism in Yugoslavia failed.

Liberal federalism

The main Yugoslav political problem was its fundamental constitutional arrangement. Yugoslavia was a multi-national state, which had never found the right balance between the power of the center and that of the federalized nations. The federal republic could have been the constitutional solution, but that was difficult to build, because socialism and federalism are rather incompatible principles. Socialism is grounded in public property (state or



social) which gives too much power to the center. On the other hand, if state property is decentralized, local states tend to opt for nationalist economic policies, because socialism, being inimical to markets, goes with protectionism. Thus, a sort of nationalist federalism tended to develop, which was for the most part very unstable.

Now pure liberalism clashes both with socialism and nationalism, but in a socialist state taking up both of these adversaries at the same time is a very difficult task. To be able to advocate liberalism in a situation of very tense nationalistic animosities required a very strong belief in liberal principles. In a socialist state a political preference that is natural for an occupied country is dominant: for an individual to be free, his nation has to be free. One looks for a nation-state to protect him from socialism. Of course, Yugoslavia did not have to be identified with socialism; it ought not even to have been seen as a hostage of centralism, for one could have searched for a liberal federation. As a matter of fact, liberal federation could have been a solution to both main Yugoslav problems: socialism and nationalism. Also, it could have been a solution to the problem of Yugoslavia having no firm foundation in natural or political rights and interests. It could have been a discovery of the right kind of adaptation to the existing political facts.

But the chances were slim. A kind of a Liberal (Prisoner's) Dilemma operated so as to both coordinate and conflict socialist and nationalist political sentiments. If liberal federalism was advocated, in the prevailing power constellation, acceptance of federalism could be manipulated in favor of socialism. This strengthened the nationalist opposition. On the other hand, liberal attitudes could be manipulated in favor of nationalist interests, which strengthened the socialist opposition. Thus, nationalists and socialists could cooperate even when they were in opposition, but the liberal alternative could hardly constitute itself as a viable political option.

The above Liberal Dilemma springs from disequilibrium between political memories and expectations. If one looks for natural rights, one is driven to look back, into history, and the history of the Yugoslav nations is not only full of unfulfilled expectations, but is marked by dissimilarities. Some nations have never had independent states, though that had been their main political ideal. Some other nations had looked to Yugoslavia as a definite solution to their national problems, while others saw Yugoslavia only as a political expediency. So, there was no common memory, if one disregarded the common memory of animosities, violence, and dissatisfaction.

This being the case, it was very difficult to arrive at common expectations. The idea of liberal polity, that respects all rights and that uses federation as a kind of protection against the powerful nation-states, was seen as Utopian. If such a polity had ever existed, even in some mythical memory, it could have been rediscovered. But to discover it as a political goal seemed incredible, because it required a type of political party that had never existed in Yugoslavia.

At this point the liberal idea found itself at a dead end. It is true that liberal ideas were developing very fast in Yugoslavia, and were gaining ground in the otherwise very different cultures of the Yugoslav nations, but there was no liberal Yugoslav coalition that could have opposed the much stronger socialist and nationalist forces. That coalition could have been formed around the idea of a liberal federation, but the liberals as well as all the other parties thought that that idea had very low mobilizing potential. In comparison to the idea of an ethnic state, liberal federalism did not look simply Utopian; it was seen as downright irrelevant.



The failure of liberalism in Yugoslavia

As I tried to show, liberalism was discovered in Yugoslavia through a specific process of learning from experience. As there was no serious and widespread liberal tradition to speak of, one had to experience conflicts with socialism to see the natural beauties of liberalism. It was through a process of individuation, springing from the experience of discrimination, that the idea of individual rights emerged. Once rights were perceived, the feeling of impotence developed. It brought in a natural idea of universalization that brings in all the usual liberal ideas. To put this in few words, it is the experience of exclusion and repression that produces the demand for freedom; universalization then works toward a discovery of liberal principles.

But the universalization process stopped short of a discovery of liberal federalism, because Yugoslavia was not part of the idea of what constituted natural political rights and was not seen as a natural body politic. This sapped both liberal ideas of political equality and the effectiveness of liberal political organizations.

One way out was to look for an outside help, and that meant an integration of Yugoslavia into the European Community. As this integration was apparently moving towards some kind of liberal federation, Yugoslavia could have perhaps lost interest in its internal quarrels if it had joined that wider community, that is also non-existent in the European past, and is a complete liberal imagination. This idea was gaining ground, but the process of discovery that I described above somehow pushed it aside. It seemed necessary for the worst consequences of socialism and of Yugoslavia to be experienced, and only then one could have hoped for more reasonable political thinking that could give liberalism a chance. It seemed also that it would be necessary for the limits of nationalism to be experienced for the idea of liberal federation to become understandable (the hope for it becoming acceptable was soon lost). Also it seemed that the limits of socialism would have to be experienced for the whole idea to be abandoned. How costly this process had to be was quite difficult

to say at the time. It seemed as if a liberal kind of reform could hardly be opted for until some ancient authoritarian means had been discarded. Only then, perhaps, the liberal idea of economic liberty and political freedom, that had already been discovered, could have been combined with a discovery of liberal federalism.

Once the road to a liberal society is described in these terms, it becomes evident that the liberal idea had failed. That was precisely what happened in Yugoslavia. The main political goal continued to be ethnic justice, not individual rights. The liberal parties, once they emerged, accepted the role of more or less willing coalition partners of either the communists or the nationalists. That meant that they staked their future chances on the emerging ethnic states and not on the liberal principles. That was what completely marginalized them.



CHAPTER 3

Why do countries break up?

“Who desires the ends, desires the means also.”

Rousseau

In this chapter, I give a straightforward explanation of the break-up of Yugoslavia and speculate on the possible outcomes. It seems to me that not much is gained by more formal modeling of what has indeed happened, at least not for the most immediate understanding.⁷⁵ However, I do not think that any level of generality is lost that way and will in fact start with a rather general discussion of the possible causes of a state break-up, describe some of the strategic aspects of such a process, and then identify the essential problems of the former Yugoslav state, interpret the dynamics of the break-up, and speculate briefly on the possible outcomes.

Two assumptions

To theoretically motivate the chapter, I will just state the two assumptions that I rely on, and that I will be trying to justify and substantiate throughout this chapter and that I will rely on in the next:

First, *people get what they want*. In other words, the explanation of a break-up of a state and even of a civil war has to be in agreement with the political preferences of the individuals involved. The break-up, the civil war, and the price paid, all that is a matter of choice.

75 However, I give an indication of some possibilities in appendices III and IV.

This does not mean that the preferences are taken as given. On the contrary, they are formed through the political process. The description of the formation of political preferences is an important part of the explanation argument. Also, it does not mean that the choice is among the alternatives that are given with certainty: the choice is one of prospects and indeed they may even have to be found. Therefore, the value of the *ex post* costs may be seen as being much higher than were those calculated *ex ante*, indeed a pervasive political feeling of regret may eventually develop.

This may be so for another reason also. Political decisions taken are not independent of the procedure used or of the lack of an explicit procedure. Therefore, the costs may, in part or in totality, fall on those in the opposition or on those who had nothing to do with the decision in the first place (on the innocents). Thus, it may seem cynical in the extreme to argue that these people got what they wanted. However, all I am saying is that a state break-up is not similar to a natural catastrophe, to an outside, unexpected shock; it is a political choice, though it may have catastrophic consequences, in moral as well as in other terms.

These peculiarities of political preferences have to be kept in mind at all times. For these reasons, the claim that “people get what they want” will become clear when preferences, outcomes, and the polity are all much better defined (that is done in the section on nationalism below).

Second, *political preferences dominate the economic ones*. This means that the conflict that leads to a state dissolution is the one over political goods (security, justice, rights, liberty, equality, and such).⁷⁶

That does not mean that the economic preferences are insignificant or uninfluential. Moreover, the fact that the objects of the political preferences are called “political goods” means that they have important economic aspects. Still, the political aspects dominate,

⁷⁶ Detailed analysis of political preferences and political goods can be found in Gligorov [1985] and [1992d].

the way ends dominate means. This, again, will become clear when political preferences are more precisely defined.

I stand on these two assumptions because I do not believe in the explanations that rely either on the specificity of the political culture or culture in general, or on those that in one way or another invoke some kind of historical inevitability, seeing people as agents or victims of historical, cultural, or religious obligations. I take these explanations, when supplied by those politically involved as rationalizations (in Vilfredo Pareto's sense), and I take them as failures when they come from those who study the subject.

This is not to say that I deny the importance of all these factors for either politics or economics. It is, in a sense, to say that I take them as conditions, not as causes. That is why I call the explanation that I am going to give "straightforward". I take a straightforward explanation to be the one that identifies the causes or the reasons for action. The others, I believe, rely on a mistake, they take conditions for causes.

Sometimes, historical explanations refer to causes that are not even conditions. An example might be useful. The civil war in Yugoslavia is sometimes explained by historians, in the end, by the fact, if the fact it is, that the border line between the West and the East has been there for well over thousand years. Now, how does that explain? The same is true with the references to the previous civil war, the one that was fought during the World War II. The people fighting now were not even born at that time. Not even revenge explains this, because that would rely on the doctrine of original sin being politically efficacious; and collective horrifying memories should deter rather than encourage. All such explanations I do not consider to be straightforward. The same is, I think, true of economic explanations, and I will argue against those in the next section of this chapter. My explanation will be political.

The legitimacy problem

The notion that a break-up of a country is an outcome of a process governed by individual preferences and choices points to an economic explanation. In a sense, this cannot fail to be true. However, in the Yugoslav case at least, but I think in general also, specific economic explanations of either state creation or state break-up fail. The general form of an economic explanation of disintegration is that there are gains to be secured through secession. Specifically through:

- smaller burden of the public sector;
- changes in the terms of trade;
- joining a new economic or political union.⁷⁷

These arguments have been invoked to explain both the barriers to further integration and the push towards disintegration. Obviously, a country does not have to coincide with the optimal customs and currency area, as well as the burden of the public sector may not be ideally distributed over the regions in a state. Therefore, both shifting integrations and disintegrations can in principle be explained in terms of the changes in the opportunity sets that the country as a whole and each of its regions separately face.

These explanations run into two methodological objections. On the one hand, there is the *post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy*. Every actual or prospective social change will have distributional consequences: there will be profits and losses (if there are none, then the overall stationary state has been reached). Thus, an explanation pointing to a profit-seeking coalition⁷⁸ as the one that has engineered the change (the popular *qui bono* argument) cannot be wrong, once the change has occurred. In that sense, there is always an economic explanation to everything. The mistake here is really to confuse consequences with expectations.

77 In case of Yugoslavia, all these reasons fail in all the newly established states. The burden of the public sector is larger, especially the defense spending. The terms of trade have changed unfavorably. All these new states are further away from integration into the European Union than was Yugoslavia.

78 As in the “economics of clubs” approach, see Buchanan [1965].



On the other hand, if the time horizon is not specified in advance, any policy change cannot fail to prove to be the right one. This is the *self-fulfilling prophecy fallacy*. For example, if one points out that a secession has incurred very high costs that would not have been necessary without the secession taking place, there is always the answer that the costs were rational in view of the expected future gains, that, given long enough period of time, cannot fail to surface.⁷⁹ This is the type of thinking that merited Keynes' remark that: "In the long run, we are all dead". For these two reasons, these types of explanations have to be very carefully used.⁸⁰

An alternative approach, that I favor, is political. There are several ways to argue for political explanations of state break-ups. One is to rely on either social choice or game-theoretic paradoxes of collective and individual rationality.⁸¹ For instance, in terms of game theory, one can invoke such failures of cooperation like those supposedly exemplified by the Prisoner's Dilemma or by the game of Chicken. Indeed, there is a way in which the basic Yugoslav conflict, and that is the one between the Serbs and the Croats, can be represented by a process of the Prisoner's Dilemma turning into the game of Chicken. As a matter of fact, by far the best Serbian legal and political philosopher and political historian, Slobodan Jovanovic, almost

79 For instance, if one chooses to go from x to y, y should be justifiable at the moment of decision or there should be no feeling of regret at the moment of arrival, or ideally both, but not at some indeterminate future time. Even more fundamentally, as the individuals control their expectations, they can always be adjusted to be in accordance with the costs borne. One way the latter is often done is to compare the move from x to y against the return move from y to x, after the move has already been made. Then it may very well be the case that the costs of the original move are judged smaller than those of the return move (even with regrets included). But, of course, the return costs do not appear if the move from x to y is not even made.

80 There are at least two additional objections to be considered. The first is a variant of the fallacy discussed above. In terms of the theory of economic policy, success is defined in terms of targets chosen. For instance, if the 5% annual inflation rate is the target, 6% or 5.5% achieved is not a success. Otherwise, everything is a success, because of the 'it could have been worse' argument. The second is far subtler. It has to do with the perception of causality. Once something is done, it becomes one of the conditions for whatever goes on in the future. Therefore, it becomes part of the general historical causality. This can be perceived as "everything done was necessary". Thus, "everything done" receives its explanatory as well as every other value from the existing. See Lucas [1975] for a far-reaching criticism of the economic policy argument.

81 I use a very simple informal social choice model in Gligorov [1992a].

arrived at such an understanding.⁸² He saw Croats using a strategy that led them both in Austro-Hungary and in Yugoslavia to the Prisoner's Dilemma game situation. They always used secession as a threat, ending up eventually with a solution that was worse than the one that they could have secured through cooperation.⁸³

On the other hand, he described Serbian strategy in Yugoslavia as being such that rather than settling for a compromise they tended to favor an outright confrontation, much like in the game of Chicken. Thus, one might say that the outcomes of the conflict between the Serbs and the Croats were determined by the inability of the Croats to cooperate and by the tendency of the Serbs to look for the resolution through "a final showdown". Indeed, they could not even agree on the game they were to be playing, let alone on a common strategy.

This brief discussion of a possible interpretation of Slobodan Jovanovic's understanding of the basic Yugoslav conflict is just one simple example of the possible game-theoretic explanations of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. There is nothing wrong with that. The observations or even the explanations arrived at that way are certainly illuminating and possibly true. But they rely on the unspecified explanatory powers of the game form. If to a question: "Why is there a civil war going on in Yugoslavia?" the following answer is given: "It is a Prisoner's Dilemma turning into a game of Chicken", this may be unobjectionable, but not quite what one is looking for. Game theory can of course be used to analyze the notion of political rationality, which I will rely on below.

However, even in terms of explanations, it is not as empty as all that. In the example discussed, from the way Slobodan Jovanovic presented the strategies of those involved, it follows that the Serbs were the only ones capable of breaking the country up, both by their choice of the game form and by the way they played the game. Also,

82 See Jovanovic [1991a] (originally in 1964). Jovanovic, of course, did not use game theory. I discuss some of the game-theoretic ideas that can be used to model the Yugoslav conflicts in appendix III.

83 This is close to the interpretation of the Croatian national strategies given by their leading writer Miroslav Krleza in many of his writings, but especially in the first two volumes of *Zastave*.



it supports the claim that all the others tried to use the exit option not being able to influence the choice of the game and the strategy of the dominant player. The only problem really is the metaphorical character of the explanations in terms of games. I will allude to these explanations here and there (see appendix III for a description of the relevant games).

I look for another approach. In my opinion, the explanation of the break-up of the Yugoslav state has to be seen in the most traditional political terms. Yugoslavia broke up because different nations that had composed it struggled for power in order to secure the basic political goods: freedom, rights, equality, and justice. The key word is: justice. The constitution of Yugoslavia was not just.⁸⁴

Yugoslavia did not stand in the way of one being found though. By this I mean that its fundamental make-up was not unreformable. Or so I will argue. The Yugoslav nations could have arrived at a just political settlement, meaning by that a constitution that would have satisfied their long-term national interests, had it not been the case that the distribution of power was so complex that everybody thought that the choice was between a complete subjugation and a full sovereignty, or, to put it in terms of the expected gains, everybody thought all the time that, regardless of any constitutional agreement arrived at, “even more was possible” (again, this is similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma

84 There are three senses in which the word ‘constitution’ is being used in this chapter. In this instance, I mean “the fundamental make-up” of the country rather than a written constitution, of which there were many. The two coincided in a sense in the first written constitution, voted in in 1921, therefore much of what went on was determined then. Still the best source on that constitution is Jovanovic [1928]. On the constitutional make-up of Yugoslavia from a historical perspective see Banac [1984]. The third meaning of constitution is that of a regime. Thus, there are the fundamental constitution, the written constitution and the working constitution (the regime). The meaning that I intend should be obvious from the context; if not, I will try to make it clear’. These distinctions are useful because the fundamental make-up of a country may be unjust, while both the written constitution and the regime in terms of its outcomes may not be unjust. For instance, in Yugoslavia in the end, the written constitution relied on consensus as a decision-making rule; also, the distribution of the political and economic advantages were never proven to have been unjust, though everybody complained that his interests were not equally respected. Still, the fundamental constitution of Yugoslavia was unjust.

game). That constantly made Yugoslavia look as a reformable but undesirable constraint that undermined the legitimacy of the state.

Therefore, I think, a convincing explanation of the dissolution of Yugoslavia has to rely on two main explanatory factors: the long term national (ethnic) strategies (“peoples’ wants”) and the power structure (“the political use of economics”). Both were justified by a sense of justice, or rather injustice (the difference is crucial; I will argue for that below and in appendix I). Of course, this elusive political good will has to be defined carefully and analyzed in detail (that is not attempted in full here),⁸⁵ for the explanation I intend to give to come together.

I will discuss these factors below. To summarize, I want to make a very general point that I think the case of Yugoslavia illustrates: countries come together for different reasons, but necessarily provide security; they break up for the lack of justice. The level of political conflict in Yugoslavia was always very high, though it was never in a state of near *anarchy* that is not otherwise uncharacteristic for that region. In that sense, Yugoslavia succeeded in being a state (like Czechoslovakia in the beginning, and even more than that after World War II), but never a legitimate state; it was livable, but not acceptable. It never developed in its citizens the necessary sense of political obligation that is characteristic of a legitimate state. Thus, it could not contain the internal conflicts in periods of either adverse or indeed favorable external changes.⁸⁶

There are countries that are internally quite unstable, but are never on the verge of dissolution. Yugoslavia was not internally unstable most of the time (at least in comparison with what passed for political stability in a number of other European states), but the equilibrium it enjoyed was precarious as it was underlaid by a multifaceted fundamental conflict, the one over the sense and the level of (ethnic) justice that the state’s institutions provided. The ways the conflicts were contained and manipulated with made the substance of the Yugoslav political history; the ways they erupted and aggravated

85 Elements of that can be found in Gligorov [1992b].

86 The only possible exception occurred in 1948, when Yugoslavia resisted Stalin’s pressure.



made the end of that history morally thoroughly horrifying, but for all that even more important to understand.

What is the problem of justice that delegitimized the Yugoslav state? One way to answer this question is to describe the just solution and compare the factual one with that ideal. This is not appropriate in this case. The lack of legitimacy that characterized the successive Yugoslav constitutions was not the outcome of their failure to accord with some ideal of justice but in the feeling of injustice that they were constantly breeding. One does not have to know what is just to feel that an injustice is being done to him. The feeling of injustice politically motives differently than the ideal of justice do. Indeed, when the principles of justice are known or legalized, the injustice complaints are made in reference to them. Otherwise, they refer to some form of interest suppression, either individual or collective, and instigate political conflicts. The Yugoslav written constitutions were breeding the feelings of injustice not because they were not an adequate reflection of this or that ideal of justice that the people may had agreed or disagreed on, but because they were not supplying a remedy to the injustices felt to be the consequence of the fundamental make-up of the country. This is not to say that different ideals of justice were not tried. In fact, as I will show, many were, but all failed to eradicate the fundamental feeling of injustice and often served as an illustration for it.

How does the feeling of political injustice work? In Yugoslavia, the main complaint was that of national discrimination. State's creation was justified by the principle of national self-determination; its main problem was to accommodate claims for ethnic self-determination. The state's response was to increasingly substitute democratic and meritorious criteria with those of ethnicity. On the one hand, consensus was increasingly required in almost everything (the number of consenting parties grew also; from three at the beginning to eight at the end); on the other hand, proportional representation was formally or informally respected and eventually substituted with equal ethnic and regional representation. The acceptable equality being impossible to implement consistently, the harder the state

searched for the principles of ethnic justice, the more widespread were the complaints of national discrimination. The fundamental failure of the Yugoslav constitution is that of the impossibility of finding an unobjectionable system of collective distributive justice.

To see that there was no idea of justice that was necessarily violated, I will give a few examples to show how complicated the perception of justice in fact was. The federal tax system was based, in the end, on contributions from the republics (there were no direct federal income taxes).⁸⁷ Now, how much should the republics contribute? The rule used was for every republic to contribute the percentage proportionate to its share in the national income of the Yugoslav economy. That meant, for instance, that Slovenia should contribute around 25% of the Yugoslav federal budget, though her share in the Yugoslav population was around 8%. Now, what is just? The conflict is obvious, Slovenia believed that the justness of the 8% contribution was obvious, Serbia and some of the other republics that 25% was not progressive enough, if at all. On the other hand, Slovenia did not feel that it should be represented in the federal government in proportion to its population but equally (which did not mean only the same number of representatives but the same power to influence the decisions; the latter in effect meant that everybody had to have equal influence as everybody else put together, that is, it meant that everybody had to have the right of veto on every issue). One can see that the conflicting arguments would have to be given for that position to be maintained. The same was the case with everybody else, only in the opposite direction for some of them. Now, what is the meaning of “no taxation without representation” in this case?

I will give another apparently not so significant but indeed quite characteristic example. By the very end of the communist rule, the heated debate erupted around the school literature program. The idea of the Communist Party people was to have a “common core” of representative authors of all the national literatures for every child to read in all the Yugoslav schools. It turned out to be impossible

⁸⁷ Other sources of federal revenues were a sales tax and customs duties; for details see Dubravcic [1993].



to either justify the need for such a “common core”, as against the national approach, or to find a distribution of authors that would satisfy everybody. In the end, everybody complained that an injustice was being done to their respective nations, the relative importance of their national authors being always greater in their eyes than in the eyes of the others, and everybody finally opted for separate national literature programs. This indeed extends to the history programs, language programs, and social science and humanities programs in general. The ultimate meaning of these disputes was that the very idea of collective understanding and memory on which at least the mythology of the state was founded was rejected together with the less ambitious idea of multiculturalism. The Yugoslav nations separated in their understanding of history and basic cultural values almost from the very beginning and in cultural toleration much earlier than in politics or economics. This is important because Yugoslavia was founded on an idea of the common origin of its multiethnic people, separated only by history, politics and different cultural influences.⁸⁸

The feeling of injustice worked in the same way in almost every other instance, both significant and insignificant. The injustice complaint was not that some ideal of just distribution had not been implemented, but that specific injustices were being inflicted on just about everybody by any system of justice proposed or introduced. A more important example was the dispute over the economic benefits of Yugoslavia that was coached in terms of “who exploits whom”. Slovenia and Croatia argued that Serbia and the other less developed republics fared better in several ways and overall. They brought up the federal fund for the less developed regions, the exchange rate of the hard currencies and of the ruble, on the one side, the monetary policy of the central bank, and many other things, on the other (the above mentioned public burden argument in general). Serbia and the other republics argued that Slovenia and Croatia used the advantage of the shielded Yugoslav market to sell their otherwise

88 This was of course always a matter of dispute, as the classic statement of I. Cankar testifies and as it was brought out in Slovenia most clearly in the debates in the eighties. See Vodopivec [1992].

noncompetitive products at higher prices and many other complaints also (the customs union benefits and costs in general).

There are two ways to see which of these complaints were true. The one is to study the figures. The studies undertaken do not prove any of these assertions. The other is to look into the policies advocated by the respective republics. In general, Slovenia and Croatia should have supported the convertibility of the Yugoslav dinar and the autonomy of the Yugoslav central bank. For the most part, they did not. On the other hand, Serbia and the other less developed republics should have advocated the opening of the Yugoslav market to foreign competition. For the most part, they did not. In fact, various studies show the same picture: (i) most of the republics were adapted to the world market and to the Yugoslav financial system in a similar way; (ii) the economic structure of most of the republics was indistinguishable. Therefore, not much credence should be given to their respective political claims.

A way to verify what I am saying about the disastrous effects of this sense of injustice is to compare the principles that were deemed to be just in Yugoslavia with those that are now followed in the newly independent states. With the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina unsuccessfully and newly formed rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia insincerely, nowhere are either consensus or proportionality (let alone equality) of ethnic representation constitutionally required the way they had been in former Yugoslavia, though all the newly independent republics are multinational to a greater or lesser extent. Therefore, it was not that the principles of justice that were advocated failed to be implemented, but a widespread feeling of injustice was felt among other reasons because the principles were put forward but not believed in and they were impossible to implement justly anyhow. All that worked for the long term lack of legitimacy of the Yugoslav state.

To summarize, I will use the simple Aristotelian idea of justice to describe what I am talking about. The just distribution is the one that treats “the equals equally and the unequals unequally”. However, a just state constitution has to be founded on some basic equality of



the citizens. If that is seen, whatever that is, as being something in which the respective groups are unequal, there is no just constitution to be found. All the principles of justice can be tried and they will fail (this was recognized by Aristotle who indeed thought that “justice is some kind of a proportion” essentially impossible to find; for more on Aristotle’s idea of justice see Gligorov [1985]). That will be the case in a multiethnic state based on the principle of ethnicity. As the ethnic principle differentiates generally, in just about everything the citizens of a multiethnic state would have to be treated unequally. In Yugoslavia, they were categorized and classified by ethnicity in increasingly complicated ways (there were nations, nationalities, ethnic groups, and ethnic minorities). These inequities were tried to be remedied through increasingly more complicated principles of representation and political obligation also (essentially ethnic allegiance was seen as overriding that owed to the state). That proved to be an impossible task. In the end, such a state could not supply its subjects with a sense of justice, it even constantly increased the sense of injustice and depravation; accordingly, it could not be seen as legitimate. That was the fundamental problem of Yugoslavia.

Was it inevitable?

To stress the main points of this and the next chapter even more, and to get some of the alternative explanations out of the way, I will now argue that the break-up of Yugoslavia was not inevitable. Moreover, I will argue that Yugoslavia was in fact reformable. To go to the extreme, I will indeed argue, not only for the sake of argument, that in the seventy odd years of its existence, Yugoslavia was developing in the direction of an ever more just political solution to its constitutional problems (I elaborate this claim in the next chapter). There were, however, some fundamental detours along the way – the dictatorship

in the pre-World War II period, the civil war during the World War II, the communism or socialism afterwards – and the state never reached the satisfactory level of legitimacy in the end, that is, before the ultimate detour. But, it took hard work to break her up, and the job is not completely finished yet.

The beginning of the state was bad. There were high hopes and base motives. There was also lack of mutual understanding and of sensitivity. Yugoslavia was created in response to widespread expectations and favorable sentiments, but without the explicit consensus of her citizens, their nations and even of their representatives.⁸⁹ That created the legitimacy problem that I pointed to above. Therefore, it cannot be maintained that Yugoslavia as a country was created in opposition to the preferences of its nationalities, but the state form the country took did not meet the requirement of consensual agreement. It started as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, though without the appropriately expressed agreement of both the Croats and the Slovenians (not to mention all the others ethnically not recognized or not recognized to the same degree as those explicitly mentioned in the state's name).

Because of the lack of an initial political consensus, Yugoslavia went through successive constitutional reforms that eventually established the politics of consensus in just about everything. In theory, consensus has a distinct advantage in constitutional choice, but obvious disadvantages otherwise.⁹⁰ To make things worse, no constitution of the state ever reached the point where it would express a consensus, but in the last one, almost every decision had to be arrived at through consensus.⁹¹ This means that the constitutional distribution of rights could be seen as unjust (as indeed was the case), and it could be changed only through a consensus. Obviously, rather than producing just solutions, such constitution only perpetuated the frustrations. Such a constitutional make-up reveals a state legitimacy

89 On this see S. Jovanovic [1928].

90 See Buchanan and Tullock [1961]. I have reservations about the validity of their argument, but that is besides the point here.

91 The most contested constitution of 1974.



failure and creates incentives for its citizens to demand that an inside or an outside authority steps in and breaks-up the stalemate, especially if it persists and the problems just keep piling up. For the same reason, and in expectation of possible authoritarianism, it also brings in incentives to get out, to secede.

However, the example also shows that the state did search for legitimacy through its constitutional development. The same is the case with the quota system of representation that I mentioned already. Increasingly, equal representation of all regions and ethnicities was required in all the federal institutions. This even had an unanticipated consequence of creating experienced political elites for the various ethnicities that would prove of significant importance in the independence drives. Military, diplomatic, financial and bureaucratic skills and connections acquired in the Yugoslav federal institutions proved invaluable for the emerging states. In any case, Yugoslavia proved good for national emancipation in that sense, though, as I will point out below, not only in that sense.

Another example is that the need for decentralization was recognized. Early on an understanding was spreading that the state would not succeed without federalization. It is also true that the invariable reaction to almost all serious crises was further decentralization and federalization (if not immediately, then eventually, as was the case with the centralization of Yugoslavia after the introduction of dictatorship in 1929 that ended with the acceptance of the autonomy of Croatia in 1939). But the state also never gave up the belief in centralism completely and especially in authoritarianism. Therefore, all the debates on the constitution of Yugoslavia were coached in terms of parallel decentralization (or federalization) and centralization (again, that was in response to the fundamental Croat and Serbian political interests respectively). In the end, federal (some say confederal) elements were nominally much stronger than the centralized ones, but the policy of thorough and principled federalism was never accepted. As a result, the federal institutions lacked legitimacy. They were also steadily losing credibility as the central authority proved time and again to be highly inefficient. Thus, one could argue that, in

the end, Yugoslavia was nominally highly federalized, fundamentally authoritarian, but in reality with a polyarchic distribution of power. That, however, delegitimized all these characteristics of its political regime.

In international policy, Yugoslavia made the right choice, though not unequivocally. Except for a very short period after World War II, it relied on the West. This was because the West was more sympathetic to that state than Central Europe or the East was. But it never completely integrated in the West. I cannot go into that here, but it is true that Yugoslavia could not have survived so long as it did without the support of the West. Once that was turned away or lost, the internal problems proved to be insurmountable.

However, the integration of Yugoslavia in the West was not insignificant. The state did not rely on the West for its security only. The economic development as well as the development of the basic institutions was to an ever larger extent determined by its relations with the Western world. Yugoslavia was a founding member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and had an increasingly close relations with the European Community (it was offered an associated membership as a first step towards a full membership just before it disintegrated; the offer was in effect turned down by the parties set on going to war), and had significant cultural, scientific, and military connections with the West. The crucial moment, however, came when an almost fundamentalist revival of the East occurred in Serbia and Montenegro. I will discuss that when I come to nationalism.

Finally, in terms of the recognition of national rights, Yugoslavia, in the end, achieved a much better record than any of the newly established states have had so far (and the record was certainly different than those of the other Balkan or Central European states, though it was not without serious, indeed fundamental flaws, not to mention the wounds from the civil war fought during the World War II). It is one of the rare states which served as a vehicle of multinational emancipation, though that was painful for almost



everybody involved. Some nations gained their identity only inside Yugoslavia; some experienced unprecedented cultural development; some gained elements of political sovereignty that they never enjoyed before. Therefore, Yugoslavia was not hopelessly moving in the direction of its own destruction. But it proved incapable of finding the right constitutional solution.

So, two questions seem interesting: Could it have been found? Was it looking for it? I will deal with the second question first.

Essentially, the question is: Was Yugoslavia reformable? Again, there are two questions involved: Could Yugoslavia have gotten out of socialism through a reform? Could it have arrived at a just constitution through reform? I will deal with the reform of socialism first.

Unlike The Soviet Union and much like other socialist countries, Yugoslavia was reformable. Why? The reason is that reforms in the socialist countries (and maybe in general) succeed, if at all, through failure.⁹² They start as an attempt to improve the efficiency of the socialist system, which is a reform that must fail. But it brings along certain irreversible changes. If that is so, the failure of a reform invites the introduction of a further reform. If they are all in the same direction, in the end, the system has to give (more on that in appendix V).

Yugoslavia went through several unsuccessful reforms that brought some fundamental changes to its institutions. Not all of the reforms failed however. The introduction of self-management, for instance and ironically speaking, was a success (unfortunately, I might add). It brought low efficiency to Yugoslav economy, but was firmly established in the official and even not so official ideology.⁹³ Worst of all, it was repeatedly used to cancel the efficiency gains that the reforms were intended to bring and when indeed they were achieved. In spite of that, all pro-market reforms used to bring the system into

92 Here I disagree with the analyses of Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny [1992]. More on that in appendix V.

93 The best source on the lack of efficiency as well as on the desirability of self-management is Bajt [1990].

an instability that was favorable for a definite breakthrough reform. As a matter of fact, changes that took place in the Central European socialist countries show that such reforms that succeed through failure are possible. Indeed, Yugoslavia was the first to attempt an ultimate far-reaching reform at the end of 1989. And it was successful in that ambiguous sense I am using: it broke the system down, as it should have had and as it had been intended, perhaps.⁹⁴ The problem was that the country broke up also.

Therefore, I think that I am right in saying that Yugoslavia could have gotten out of socialism through reform. Now, could it have found a just constitution through reform? The answer is that it did not look for one. All through the eighties Yugoslavia searched for a constitutional reform. But it failed to arrive at one because of two reasons. First, the reformers relied on spontaneous forces of liberalization. Second, the prodemocracy forces did not even attempt to organize a countrywide, Yugoslav opposition. Because of the latter, the reformists relied on the combination of market liberalization and, at moments, on an alliance with the military, for lack of other authority base. The former succeeded in breaking up the system, the latter instigated a civil war.

Thus, it is not the case that one needed to get out of Yugoslavia in order to get out of socialism. In terms of the socialist institutions, Yugoslavia was reformable; it was possible to get rid of socialism through successive reforms. However, unlike other Central European socialist countries, the development of the civil society did not bring about a nation-wide party or a movement with an alternative constitutional idea. The opposition and then, eventually, the ruling party also, were hopelessly captured by the nationalists. And the country broke up.

Was there a just constitution to be found? There are again two questions involved: Is it imaginable? Is it politically reachable?

The first question is not difficult to answer in principle. Yugoslavia is a model case for a constitution based on what Rawls calls “overlapping

94 I discuss the strategy of reforms and the 1989 reforms in V. Gligorov [1990].



consensus".⁹⁵ There are so many dimensions of conflict, that only a very general liberal and (con)federal constitution can hope to prop up a state that guarantees security and protects rights.

However, two in the end irreconcilable constitutional ideas failed to reach a consensus. It is perhaps instructive to see why. The first and the last constitutions represent the conflicting principles well. The first constitution, founded on liberal principles, was voted in on the constitutional convention by the Serbian majority. It failed to endorse federalism. It was not considered legitimate by those who ended up in the minority.⁹⁶ Thus, those against federalism were for majoritarianism, while the federalists were for consensus.

In the attempted reform of the last constitution, Serbian politicians, both those in the government and in the opposition, argued for a majority rule of decision-making, while the others wanted to stick to unanimity. As a matter of fact, both approaches were motivated more by bad memories and romantic expectations than by the realities of the distribution of power. Those advocating majoritarianism failed to notice that in fact, there was no stable majority any more to be found. On the other hand, those advocating unanimity failed to see that the changes cannot come about that way, if one party to the consensus search is willing to be uncompromising. Thus, Serbian politicians and intellectuals argued for majoritarianism and that was unacceptable to the Croats and the Slovenians, though Serbs could not have hoped that they were going to form the majority, the way they did at the moment of the creation of the state. The Croats and the Slovenians (as well as the Macedonians, the Muslims, the Albanians and even the Montenegrins) argued for unanimity, which was unacceptable to the Serbs, though the consensus advocates were in the majority while the Serbs, had they chosen to democratize first, would have stood a good chance of forcing a consensus favorable to them.

It may be useful to show why and how (more on that in appendix IV). Take the case of the majoritarianism first. Let us assume that

95 See e.g., Rawls [1985] and [1987].

96 The country was not called Yugoslavia at the time, but the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians.

a parliament is voted in that reflects the national configuration of Yugoslavia. That means that the Serbs would have about 40% of the seats at best (less than 40% of the population of Yugoslavia declared themselves as Serbs in 1991 census). To form a majority, they would have to secure the cooperation of at least one other ethnic group. In that case, everything would depend on the political preferences of the prospective political partners. One might argue that they could not be too influential, because everybody would be eligible for the partnership (this is in fact not the case, but I will disregard that as it works in support of what I am saying). However, that is not so. Any serious disregard of the political interests of the minority partner would create incentives for the coalition without the Serbian parties to be formed. In general, the coalition of the Croats, the Slovenians, the Albanians and the Muslims would have the majority. Therefore, the Serbian parties would have to look for the prospective partners there. If anything, the partner chosen would have an incentive to bid with the Serbs for greater influence. The choice would be between a coalition of the Serbian parties with those of some other ethnicity, with the junior partner being more than equally powerful, and that of the coalition of the “powerless”, with the Serbian parties permanently in the opposition. Therefore, the majoritarian principle would not necessarily work to the advantage of the largest ethnic group, the way it did, for a number of reasons, in 1921.

Take the unanimity principle next. The principle is highly conservative. It gives everybody the negative (veto) power to stop any decision from being taken, but it is not very useful in times of political change. Now, how does it work for the small and for the big nations in the time of change? First, many issues will be left unsolved, that is, they will be left to be solved outside of the political institutions. In general, that works to the advantage of the larger nations. Second, it makes every political decision more costly to the interested party, because it has to persuade everybody to support its position as compared to only the majority under the alternative decision-making rule, when the agreement can even be made at the expense of the minority that is left out. If the first consequence



holds, the second makes the unanimity principle more costly for the small nations (the transaction costs of unanimity are generally taken to be higher than those of any type of majority decision-making rule; all I am saying is that it is more than proportionately higher for the weaker partners).

These considerations put together, it follows that the best strategy for the Serbs, as the largest nation, if they wanted to preserve Yugoslavia, was to lead in the liberalization and democratization drive. I do not see how that strategy could have been successfully countered by a separatist one, given the complex ethnic configuration of Yugoslavia, the international commitment to support the integrity of the state, and the need for a fundamental economic reform. From this I conclude that Yugoslavia was reformable.

So, why did the reform not happen? Were they all irrational? No. In fact, the actions and the outcomes reveal a configuration of political preferences that is consistent with the distribution of the expected constitutional power. The majority of the nations left or are leaving Yugoslavia, while the Serbs got what they decided to want relying on the distribution of real power, that is, relying on the use of force. Thus, the described distribution of power, given the long-term national interests, produced the predictable results. Therefore, there was a constitution adequate for a country like Yugoslavia, but it had to be preferred to the alternative outcomes and to be politically found. In economic terms, indeed, I think that that outcome was preferred, but politically it was not. And economic preferences not supporting the political ones, there was nothing to support the economic preferences (again, this can be summarized as a Prisoner's Dilemma game).

The second question is thus more important: Was it reachable? We now know that it was not. It is always difficult to use hypothetical judgments to comment on the existing. It seems obvious to me that a Yugoslav solution is out of the question now. One is bound to argue in counterfactual terms and even if the argument turned out to be convincing, who would care? However, there is one way to approach

the forgone possibility in a quasi-realistic way. Look at Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is there a just constitution for that state? Though Yugoslavia was not the same thing, the central Yugoslav conflict and problem was there. What is striking about Bosnia and Herzegovina is that it is so culturally, ethnically and religiously mixed that it is politically indivisible. The same is the case with some parts of Croatia and Serbia. Therefore, the central justification of Yugoslavia is that ethnic states are politically impossible to construct. Ethnic states cannot guarantee equal rights to their citizens (multi-ethnic states not even to the recognized ethnicities). Thus, precisely because there is such a mixture of ethnic and other individualities, Yugoslavia was politically sustainable.

As a matter of fact, in the Bosnian example, as well as in the example of Croatia, the dispute between majoritarianism and consensus has an ironic twist, though it is not necessarily of central importance. Those, in this case the Croats and the Muslims, who had argued for consensus in Yugoslavia, were for majoritarian democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and Croatia), while the Serbs favored consensus as a rule of decision-making in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and Croatia), though they rejected it in Yugoslavia (also, Croats defended consensual rights for Albanians in Serbia, but not for the Serbs in Croatia, while the Serbs demanded consensual rights in Croatia, but rejected similar rights for Albanians in Serbia). In fact, there is no stable majority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, though the distribution of power is perhaps somewhat simpler than it was in Yugoslavia. There are fewer, only three, conflicting parties, two of which, the Serbs and the Croats, are far apart (Serbs make 31% of the population, Croats 17%, Muslims over 40%; the figures are disputed as everything else). However, while complexity of the balance of power destroyed Yugoslavia, simplicity is sealing the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina. If Serbs and Croats cannot form a coalition, the Muslims will always be in the winning coalition. As the Croats are the least numerous of the three ethnicities, the coalition between the Muslims and the Croats in the government with the Serbs in the opposition is a likely outcome of the introduction of a majoritarian democracy. The



distribution of power is simpler than in the former Yugoslavia, but the solution is by necessity more complex. While Yugoslavia might have been organized as a liberal federation with majoritarian democracy, Bosnia and Herzegovina is almost impossible to federalize, difficult to see as a liberal state, and would have to be run by consensus. At the same time, it would have to share its sovereignty with Serbia and Croatia, as they are vitally interested in what goes on in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All that is not inconceivable, but it is almost infeasible. Indeed, a much simpler and more attainable solution for Yugoslavia proved to be almost Utopian.

Given that the ethnic states are impossible, one would think that it would be enough for rational people to anticipate the horrors of the civil war (that was already experienced in the World War II and was kept vivid in the memory of those most concerned), if not the profits of the economic and constitutional reform, to reach a political solution through a (con)federal arrangement that guarantees and protects equal rights of all the ethnicities and other individualities. The opposite turned out to be true, but it was not inevitable, as I hope to have been able to show, however incredible the idea of Yugoslavia may seem now and however definite the break-up looks now. That makes the case of the break-up of Yugoslavia, as an example of the failure of a profitable political integration to achieve viability, even more important to understand (I discuss the economic advantages and costs in somewhat greater detail below; see appendices VI and VII).

Nationalism

“Serbs win in wars and lose in peace.”

Dobrica Cosic

I think that thus far I have given some arguments in support of my claim that political reasons dominate the economic ones in the break-up of a country (I will come to that in the last section of this chapter again as well as in the next chapter). Now, I want to argue for the other claim, i.e., that people get what they want. This call for the description of the political process of the nationalist preferences formation (see appendix II also).

As I said, the fundamental Yugoslav conflict is that between the Serbs and the Croats. The problem is that they live partly on mixed territories, so that they can hardly form independent states without the other side feeling that its vital national interests have been denied and they cannot agree to form a joint state without both sides feeling deprived in their national rights. It stands to reason that this conflict could have been politically resolved, given the World War II experience of a horrible civil war and given the utter infeasibility of the creation of Croat and Serb nationalist states without a repetition of the civil war. The fact that Yugoslavia was a state of a number of other nationalities should have helped by making the power structure more intricate and balanced, had there been no other severe conflicts in Yugoslavia (the discussion that is to follow can be seen in terms of the Chain Store game, see appendix III for more).

One that is especially difficult to incorporate in the overall Yugoslav (South Slav) solution is that between the Serbs and the Albanians. Without going into details, it is obvious that Albanians are not South Slavs and they can hardly disregard the fact that more than one third of them do not live in Albania but in Yugoslavia, of which the overwhelming majority lives in Serbia. On top of that, they live on a compact and connected ethnic territory.



How are their rights to be reconciled with the rights of the other Yugoslav nations? The Albanians felt that they should have equal political rights in the Yugoslav federation, the Serbs felt that demand as a threat to their national interests. The conflict touches the very foundation of Yugoslavia: is it an ethnic state of the South Slavs or is it a federation of all the ethnicities living there? Indeed, the inability of the Yugoslav nations to give an unequivocal answer to that question led to the birth of an ever more fanatical Serbian nationalism. Once it captured the Serbian political, intellectual and military elite, there was no way for the Slovenian and Croatian communist governments that were in a tight spot because of the collapse of socialism anyhow, to give much of a resistance to their nationalists (the emerging liberals turned out to be very weak indeed). And that was the beginning of the end.

The beginning is usually forgotten in the discussions on the break-up of Yugoslavia. It is often believed that the problem was that the regions more close to the West aimed at seceding so as to integrate swiftly into the Western World. However, the secessionist movement started in Kosovo and was inspired not only by the liberating nationalism but by an idealization of the Albanian communism. It would take a lot of space to give an adequate account of what went on there, so all I want to say here is that the fundamental Yugoslav crisis did not start in the more developed West, that took the path of separatism in search of economic gains or out of craving for liberalism and democracy, but in the underdeveloped South.

The Kosovo conflict underlined the Yugoslav constitutional problem and justified the emergence of Serbian nationalism and of the use of (and of the continuous reliance on) violence. While there are non-violent, i.e., liberal political solutions to the central Yugoslav conflict (at least in principle), there are no nationalistic solutions anywhere in Yugoslavia without the use of violence and that can be seen most clearly in Kosovo. Everything else that was to happen in the dissolution of Yugoslavia was an implementation of the goals formulated and the policies tested and justified in Kosovo. There, the Albanian resistance was muted because other deadly conflicts

erupted elsewhere, and it seemed much more politically profitable to the Albanians to let the South Slavs to fight it out and destroy each other than to risk everything in a confrontation with a much stronger and a quite outraged opponent. In that sense, in Kosovo, Serbs and Albanians got what they wanted – so far.

This is not to say that they achieved their fundamentalist goals. This may sound difficult to understand; therefore I will use this example to clarify what I mean by political preferences (“people’s wants”). The case of Kosovo is simple, among other reasons because it is somewhat grotesque (again, it can be formalized as a Prisoner’s Dilemma as will be seen below). The Kosovo region⁹⁷ is of great historical importance to the Serbs, while it is at this time inhabited by Albanians (close to 90%) and Serbs and Montenegrins (the rest; but there are also Turks, Romanies, and other minorities). Yugoslavia tried to solve the ethnic tensions there through ever increasing autonomy of Kosovo, although the region was never made constitutionally equal to the other Yugoslav states.

Now, a nationalistic Serbian state cannot hope to govern Kosovo democratically, because it will not be in the interest of the nationalistic state to give the right of self-rule to Kosovo, as that would mean an Albanian self-rule; on the other hand, anything less than that is simply in contradiction with the current ethnic configuration of Kosovo and is impossible to disregard in a state that is based on ethnic principles. Thus, Serbian ethnic state has to get rid of the Albanians, if not physically then politically; i.e., the choice is between ethnic cleansing and the police state.

On the other hand, Albanians cannot hope to secede from Serbia peacefully, given the importance of Kosovo for the Serbian national interests; but they can hardly accept either to leave Kosovo or to conform to a police state in the long run. Thus, though the ultimately desirable goals are a Serbian Kosovo (requiring ethnic cleansing on a rather grand scale), for the one side, and an independent Kosovo (requiring a civil war), for the other, these are not to be expected

97 Or rather Kosovo and Metohija, but I will disregard this here.



realistically. Thus, both sides must be prepared to follow their more pragmatic political preferences, which in this case mean an uneasy combination of a police state and an underground independence.

The alternative to that is war. It may very well be true that the existing solution is a temporary one and simply means the postponement of the inevitable war. In that case, my point would be even strengthened. If the two sides do not change their preferences they will have eventually to go to war and the current arrangement would have to be seen as a war preparation stage. Whichever way the situation develops, the political preferences will be satisfied. In that sense, both sides got what they wanted and will eventually end up with what they come to want (indeed, that would look like a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma).

The example of Kosovo illustrates two theoretically important considerations. First, the construction of political preferences and the role of nationalism in that. Let us assume two sides bargaining. The most each side can aim at is to get everything that is the object of the bargain. This may not seem fair even to those that aim at such an outcome, therefore a strong justification is helpful. Nationalism is such a justification. However, if both parties are nationalist, it is not realistic for either side to expect to get all that it wants. Therefore, the political preferences of even nationalist movements can be at times more pragmatic. When I say that people get what they want, by "people's wants" I mean some combination of these more pragmatic preferences that mirror the politically feasible goals with the more extreme ones that rely on nationalism. Hopefully, the pragmatic preferences will dominate. But of course, the nationalistic justification will not go away, so it may destabilize the achieved political solutions. As a matter of fact, the demise of Yugoslavia is the case in point.

Second, the political preferences of the Serbian nationalists were both formed and revealed in Kosovo. It became transparent that a police state was preferable to democracy, if that meant that the hope of the achievement of the final nationalistic aim could be kept alive even if in fiction rather than in reality (if that could keep the game going,

so to speak). This preference commitment has not been given up yet; thus all that the further political developments brought about was the spread of the police and war state.

These political preferences are founded on an idea of justice also, of retributive justice to be precise; on the idea of those living under the police state deserving precisely that.⁹⁸ This I think is of fundamental importance for what went on. The historical importance of Kosovo for Serbian nationalism does not by itself justify a police state, not to mention ethnic cleansing. A stronger justification is needed. In the case of Kosovo, Albanians were presented as perpetrators of the politics of genocide against the Serbian people. That justified the policy of “all the necessary measures”. Given the crime, the punishment is appropriate; given the injustice complaint, the police state is just. The same justification was used in Croatia (on both sides) and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (by the Serbs against the Muslims mainly, but increasingly by the other two sides also). Again, nationalism plays the role of the ultimate justifier. The consequences are devastating indeed. Once “the extreme measures” are used and justified, the moral damage done to the nation is so high, that the whole society falls hostage to the nationalists. The character of the Serbian state now is not so much determined by nationalism, but by a nationalist justification of the most drastic policies. Justifications oblige, they become reasons, and are thus relied on generally. Therefore, what was accepted for Kosovo became even more acceptable everywhere else. Every means could be justifiably used everywhere, as everybody was guilty of the most horrendous crimes and deserved the worst fate to befall them.

The cases of the political preferences of the Croats and the Muslims are somewhat simpler. Croats voted in by a relative majority their nationalist party in the first multi-party elections in 1990, though it had already been obvious at that time that the goals of that party could not be achieved without the war against the Serbs being fought. Then everybody voted for their respective ethnic parties in Bosnia and

98 That fascism and even Nazism are based on the idea of justice is argued in Hayek [1944].



Herzegovina, thus disappointing the hopes of the Yugoslav parties and sealing the fate of Yugoslavia; indeed opting for a possibility of a civil war (the period of preparations lasted a little longer in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

What the Croats and the Muslims disregarded was that they had no answer to the fact that there is a Serbian problem, the way that the Serbs did not at first recognize, and then had no choice but not to care, that by imposing a police state in Kosovo they are disregarding the problem of Yugoslavia that is thus opened. The Croats in particular calculated that they can disregard the Serbian problem by diversification, as it were, and succeeded in fact to help it to generalize. The Muslims, on the other hand, opted for independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina to avoid the fate of Kosovo that they feared they would share if they were to stay with Serbia, disregarding that they cannot hope to get the consent of Serbia for its independence. As a matter of fact, prior to the independence decision in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbs from that republic made it clear through the decision in their ethnic referendum that they will not accept any kind of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The political options of Bosnia and Herzegovina can be seen in another way also. Assume that there is a political game with three strategies: exit, voice, and loyalty.⁹⁹ The position of Bosnia and Herzegovina is such that it can have a voice and it can even be decisive through loyalty, but it has no exit option. Bosnia is a province in search of a state. If there is no state that it can be loyal to and in which its voice can be heard, Bosnia may choose to become a state. But that will be seen by the other interested states, i.e., Serbia and Croatia, as Bosnia using the exit option, and their conflict over Bosnia and Herzegovina will make such a choice doomed. It was not much of a choice that the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina had, but it was made in the first free elections and in the independence referendum and that makes the Bosnian case tragic.

99 I am of course relying on the classic analysis of strategic political choices in Hirschman [1970].

The only ones that showed some kind of ambiguity were the Macedonians, being among the last to declare their independence and showing clear unwillingness to engage in any level of violence, and they are the only ones that succeeded in staying out of the war - so far. In that sense, they all got what they chose to want. The Albanians got away with a severe repression, because they did not opt for a war confrontation. The Macedonians got stuck with a funny debate over their right to their ethnic and state name with their neighbors, the European Community and the United States of all possible opponents, and have suffered from an economic blockade from Greece of all states, but did not opt for war.

The case of Slovenia is different and somewhat exceptional, but it seems to me obvious that even they anticipated that some kind of military confrontation is inevitable and they certainly prepared for that. However, the confrontation was as short and as reluctant as it was pointless. There are no conflicts of national interests between the Serbs, or anybody else in Yugoslavia, and the Slovenians. The problem there was the timing of the secessionist move and the vested interests of the Yugoslav Army. Otherwise, the secession of Slovenia should have been a problem only in terms of the change in the distribution of economic and political power that it was to bring about (not a light consideration though, it forced others to try either to keep Slovenia inside Yugoslavia or to follow its example; otherwise, the power configuration that I described above would change decisively in favor of the largest nation).

Thus, repugnant as the claim is, it seems to be true that whatever went on in Yugoslavia was in accordance with the (revealed or strategic) political preferences of all those concerned. The dynamics, however, is not without importance. The break-up started at a point (Kosovo) where the conflict in question is the most difficult one to solve by constitutional means, that is, through rights generalization. It influenced decisively the ideology of the Serbian nationalism. While much of it was traditionally Western oriented, in Kosovo it instigated the revival of an ideology that can even be termed as fundamentalist in some kind of Eastern sense. It relied on a



combination of nationalism, communism and the hope in the same combination winning in Russia. The policy was chosen that relied on the superior might and it was perceived as a threat all over Yugoslavia because of the potential generalization over the other conflicts. The question of justice, or rather injustice that was not resolved anyhow, became acute. If you can use nationalism and military force in Kosovo without our consent, why cannot we (whoever we are) do the same in the Serbian areas in Croatia (Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina)? The argument works in the opposite direction also. Thus, incomparable becomes the same. And nationalism generalizes.

What does nationalism mean and how it generalizes? Take the case of Kosovo again. If it is to be run against the will of at least 80% of its population, it can only be run as a police state. If the whole of Serbia and Yugoslavia are not to be run as police states also, it should be possible to have durable democracy in Serbia and Yugoslavia with a durable police state in Kosovo. This is politically incredible. It certainly was not believed by all the others in Yugoslavia. Thus, the alternatives were: either Kosovo will have to be given the same or similar constitutional rights the other Yugoslav republics enjoyed, or everybody will have to start looking for a way to evade the fate that was to befall Kosovo.

The dilemma dragged on for quite a while, influencing the political development throughout Yugoslavia and especially Serbia. It generalized into a dilemma between democracy and authoritarianism. At the crucial moment, in 1986 and 1987, there was a change in the Serbian political strategy, that is akin to an acceptance of authoritarianism and separatism (up to that point Serbia was championing the cause of liberalization and democratization). If the others cannot take the Serbian solution of the Kosovo problem, they will have to take up independent Serbia. That of course would involve the change in internal borders, threatening almost everybody in Yugoslavia. Thus, the vital interests of everybody being endangered, nationalism appeared as a desirable political alternative everywhere. That is all well known; the only point worth emphasizing is Serbian separatism. That is not usually recognized.

The process can and should be seen from the other sides also. Take the long term Croatian interest to achieve state independence. That interest was ever present, being suppressed only after the forceful political intervention against the surge of Croatian nationalism in 1971. However, once the balance of power starts changing, with Serbia asserting its interests more forcefully, the Croatian nationalist interest becomes paramount again. It feeds back and reinforces the Serbian nationalist movement, with everybody else looking for a way out. That, in turn, reinforces Serbian nationalism even more, pushing at the same time the nationalists in Croatia to power. Everybody relies on the resources in which they have comparative advantage, some on ethnic political mobilization, and others on military might. And various types of nationalist states spring up.

From a historical point of view, the interesting thing is that, in the final stages of the Yugoslav disintegration unlike in the inter-war period and in the crises of the late sixties, separatism was not championed either by Croatia or by Serbia for quite some time. The first to put out their interests were the Albanians; the Serbs followed. Then came the Slovenians. Their case is strategically interesting. It has sometimes been argued that Yugoslavia could survive the secession of Slovenia and Macedonia, but not of Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is politically more than wrong. Following some such idea of Slovenia being in a special position in Yugoslavia, their communist politicians argued for something they named an “asymmetric federation”. That meant simply that what went on in Yugoslavia would be applied to Slovenia only if it agrees to that. It was almost politically irresponsible, given the importance of ethnic justice for Yugoslav politics. Apart from that, if Slovenia were to pull out partially or completely, the balance of power in the rest of Yugoslavia would shift decisively in favor of Serbia. This case illustrates the character of the Yugoslav political equilibrium. Everybody had to stay in (including the Albanians) or the whole thing would fall down. Once the Slovenians committed themselves to leaving Yugoslavia, the state was doomed.

These processes can be seen as running parallel. Indeed, I think that, more or less, that is how nationalism generalized in Yugoslavia. Once



everybody got committed to it, there was no solution short of the confrontations that finally ensued. The fundamental characteristic of nationalism is that it puts collectivist interests before and above principles and individual rights. That makes common, multi-ethnic state all but impossible, and the rules of international law become applicable. This being the case, violent conflicts is inevitable and the country breaks up.

The inconclusion

One has to look at Bosnia and Herzegovina to see what the enduring dilemmas are and expected political outcomes. There is an inconclusive break-up, an unjust constitution, permanent instability, and a growing international involvement. The same is true for almost the whole ex-Yugoslavia.

A comparison with former Yugoslavia is telling. Though Yugoslavia was not a just state, it was a state. It supplied its citizens with security. The different ethnicities in Yugoslavia had conflicting ideas as to what their state should look like, and eventually failed to come up with an “overlapping consensus”. But, the ethnic states that have emerged after the break-up of Yugoslavia are in most cases not even states.

Serbia is a state without clearly defined borders. It extends over its official borders, not only into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the federation of Serbia and Montenegro), but into Serbian held territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, but it does not extend (except through its military and police presence) as far as its official borders in Kosovo. The Kosovo problem is hardly solvable without a permanent international involvement. But it will eventually become clear that even the Serbian problem is unsolvable without a permanent international involvement. Serbia has developed into an

aimless might. It is hard to see whether it will ever come up with a feasible national interest to organize a state around. The aimlessness will be permanent, if a solution to the Kosovo problem is not found, assuming all the other problems are somehow solved. But what could that be?

Croatia is also a state without clear borders. It extends into Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it does not extend over the Serbian areas inside Croatia. As a matter of fact, for some crucial state decisions, it has to acquire and it will continue to have to acquire the consent of the Serbs in Croatia and of the Serbian government. The case of Croatia is telling precisely for the comparative importance of political vs. economic interests. The costs of the secession of Croatia in terms of wealth, income, and sheer possibilities of communication (that is, security) are very high and long term. In terms of economic sovereignty, Croatia now has to negotiate with an all Serbian government in Belgrade (as opposed to a Yugoslav one) and with a Serbian Krajina government in Knin. Its bargaining position has worsened, to put it mildly. It had to rely on international support to acquire its sovereignty and will have to rely on a permanent international involvement to somehow persist.

Bosnia and Herzegovina will be a state in name only, if at all. The same problem of fundamental injustice, only aggravated because of the cruel civil war that will go on for quite some time, will work for a permanent instability there. That state will not be able to protect its own citizens without a permanent international involvement. That, however, means the same thing as in the Middle East: the involvement of the whole world. The solutions that are to be arrived at in Geneva, New York, Washington, Moscow, or somewhere else, at this very moment or later on, are unfortunate because by attempting to solve the acute problem of the civil war, the permanent problem area will be created that will agitate all the key world powers for a rather long period of time.

The only state to emerge from Yugoslavia is Slovenia. On the other extreme there is Macedonia which is not a fully recognized state, that



is, it is a state without a name. It is perceived by the international community as a temporary arrangement. It will also invite an ever growing international involvement. It will rely on the balance of powers for its security and it will require a very high level of political justice to evade further partitions. From a realistic point of view, this is hard to achieve without an active support from the European Community and the United States.

This is all with the Kosovo problem being completely pushed aside. As it will not go away, the internally destabilizing factor will be there. But with the outside interests being involved everywhere else in the former Yugoslav lands that factor of destabilization will be present all the time also. The most one can hope for is a durable cease-fire in the Balkans, stability is not to be expected.

To summarize, with the exception of Slovenia, the former Yugoslav lands seem to be heading towards long term instability. If the sources of instability become firmly institutionalized and internationally secured, as it seems more than likely now, the area will suffer from a long term economic retardation and will breed political and other injustices as almost throughout the whole of the history of the Balkans.

CHAPTER 4

Is what is left right?

“Whatever leads to good is good.”

Machiavelli

The outcome of the Yugoslav crisis is still pretty far away. The country has disintegrated, and everything else has fallen to pieces. At this moment (March, 1994), there is still a civil war going on, there are new independent and semi-independent states and regions, thousands of dead and wounded people, destroyed cities and villages, a huge and growing tide of refugees, private and officially private armies and mafia, growing unemployment, general unrest and a running inflation and hyperinflation.¹⁰⁰ However, the main problem is that there is still no political solution in sight.

In this chapter I try to apply the explanation advanced in the previous chapters to the political dead-end that Yugoslavia and the post-Yugoslav states have come to. In order to do that, I elaborate on a theme from chapter 2 and describe the essentials of the break-down of the communist political space; I bring out more explicitly than in chapter 3 the political fundamentals of the country; I interpret the overall developments in the different regions and speculate on the characteristics of the eventual outcome of the crisis.¹⁰¹

100 Not only of the Yugoslav dinar, but of the new Slovenian tolar and also of Croatian and Macedonian dinars (though Slovenian inflation seems to have slowed down and those of Croatian and Macedonian dinars are not nearly as high as the Yugoslav inflation, yet). The monetary policy of the newly created states will be an interesting subject to study. It is quite possible that they all follow the monetary policy of every revolutionary government, that is they introduce new currency (in fact, at least in the very beginning, they are just coupons), run it through hyperinflation to wipe out all the pre-existing obligations, and only then stabilize through an introduction of yet another new currency. That may be called the “takeover of monetary sovereignty”.

101 For more background information see chapter 2.



Here, I discuss only the political aspects of the Yugoslav crisis, leaving the historical and economic considerations and explanations out.¹⁰² What I will argue for, summarizing to some extent what I have said already, is that the political legacy of communism contributed to the crisis erupting (see chapter 2), but it deepened and had persisted because not only the crisis but even the civil war was what the political actors rationally chose in view of the political interests they had committed themselves to (see chapter 3). Though everybody in Yugoslavia blames the past or the enemy for what is going on, the plain truth is that the crisis is a predictable outcome of the political aims that have gained wide legitimacy. And the crisis will not end until the political strategies of the dominant nations are changed.

What the crisis is all about is well brought out by one way to characterize a civil war: in civil wars both (in this case, all) sides fight for a just cause. In the Yugoslav case, the just causes are the national identities, interests and rights. That is why the war is so violent, brutal and destructive. In a war between states, at least in principle natural rights are respected (and many legal and other conventions). In a civil war, no rights are recognized. Both (all) warring factions want to completely destroy the legitimacy of the rival side(s).¹⁰³ So, the Yugoslav crisis is about rights and power, and that what is left.

102 Which is not to say that there are no historical roots to the current conflicts or that so-called material interests are unimportant. I am only singling out what I think is the leading theme in an otherwise very complex story.

103 There are no “innocent victims” in a civil war’. While in a war armies fight, in a civil war there are no armies and there is no civilian population. In that sense, Carl Schmitt was right, the fundamental and, in fact, the only distinction is the one between the friend and the enemy.

The center does not hold

The dominant political theory described totalitarianism as a totally controlled social system, or as a system without ideological, political or economic competition. This picture has been criticized by many, but the alternative interpretation rested mainly on the sociological idea of growing functional differentiation. Judging by the evidence, the anti-totalitarians were right. However, the totalitarian model proved to have greater predictive power, because it asserted that the system is headed for a collapse. The alternative model predicted a more smooth transition. Still, both models lacked a theory of the political dynamics of the transition period. They failed to look at the specifics of the political space as it developed through political competition under communism. What I will do now is to draw a very simple picture of the communist political space.¹⁰⁴

The totalitarian theory saw the communist system as one vertical line of authority (because of the centralization of power and property rights and one party rule). The revisionist theory argued that there were different dimensions of authority, and they drew a number of vertical lines. The elements of competition were seen to emerge on the horizontal levels between these lines. A typical picture is that of a number of ministries competing for authority and resources.

However, in these models, there was no place for the general horizontal level of legitimization of the political system. The competing factions were described in terms of “reformists” and “hard-liners”, or “liberals” and “conservatives”. Sometimes the metaphors for the “left” and “right” were used, mostly in the way introduced by Stalin.¹⁰⁵ It was believed that because the communist system was not

104 A detailed discussion can be found in Gligorov [1979] and [1984].

105 The criterion is a simple one: everything bad is on the right side. It is interesting to note that Lenin had a somewhat different political space perception than Stalin. He saw opposition on both extremes (left-wing adventurers being mainly his party opponents, while the class enemy was on the right side; it seems that he at least tried to position himself in the center of the political space). Stalin saw only the division between the two extremes, he being on the left and everybody else on the right side. Indeed, he pioneered the idea of the “two rights”, the one being the right faction of the Communist party, the other being everybody else.



a legitimate one and there was one party rule, there was no need to introduce the citizens into the political model.

An exception was made when nationalism was discussed, but it was never clear how was this factor supposed to influence the overall picture of totalitarian communism? That proved to be a huge flaw in the so-called communist studies. It left the profession without any serious answer as to what will happen when the totalitarian system collapses and the population becomes influential that is when the power has to be redistributed. The only way in which the individuals and the nations entered into these models was as consumers that is as economic clients of the government. It was believed that the system would get into trouble at the point when it failed to provide for the needs of the population that is at the point when the inefficiencies caught up with the institutions and the structure of authority collapsed. However, explicit political needs were left out.¹⁰⁶

In fact, the communist political space was in some sense simpler and at the same time more complex than these models described. If we only take the revisionist idea that there were a number of lines of authority, it is to be expected that they will not only compete for influence over the power center, but also for popular support. If that is correct, there will be a number of factions in the ruling communist party competing for the support of the various sectors of the population. Thus, though there are no meaningful elections, the population “votes” in many other ways, and a quasi-pluralized political space comparable (though not similar) to the one characteristic of democracies develops. However, it has a kind of an equilibrium point somewhere between the center and the one of the extremes. Following Stalin, I will call the side where the rulers are the “left” and that where the population is the “right”. The question is: How does the behavior of the political actors influence the dynamics of this political space?

106 The economic model with explicit horizontal relations in otherwise completely socialist system was developed by J. Kornai in a series of books; see for instance Kornai [1980].

If the population is not indifferent as to what the policies are, and if that can be exploited in the competition for power, there will be at least two factions in the ruling communist party, one of which would be more to the right than the other. If the masses of the population are to the right of the ruling party, the policies of the right faction of the communist party will be more popular. As a matter of fact, the further to the right the population goes, the closer to the center the power center can be moved. On the other hand, the left-wing faction can block this development by going even further to the left. So, an equilibrium emerges with most of the population moving to the right, with the ruling communist party together with the real power centers moving to the left, and with the “right-wingers” holding the space in a quasi-equilibrium by creating a center that is to the left of the one where the power would have settled after a few rounds of regular free elections had they been held.¹⁰⁷

The communist equilibrium described is not stable. In terms of ideology, the political space is never left-wing enough. On the other hand, in terms of the beliefs of the majority, it is never right-wing enough. Therefore, it can rest only on force, fear, and corruption. Force, because otherwise a rival party would emerge trying to represent the will of the majority. Fear, because otherwise the routinized compliance and cooperation with the authorities could hardly be explained. Corruption, because no level of force and fear can rationalize the prolonged quasi-stability of the otherwise unpopular regime. However, in time, the fact that the center of the communist space diverges from that that would have emerged had the free elections been held, creates all kinds of political and even moral problems. In some communist countries, the moral disgust is the basis for the political unrest; in others the political irrationality induces moral considerations.¹⁰⁸ Whatever the case, the center cannot

107 The picture that I am trying to draw is this: suppose that there is an implicit democratic distribution of power, the one that would have emerged had there been a history of at least three to four regular and legitimate elections. Then, in comparison to that political space, the center of the communist space is skewed towards the left extreme (see appendix III).

108 More on this in Gligorov [1984].



hold indefinitely. Indeed, the supply of force, fear, and corruption has to be renewed constantly. Once one or all of them dry out, the instability is unavoidable.

At least two outcomes are possible. One is for the majority of the population to join the ruling party or ruling party controlled organizations. And, as a matter of fact, developed communist systems used to recruit almost everyone in one way or another. If that goes on for some time, the totalitarian system might get transformed into an authoritarian one, in the sense that the right-wing faction of the ruling party and especially the bureaucracy and the state officials would be captured by the population, while the power center would end up being an isolated, autocratic ruling body that has to be gotten rid off as soon as a favorable occasion presents itself. This I might call, somewhat ironically, a “liberal solution”.

The second possibility is for the political space to break down. If the ruling party remains under the control of the left-wing faction, the population will be driven to the far right extreme, and when this becomes, for whatever reason, politically unsustainable, the whole political space will start falling to the right almost indefinitely. I will call this a “populist solution”. An interesting variant of the “populist solution” occurs when a “liberal” faction of the Communist Party gets hold of the power just before or immediately after the collapse of the political equilibrium. That “liberalization” attempt, if it comes too late or in an already “populist” political space, will prove to be unsuccessful (as indeed was the case in Yugoslavia). The defeat of the “liberal communists” may even move the whole political space deeper into the populist direction, because it had been heading that way anyhow.

As I will show presently, the way the political space will go does not depend only or even decisively on the characteristics of the political space described, but also on what I will call the specific political fundamentals. However, the two possibilities of change described above are given by the way the political space is constructed.¹⁰⁹

109 This is a minimal political space that I need for the stated result. In reality, everything is much more complicated.

The fundamentals

I will now describe the political fundamentals of Yugoslavia, paying attention mostly to the central conflicts and I will come back to the others when I discuss the developments in the different regions.

1. Yugoslavia was a construct, it was not a “natural state”.

Philosophically, of course, this is a debatable point, because every state can be seen to be a construct.¹¹⁰ However, in Europe, states tend to be nation-states, and in that sense have a “natural foundation”. Yugoslavia was constructed without such a justification, though the very name implies that the nations living in Yugoslavia are ethnically close to each other (Yugoslavia means “the state of the South Slavs”).¹¹¹ Anyhow, because of the way the political space developed under the pre-World War II monarchy and especially under communism, no continuous horizontal line was constructed. A possibility existed for different regions to choose different solutions on their way out of communism. And this is in a way what happened.

If there is one fundamental fact of Yugoslav history and politics this is it: *National interests are the reason both for the construction as well as for the destruction of Yugoslavia*. The state was created as an expression of the “right to self-determination” of nations previously grouped together inside the Austro-Hungarian Empire or recently liberated from centuries of Turkish occupation. Thus, national interests were taken to be the “natural foundation” of the newly created and never before existing state. However, it soon became obvious that some old national rivalries and conflicts will only aggravate in the new state and some new ones will emerge. And in fact it is the understanding

¹¹⁰ In some sense. However, for criticism of the contractarian approach in political philosophy see V. Gligorov [1992d].

¹¹¹ Of course, history can be interpreted differently. On the one hand, Yugoslavia was created in 1918 (in fact, at first, as a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians; it took up the name of Yugoslavia only in 1929) under the rule of the “self-determination” of nations. On the other hand, a strong mythology of common linguistic and cultural roots had developed in some intellectual and political circles in various parts of what was to become Yugoslavia. However, no nationality was in fact ready to give up its national identity in exchange for the common one.



that national interests are “natural” that makes the construct like Yugoslavia “unnatural”.¹¹²

2. *Yugoslavia was reconstructed several times, but never in a satisfactory way.*

The first Yugoslav constitution (1921) was democratic (even social-democratic in some respects), but not federalist. It was passed by the dominant Serbian parties with Croatian and Slovenian parties in the opposition.¹¹³ So, the main Yugoslav political problem up until the Second World War was the so called Croatian question.¹¹⁴ Finally, in 1939, the Cvetkovic-Macek agreement federalized Yugoslavia in an asymmetric way, that is, it created a Croatian province (state) without federalizing Yugoslavia as a whole. Nothing symbolizes the basic political conflict in Yugoslavia better than this chimerical solution.¹¹⁵

The numerous constitutions of the second Yugoslavia were federalist, but not democratic. They recognized both the necessity of giving autonomy to all the nations in the country (the principle of self-determination was reasserted in almost every post-war constitution) and of a full-blown federalism (even con-federalism). However, the federalization itself was imperfect, because it copied The Soviet Union model, and the system was socialist. Federalism and socialism work against each other, which is a welcome check on the growth of socialism in an otherwise democratic state, but decentralization aggravates every regional conflict in a comprehensive socialist system.¹¹⁶ Yugoslavia experienced both consequences. Federalism justified various sorts of decentralizations, and Yugoslav totalitarian

112 I discuss some more the relation between natural and national foundations of a state in relation to a “liberal constitution” in appendix II.

113 On the first Yugoslav constitution see S. Jovanovic [1928].

114 This is not to say that no other national conflicts existed. As a matter of fact, Slovenian, Macedonian, Albanian, Muslim and all the other now apparent problems were there from the outset. Only the Croatian question was recognized as the central one.

115 Because this example is so telling, I come back to it below. However, at this point, it is perhaps worth mentioning that the ethnic principle was used to determine the borders of the Croatian federal unit. The borders did differ from those drawn after the Second World War, but not as drastically as one might get an impression by listening to the heated debates about the “unjust borders” of what was federal Yugoslavia.

116 More on that in Gligorov [1990c].

system was much more free and market oriented than that in the other Eastern European countries. However, everybody complained that the rival region or regions got a better deal in the socialist game of distributing and redistributing resources.¹¹⁷

3. Yugoslavia's record of national tolerance is better than that of the majority of other states in the region.

Though Yugoslavia was not a proper federation and was only for a short while a democracy, it was not harshly anti-nationalist if all seventy odd years of its existence are taken into account. If the Yugoslav record is compared to that of the other countries in the region or to that of nation-states created during the Second World War on Yugoslav territories and indeed to that of the newly established ex-Yugoslav states, it becomes clear that Yugoslavia did not systematically go against the national emancipation of those living in it. It is true that any kind of emancipation had to be won through sometimes bitter political struggle, but, in the end, inside Yugoslavia, the rights of Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians, Muslims, Albanians and Hungarians were recognized and steadily enlarged. And it would be hard to prove that the rights of Serbs and Montenegrins were frustrated.¹¹⁸ However, as it will be seen immediately, that depends

117 However, the economic profession did not support the popular' opinion. Only a minority of economists in every nation believed that it was exactly their nation that was exploited by the rival one. Their influence grew precisely when the communist space broke down and they were able to use the authority of the nationalist parties they joined or of the important national institutions that they had been or were to become members of (like the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences that in an infamous "Memorandum" gave credence to the suspicion that "Serbs were exploited by the Slovenians and the Croats from the time Yugoslavia was created in 1918"). The funny thing is that most of the explanations for the long-term exploitation of certain regions in Yugoslavia are coached in Marxist jargon. Some Marxists say that it is evident that the more developed regions are exploiting the less developed, while their Marxist opponents from more developed regions say that it is more than evident that only the less developed regions can exploit the more advanced ones.

118 There are many versions of the process of national emancipation in Yugoslavia. Some deny that any nation except the one they belong to really exists. There also used to exist very strong movements of self-denial. In fact, Yugoslavia was conceived as a state based on ethnic similarities of the different nations living there. There was a widely shared belief among influential intellectuals of all the leading nations in the nineteenth and twentieth century that Slovenians, Croats and Serbs are one nation consisting of three tribes. So, they had to get to know each other living together in the



on how the rights are perceived, that is that depends on the national interests one is committed to.¹¹⁹

4. Yugoslavia was constructed and reconstructed in the described ways because that was what the dominant political forces wanted.

Neither the first nor the second Yugoslavia was a mistake or a ploy. There have always been theories of Yugoslav history that claimed to have shown “once and for all” that “the other side” tricked the “right side” into the bargain. However, the state was constructed in accordance with the interests of those living in it. As is easy to see now, the dominant idea of all the Yugoslav nations is a centralized, unitary state¹²⁰. Some nations could never hope to dominate Yugoslavia, so they advocated a federal or a con-federal constitution. Some, on the other hand, did dominate it, and they tried to get it to be as centralized as possible. Even socialism was accepted by some as one way to centralize, apart from other mainly revolutionary and post-war like reasons.

However, no construction proved to be stable. This is because the only way that a state like Yugoslavia could have achieved stability would

same country. Having had all kinds of wrong ideas as to who Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians, Muslims and others had really been, they were all very surprised to find out that the differences are far greater than the similarities. So, the history of Yugoslav national conflict has to be seen, admittedly rather benignly, as one of encounter and of ever growing understanding of who they really are. If this is defined as “cultural difference”, then given how huge it was and how primitive historical knowledge was and how strong cultural prejudices were, the national tolerance level of Yugoslavia was not too low. For instance, Serbs fought to liberate their compatriots in Macedonia only to learn to their amazement that the majority of the population there had not been Serbian for quite a long time. Even very well educated and liberal intellectuals could never reconcile themselves to the idea that the center of the Middle-Ages Serbian kingdom is not populated by Serbs any more. So, during the whole inter-war period, there was the Macedonian problem as well as the Croatian one. However, after the Second World War the national rights of Macedonians were recognized. So, everybody learned what the reality had been. Of course, nationalists in Macedonia and outside it still do not want to accept that their historical perceptions are simply myths, but I think that this is a normal process of historical learning that is to be expected.

119 What it means to be committed to national interests is a complicated theoretical problem that I do not want to go into here. I generally accept Lord Acton’s characterization in his essay on “Nationality” (see the appendices for some quotes).

120 All the constitutions of the independent Yugoslav republics define highly centralized states (the exception is Bosnia and Herzegovina which allows the formation of regions and Serbia that nominally has two autonomous provinces, but is otherwise as centralized as a state can be).

have been to be founded on a liberal constitution. But, liberal forces were always very weak in Yugoslavia as in the Balkans in general. Thus, though democracy and federalism are necessary ingredients of an acceptable Yugoslav state, they are not sufficient for the stability of that state. Only with a liberal constitution could Yugoslavia survive. But, as in many other countries, the liberal elements were and are nationalist, and the populist elements are not liberal. So, that solution was never explored.¹²¹

5. *The fundamental Yugoslav problem was the Serbo-Croat national conflict.*¹²²

All that was said above is background information. It hints at what was the fundamental political fact of Yugoslavia. That was the conflicting political strategies or national interests to which the two dominant nations, Serbs and Croats, were committed. Croats want to live in a separate state. They claim that they have never renounced that right, though during almost all of their history they have not been able to create their independent and sovereign nation-state.

Serbs, on the other hand, want to live together in one state. This has been the way they had perceived their national interest for more than a century now. Serbian state expended through wars and in other ways to end up as a dominant element of the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941). After the Second World War Serbian national aims were somewhat frustrated. But the dominant perception was that even a federal Yugoslavia was acceptable as long as Serbs could feel that they were all living together in the same state.

6. *To solve the “Croatian question” is to open the “Serbian question”.*

The nature of the Serbo-Croat conflict was well recognized after the so-called Cvetkovic-Macek agreement was signed in 1939. Once Croats' rights to state autonomy were recognized, there was a marked change in the way political problems were perceived in Yugoslavia. The leading Serbian politicians and intellectuals became aware that with

121 What I mean by a “liberal constitution” I make clear in appendix II below.

122 By a “national conflict” I mean the conflict between nations in its conveniently ambiguous meaning: as a conflict between states and between ethnicities.



the “solution” of the “Croatian problem” the “Serbian problem” had emerged. In at least three ways. First, the Croats had their autonomy in Croatia, while Serbs had no such state entity. Second, Yugoslavia ruled directly over all the other parts of the state, except for Croatia. That is, Croats (and others) could influence the decisions in the center, which meant in all the other parts of Yugoslavia, while Yugoslavia, and that meant all the other Yugoslav citizens and nations, had to respect Croatian autonomy. Third, as every asymmetry tends to elicit demands for symmetrical treatment, all the other nations were bound to demand to be treated in the same way the Croats were treated, so that further federalization was politically almost inevitable. That, of course, meant further erosion of the power of the Serbs as well as further aggravation of their national and territorial problems. The basic problem is simple:

If Croatia is created and if every nation is given the right to self-determination, where are the borders of the Serbian state to be drawn?

There is still no answer to that question.

7. The national interests of Serbs and Croats are irreconcilable.

One glance on the map of Yugoslavia will make it clear that, given the ethnic distribution of the population, Serbs and Croats cannot both have it their own way. For Croats to have a separate state, Serbs would have to give up what they perceive to be their fundamental national interest. Also, for Serbs to all live in one state, Croats would have to give up what they believe is their one thousand years old national interest. The only way that either of these outcomes could be achieved is for one side to prevail over the other. And that means war.

Therefore, once Serbs and Croats became committed to a political strategy that was in accordance with their long-term national interests, civil war in Yugoslavia was inevitable. And, for these strategies to be adopted populist movements had to come to power, which is precisely what happened in Serbia and Croatia. And, as I tried to show, the development of the communist political space made this outcome quite possible. That is how everything came together to produce the destruction of Yugoslavia.

8. All the other national conflicts could be, in principle, reconciled inside Yugoslavia or through secession, but not in any other multi-national state construct.

Apart from the conflicting national interests of the Serbs and the Croats, the interests of the other nations could be satisfied inside a Yugoslav federation or confederation, or in independent states. For instance, Slovenian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Muslim and even Albanian interests could have been satisfied inside a liberal Yugoslav federal state which respects equal rights of all individuals and nations. Also, the interests of all these nations (except for the Muslims) could be satisfied without further political deteriorations of Serbian or Croatian interests if they were to create independent states or, in case of the Albanians, if they were to unite with Albania. The problem of Albanian separation is politically a difficult one, but the territories they live on are ethnically very homogeneous now. Also, Slovenians and Macedonians faced complex problems once they had chosen to have independent states, but no national interests of other nations were really severed because of that. This is true for Montenegro too, though the problem of their national identity is rather complicated. Still, except during the inter-war Yugoslav period, they have had their independent or autonomous state and it is hard to see that they would be ready to give it up completely now.

However, the problem of the Muslims is different. They cannot live without autonomy, but they can hardly create an independent state. The regions that they populate, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandzak, seem doomed to be provinces in search of a state. The best solution they could have hoped for was to live in a federal or confederate unit in a Yugoslav state. But if such a state disappears, they are left in a void. They, as well as the other nations in the region, cannot become a part of a different state construct, for instance of Serbian dominated “smaller Yugoslavia” or of a “greater Croatia”.

9. There was no solution to the Yugoslav or the Serbo-Croat-Slovenian crisis without an added Bosnian crisis being created.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is populated by Serbs (just over 31%), Croats

(about 17%), and Muslims (more than 40%).¹²³ All possible mixtures exist. In some parts, one nation predominates; in others, Serbs live mixed mainly with the Muslims, or Muslims are mainly mixed with the Croats; but in large parts the three nations are mixed in such a way that there is only relative majority which changes from one town to another or from one village to another. So, in most cases, there is only relative majority and there are few ethnically clear cut regions.

Therefore, Croats can hardly live in a Bosnian state with no strong ties with Croatia, and the same goes for the Serbs. Muslims, on the other hand, cannot accept a solution that deprives Bosnia of political autonomy, because that would drastically infringe upon their national interests. As long as there was a Yugoslav state, the national problems could have been solved in terms of individual and collective rights. With the disappearance of Yugoslavia, there are national rights to be considered. And how they could ever be reconciled is hard to see. This is not to say that there are no political solutions; it is to say that it is hard to expect that they will be in accord with the nationalist perceptions.

10. Even if a solution to Serbo-Croat-Muslim problem is found, there is still the Albanian question.

Though the central conflict is the one between Serbs and Croats, with the Muslims being caught in the middle, even if that was to be solved, there is the Albanian problem left. With the way things have been developing in Eastern Europe, there is no way that the Albanians will give up their goal of creating a nation-state. Apart from Albania, Albanians live on nationally homogeneous territories in Kosovo (that is Serbia), Macedonia and Montenegro. All these territories border on each other or on Albania. Even if Yugoslavia had survived, the Albanian question would have been all but impossible to solve. Probably more than one third of Albanians live in Yugoslavia

123 The figures are based on the latest census (spring, 1991) which is not very reliable, because the state was already less than organized, some boycotted the census, propaganda was high, and the objectivity of the Census Bureaus was not beyond suspicion.

and Macedonia¹²⁴ and only the borders divide them from Albania. Therefore, it is only a matter of time and opportunity when these two (or three) Albanian states or regions will make a serious attempt to get united. This is so irrespective of the changes in the political regimes in Serbia, Macedonia or Yugoslavia, and for that matter in Albania too. However, a non-democratic regime in Serbia and a democratic regime in Albania would heavily underline the whole problem.

11. Apart from all that, there are other Central European and Balkan problems left.

On the fringes of all these conflicts there are those connected with the Slovenian, Hungarian and Macedonian problems. Slovenia is the easiest case, though it stood for some time as a proxy for Croatia fighting over every possible political issue with Serbia. However, there are no conflicting interests between Serbia and Slovenia. There are certain other Central European problems that Slovenia will face.

Hungarian question is a more difficult one, because there is a sizable Hungarian minority in Serbia and Croatia, and they have expressed serious misgivings with the new nationalist regimes, especially with the Serbian one (most of the Hungarian minority lives there). However, once the conflict between Serbs and Croats is over (that may take quite a long time), the Hungarian minority problem is one of national and cultural rights that should not be politically difficult to solve.

Contrary to that, the Macedonian problem brings in the very essence of all Balkan conflicts. As the Macedonian question does not belong only to the Yugoslav crisis, I leave it out here. However, it is not to be forgotten because it is not going to go away quite so soon.¹²⁵

12. Nationalism and not multi-nationalism is the real problem.

So, to sum up, Yugoslavia was not a complete disaster because it was not openly nationalist or anti-nationalist, though it was neither, for

¹²⁴ The Albanians boycotted the last census, so the numbers used are sometimes highly speculative.

¹²⁵ I come back to it at the end of this chapter when I discuss the possible outcomes.



most of the time, a democracy nor was it ever a liberal federation. However, it did not develop in a modern liberal state, because it chose socialism in a very dark moment of its history and developed a political space that was not favorable to a liberal solution, at least on the federal level. But it did offer the liberal solution a chance, which was frustrated by a resurgence of populist movements playing on the long-term national interests of the dominant Yugoslav nations.

Therefore, in general, it is not the existence of different nations that makes it impossible for a multi-national state like Yugoslavia to preserve stability and its very existence in the long run. Nationalist political interests are the real problem.¹²⁶ They are an expression of a demand for security and equal rights for the equals, that is for justice. In that last sense, national interests are a demand for coherence between the personal and public identity of the people. However, they imply possible discrimination of those with different national identities, in terms of justice, security, rights and policy.

Asymmetrical symmetries¹²⁷

Why did the populist parties take over in Serbia and Croatia? The simple answer is that that is what the majority of Serbs and Croats wanted. And their decisions were based on a rational judgment that that is what it takes for their national interests to be fulfilled. That is to say, they anticipated that the ensuing conflict will be a brutal one and mobilized the resources that they believed would prove to be the most effective for a favorable outcome.

126 See appendix II for more on this. Lord Acton believed that any state that was not multi-national was “imperfect” (see his already quoted article on “Nationality”). See also F. v. Hayek’s [1948] last chapter on federalism.

127 For the failure of Yugoslavia to accept universal principles and for some reasons for that see chapter 2.

The way to see this is to compare the development in Slovenia with those in Serbia and Croatia. Slovenia was the first to realize the possibilities that at that time an already predictable collapse of communism opened¹²⁸. It moved towards democracy and greater independence from the rest of Yugoslavia, and was eventually successful relying mainly on the coalition between the more liberal faction in the Slovenian Communist Party and the more moderate nationalists. So, the otherwise typical communist space that had developed in Slovenia too broke down in the direction of what I have called “the liberal solution”.

To achieve the same goals, Croatia chose “populism”. The “liberal coalition” was badly defeated in the elections and a curious coalition of hard-line communists and a far right-wing party developed almost immediately after the elections.¹²⁹ This was explained as a reaction to the previous revival of Serbian nationalism. However, this hardly fits the facts. The fact is that the Croatian political space was more severely twisted in the orthodox communist direction and that made the populist outcome more likely¹³⁰. But the basic fact is that it was perceived by the political elite and by the electorate that their national interest was not to be achieved without a populist party taking over.¹³¹

128 This was somewhere around 1988. Otherwise, Slovenia was as thoroughly a socialist state as any other in Yugoslavia. As a matter of fact, one could very well argue that Slovenia was a model socialist state, because, unlike the other regions in Yugoslavia, it had almost full employment, higher social services, and very little opposition. The Slovenian communist leadership was certainly more conservative than for instance the Serbian one during all the time in the eighties before Milosevic took over. This is important because the same communist leadership is, in one way or the other, still in power in Slovenia.

129 The Communist Party threw its support for the nationalists almost immediately after the elections and their members have held very important positions in the new government ever since. For a while, only the small Social-Liberal Party acted as an opposition, to eventually collaborate with the nationalist regime when an emergency government was created justified by the ever worsening civil war in Croatia.

130 This was because of the way the 1971 political crisis in Croatia had been resolved. Communist rule broke down in Croatia and nationalists were close to taking over. However, the then president of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito, relying on the hard-liners in the party and in the Yugoslav army, staged a political counter-attack and a hard-line communist system was introduced. It broke down after Tito’s death, but because of the internal struggle it took some time for the nationalist movement to mobilize again.

131 More on this in Gligorov [1989].

Otherwise, a solution more similar to the Slovenian one could have been chosen.

On the Serbian side, there was almost a rehearsal of a resurgence of Stalinism. The right-wing faction of the Communist Party was defeated long before the collapse of communism was in sight, and the main reason was that it did not move decisively enough and severely enough against the demands of the Albanian nationalists. The left-wing faction of the Serbian Communist Party expected that with a show of force and with the help from the federal party and the army it would be able to take over. However, it misjudged the constellation of the political space in the other Yugoslav regions and in the federal state also. At the same time it almost grotesquely misjudged the developments in Eastern European communist states, and fatally the way the Russian nation would go. So, eventually, it had to move and even jump to the extreme right, nationalist position, leading the populist movement with a promise that it can use the Yugoslav army to deliver the satisfaction of the Serbian national interest. The electorate understood the message, believed it to a great degree, and voted the Socialist Party of Serbia in.¹³²

Therefore, once the elections in Croatia and Serbia were over, the war could have been safely predicted. As a matter of fact, the populist parties in Serbia and Croatia did not hide that that is what they were preparing for. Again, their aims were such that nothing short of war could be expected to be efficient. The war rhetoric actually started during the prolonged Kosovo crisis. Albanians argued that they were in the majority in Kosovo (which is more than true, because they account for almost 90% of the population), and that in their sovereign republic Serbs would be guaranteed all the minority rights. Serbs answered by saying that Albanians were a minority in the whole Serbian state (which is also more than true), and that they would enjoy all the minority rights in the Serbian state. And the same argument has been repeated all over Yugoslavia. When the Croatian nationalists came to power, they were ready to respect all the minority rights of

132 More on the developments in Serbia in Gligorov [1990a] and [1990b].

the Serbs living in the state of the Croats. So, the logical answer was:

“Why should we be a minority in your state, when you can be a minority in our state?”

The ultimate consequence of this slogan is not to have a state at all. That this is so can be seen by considering the situation in the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There, Muslims are only in relative majority. Therefore, Bosnia cannot be either a theocracy or a nation-state. It lives in some kind of a con-societal political space that was never democratic and liberal, but was not without a respectful degree of tolerance. So, the only direction that this region can move to, if left alone, is towards some kind of pluralized democracy, with perhaps regional autonomies. So, the multi-national character of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not an insurmountable obstacle. However, nationalism inevitably does this republic in. Both Serbs and Croats offer to the Muslims the prospect of being a respectful minority in Serbian or Croatian state, while some Muslim nationalists assure both Serbs and Croats living in Bosnia and Herzegovina that their minority rights would be fully respected in their Muslim state.

The problem is not only that nobody wants to be a minority in somebody else's nationalist state, but that every nation can offer the same prospect to the rival nation. At this point, if the way the existing political space was constituted is kept in mind and given the rational expectations that the realization of the national interests are, for the first time in the history of every Yugoslav nation, within reach these two factors produce the more or less violent outcomes even in those regions lacking any overwhelming reasons for that.

The situation is somewhat different and also more complex in Montenegro and Macedonia. These two republics contributed almost nothing to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. So, in a sense, they have been dragged into the conflict and pushed into directions that do not necessarily represent their best considered interests. However, once the conflict between Serbs and Croats erupted, everybody had to search for a place in the world.



Macedonia is a contested territory, where the population¹³³ is as nationalistic as everywhere else, but where there are no gains to be anticipated by relying on the use of force. So, the populist option did not win in Macedonia, though neither did the liberal one. The real test there will be if and when a clash between the Serbs and the Albanians erupts. If and when that happens, it is anybody's guess what will happen to the whole region. Barring that, Macedonia has problems with all its neighbors. Greece on the south objects to the name of the nation and the state. Macedonians are Slavs that have adopted the name of the region they live in and which does not coincide with the ancient or geographical Macedonian territories. Therefore, Greece would rather that Macedonians choose a different name. However, the choice of a new name would not solve the problem, because it is the identity and the territories that are contested. So, the identity conflict being difficult to settle in the short run, the basic problem is to credibly accept the existing borders.

As a matter of fact, some more probable changes in the nation's and state's name may even aggravate the territorial problems. If Macedonians were to declare themselves Bulgarians, the territorial claims of larger Bulgaria might even be more forcefully put. That might be part of the reason that Bulgaria does not recognize the existence of a Macedonian nation. That, of course, creates new problems for the Macedonian state. Finally, the old, Middle-Ages Serbian state incorporated Macedonia and that had actually been the reason that Serbs fought wars against Turkey and Bulgaria for. In any case, whichever way the national and state identity of Macedonia develops, the territorial contest may only aggravate because it will be taken up by more powerful states.

However, the major Macedonian internal problem is that of the large Albanian minority. It is hard to expect that the Albanians, who live on compact national territories, will not work for their national state incorporating Albania, Kosovo and Western Macedonia (perhaps even parts of Montenegro). How are the Macedonians to solve all

¹³³ The population consists mostly of Macedonians, Albanians, Serbs, Romanies, Turks and a number of other nationalities. Albanians are about 25% of the population.

these problems is impossible to see clearly at the moment. So, even though Macedonia presents no threat to anybody, it is a medium through which threats are generated and transmitted.

In Montenegro, on the other hand, the main problem is how close that state wants to be to the Serbian state. There are also many other political problems, mainly of long-term modernizing sort. But, short of all of ex-Yugoslavia exploding, Montenegrins should be able to handle their problems through mainly political means. There, no serious contests over the state territory exist (though that may be changing with the territory of Sandzak that is divided between Serbia and Montenegro and is in part populated by Muslim majority striving for autonomy), although almost 30% of the population is either Muslim or Albanian.¹³⁴

In general then, the basic problem of Yugoslavia is not difficult to see. National rights could hardly be universalized without many violent changes. For instance, the right to self-determination universally applied would require not only drastic changes in the existing borders but huge migrations in all directions. On the other hand, asymmetrical solutions were not acceptable to all those who found them inequitable, and that was bound to be the majority of the population however the rights were to be distributed.

For a symmetrical solution to be found, national rights would have to be seen as derived and not fundamental. Unfortunately, Yugoslavia was not the state that could credibly guarantee the respect of equal rights of all its citizens regardless of their nationality. This being the case, there was a widespread feeling that individual rights could be credibly protected only inside a nation state. So, to feel safe of injustices, citizens of all federal states demanded asymmetrical rights, which elicited similar counter-demands and the whole thing became one complicated problem of multi-criteria classification that is impossible to solve even in principle.

¹³⁴ However, in the course of the civil war, a conflict between Montenegro and Croatia has emerged over Prevlaka (a strip of land on the coast). There are emerging problems in Ulcinj and some other Montenegrin regions where Albanians and Muslims are in majority.



The right's left

Yugoslavia has disintegrated though it is still not clear into precisely what. However, the new states and the states that are coming into existence have either written or rewritten their constitutions or have announced their political intentions. On the basis of that, one can judge what can be expected in the whole region. I will discuss national, human, economic, political and basic citizens' rights briefly and in that order. I am not going to pay attention to the letter of these constitutions, but to their spirit (though I do not believe that there can be something in the spirit that is not somehow to be found in the letter).

1. All the new states are nationalist in the sense of expecting their citizens to value their nation more than their individual rights, including the right to live. Without such a perception of the national interest the civil war would not have been possible. This means that the constitutions of all the new states are founded on national obligation. Therefore, though they may be formally democratic, they are constitutionally authoritarian states, because the duties and obligations of the state and of the citizens are derived from the interpretation of the national interest and not from the constitutional, legal or democratic procedures. That practically means that the political space in those states that will keep their nationalist constitutions will be moved to the one of the extremes permanently. In a sense, in some of these states there will be a relapse into the same political space that was characteristic for the communist rule; in others, there will be authoritarian restrictions on the collective rights and on the freedom of political organization. Except that now it will be the "right" one.¹³⁵

135 For more on this see an early version of this paper presented to the Vienna conference on "The Forgotten Legacy" in June 1991 (Gligorov [1992a]). As everything has an original and a caricature in Yugoslavia, the constitutions of the new Serbian states in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina represent such an extreme and hyper-realistic nationalist cases. All the worst nationalist ideas and practices can be found there together with constitutional declarations of respect for universal human rights. Elements of the same thing can be found both in Croatia and Serbia. But, although to a much smaller extent, in the other republics too.

2. They all have constitutions that implicitly or explicitly discriminate on the basis of nationality. The constitutions of the newly created states define these states as ethnic states or give preferential treatment to the dominant nation and its culture. Thus, nations that have constituted new states relying on the right to self-determination deny that same right to other nations. Croats have created their independent state on the basis of their right to self-determination, but they do not grant the same right to the Serbs living in Croatia. Also, Serbs resisted the Croatian right to self-determination but justified their own actions by relying on the same right. They also deny such a right to Albanians and Hungarians living in Serbia. And the same is true for all the new states.

When the nationalist character of the state is not explicitly to be found in the constitution it can be detected from the way cultural diversities are treated. The most telling is the treatment of the language and the alphabet. Serbs and Croats speak the same language which can be written both in Latin and Cyrillic alphabets. However, they not only use their national name for the language, and they not only deny that the language is the same, but they discriminate against the alphabet that they do not consider to be their national alphabet. Thus, Serbian constitution prefers Cyrillic alphabet, while Croatian prefers Latin. Of course, both alphabets are neither Serbian nor Croatian, but are regarded as such because the other alphabet is preferred by the other side.

On the basis of these discriminations further follow in terms of citizenship rights, employment, promotion, education and everything else. In Serbia, thousands of Albanian teachers were at some point fired because they did not accept the new school programs based on the new constitution (and thousands of Albanian workers and professionals have lost their jobs for political reasons). In Croatia, the new government instituted quota requirements aimed at giving preferential treatment to Croats over Serbs. Similar problems are faced by other minorities in Serbia and Croatia, as well as in other republics.



3. The new states have shown an inclination to rely on nationalist interpretation of economic rights and on nationalist economic policies. All the privatization schemes have strong nationalist overtones, and these states have already experienced all kinds of protectionist policies. They have all nationalized or declared their intention to nationalize their currencies. They have created huge publicly owned corporations and they have introduced tax differences on the basis of state or national affiliation.

4. All new states treat freedom of speech in an instrumental way and even restrict it in many explicit and implicit ways. The propaganda is unbearable and in many places there is much more effective censorship than in the final years of the communist regime. In all the new states the dominant newspapers and TV networks have been nationalized, so that the government can tightly control the public opinion.

5. Finally, the general level of protection is very low, not to mention the reality of the rule of law. One is still protected in a mafia type of way. While socialism was a system of comprehensive dependence on the people in power, the new states have developed a system of dependence characteristic of typical authoritarian regimes. Again there are regional differences. While there are many elements of a typical police state in both Serbia and Croatia together with the high level of lawlessness and mafia type protection agencies, in other states all this is present but to a much smaller degree (Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a state in that sense, so there is no point of speaking of the rule of law or of lawlessness there). In some states this is not unexpected and will change through normal legal and democratic evolution or with eventual modernization. However, in the key states of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina the democratic transformation will be possible only after the nationalist character of these states is changed. That is admittedly a distant prospect. This is not to say that in time changes are not to be expected. They will eventually be brought about by internal developments and international influences, to which I now turn.

Permanent instability

What outcomes can be expected? The process I have described is one known by the technical name of “Balkanization”.¹³⁶ It is characterized by internal disintegration and permanent international involvement. At this point, there are as much as five Serbian states, autonomous regions or federation.¹³⁷ Apart from that, there are republics of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. All seceded in time. The secession of Slovenia created huge problems, but it was in the end recognized that no national interests of the others are at stake as long as Yugoslavia was to disintegrate anyway. Macedonia managed to secede even without inciting any violent clashes, but it failed to gain a full international recognition because Greece objects to its name. This is a phantom conflict, because no real national interests are at stake. In principle, at least, the secessions of Slovenia and Macedonia leave the rest in Yugoslavia no worse off in terms of their national interests, once of course there is no Yugoslavia any more.

However, the Serbian states and regions intended to create new, smaller Yugoslavia minus Slovenia and partly Croatia that would effectively terminate the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and would abort Albanian intentions to have their republic of Kosovo. It would also make the state of Croatia all but chimerical. On the other hand, Serbian territories, regions and states can hardly be run over by Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

Croatian strategy is to grant the Serbs in Croatia significant rights of autonomy. This is difficult to achieve, especially after the civil war, but is not inconceivable. In that sense, a Croatian state is possible in

136 For more on that see Ch. I.

137 There were at one point even more Serbian states: Serbia; Montenegro; Krajina; Zapadna Slavonija; Istočna Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem; Bosanska Krajina - and more. By mid 1992 the Republic of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina had been proclaimed (consisting of all the “Serbian regions in this, now internationally recognized, state); also the Republic of Serbian Krajina was proclaimed (consisting of all the “Serbian regions” in Croatia); finally, the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed in May 1992, consisting of Republics of Serbia and Montenegro (that state has not been internationally recognized and it participates in some international bodies under the ghost name of the former Yugoslavia).



principle, especially if it is affiliated with the European Community (that, however, does not mean that it will ever be accepted as legitimate by the Serbs living there). However, a creation of a viable state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is difficult to imagine. The best hope for this region was to be put under some kind of a prolonged international protection. But, in that case, Serbian problem would hardly have been solved. It is difficult to see that the Serbs would be willing to give up all their territorial aspirations, especially because they would be left with the Kosovo problem. As soon as the Yugoslav and Bosnian crisis are solved, whatever that means, the Kosovo crisis will erupt (that of course may happen even before).

Therefore, Serbia is the central problem. The real positive Serbian contribution would be for that state to turn towards Western Europe. It is certainly a long-lasting negative effect of the nationalistic regime to have turned Serbia away from the West. Isolated and under a regime of sanctions, Serbia is experiencing hard political and economic times.¹³⁸ With a liberal and democratic government, Serbia could have looked for more promising solutions of its national interest. With the government of extreme nationalists and socialists, its problems will only hopelessly aggravate.

Anyhow, at this point, the strategies of those in former Yugoslavia and of the international community seem to be the following. Everybody officially accepts the fact of the non-existence of the old Yugoslavia, and Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are recognized as independent states (Macedonia is also a member of United Nations under a temporary name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, but it still faces problems with its neighbors). Serbian government originally aimed at recreating a smaller Yugoslavia, including Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina (or at least Serbian territories there), Serbian territories in Croatia, and possibly Macedonia. Now, it has, for the time being, settled for a much smaller Yugoslavia, consisting only of Serbia and Montenegro. However, the name of

138 In May 1992 a comprehensive set of sanctions were put by the United Nations on the newly created state of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) proclaiming it, in effect, an outlaw state.

Yugoslavia is used to signal that the long-term goal has not been changed, though it might have been modified. Only when all the “Serbian territories” are incorporated, the name of the state will be changed from Yugoslavia to Serbia.¹³⁹

The strategy of the international community¹⁴⁰ was to first secure the independence of Slovenia and Croatia and then to start to worry about the rest. The rest was a Serbian dominated territory with millions of Albanians, millions of Muslims and millions of Macedonians and hundreds of thousands of other national minorities. Thus, the process of further Balkanization was opened. With Macedonia proclaiming independence, and with the Yugoslav Army pulling out of there, the problem stayed because the Serb-dominated area was left with huge Albanian and Muslim minorities. So, the process of Balkanization went on and will go on. There is no way, as far as I can see, for this region to achieve stability, not to mention the respect of human rights and democracy.

Even if Serbia turns to democracy and even if all the other states temper down their nationalism, the problems will stay. The stability of this region is difficult to envisage. The best one can hope for is that the fighting will stop and the long term process of political emancipation will start. But it is more likely that a state of permanent instability will be the outcome of the creation of nation states and lawless regions.

Here the international influence could have helped. The fundamental problems of Yugoslavia (and the Balkans in general) are connected with rights and security. In the end, it is the one big problem of national emancipation and political modernization. It is hard to expect that the newly created states would be able to guarantee equal rights and security to their citizens, even if they were to recognize each other and even if they were to decide to live in peace with each

139 The change might come sooner, if there is a change in the current government in Serbia, but again the political goal will not be changed.

140 This is, of course, a very interesting notion now, but I cannot go into the analysis of it here. In the particular case of Slovenia and Croatia the lead for the “international community” was taken by Germany.



other. Because of that, some direct and indirect involvement of the international community will be necessary and, if appropriate, could in fact help.

In terms of rights, it would be a significant step forward if the new states were to accept the jurisdiction of some international court that could rule in areas of human rights and intergovernmental conflicts. In terms of security, some states and regions should be demilitarized and some like Bosnia and Herzegovina should be put under some kind of protection. In the long run, these regions will have to be integrated in the newly emerging European order, but until then, they should not be left to their local nationalist leaders that will continue forever to fight over contested territories.

All, however, depends on the way the international community will develop as well as on internal developments. The “international community” has not been acting altogether responsibly in the whole Yugoslav crisis and seems at the moment incapable to define its internal structure, let alone its objectives. On the other hand, partly because of mixed international signals and mostly in disregard of anything else but their narrow nationalist interests, Balkan countries (not only those from former Yugoslavia) have been going on with their destructive policies that, at this point, seem to be leading towards deepening of the Balkanization process.

With the failure, first, of more decisively influencing the democratic process in Yugoslavia, and, second, with the disregard of the dangerous policies in Belgrade, and, third, with a belated recognition of the seceding republics, and, forth, with the uneven treatment of their requests, both the USA and the EC have revealed a worrisome inability to even formulate some obvious principles of the “new world order” let alone to act on them.

Therefore, permanent instability seems to be what will be left after the demise of Yugoslavia. Strategically speaking, Yugoslav crisis is a combination of two conflicts really. The first is of Central European origin and has to do with the Serbo-Croat separation. The second is

the Balkan conflict. It has to do with the unfinished business of the Balkan wars. For the first, Yugoslavia was necessary. Indeed, the conflict will go on as long as any trace of Yugoslavia is left. For the second, Yugoslavia is not necessary. Yugoslavia was a country that solved both of these problems by bringing security to the region. It even offered a chance for the problem of ethnic justice to be solved in a liberal federation. With its demise, both problems could only aggravate. How is security to return to the former Yugoslav areas and how is the further ethnic strife in the Balkans to be avoided is yet to be seen. While justice, the craving for which is the root of all the conflicts there, is all but out of reach.



CONCLUSION

Is Balkans different?

In this book I have tried to explain the break-up of Yugoslavia as the outcome of rational political choice of its citizens. In doing that I have gone against the mainstream liberal political philosophy criticizing Rawls and relying on Aristotle. But I look to Aristotle for explanations, not for recommendations. Indeed, I believe that his theory of justice is pessimistic in the way that is particularly applicable to the Balkans: justice is an Utopian ideal, because the experience and acceptance of inequality are so much deeper than those of equality. In the Yugoslav case, the experience of ethnic injustice is the dominant one and all the liberal arguments in favor of that state (in fact, of a state in general) are in vain.

Still, I do not think that the Balkans is different. It exemplifies the fragility of the libertarian motive that is perfectly general. There are, of course, certain Balkan specificities. The main one that I do not go into in this book, that confuses foreign observes and scholars is the importance of history, sometimes a very old one indeed. That leads many to argue that the Yugoslav case is complex, difficult to understand, and generally atypical. Not in the sense that it has to be studied closely to understand. That of course is true, as it is true of every scientific or political subject. But in the sense that it is alien and fundamentally irrational. That is what is wrong.

One way to see that rational choice approach is applicable to the Balkans also is to observe how the conflicting parties there have been able to utilize the outside willingness to treat them as different. Quite perceptively, they have treated the international factors for what they are: unwilling to invest time and effort to understand, because they would then be unable to behave in the way they did. Indeed, people in the Balkans do not really believe that they could fool anybody that they are different. But the rhetoric of the Balkans being different

is useful to everybody, because it is the way to let the moral and political horror to go on without any devastating feeling of political and intellectual failure to meet one's obligations arising. That is why there is such an interest in painting the Balkans as different.

The failure of taking one's political obligations seriously that I am talking about and that is the point that I want to make in these concluding remarks is simple and possibly far-reaching. The case of Yugoslavia and of the Balkans in general is a test of the ability of the West to put across firm principles that they take as constraints on their political behavior in areas undergoing fundamental political changes. In fact, the West showed an inability to sustain support for a country that it did so much to put into existence and to keep alive. The indifference with which it let it fall was only an introduction to the willingness and even eagerness with which it was ready to renege on just about every principle that it successively put over. So, it is not that the Balkans are different, but it is the West that is no different.

It was my intention in this book to say something fundamental about the liberal political philosophy and something straightforward about the break-up of Yugoslavia, but I have no interest in speculating on the ramifications of the Balkan affairs for the other European areas, especially for Central and Eastern Europe. The resurgence of fascism, of ethnic intransigence, of ruthlessness of extreme proportions, of international cynicism and indifference, all these are ominous signs. All I want to say here is that the hope that they could be contained to that queer place called the Balkans is as wrong as the belief that the liberal values could be extended easily as soon as the communists go away. There are new challenges that liberty will have yet to face.



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APPENDIX I

State in the Balkans

The notion of state used in this book is that of public choice theory.¹⁴¹ A state is a supplier of political goods (and other goods too, but I will disregard that here). The other way to see it is as an institutional representation of individual political demands. Without going into details of the public choice theory of state, I will just list the goods that are demanded from a state and the importance of their supply for the state meeting certain political criteria.

Security is a political good that a state must supply (not necessarily in full, i.e., exclusively), otherwise it is a state in name only. What goes into the “production function” of security is an altogether complex question.¹⁴² In one way or another, every other political good enters into it, but other considerations too, the international ones being the most prominent. For instance, it is imaginable that a state without security forces could supply its citizens with security relying only on the international balance of power (Macedonia is an example of sorts). But, that is exceptional (such a state will either be a member of a security pact or will be a province or a protectorate). Whatever the case, it is difficult to consider a polity to be a state if it does not supply some basic level of security in one way or another.¹⁴³

Justice is next on the list of political goods. It is indeed more of an ideal. There are many aspects of this ideal. I am not going to go into the complexities of the theory of justice. I will just distinguish three things: the sense of injustice, the idea of commutative justice, and the ideal of distributive justice. How the sense of injustice is ameliorated and the desired type and level of justice is assured makes the “spirit

¹⁴¹ For an introduction to a public choice theory of state see Buchanan and Tullock [1961]; see also Breton [1974] and [1989].

¹⁴² I take Hobbes’ Leviathan to be one classic answer to that question, while Nozick [1974] is a contemporary, minimalist, attempt.

¹⁴³ This is a Hobbesian view of state (at least in traditional interpretations).

of the laws” of a state. All that needs being said in addition is that the foundation of the state’s authority rests on the way it supplies this good. If citizens turn to the state for justice, that means that the authority of its laws, its institutions, and its magistrates are expected to supply that good. As long as it is the case that the injustice complaints are being met in one way or the other, the question of what the ideal of justice is can be safely put aside.

Finally, a state is a *welfare* supplier. In the same way as it is not the sole supplier of security and even less of justice it is only one of the welfare suppliers. This is again a very complex good. On one hand, state has a monetary power, a fiscal power, and numerous regulatory powers. How they are used determines directly or indirectly the well-being of its citizens. On the other hand, it redistributes, influencing directly everybody’s welfare.

Security makes a state livable, justice makes it legitimate, together they should secure viability; welfare is in an altogether different category. In this paper, I take a Hobbesian attitude that the necessary condition for a state to exist is that it supplies security to its citizens.

That was the approach taken by the so-called Badinter’s commission set up by the European Community to judge the viability of the respective ex-Yugoslav states looking for international recognition. In that sense, former Yugoslavia was a state, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not. There are of course border cases, like Croatia that does not meet the criterion entirely (that was the judgment of the Badinter’s commission also) and Macedonia that meets the criterion by default as it were.

The Badinter’s commission considered the justice aspects of the aspiring states, and found some of them deficient (Croatia and Serbia). Still, it was clearly considered as an important but not a necessary condition in the sense in which security was. The welfare criterion was not considered in any significant way, as far as I know. The Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina indeed takes the welfare aspects in consideration when delineating the autonomous



regions there. But the criterion is clearly seen as a subsidiary one. However, that plan does not take the supply of security as a necessary condition for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina to exist, which testifies to the fact that they saw it more as a province or a protectorate than as a state.

There are other state like polities in ex-Yugoslavia, Mainly Yugoslavia itself, Serbia, Montenegro, Serbian states in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in Serbia. These polities do not meet the necessary condition of states, as they either do not supply security on their whole territory or have no clear territories. Again in the Hobbesian spirit, there is a difference to be noted between a war state and a state proper. Yugoslavia and the other states mentioned above (with exception of Kosovo) meet the Augustinian criterion of statehood, by which a band or a war party can be a state also. In that sense, Yugoslavia can be seen as an army in search of a state. Kosovo, on the other hand, is something that can be called a “parallel state”, as it illegally supplies its citizens with the basic political goods.

On the different ends of the spectrum of statehood are Slovenia, that is a state in terms of security because its security is not threatened, and Macedonia, that is a state for lack of evidence to the contrary. If Slovenia is not considered a Balkan but a Central European state, then, apart from Bulgaria, possibly temporarily, Greece, which depends for its security on NATO, and Albania, that is trying to become a state, the Balkans are a stateless territory.

The reason for this state of affairs I have found in the process of Balkanization that I describe in some detail in the book. Here I just want to support the claims made there by a quote and some added considerations.

“If we take the establishment of liberty for the realization of moral duties to be the end of civil society, we must conclude that those states are substantially the most perfect which, like the British and Austrian Empires include various different nationalities without oppressing them. Those in which no mixture of races has occurred are imperfect;

and those in which its effects have disappeared are decrepit. A State which is incompetent to satisfy different races condemns itself; a State which labors to neutralize, to absorb, or to expel them, destroys its own vitality; a State which does not include them is destitute of the chief basis of self-government. The theory of nationality, therefore, is a retrograde step in history.” Lord Acton, “Nationality”.

The process of “Balkanization” that I discuss in chapters 1 and 4 can be summarized in the following way. Suppose that there is a Tiedbout process of spontaneous state creation. That is, people use institutional or violent means to organize a state only for those citizens that happen to share certain similar characteristics. Suppose that the stable solution is given by a distribution of power (as a function of a tax level chosen by different proto-states that want to be independent).¹⁴⁴ Then, a process of “Balkanization” is described by two properties:

- (i) every distribution of power is worse than some other for at least one proto-state;
- (ii) every decentralization of state authority reveals a new preferred decentralization or centralization of state authority.

That is to say, “Balkanization” is a process that constantly changes the distribution of power due, among other influences, to the international grouping and regrouping; and it is a process that never reveals the “true” preferences of all those concerned. In the latter sense, it is a process of constitutional destruction.

However, even the Tiedbout process is not an adequate framework for analyzing the process of Balkanization because it is presumed on state, federal or con-federal jurisdictions being clearly drawn so that people can “vote with their feet”. If, on the other hand, the boundaries are not clearly drawn, then there is a degree of freedom that strengthens the two outcomes mentioned above. There is no distribution of power which is independent of the way the boundaries are drawn and there is no state that equilibrates the level of the public

144 On the size of a state as a function of its tax base see D. Friedman [1977].



goods supplied, because that depends on the nationalist preferences, that is, on the process of revelation of the preferences for the domain of state's authority.

Both processes bring in the international factor that makes the problem of power politics even more complicated.¹⁴⁵

145 On that see Wight [1977].

APPENDIX II

Nationalist preferences

By a liberal constitution in chapter II as opposed to a nationalistic one I mean an institutional arrangement that is based on a Bill of Rights. The essential characteristic of a liberal constitution is not the fact that it is such that it could have been approved unanimously, but that the rights that it relies on are universalizable. That means that the state is founded on the notion of protection of individual freedoms.

Liberal constitution does not have to be based on a contract. But it differs from an ethnic-state constitution in that the later is founded on a special non-contractarian quality of ethnic origin. A nationalist state is a state that:

- (i) includes those that are of specific origin, whether by birth or by choice;
- (ii) treats in a different way those that are of a different origin;
- (iii) follows a national interest.

The last element is well described by Lord Acton:

“... (T)he national theory marks the end of the revolutionary doctrine and its logical exhaustion. In proclaiming the supremacy of the rights of nationality, the system of democratic equality goes beyond its own extreme boundary, and it falls into contradiction with itself... Nationality is a more advanced system than socialism, because it is a more arbitrary system... (N)ationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the state. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind. There is no principle of change, no phase of political speculation conceivable, more comprehensive, more subversive, or



more arbitrary than this. It is a confutation of democracy, because it sets limits to the exercise of the popular will, and substitutes for it a higher principle... (T)hus, after surrendering the individual to the collective will, the revolutionary system makes the collective will subject to conditions which are independent of it, and rejects all law, only to be controlled by an accident."

On national rights Lord Acton says the following:

"The greatest adversary of the right of nationality is the modern theory of nationality. By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, it reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the boundary. It cannot admit them to equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because the State would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of its existence. According, therefore, to the degree of humanity and civilization of that dominant body which claims all the rights of the community, the inferior races are exterminated, or reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a condition of dependence."

The fundamental problem of nationalism is seen when it is universalized. If every state should be a nation state, no state could have national minorities. Therefore, it is not only the case that voluntary migrations are not to be allowed, but there have to be some compulsory migrations, if it so happens that nations live mixed on the same territory. Civil war is own way to achieve these forced migrations, while all kinds of discriminations are the political way to check the undesired migrations or stimulate the desired ones.

The politics and economics of nationalism are a wide subject. It is here necessary just to single out an aspect or two that will make the understanding of this book easier.

There are economic theories of nationalism that see it in terms of the theory of clubs. The idea is that nationalism is a way to internalize some of the most important externalities. A political version of that is the theory of self-determination. The theory of clubs version of

nationalism as well as some other economic theories relies on benign versions of nationalist preferences. They miss a fundamental point: nation is not a voluntary organization, it is not a club. Even if a state can be seen in terms of a social contract or even as a kind of a club, a nation is not a contractarian institution even in that sense. The entry to and exit from one's ethnicity conditions are different from those for a club or a state. Therefore, the internalization of externalities is not the driving economic force of nationalism, not to mention political motives.

The nationalist values transform one's ethnic membership into a one sided obligation, into an acceptance of an amorphous authority. This is why they are so easy to succumb to and so powerful as well as susceptible to capture. In many cases, nationalism serves as an effective vehicle for a special interest to have a general force. Croatia and Serbia are the cases in point (all I say is of course an oversimplification and is intended as first information only).

The Croat nation is divided historically, territorially, and culturally. The distinctive ethnic characteristic is neither the language nor common ethnic origin, but the national idea and in some cases religion. However, religion divides Croats, who are Catholics, from Serbs, who are Orthodox, and from Muslims, but not from the Slovenians, who are also Catholics, or from the Italians. In the latter cases, the dividing criterion is the language and the national idea. Because of this mixture of ethnic criteria, the strongest Croat nationalism can be found where they are mixed with the Serbs, with whom they share the language and much of history and culture, but are divided in religion and in the national idea. These parts are generally economically and otherwise less developed than the rest of the country. However, they have a special claim on ethnic solidarity. Therefore, they tend to dominate the Croat political preferences in times of national crisis.

The Serbian case is much more complicated. There is little understanding of that case nowadays due to the politics of the current Belgrade government. However, it merits serious consideration. Serbs



live all over the former Yugoslavia, though in less significant numbers in Slovenia and Macedonia (the latter claim is sometimes disputed). Serbia proper is ethnically quite homogeneous. However, in Kosovo, that is an autonomous province in Serbia, they are only about 10% of the population. In Vojvodina, another autonomous province in Serbia, they are just over 50% of the population. In Croatia they are about 12% of the population, but in some parts of Croatia, notably in Krajina, Lika, Kordun, Banija and parts of Western and Eastern Slavonia, they are in absolute or relative majority. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, they are about one third of the population, but are in majority in parts of Eastern Herzegovina and Bosanska Krajina. I am dwelling on the details of the ethnic dispersion of the Serbs to point out the difficult problem they politically face.

All that gets even more complicated, because their identity is not based either on language, or on religion, but rather on a complicated national idea. But leaving the question of Serbian ethnic identity aside, the political problem is that the Serbian national interest is bound to be divided between the interests of the Serbs from Serbia proper and all those Serbs from the other Serbian or ex-Yugoslav territories. Again, like in the case of Croatia, many of the Serbian lands on the outskirts of the Serbian nation are underdeveloped and in need of ethnic solidarity. That is especially the case with Kosovo, where the recent rebirth of Serbian nationalism started.

The nationalism of the other ethnicities in Yugoslavia is different. Slovenian nationalism was originally defined in terms of the specificity of the Slovenian language. It developed into a demand for national self-determination.¹⁴⁶ Macedonian nationalism developed from regionalism. The Slavic population inhabiting the region of ancient Macedonia adopted the name of that region for their national name to avoid identification with and subjugation by Bulgaria and Serbia. It also developed into the demand for self-determination. The Montenegrin nationalism has origins in the state of Montenegro that existed until 1918 when it joined Serbia first and Yugoslavia

146 See Vodopivec [1992].

immediately afterwards. Montenegrin nationalism is not centered around the right of self-determination but around the preservation of the state of Montenegro.

The Muslim nationalism is mainly negative. Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina are Islamized Slavs. Their nationalism is a combination of the demand for the right of self-determination, of the artifact of Yugoslavia being legitimized on ethnic grounds, and of the imitation of the religious nationalism of the Serbs and the Croats.

The Albanian nationalism is essentially separatist. It is aggravated by the fact that they have never been accepted as equal partners in Yugoslavia, but were treated as an ethnic minority. That was hard to explain to the Albanians because no Slavic ethnicity was considered an ethnic minority anywhere in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had a complicated classification of political rights of different ethnicities. That was a normative expression of the unjust fundamental makeup that I discuss in the book. The equal representation without political equality was unsatisfactory to the Albanian minority and unacceptable to the Serbian majority (but similar problems, only in the opposite direction, existed in all the republics, and especially in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia).

There is an added aspect that distinguishes nationalism in post-communist states from the other, and that had an ironic turn in Yugoslavia. In a post-totalitarian society, the opposition develops during the totalitarian period. In most cases it means that it will be conservative, traditionalist, liberal and nationalist. In Yugoslavia, that was different in different regions. In Slovenia the strongest opposition was the communists themselves, who presented themselves as defenders of the Slovenian nationalist cause *vis-a-vis* the federal government in Belgrade. They came to and are still in power. In Croatia, the nationalists emerged as an opposition in the sixties. They were suppressed, and by the logic of post-communist development, they emerged as the force to take the power. In Serbia and Montenegro, the picture was much more complicated. In Belgrade and parts of Vojvodina, the opposition was liberal and liberal-nationalist. In Serbia



proper it was mainly conservative. In Vojvodina in general, as well as in Kosovo and in Montenegro, the strongest was the opposition of the Stalinists (who were severely persecuted after the 1948 break-up with The Soviet Union) and almost Slavophile nationalists. These two blended with the similar Serbian nationalists among the Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The blending was made easier by the fact that the Serbs from these parts of Yugoslavia felt most threatened and dominated the army and security forces. Thus, the liberal opposition lost against the coalition of Stalinists and nationalists (for the second time, after they first lost against the conservative communists in the early seventies). It is ironic but true that in both cases they lost against mostly the same forces, only the first time around they were Titoists and on the second occasion they depicted themselves as anti-Titoists. In both cases, the liberals were proclaimed to be traitors both to the national as well as to the higher cause. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serb and the Croat cases were almost the same, while the Muslims chose the more conservative faction of their nationalist party. In Macedonia, the more nationalist communists were the only opposition, and they came to power and are still there, either as democratic socialists or as liberals. Therefore, as the liberals were in minority in the anti-communist opposition everywhere, they were unsuccessful against the nationalists of the more conservative and radical kind also.

Though economic preferences are subordinated, they are present. What are the economic values of nationalism? In essence, they are redistributive. In Yugoslavia, the resurgence of the Serbian nationalism was supported by a huge propaganda about the economic disadvantages of the Serbian position in Yugoslavia. It was followed by the rejection of the free trade ideas of any sort, and was concluded by an introduction of the internal boycott of the Slovenian goods and with the illegal takeover of the federal monetary power. Thus, the economics of nationalism is: protectionism, discriminatory economic policy and irresponsible monetary policy. All these practices appeared in one way or another in all the newly formed states of the former Yugoslavia. They will stay in some places for quite a while.


APPENDIX III

Spacial competition and the choice of a game

“Politics is but geometrical purity embracing the law of the jungle.”

Joseph Brodsky

1. The space used in chapters 2 and 4 can be represented even by a straight line.



At C there is the “true” center. That is where the power would settle if free elections were to be held regularly. At A there is the “ideal” communist power center. At B there is the “liberal” communist power center. At D the majority of the citizens are grouped, when the “liberal” communist faction is in power. At E is where the center is dragged to in the event of a break-down of the political space.

If the state is a federation, the political space might be fragmented so that no general horizontal line exists at all. In that case, all combinations are possible. In some cases, the political space will settle around the “true” center, in others it might go to the left or to the most extreme right. This in fact means that there is no state any more.

In another way this can be expressed by showing that in a federation of nationalist states there are no single-peaked preference spaces. Then, permanent instability theorem applies with two consequences: first, there are no stable majorities, and, second, every political stability is perceived as imposed.¹⁴⁷ In case that the political space breaks down

147 For the theorem see Schwartz [1981].

along national lines, the nonexistence of single peaked preferences will not only end up in a non-existence of a common horizontal line but in a breakdown of the state itself.

2. Another more formal way to see the fundamental Yugoslav conflict is in terms of the theory of games. Three games seem useful to understanding: Prisoner's Dilemma, the game of Chicken, and the Chain Store game (see Skyrms [1990]; Kreps [1990]; and Selten [1978]). I will discuss these games briefly and then come to the main political question: How is a game to be played chosen?

1. *The Prisoner's Dilemma*

The general form of this game is given by the following configuration of payoffs the two players face (the row pay-offs come first):

		Player B	
		x	y
Player A	x	2,2	0,3
	y	3,0	1,1

Players A and B can choose to do either x or y . If both do x , they get 2 worth of something. If both do y , they get 1 worth of something. If A does x and B does y , A gets 0 and B gets 3, and the other way around for an opposite choice. The rational thing to do is for both players to choose y and end up with 1, though they could have both played x and got away with 2. The reason is that if one of the players cooperates by playing x , the other can benefit even more opting out by playing y . The same goes for both players, therefore the safe play is y for both players.

The game can be interpreted thus. Let the players be Serbs and Croats. The secession of Croatia in its existing borders is the best outcome for the Croats, and the worst for the Serbs (3 to 0). The separation of Croatia and Serbia along the ethnic lines is the worst for Croatia and

the best for Serbia (0 to 3). The liberal federation brings both partners 2 worth of something. Authoritarian federalism gives 1 worth of something to both players. If the Serbs and the Croats play this game, the outcome will be an authoritarian federalism that is unsatisfactory to both of them.

2. *The game of Chicken*

This game is represented by the following pay-off configuration:

		Player B	
		x	y
Player A		x	0,0
		y	1,0 -1, -1

If players A and B opt out, they get 0 worth of something (they both lose). If one stays while the other one exits, the one who held his ground as it were, gets 1 the other gets 0 (the first wins, the other loses). If they are both stubborn, both lose 1 (they end up worse than losing).

Again, Serbs and Croats play the game. If they both opt out of the confrontation, the *status quo* remains. If the one or the other excludes his competitor out, he gains and the other one loses. If they get locked up, they both suffer great losses. The game favors the bully so to speak. If one feels stronger than his opponent, this is the game to choose. The politics of it is very simple. All the player has to do is to keep on going regardless of the costs. They fall on the one who secedes, on the chicken.

The Serbs, being the stronger, let the Croats secede, but on Serbs' terms. In this game, the Croats have no good play. Their only hope is to change the balance of power so that they can secede on their own terms. Therefore, they need an outside support. If it is lacking, they will have to accept the mutually ruinous strategy.



3. The Chain Store game

There is a player A who faces potential competition of several players B. Serbia is player A, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro etc., are player B. The game is characterized by the following payoff structure:

		Player B	
		out	in
		2,2	5,1
Player A	cooperate		
	aggressive	0,0	5,1

The usual interpretation is in terms of a competitor entering a market. For my purposes, I will reverse the interpretation. Player B wants to exit. Everything else is the same. If player B chooses to opt out and the player A does not oppose that move, they both get 2 worth of something. If player B wants to stay in and player A cooperates, B gets 1, A gets 5. A and B get the same rewards if B chooses to stay, and A does not cooperate. Finally, if B chooses to opt out and A responds aggressively, they both end up with nothing.

The game theory picks the 2,2 outcome as rational. The interpretation is simple. Assume that Croatia is the last to make her bid to secede. The best reply by Serbia is to cooperate (2,2 as opposed to 0,0). But, then, the same consideration applies to the next to the last bid and so on. Thus, the rational strategy for Serbia is to cooperate with every secessionist move.

However, if it threatens the first one, let us say Kosovo, the best that the opponent could do is to stay in. The same goes for the second, the third etc. up until the last two, let us say, with whom Serbia could cooperate. Suppose that Serbia resists the secessionist moves of Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro, but cooperates with Slovenia and Macedonia, then it would do better than

if it cooperated as a rule. Therefore, the sequence of the secessionist moves is important as well as the credibility of the players. If player A is seen as aggressive, player B may choose not to try to secede at all. If the opponent is perceived as rationally aggressive, so to speak, then a choice of the sequence of secessionist moves can produce results similar to the actual ones (only Slovenia might be seen as putting in its move prematurely, changing the sequence somewhat and ruining the reputation of Serbia, thus requiring the latter to be even more aggressive than would have otherwise been necessary in order to send the credible threat signals to the others).

4. The choice of a game

The Chain Store game is instructive because it allows a choice of a game to be modeled inside it. Thus, this game can be turned into both the Prisoner's Dilemma and the game of Chicken. In both cases, it supports aggressive moves by the dominant player. The dominant player has a choice of playing the Chain Store game as the Prisoner's Dilemma game or as that of the game of Chicken. If he chooses the Prisoner's Dilemma, secessionism is impossible, but general frustration is unavoidable. If he chooses the game of Chicken, he may choose to kick everybody out of his way on his own terms. Some of these separations may be seen as cooperative moves (as in the case of Slovenia and perhaps Macedonia), while the others are bound to be aggressive in the extreme. Therefore, the dominant player, in the case of Yugoslavia that was Serbia, determines both the choice of the game and the eventual outcomes.



APPENDIX IV

The power structure

1. In the book I discuss three different types of equilibrium and disequilibrium states that Yugoslavia used to find itself in. I will give them schematically here and then comment on the power structure that they assume or imply.

	Stable	Unstable	Crisis
Constitutional	liberal	regionalism	civil war
Political	authoritarian	polyarchy	break-up
Economic	market	socialism	collapse

The stable equilibrium required liberal constitutional arrangement, strong central authority, and market allocation. The unstable state required the respect for regionalism, decentralized distribution of power, and a high level of internal and external protectionism. The disequilibrium state is one of civil war, state break-up, and economic collapse. Therefore, it was really complicated to find an equilibrium solution in terms of both feasibility and desirability.

2. The shifting Yugoslav power structure can be formally analyzed with the notion of the Shapley value or of a variant of it.¹⁴⁸ I will illustrate that approach and then give a more informal analysis

148 See Aumann and Myerson [1988].

relying on the table above and on some stylized facts that I mention below.

Assume that there are eight players, everybody having one vote (there were that many votes in the Yugoslav federation after the introduction of the 1974 constitution). If they decide unanimously, everybody has the same power ($1/8$). If the decisions are taken by simple majority, those in the majority coalition have the same power ($1/5$), while those left out have no power at all (however, the coalition-potential of every voter is, in principle, the same). Now, assume that a stable coalition of three players is established (e.g., Serbia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina); I will call it “the big player”. If decisions are taken unanimously, he has $3/8$ of the power, while everybody else retains the power they already had (that is, $1/8$). However, if simple majority is required, the big player needs two more votes to win. If the majority is formed, then the big player has $3/5$ of the complete power, while the two coalition partners have $1/5$ of the total power each (those left out have zero power). This is the same power they would have if they were to form a coalition without the big player. On top of that, the big player can improve his position by inviting a third outside partner to join the coalition. Then, he retains the same amount of power, while the three additional partners divide the power left ($2/5$) three ways, that is, they get $2/15$ each. However, they can get $1/5$ if they join the coalition that excludes the big player. Therefore, that is the coalition that will be formed.

This works even better if the big player has 4 votes (e.g. Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro). Then, only one additional coalition partner is needed. When he is added, he divides the total power with the big player equally (everybody gets $1/2$ of it). Again, if another is added, the big player increases his power to $2/3$, while the two coalition partners get $1/6$ each. However, they would get $1/5$ by joining the coalition that excludes the big player. That indeed is the coalition that will form.

In any case, the Serbian quest for more votes with the aim of achieving majority was illusory. The simple majority voting rule gave it 0 power,



while the unanimity rule gave it at least 1/8. On the other hand, the fear of the others that the increase in the Serbian votes will give it the decisive influence was unfounded. If anything, it increased their power (individually and as a coalition).

3. Now, informally, I will consider four different power distributions: ethnic, state (regional), democratic, and real.

(i) *Ethnic*

I will use rough figures of the ethnic distribution in Yugoslavia. Serbs, 36%; Croats 20%; Muslims 10%; Slovenians 8%; Albanians 8%; Macedonians 6%; Montenegrins 3% and others 9%. Assuming a perfectly fair proportional representation, Serbs do not have a majority. Under alternative voting rules they could get more or less than 40%, but hardly ever more than 50%. Their most likely coalitional partners could be Slovenians and Macedonians. The way things were, the Slovenians could have been expected to stand in for those in the opposition really. Macedonians, on the other hand, as coalition partners, are not enough. Therefore, whether in power or in the opposition, the ruling ideas would be those of the non-Serbian majority.

(ii) *Federal (regional)*

The system used after the constitutional reforms in the seventies relied on the unanimity of the six republics (states) and the two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina, both in Serbia). Serbian politicians tried to get the representatives from the two provinces out and to change the unanimity requirement into the one of majority. That was resisted. Though it would not have changed the power structure significantly.

In the eight representatives situation, Serbs were assured between two and four votes (one from Serbia, one from Vojvodina, one from Bosnia and Herzegovina every third term and one from Croatia every now and then). Montenegrins had one vote also (though they would be insignificant as coalition partners in the ethnic representation). Thus, most of the times, Serbia could control half of the eight votes,

and some of the times even a simple majority (especially if they could secure the vote of the Macedonians). With the reduction of the number to six, nothing would change (one from Vojvodina and one from Kosovo out). They could even get into a little worse position because they could not expect to get a Serb to represent Croatia in that case. They would be left with one sure vote, one probable vote, and an extra vote some of the times. Thus, two-third of the times they could not hope to have majority even with the help of the Macedonians or some other coalition partners.

Because of that, once they took over Kosovo and Vojvodina, they changed their demands, asking only for majority and not for the reduction of the number of representatives. Thus, they were represented by tree votes plus the Montenegrin one. Still, the majority depended on the vote from Bosnia and Herzegovina. A Serb represented that republic at the crucial moment, but he did not vote with the Serbs when the crucial vote on the introduction of the army supported dictatorship was taken in the winter of 1991.

Thus, as I have repeatedly stressed, the Serbian quest for majority in Yugoslavia was really an illusionary one. Thus, the insistence on unanimity by the other Yugoslav states cannot be explained by the fear from Serbian domination, at least not decisively.

(iii) *Democratic*

Assume a multi-party federal elections were to be held. From the actual political developments, it can be inferred that outside of Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, mainly national parties would form (it is not necessary that one party would represent one nation). Depending on the electoral system, the distribution of power would either approximate the one given by the ethnic distribution, or would end up being worse for the Serbs. The plurality system would give worse results for Serbs in Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo, and most probably in Bosnia and Herzegovina too (depending on the way the districts were to be delineated). The reason is that in Croatia the majority of the Serbs live in the towns and are thus a minority. In Macedonia they live in mixed communities and are also mainly a



minority. In Kosovo they could get maybe a seat or two. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, again, they are in many places in the minority. On the other hand, Albanian and Hungarian minorities in Serbia live on rather compact ethnic territories, so the plurality system should work in their favor.

(iv) *Real*

There are two interesting cases: under growing *anarchy* and under free trade.

First, the growing *anarchy* case. If a state starts dissolving, the fundamental power distribution becomes of paramount importance. That is, the ethnic distribution, the control of the army and of the security forces, as well as of the money supply, becomes decisive. The distribution of real power (as opposed to the political power analyzed above) was favorable to the Serbs. They are by far the largest Yugoslav nation. They controlled the army and the security forces and they were in a position to take over the monetary power. Therefore, if their national interest was separatist, force is the most efficient instrument.

Second, the free trade case. Assume that a federation uses the unanimity as the decision rule. The unresolved issues can be left to a process called liberalization. For instance, if there can be no agreement on the monetary policy, privatization of the money supply can be attempted. Also, if there is no agreement on the customs policy, liberalization of foreign trade could be relied on. In that manner all the unresolved issues can be put on the market so to speak. How would the ensuing power structure look like? There was a heated debate in Yugoslavia about the meaning of the Yugoslav market. The official definition was that Yugoslavia is a unified market. The opposition favored the common market. Nobody favored the free market.

The official version favored centralization. The opposition favored an increase in internal protectionism. The free market was rejected because the consequences were unpredictable overall, but would have been predictably bad for some very concrete industries. However, the economic structure of different regions being almost the same,

the subsidization of different regions being high almost to the same degree, and the change of the terms of trade under the introduction of free trade not being more favorable for any particular region than to another, the largest economy should in the long run be better off under liberalization than the smaller one. Therefore, the short term advantages of liberalization might not have been obvious, but in the long run Serbia had nothing to fear from it.

In that sense, the choice Serbia made can be seen as an outcome of a time inconsistency in the distribution of power. In the short term, its advantage was clearly in its greater military might; in the longer run the liberalization policy would have given it even better results. They took their chances with the short run.



APPENDIX V

Out of the trap

1. The view of the reform process as succeeding through failure that I use in chapter 3 is just an interpretation of an evolutionary development through trial and error. It goes against the Schumpeterian theory of every failure leading to a move away from liberalism. The reformist way out of socialism is indeed premised on the Schumpeterian trap not existing.

The Schumpeterian trap is a constantly worsening position an economy gets in after a series of institutional or policy failures. Assume an industry fails and the state takes care of the debts and the employees. That, being a burden on the economy, will contribute to some other failure in the economy, state again taking over. If the state tries to solve the growing problem by new comprehensive regulation, through reform that is, the problems will multiply, inviting even more state regulation. The greater the failure, the greater the public commitment. Therefore, an economy inevitably slides into a trap and has no incentives to ever come out.

The process is premised on a closed economy with no budget constraint. In an open economy, the process does not work, except in a sense of an ever growing protectionism. However, even a closed economy must have a budget constraint. Once it starts to bind, the state will attempt reforms that will redress some of the burdens. In the beginning, the reforms are bound to be partial: it is a discovery process. The goals as well as a way out of the trap have to be found. It is to be noted, though, that once a reform, however insignificant, becomes necessary, the failure can only reinforce the reasons for another more ambitious attempt. Therefore, the more radical the reforms become, additional, even more radical ones, become necessary. In the end, a reform that means a definitive rejection of the existing system becomes unavoidable. This is an

evolutionary way out of the Schumpeterian trap. The process is strengthened in a federal state because the budget constraint will be felt earlier both because the demands will be higher and the rivalry of the states will work for fester liberalization. That was the case in Yugoslavia. Indeed, Schumpeter was doubly wrong. It turns out that a slide into socialism is impossible; socialism requires a revolution. On the other hand, a crawl out of socialism seems unavoidable, a revolution being most probably infeasible as well as too risky. The problem with the reformist exit from socialism is the one Schumpeter identified as the initial demand for socialism. If there is a failure, the state is turned to as the final underwriter, as it were. However, once a state cannot take up new obligations or has to repudiate some of the existing obligations, the legitimacy problem arises. In a multi-national state that may be a powerful incentive for secessionist movements gaining strength. Therefore, Schumpeter, I think, identified correctly the root cause of the difficulties with the reform process. It is not economic, as socialism is neither inevitable nor viable from an economic point of view. It is political, and it has to do with the sense of injustice.

2. Yugoslavia is a typical example. The socialist economic development had two main characteristics: the succession of reform attempts, all more or less a mixture of market liberalization and state regulation, and low economic efficiency. In comparison to the other socialist economies, Yugoslavia was unique in not relying on central planning but on a combination of market and decentralized state controls (the so-called self-management system). On the other hand, the efficiency of the self-managed Yugoslav economy was half of that of comparable Southern European mixed economies (like Greece, Turkey, Spain and Portugal).¹⁴⁹ Significantly, the efficiency was perceived as coming from market influences and from decentralization, while the low level of it was attributed to the ideological and political obstacles. Thus, though every reform attempt was met with stiff resistance, every reform failure was seen as another proof that markets and entrepreneurship should be freed of state interferences.

149 See Bajt [1990].



The powerful incentive to both the perception of reforms and to their general direction was the heavy reliance of Yugoslavia on foreign trade, foreign tourism and foreign credits and assistance. As a matter of fact, the changes in the international economic position of Yugoslavia explain pretty well the cycles of the reform attempts. The first reforms were introduced after the break with The Soviet Union (the break came in 1948, the reforms started in 1949). They gave good results generally. Yugoslavia's growth rates were quite high, though the efficiency of investment was not satisfactory. The second round of reforms was introduced after Yugoslavia had to face a significant change in the aid and credit terms in its relations with the West. The reforms of the sixties opened up the problem of socialism in Yugoslavia as well as the problem of Yugoslavia as a state. The pro-market changes brought some irreversible changes to Yugoslav economic institutions (the introduction of the commercial banking system, the liberalization of foreign trade, the complete abandonment of central planning, the greater independence of the managers etc.). It is the only period when the general efficiency of the economy went significantly up. However, the political as well as national problems surfaced also, with the 1968 demonstrations in Belgrade and later that year in Kosovo and with the nationalist movements in Slovenia and Croatia. The economic reforms had to be discontinued (though the institutional changes were not reversed), for political conflicts to calm down. Finally, the series of reforms in the eighties followed the collapse in the Yugoslav balance of payments. These reforms ended with an ambitious attempt in December 1989 to find a reformist way out of socialism. The program was the same as that introduced somewhat later in Poland. The stabilization part of the reform was successful. In three months the hyperinflation of 100% per month went down to zero. The foreign currency reserves went up dramatically while the production experienced at first a small but eventually quite a significant fall. By Jun 1990, it was all over, though the attempts to keep the reform alive dragged on till the end of the year.

What were the achievements of the final reform effort? Besides those already mentioned, the following:

It became obvious that a reform is possible.

It was realized that privatization was necessary.

The weaknesses and the strengths of both the economy and the political system became apparent.

The necessity of the democratic legitimization of the transformation was recognized.

In effect, all that was needed was the will to do what became possible. It never formed. The Yugoslav nations decided that they wanted to use the economic possibilities and the political liberties to achieve their long-term national goals: creation of their ethnic states. Thus, instead of getting out of the socialist trap, they went into the trap of civil war. In retrospect, the failures of the early reform attempts were fruitful, while the success of the final reforms was quite unfortunate, especially in respect of bringing in a substantial amount of foreign money, that proved to be helpful to the parties preparing for civil war.



APPENDIX VI

The economics of break-up

The economic justification of secessionism can take many forms. I will discuss only the following:

1. *The economic sovereignty argument.* The argument is theoretically spurious for a small open economy. Monetary sovereignty, whatever that means, is besides the point, as there are few if any monetary sovereign states in Europe. The fiscal sovereignty is not an unmixed blessing, but in Yugoslavia the states were fiscally sovereign to a very large degree already. The economic policy sovereignty is an important thing for economies in transformation. However, Yugoslavia was transforming faster than most of the newly independent states either intended to or were able to. Therefore, I think that there is no bases in actual facts for this argument.
2. *The public burden argument.* This argument works in part for Slovenia only. As Slovenia was the most developed state in Yugoslavia, it contributed proportionately more than the other states to the federal budget. All the other states were in a different position. However, the federal budget meant the Yugoslav army, everything else being left to the state finances. Apart from that, there was a development fund, that transferred money from the more developed to the less developed states. It was abolished in the last stages of the existence of Yugoslavia. Therefore, the public burden argument rests on the costs of the Yugoslav army. It is yet to be calculated whether the transformation of Yugoslavia into a peaceful and democratic state would have required more or less to be spent on security than it is the case with the independent states now, including Slovenia. If only the change in the fundamentals (the collapse of communism; the long term Balkan hostilities) are considered and if there is anything in the

economy of scale argument, I would guess that the public burden of all the newly independent states, Slovenia included, are going to be significantly higher than they would have been had Yugoslavia's reform succeeded.

However, excluding Slovenia and Macedonia, the military burdens alone of Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are much higher than they used to be, however one calculates them.

3. *The terms-of-trade argument.* It is often argued that the Western Yugoslav states chose secession because they expected favorable changes in the terms of trade with the West. Whether or not the expectations were there, they were unfounded. All of the ex-Yugoslav republics face worsened terms-of-trade. Excluding Slovenia that is a debatable case (though there is no doubt as to the losses it suffered due to the shifts in trade), every other state has suffered where it really hurts. Croatia in the tourist industry; Bosnia and Herzegovina in everything; Serbia in everything, due to the war economy and the sanctions; Macedonia in everything, due to the sanctions and the economic blockade from Greece; Montenegro in tourism and industry.

4. *The new economic integration argument.* The hope might have been that the newly independent states will join the European Community faster than the former Yugoslavia. This is wrong both as a supposed motivation and as a fact. Yugoslavia was promised a membership in the Community, none of the newly independent republics are anywhere near that (also, and more importantly, Yugoslavia was at the forefront of the ex-communist countries, which is not the case even of Slovenia now). That was known and could have been anticipated, therefore the opposite could not have politically motivated.

In fact, Slovenia is the only state approaching the agreement with the European Community that Yugoslavia had already had for many years. Other states are not even in line for consideration.



APPENDIX VII

The costs

It is almost impossible to calculate the costs of the break-up of Yugoslavia due to lack of quantitative data. I will just give a rough picture.

The most developed state in former Yugoslavia was Slovenia. In terms of production and welfare, it has gone down roughly to where it was in the early seventies. It is an incomparably larger fall than that of the other Central European post-communist economies. As it was not involved in the war significantly and as it was not in a worse position than Hungary or Poland, the fall must be largely attributed to the break-up with Yugoslavia.

Croatia is in a much worse position. That is an especially deep fall, because Croatia has comparative advantages other states lack. Its tourist industry has been crippled so severely and in such a way that it will take Croatia some time to get that industry to a level it enjoyed in ex-Yugoslavia. But Croatian economy as a whole faces hard times.

Serbia has been retarded by several decades. Bosnia and Herzegovina has no economy to speak of. Macedonia has been on the verge of economic collapse because of the sanctions imposed on Serbia, its traditionally most important trading partner, and because of the disputes with Greece its potentially most important economic partner.

In terms of wealth and incomes, the costs can be assessed thus.

The average wage in Slovenia before the break-up was significantly higher than it is now (about 600 German marks). I do not have a clear idea of the values of the enterprises and of the real estate.

In Croatia, I have no clear idea of the average wage rate (the sometimes reported figure is 100 German marks), but the real estate prices have gone down dramatically. The value of the land and the houses in towns and on the coast was generally very high. A house

that was worth couple of millions of German marks has a value of zero throughout the Dalmatian coast. Croatia as a whole faces a long-term process of post-war reconstruction.

The same is the case with the real estate values on the Montenegrin coast. Belgrade is also a very bad case. Though it has stayed out of the war, the prices of the apartments as well as of business space have gone down dramatically. The value of the enterprises is nonexistent really.

Therefore, the income and wealth effects of the break-up of Yugoslavia in every part of it are basically negative and very significant.

The rates of inflation are significantly higher than they used to be in Yugoslavia, except at the single time before the introduction of the 1989 reforms when they were in hyperinflationary levels. The Slovenian inflation was running at about 100% a year before it stabilized. The inflation rate in Croatia has often reached hyperinflationary levels. In Serbia and Montenegro the world record in hyperinflation was broken at the end of 1993. In Macedonia a new currency was introduced, but the previous one was quite inflationary.

The unemployment rates are also uniformly higher, ranging from about 13% in Slovenia (that had virtually full employment for years) to 60% in Serbia and even higher percentages for Kosovo and Montenegro. The case of Macedonia should not be as bad as all that, but it is bound to get worse.

Another high cost is in terms of skill and brain-drain. Slovenia is again an exception. A lot of young people as well as professionals have left Croatia, for military, political and economic reasons. For the same set of reasons, Serbia has been drained at an exceptionally high rate. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a disaster in this respect as in everything else.

Altogether very high costs indeed. And this is without calculating the costs of the destruction and of the demographic changes. It is as violent and as destructive a break-up of a state and its every part as they come. And it is far from over yet.



APPENDIX VIII

Agents without principals

The way I see it, the argument from economic gains of self-determination does not work. Yugoslavia dissolved for political reasons. I want to make one point about the politics of economic sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro and another about the international involvement in general.

1. In a recent article,¹⁵⁰ it is argued that selective sanctions are more effective than the general sanctions, like the ones imposed on Serbia. The argument is in line with a usual economic policy reasoning (the Tinbergen rule says that for every target there should be at least one instrument, general targets and instruments are excluded). This I believe to be wrong in cases where the target is the defeat of a war economy. In that case, sanctions are substitutes, temporal or permanent, for military confrontation (Cuba is the case in point). Therefore, political aims are such that nothing but the general regime of sanctions would do. The aims of the sanctions are not to make a certain state behave. The ultimate aim of the general sanctions is to permanently change the character of the state by excluding it as completely as possible from the international community. In the meantime, it is supposed to have a deterrence effect, it is hoped that it will not spread its influence.

In the case of Serbia, it is questionable how effective the sanctions were and might still prove to be. The international strategy of Serbia was premised on Russia transforming in such a way as to support Serbia to play a strategic role in the Balkans (it was almost the opposite of the part Yugoslavia aimed to play after the break-up with The Soviet Union in 1948). At the moment, Russian support is muted, as Russia is still uncertain as to what its wants to do. If the nationalists

150 Eaton, Engers [1992].

eventually win in Russia, which is strategically quite possible, the sanctions will have had adverse political effects. The long term effects depend on the process of modernization anyhow. The problem of these ever tightening sanctions is that they are a substitute for the use of force, can deliver desired results only in the long run, and are not an instrument of positive political influence in the short run.

2. It is interesting to consider in this context the international involvement in general. It has been disastrous almost from the very beginning. There was lack of understanding, interest, and principles. They produced a lack of will. Without going into details, I will just comment on the meaning of the Vance-Owen plan and its derivations. The aim of the peace plan was to arrive at an agreement. It turned into an added justification of ethnic cleansing and into an unsuccessful instrument of punishment.

The first outcome was a consequence of the plan accepting the principle of ethnic partition of a country that cannot be ethnically partitioned without huge demographic changes. Not only an exchange of population is necessary, but there is no solution to the problem of the ethnically mixed families, which may very well be the plurality families in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The plan was premised on the Muslims having no choice than to accept it, while the Serbs and Croats should be satisfied because it met their main political demands (ethnic separation). However, it included an element of punishment for the Serbs, by denying them what they really wanted and that is an integral Serbian region in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aim was to induce the Muslims and the Croats to sign the plan and to prevent the Serbs from achieving their strategic goals.

The plan could have been immediately signed by all the parties, had it been backed by military force. But had it been, it would not have been necessary in the first place, because a better solution could have been imposed. Worst of all, it was subject to negotiation. Therefore, the fighting intensified, as everybody tried to better their respective bargaining positions. Once it became obvious that the threat the plan posed to the Serbs was a bluff, it added a further incentive for them



to work for their strategic goal. And when it became probable that the plan could be abandoned, without any adequate response by the principle sponsors of the plan, the so-called international community, the civil war erupted anew with an even greater force and involving all the three parties.

The case illustrates a general problem. International community is represented by agencies and agents and even pursues policies (the one of sanctions, for instance), though it is not a principal in the usual political sense. The mediators like Mr. Vance and Lord Owen as well as the UN troops act as agents without a principal. This puts them in an awkward position. When cease-fire is to be observed, they are there to help and monitor, but not to impose. But the really ambiguous position is the one of peace negotiators. If they were entrusted only to aid the parties in conflict, that would be a rather clear mandate. However, they tried to impose the principles and to represent the interests of the international community, which is their nominal principal, but as the interests and the principles are lacking, there are no principals to back these agents. Therefore, they become targets of criticism by everybody and of general dissatisfaction. Consequently, they are often of no help, and sometimes their otherwise good intentions turn out to have negative effects (as the case of the Vance-Owen plan illustrates).

APPENDIX IX

Sources

The sources from former Yugoslavia are difficult to use at this point. Most of the quantitative information is less than transparent, because the data is difficult to collect. The widely used 1991 census figures are partly an estimate (the Albanians boycotted them, but there were problems in other places also). The figures on displaced persons as well as on the other current changes vary depending on the source. The UN sources and the Serbian sources, for instance, give different estimates.

The best quantitative and other information is to be found in two Belgrade weeklies, "Vreme" and "Ekonomска политика". Other newspapers are much less reliable to a smaller or greater degree. Slovenia is an exception where the newspapers are generally informative. The Macedonian newspapers are also generally more reliable. The weekly "Ekonomска политика" is the only place where quantitative data on all the former Yugoslavia states can be regularly found.

There are a number of good theoretical works on the Yugoslav self-management system (see Lydall [1984] and [1989]). The best source is the journal "Economic Analysis" that comes out in Belgrade. The best overall defence of the system is in Bajt [1990]. A rather different defence can be found in Horvat [1984]. The best succinct criticism is in Pejovich [1992]. A good analysis of the system introduced in the seventies is in Tyson [1979].

The political and historical works are less satisfactory. Of historical works in English Banac [1984] is generally reliable and informative. Of the recent works that I have seen Djilas [1991] is useful and Cvijic [1991] is informative as a general overview, but a simplification. Schophlin [1992] is good as a first reading. Gard [1992] is an ambitious



undertaking, and though hotly disputed in Belgrade, it is generally informative. On the other hand, Finkilkraut [1992] is interesting as a personal statement, but not to be relied on.

The best treatment of the history of the break-up of Yugoslavia by far is Glenny [1993]. As the book covers the period that I have been observing rather closely myself, I can testify to its exceptionally high quality. A well written and interesting is the article by Banac [1992]. Widely referred to is Magas [1993]. A very good article on the history of Slovenia's quest for independence is in Vodopivec [1992]. A useful article on Macedonian history is by Nystrom [1992]. But I am sure that there will be a flood of papers and books on the subject soon (see Hayeden [1992] for a recent and interesting study).

An introductory study of Slovenia's economic policy after independence is in Chetkovich and Chetkovich [1992] and in Mencinger [1993]. A more thorough and recent study is Cvirk *et al.* [1993]. A first attempt to study the Macedonian economy is in Wyzen [1993]. There is nothing comparable that I know on either Croatia or Serbia; however, see Madzar [1993]. This is indeed regrettable as they represent interesting cases of war economies. The best place to start to study the economics of the break-up of Yugoslavia is the recent issue of *Communist Economies and Economic Transformation* 5 [1993].

There are increasing number of places where the plight of Bosnia and Herzegovina is described. But there is no overall study that I know of. Rupnik [1993] is informative.

For some sort of a background Rebecca West's book is a classic [1944]. However, the Yugoslav literature is a very rich and important source of information on how the historical, ethnic and political problems in the Yugoslav areas were perceived. The novels are the best place to start. The works of Andric, Krleza, Crnjanski, Selimovic as well as Kis are translated in all the major languages and should be consulted.

As I have made clear in several places in the book, I rely especially on the work of the leading Serbian intellectual and legal theorist Slobodan Jovanovic.